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The  great  difficulty  which  deaf  children  have  in  leaming  to  read  is  well  documented. 
Previous  studies  have  examined  such  aspects  as  problems  with  vocabulary  and  syntax 
but  little  work  has  been  directed  towards  inferential  and  discourse  skills.  The  present 
series  of  studies  examines  the  inferencino  skills  of  severely  and  profoundly  deaf 
adolescents. 
Different  types  of  inference  were  examined  using  a  variety  of  experimental  techniques, 
ranging  from  on-line  reading  times,  through  memory  probes  after  reading,  to  tracking 
the  movements  of  subjects'  eyes  as  they  read.  The  deaf  were  found  to  be  poorer  at 
drawing  inferences  than  hearing  children  matched  on  reading  age,  although  they  can 
recall  as  much  detail  from  those  texts  in  which  they  do  infer  correctly  as  the  controls. 
The  deaf  were  as  successful  as  the  reading  age  matched  controls  for  material  which 
required  spatial  inferences  but  not  for  more  abstract  temporal  and  causal  inferences. 
On-line  studies  suggested  that  the  deaf,  when  drawing  inferences,  use  a  schemata, 
concept  driven  mechanism  similar  to  hearing  peers  approximately  matched  for 
chronolooical  a(ye.  A  similar  mechanism  would  seem  to  be  operating  when  material  is 
presented  in  the  form  of  sign  language.  Thus  many  of  the  difficulties  previously 
ascribed  to  deaf  children's  reading  skills  may  in  fact  derive  from  more  general 
language  problems.  It  is  suggested  that  these  difficulties  with  inferencing  are  0b  00 
independent  of  modality  of  presentation  and  perhaps  reflect  a  more  impoverished 
experiential  background  for  most  deaf  children.  The  comparative  richness  of  scenarios 
for  deaf  and  hearing  children  are  then  investigated. 
0 
A  final  study  examined  the  eye  movements  of  deaf  and  hearing  children  as  they  read. 
The  findings  confirmed  that  both  groups  do  make  inferences  on-line  but  that  these 
inferences  take  a  small  but  finite  time  to  generate.  Their  performance  is  compared  to 
evidence  from  studies  with  adults  and  a  scenario  driven,  situational  model  is 
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xi Chapter  One 
Reading  and  deaf  children:  A  review  of  the  literature 
Reading  is  a  basic  skill  central  to  any  child's  education.  It  is  the  gateway  to  all  other 
forms  and  s6urces  of  knowledge.  For  the  deaf  child,  it  is  a  particularly  difficult  skill  to 
acquire.  Despite  centuries  of  diligent  effort  by  teachers,  the  sad  fact  remains  that  the 
typical  deaf  child  cannot  read  as  well  as  the  typical  hearing  chili. 
1.1  Achievement  Levels 
Over  the  years  many  studies  have  shown  the  very  poor  achievement  levels  of  severely 
and  profoundly  deaf  students,  eg  DiFrancesca  (1972)  in  the  USA  and  Conrad  (1977) 
in  England  and  Wales.  A  typical  16  year  old  deaf  student  is  found  to  be  reading  at  the 
8.5  to  9  year  level  using  standard  tests  of  reading.  There  also  seems  to  be  a  levelling 
off  in  attainment  between  the  ages  of  11-16  years,  a  "plateau"  effect  (Brooks,  1978; 
Reich  &  Reich,  1974).  Furth  (1966)  analysing  data  obtained  by  Wrightstone,  Aronow 
and  Moskowitz  (1963)  showed  that  for  deaf  children,  their  average  reading  age  scores 
increased  by  less  than  one  year  between  the  ages  of  10-11  and  15-16  years.  These 
findings  are  supported  in  a  later  study  by  DiFrancesca  (1972)  who  calculated  an 
average  growth  in  reading  achievement  age  of  0.2  years  per  yqar  of  schooling. 
Harnmermeister  (1971)  showed  that  7  to  13  years  after  leaving  school  there  was  a 
significant  improvement  in  word  meaning  (ie  vocabulary)  but  not  in  paragraph  (ie 
connected  language)  meaning  for  deaf  subjects. 
-1- 1.2  Vocabulary 
Numerous  authors,  eg  Fusaro  &  Slike  (1979),  Kyle  (1980b),  Hatcher  &  Robbins 
(1978),  and  Gris  wold  &  Cummings  (1974),  who  have  examined  vocabulary 
development  in  the  deaf,  have  confirmed  that  deaf  students  of  all  ages  can  comprehend 
from  print  substantially  fewer  words  than  hearing  students  and  that  the  distribution  of 
types  of  words,  such  as  nouns  and  verbs,  is  different  between  the  two  groups.  Paul 
(1984)  examined  the  performance  of  deaf  and  hearing  subjects  on  a  picture  vocabulary 
test  with  a  multiple-choice  response  section.  Some  items  required  only  one  correct 
response  while  other  multimeaning  words  required  two  responses.  Paul  found  that  the 
hearing  subjects  performed  better  than  the  deaf  5ubjects  on  selecting  two  meanings  for 
the  words.  In  addition,  they  outperformed  the  deaf  subjects,  on  selecting  at  least  one 
meaning  for  the  same  words.  For  both  groups,  however,  knowing  two  meanings  was 
more  difficult  than  knowing  only  a  single  meaning.  Also  the  subjects  chose  the 
primary,  or more  common  meanings,  more  often  than  the  secondary  meanings.  Paul 
concludes  that  both  deaf  and  hearing  subjects  have  difficulty  with  the  notion  that  a 
word  may  have  several  meanings,  and  not  being  aware  of  the  most  common  meanings 
of  words  appearing  frequently  in  print  may  contribute  to  reading  comprehension 
problems  in  the  deaf.  Paul  (1984)  reported  that  deaf  children,  as  well  as  knowing  only 
the  most  common  meanings  of  multi-meaning  words,  cannot  use  the  available  context 
clues  to  help  derive  word  meanings. 
Some  of  these  studies  have  attempted  to  isolate  various  factors  that  influence 
vocabulary  development  in  deaf  children.  For  example,  Hatcher  &  Robbins  (1978) 
found  that  deaf  children  they  studied  had  somehow  developed  vocabulary  and  reading 
skills  beyond  the  level  expected  from  their  knowledge  of  primary  word  analysis  skills, 
if  indeed  phonic  skills  are  essential  prerequisites  for  reading.  Kyle  (1980)  looked  at 
the  development  of  basic  perceptual  processes  such  as  letter  identification, 
discriminating  and  matching  letter  shapes,  and  the  ability  to  associate  words  and 
pictures  together.  Over  a3  year  period  these  skills  showed  no  developmental 
difference  in  deaf  and  hearing  children  between  about  7  and  11  years  of  age. 
-2- A  more  recent  study  by  Laybaert  &  Alegria  (1993)  used  the  Stroop  technique  to  study 
word  processing  in  deaf  children.  This  technique  (Stroop,  1935)  measures  response 
times  to  words  printed  in  different  coloured  ink.  Children  have  to  name  the  colour  of 
the  ink  but  access  to  the  word  meaning  interferes  with  this  process,  causing  an 
increase  in-response  time.  Leybaert  &  Alegria,  using  both  verbal  and  manual 
responses,  found  that  access  to  orthographic,  semantic  and  even  phonological 
information  can  occur  automatically  when  deaf  children  read. 
In  other  words,  simply  examining  the  "bottom-up"  processes  such  as  ability  to  learn 
sight  vocabulary  shows  little  difference  between  young  deaf  and  hearing  children.  The 
deaf  child's  reading  problems  begin  as  soon  as  an  attempt  is  made  tq  understand  more 
complex  text.  Webster  (1986)  states  that  reading  tests  up  to  about  the  8.5  year  range 
tap  such  low-level  skills  as  word  recognition  but  beyond  this  point  require  more 
complex  skills  and  this  accounts  for  the  plateau  effect. 
Dodd  &  Hermelin  (1977)  and  Dodd  (1980)  have  suggested  that  deaf  children  can  use 
phonological  information  acquired  through  lipreading  in  spelling  tasks  (and  possibly 
also  in  reading)  although  they  tend  to  prefer  to  use  visual  information.  Moores  (1967) 
compared  the  performance  using  the  cloze  procedure  of  a  group  of  deaf  students  with 
a  group  of  hearing  students,  matched  for  reading  age.  Students  had  to  replace  words 
deleted  from  the  text.  Using  methods  constructed  to  indicate  how  well  the  subjects 
used  vocabulary  and  syntax  in  this  procedure,  Moores  found  the  deaf  to  be 
significantly  deficient  in  their  vocabulary  and  syntax  compared  with  the  hearing  group. 
O'Neill  (1973)  confirmed  Moores'  conclusions  in  a  study  of  deaf  and  hearing 
children's  knowledge  of  phrase  structure.  She  found  deaf  children  to  be  significantly 
less  able  to  judge  correctly  the  grammaticality  of  pairs  of  grammatical  and 
ungrammatical  sentences,  even  although  both  groups  were  matched  on  reading 
achievement  levels.  Moores'  and  O'Neill's  studies  both  indicate  that  standard  reading 
tests  may  give  spuriously  high  estimates  of  reading  levels  in  the  deaf  population. 
Wood  (1984b)  noted  that  the  deaf  have  difficulty  with  "diectic"  functional  words,  for 
example,  pronouns  referring  to  elements  mentioned  earlier  in  the  text.  He  quotes  Clark 
-3- (1978)  on  how  the  use  of  such  a  class  of  words  develops  in  the  hearing  child  over 
time,  and  states  that  he  believes  that  the  problems  experienced  by  the  deaf  are  due  to 
their  relative  lack  of  adequate  experience  in  using  such  words  in  meaningful  situations. 
Wood  argues  that  comprehension  relies  upon  the  qomplex  relationship  between  words 
and  the  systematic  ways  in  which  their  meanings  change,  and  that  deaf  children, 
because  of  their  lack  of  good  auditory  memory  for  sequences  of  words,  are  denied 
access  to  or  adequate  experience  of  such  situations.  Unlike  "concrete"  words  which 
can  be  exemplified  by  pointing,  "function"  words  can  only  be  mastered  by 
appreciating  the  place  they  occupy  in  connected  text. 
In  summary,  when  lower  level  skills  are  considered,  there  is  no  difference  between 
deaf  and  hearing  children  in  their  perceptual  discrimination  skills,  letter  discrimination 
and  ability  to  learn  sight  vocabulary.  However,  the  deaf  have  narrower  vocabularies; 
they  understand  fewer  words,  and  for  words  with  more'than  one  meaning,  they 
usually  only  know  the  more  common  meanings. 
1.3  Syntax 
Another  critical  component  of  effective  readers  is  the  ability  to  use  syntax  in  written 
text.  Several  researchers  have  examined  the  syntactic  structures  used  by  deaf  readers, 
their  approaches  usually  being  influenced  by  the  prevalent  linguistic  theories  of  the 
time.  The  earliest  attempts  followed  the  lines  of  traditional  grammar  (counting  the 
number  of  nouns/verbs  etc  used),  followed  by  several  studies  which  used  Chomsky's 
(1957,1965,1976)  transformational  generative  grammar  and  generative  semantics 
(Chafe,  1970;  Fillmore,  1968:  McCawley,  1968)  Probably  the  most  comprehensive 
examination  of  how  the  deaf  understand  and  use  standard  English  syntax  was  carried 
out  by  Quigley  and  his  associates  eg  Quigley,  Wilbur  &  Montanelli  (1974),  Quigley, 
Power  &  Steinkamp  (1977),  and  Quigley,  Smith  &  Wilbur  (1974).  A  summary  of  the 
differences  between  the  deaf  and  hearing  populations  is  tabulated  in  Table  1.1.  It  can 
be  seen  from  this  table  that  the  average  8  year  old  hearing  student  scores  higher  on  the 
various  tasks  than  the  average  18  year  old  deaf  student.  It  can  also  be  seen  that  various 
-4- syntactic  structures  typically  appear  in  a  standard  school  reading  series  at  an  age  level 
long  before  the  deaf  students  can  comprehend  them.  This  would  indicate  a  serious 
reading  problem  based  on  syntax  alone.  When  the  typical  vocabulary,  conceptual  and 
experiential.  problems  of  deaf  students  are  added,  it  can  be  easily  seen  how  such 
commonly  used  reading  materials  might  present  serious  difficulties  for  many  deaf 
students. 
TABLE  1.1 
Performance  of  deaf  and  hearing  subjects  on  various  syntactic 
structures.  Quigley  et  al,  1976.  (Percentage  of  each  group  who 
have  mastered  each  construction). 
Deaf  Students  Hearinq  Students 
Averaged  Age  Age  Averaged 
Structure  over  all  ages  10  18  over  all  ages 
Negation  76%  570/6  83%  900/0 
Conjunction  73  57  86  92 
Question  66  46  78  98 
formation 
Pronouns  60  39  78  90 
Verbs  58  53  71  79 
Relativization  54  46  63  82 
-5- For  example,  Robbins  &  Hatcher  (1981)  found  that  controlling  for  word  recognition 
and  training  in  word  meaning  did  not  improve  performance  in  reading  single  sentences 
containing  various  syntactic  structures  for  deaf  children  aged  9-12  years.  They  found 
passive  voice  sentences  most  difficult  to  comprehend,  followed  by  relative  clauses, 
conjunctions,  pronominalisation  and  indirect  objects,  a  pattern  similar  to  that  in  Table 
1.  Some  studies  (eg  Gormley  &  Franzen,  1978)  have  shown  that  deaf  students  seem 
to  comprehend  syntactic  structures  more  easily  in  connected  discourse  than  in  single 
sentences.  This  will  be  covered  later  when  we  discuss  discourse  more  fully. 
Wood  (1984),  Webster  (1986),  and  King  &  Quigley  (1985)  among  others  have  noted 
also  the  rather  rigid  and  simplified  structures 
, 
ývhich  the  deaf  tend  to  produce  in  their 
writing  and  interpret/misinterpret  in  their  reading,  such  as  the  Subject-Verb-Object  and 
the  Minimal  Distance  Principal,  which  reflect  these  difficulties  in  syntax.  For  example, 
when  given  the  two  sentences,  "The  boy  kissed  the  girl"  and  "The  boy  ran  away", 
most  deaf  students  understand  them,  but  when  one  sentence  is  embedded  in  another  to 
form  the  relativised  sentence,  "The  boy  who  kissed  the  girl  ran  away",  most  deaf 
students  (even  those  aged  18)  thought  it  was  the  girl  and  not  the  boy  who  ran  away. 
[An  example  of  the  Minimum  Distance  Principal].  Similarly,  "The  boy  was  helped  by 
the  girl"  is  ipterpreted  as  "The  boy  helped  the  girl".  [An  example  of  Subject-Vcrb- 
Object].  Webster  (1986)  believes  that  the  deaf  do  make  slow  but  consistent  progress 
over  time,  which  runs  contrary  to  the  idea  that  deaf  children's  reading  ability  and 
general  language  development  plateaus  out. 
In  short,  the  deaf  experience  great  difficulty  with  normal  English  syntax.  Passive 
constructions,  relative  clauses,  pronominal  isation,  and  ellipsis  cause  the  greatest 
difficulty.  This  is  reflected  in  how  the  deaf  (mis)interpret  text  and  also  in  the  rather 
rigid  constructions  used  in  their  written  output. 
-6- 1.4  Reading  tests 
Given  the  differences  noted  above,  the  question  arises  as  to  the  design  and 
construction  of  the  various  tests  which  have  been  used  to  assess  the  reading  standards 
of  deaf  children. 
Webster  (1986)  questions  the  validity  of  using  reading  tests  with  the  deaf  which  have 
been  standardised  on  a  hearing  population.  He  argues  that  if  one  accepts  Kyle's 
contention  that  there  is  no  difference  in  intelligence  between  deaf  and  hearing 
populations,  then  a  deaf  16  year  old  will  be  much  more  sophisticated,  emotionally, 
physically,  and 
* 
conceptually  than  a9  year  old  hearing  child  and  therefore  comparisons 
between  these  two  populations  on  the  grounds  that  they  have  similar  reading  ages  on  a 
standardised  test  is  really  meaningless.  Webster  et  al  (1981)  replicated  Conrad's 
(1979)  work,  using  the  Widespan  Reading  Test  (Brimer,  1972).  They  compared  deaf 
and  hearing  children  matched  on  their  reading  ages,  but  looked  at  errors  made  using 
Goodman's  (1969)  miscue  analysis.  In  the  Widespan  test  the  child  has  to  choose  one 
word  from  the  first  of  a  pair  of  sentences  to  complete  a  gap  in  the  second  sentence. 
According  to  Webster,  the  test  demands  certain  metalinguistic  skills,  "a  reflective  or 
explicit  awareness,  a  kind  of  disembedded  thinking".  An  example  of  the  type  of 
questions  asked  and  one  type  of  error  are  noted  below: 
"The  salt  of  the  earth  are  "Alongside  the  wardrobe 
the  hewers  of  wood  and  the  stood  a  tall  chest  of 
drawers  of  water" 
The  answer  expected  is,  of  course  "drawers"  but  the  deaf  tended  to  answer  with 
"wood".  Of  the  errors  made  by  the  hearing  children,  81%  were  "linguistic",  ie  a  word 
which  is  both  semantically  and  grammatically  appropriate,  but  incorrect  (as  above).  In 
other  words,  the  child  is  aware  of  some  the  linguistic  constraints,  although  he  gets  the 
item  wrong.  Non-linguistic  errors  were  those  responses  where  no  obvious  connection 
-7- could  be  found  between  the  meaning  or  structure  of  the  sentence  and  the  word  inserted 
into  it.  The  hearing  impaired  children  made  twice  as  many  errors  as  the  controls  and 
only  52%  of  these  showed  any  linguistic  strategy.  Those  children  who  achieved  the 
highest  reading  ages  in  both  groups  also  made  relatively  higher  proportions  of 
linguistic  errors  ihan  non-linguistic  errors.  Also  most  of  the  hearing  children  stopped 
the  test  at  their  ceilings  but  the  deaf  continued  well  beyond  theirs,  very  often  right  to 
the  end  of  the  test.  In  other  words  the  deaf  seem  to  have  no  sclf-monitoring  skills, 
which  according  to  Clay  (1977)  are  essential  in  the  development  of  reading  skills. 
Webster  interprets  this  as  perhaps  being  a  legacy  of  teaching  practice  itself,  the  often 
unwitting  expectation  of  a  passive,  unquestionipg  style  of  learning  from  the  deaf 
mentioned  earlier.  In  any  case  the  test  is  not  measuring  a  delayed  but  a  different 
process  in  the  deaf. 
In  another  experiment,  Wood,  Griffiths,  &  Webster  (1981)  tried  to  ascertain  if  the 
results  of 
& 
above  experiment  were  test  specific.  They  duplicated  Webster's 
procedures  using  the  Southgate  test  (1962)  which  requires  the  child  to  choose  one  of 
several  words  given  at  the  end  to  complete  each  sentence.  Again  they  found  that  the 
deaf  made  more  errors  than  the  hearing  children  (47%  versus  18%).  They  also  found 
that  the  deaf  do  not  self-monitor  and  continue  well  beyond  their  ceilings.  The  deaf  did 
not  seem  to  be  distracted  by  similar  looking  alternatives  in  the  choices.  But  most  deaf 
children  did  agree  on  their  choices  of  answer  albeit  incorrect.  For  exaýmple, 
"Birds  are  covered  with  .....  trees,  skirts,  sky,  nests,  feathers.  " 
"Ducks  can  .....  pond,  swim,  water,  farm,  sing.  " 
In  the  first  example,  the  correct  answer  is,  of  course,  "feathers"  but  deaf  children  tend 
to  choose  "nests".  For  the  second,  they  choose  "pond"  rather  than  "swim".  Therefore, 
the  deaf  seem  to  be  choosing  on  the  basis  of  word  association,  a  sense  of  which 
words  tend  to  appear  together  in  everyday  usage  and  experience.  In  other  words,  the 
deaf  are  keywording. 
.  8- In  another  study  by  Beggs  &  Breslaw  (1982),  deaf  and  hearing  children  were 
compared  on  the  Picture  Aided  Reading  Test  (Hamp,  1975).  Here  the  child  is  given  a 
printed  word  and  has  to  choose  the  correct  picture  from  four  possibles.  The  deaf 
identified  correctly  a  quite  different  subset  from  the  hearing  group;  they  got  some  of 
the  later,  more  difficult  items  correct  and  some  of  the  earlier,  eas*ier  items  wrong. 
There  was  also  agreement  among  the  deaf  in  their  (wrong)  choices.  By  giving  the 
series  of  pictures  only  to  another  group  of  hearing  children,  Beggs  and  Breslaw  found 
remarkable  agreement  in  their  choices  with  those  of  the  deaf.  Therefore,  the  deaf 
seemed  to  bý  choosing  on  the  basis  of  picture  "saliency",  ie  the  visual  appeal  of  the 
picture. 
The  above  findings  show  that  the  deaf  use  diff6rent  strategies  to  hearing  subjects  when 
performing  on  standardised  tests  of  reading.  Even  on.  tests  which  have  been 
specifically  designed  for  and  standardised  on  a  deaf  population,  deaf  subjects  use 
strategies  other  than  those  which  might  be  expected  to  be  taking-place  during  the 
normal  reading  process.  This,  of  course,  poses  the  question  of  what  exacting 
measured  by  such  standardised  tests? 
1.5  Phonological  Recoding:  Hearing  Subjects 
An  important  aspect  of  any  model  of  reading  is  how  the  visual  images  of  the  printed 
letters  are  converted  into  meaning.  What  cognitive  mechanisms  mediate  this  process? 
It  is  noticeably  to  most  fluent  readers  that  as  they  scan  over  a  text,  they  silently 
vocalise  in  their  head  what  they  are  reading. 
Several  researchers  have  used  electromyographic  techniques  (EMG)  to  measure  the 
muscular  activity  of  the  speech  organs  (lips,  tongue,  larynx,  throat  etc)  while  subjects 
are  reading.  For  example,  Edfeldt  (1960)  showed  that  EMG  activity  increased  for 
more  difficult  texts  than  for  easier  texts.  McGuigan  (1967)  and  McGuigan  and  Bailey 
.  9- (1969)  found  that  as  readers  became  more  sIdlled  the  level  of  EMG  activity  decreased. 
However,  whether  this  subvocal  activity  serves  any  useful  purpose  is  less  clear. 
Hardyck,  Petrovich  &  Ellsworth  (1966)  and  Aarons  (1971)  attempted  to  reduce  EMG 
activity  by  using  feedback  methods.  Hardyck  &  Petrovich  (1970),  using  such 
techniques,  found  that  when  subvocalisation  is  reduced,  comprehension  suffers. 
However,  Taylor  &  Taylor  (1983)  have  suggested  that  the  fact  that  subjects  have  to 
pay  attention  to  eliminating  muscle  activity  could  in  itself  interfere  with  comprehension 
of  the  text. 
Another  approach  was  to  have  subjects  engage  in  some  concurrent  articulatory  activity 
such  as  reciting  a  well  known  nursery  rhyme,  'Zounting  or  repeating  a  nonsense  phrase 
while  reading  a  piece  of  text.  This  minimises  the  demands  on  the  subjects  attention  but 
still  involves  the  vocal  muscles  in  a  task  not  directly  linked  to  the  reading  task. 
YJeiman  (1975),  using  such  concurrent  tasks,  showed  that  the  meanings  of  individual 
words  can  be  accessed  without  reference  to  inner  speech.  He  felt  that  inner  speech  was 
more  important  for  accessing  working  memory.  Others,  eg  Levy  (1975,1977); 
Slowiaczec  and  Clifton  (1980),  have  presented  evidence  which  suggests  that  the  inner 
speech  is  important  in  these  memory  processes  as  it  aids  the  comprehension  of 
connected  discourse. 
There  are  possible  methodological  criticisms  of  these  suppression  techniques.  Firstly, 
any  decrements  in  reading  might  be  due,  not  to  the  suppression  of  subvocalisation,  but 
to  an  increase  in  cognitive  load  of  having  to  carry  out  two  tasks  simultaneously. 
Alternatively,  the  suppression  task  may  not  adequately  suppress  inner  speech.  There  is 
evidence  (eg  Posner  &  Boies,  1971)  that  in  a  dual  task  situation,  the  task  which  is 
perceived  by  subjects  as  being  less  important  can  suffer.  In  other  words,  the 
concurrent  vocalisation  task  might  suffer  rather  than  the  reading  task.  However, 
subvocalisation  is  not  exactly  the  same  as  phonological  coding.  Subvocalisation  refers 
to  activity  (muscular  movement  or  articulatory  processes)  in  the  speech  tract  while 
phonological  coding  refers  to  the  mental  representations  of  sounds  (Rayner  & 
Pollatsek,  1989,  pp  189,201-202). 
-10- Alternative  techniques  have  been  used  to  assess  whether  inner  speech  is  activated 
during  reading.  Several  studies,  eg  Baron  (1973),  Doctor  &  Coltheart  (1980),  Banks, 
Oka  &  Shugarman  (1981),  Treiman,  Freyd  &  Baron  (1983),  Treiman,  Baron  &  Luk 
(1981),  Treiman  &  Hirsh-Pasek  (1983),  used  homophones  (words  sounding  the  same 
but  with  different  spellings  and  meanings).  Thus  for  a  sentence  containing  words 
which  sound  correct  but  are  misspelled,  if  a  speech  code  is  being  used,  then  subjects 
should  have  no  difficulty  reading  this  sentence  compared  to  a  normally  written 
sentence.  A  corollary  of  this,  however,  is  that  it  should  be  more  difficult  to  judge 
whether  a  sentence  is  meaningful.  The  findings  indicate  that  there  was  no  difference  in 
the  time  taken  to  make  semantic  acceptability  judgements  between  the  control 
sentences  and  those  containing  the  homophones  but  more  errors  are  made  with  the 
homophone  sentences.  The  results  have  been  interpreted  as  showing  that  subjects  can 
access  the  meaning  of  individual  words  directly  by  visual  means  but  that  speech 
coding  does  occur  postlexically  and  is  essential  for  interpretation  at  the  level  of  the 
phrase  or  sentence. 
Another  approach  favoured  by  some  researchers  utilised  tongue-twister  sentences 
which  contain  several  words  with  the  same  initial  consonant.  Just  as  it  is  more 
difficult  to  say  these  sentences,  so  it  has  been  found  that  it  takes  longer  to  read  them 
silently  and  orally  compared  with  straightforward  control  sentences  (Haber  &  Haber, 
1982;  Ayers,  1984).  Also  semantic  acceptability  judgements  took  longer  and  were  less 
accurate  for  tongue-twister  sentences  (McCutchen  &  Perfetti,  1982;  McCutchen,  Bell, 
France  &  Perfetti,  1991).  McCutchen  and  Perfetti  argue  that  specific  phonemes  are 
activated  during  reading  and  that  this  occurs  postlexically.  They  and  others 
(McCutchen  et  al,  in  press;  Haber  &  Haber,  1982)  see  the  interference  as  being  due  to 
the  similarity  of  the  phonetic  representations  generated.  Other  investigators  (Baddeley 
&  Lewis,  1981)  have  suggested  that  the  tongue-twister  effects  mentioned  could  be  due 
to  grapheme  rather  than  phoneme  repetitions.  However  these  difficulties  were 
partially  unconfounded  by  McCutchen  &  Perfetti  (1982)  by  their  use  of  tongue-twister 
sentences  with  mixed  grapheme  stimuli.  Thus,  instead  of. 
-  11  - The  talentee(teenager  took  the  trophy  in  the  tournament. 
they  used  a  sentence  where  the  tongue-twister  remains  but  where  two  different 
consonants  alternate: 
The  taxis  delivered  the  tourists  directly  to  the  tavern. 
Similar  tongue-twister  effects  were  found  in  the  mixed-grapheme  sentence  as  in  the 
same-grapheme  sentence.  Thus,  although  these  mixed  grapheme  stimuli  reduce  the 
visual  and  phonetic  confounding  inherent  i  n'tongue-  twister  sentences,  they  do  not 
eliminate  it  entirely. 
An  alternative  strategy  has  been  used  by  McCutchen,  Bell,  France,  &  Pcrfctti  (1991). 
They  asked  subjects  tojudge  the  semantic  acceptability  of  tongue-twister  sentences  but 
added  a  concurrent  memory  load.  Two  types  of  tongue-twistcr  were  used,  either 
alveolarfticative: 
eg  The  sparrow  snatched  the  spider  swiftly  off  the  ceiling. 
or  av  stop: 
eg  The  taxis  delivered  the  tourists  directly  to  the  tavern. 
Before  seeing  the  sentences,  five  numbers  were  presented  on  the  screen  for  subjects  to 
memorise.  The  numbers  either  began  with  alveolar  stops  (eg  12,12,20,25,22)  or 
with  alveolar  fricatives  (eg  17,6,65,16,77).  Subjects  then  saw  the  sentence,  had  to 
judge  if  it  was  semantically  acceptable  and  then  had  to  recall  as  many  numbers  as 
-12- possible.  McCutchen  et  al  (1991)  found  that  if  the  numbers  started  with  a  fricative  then 
it  took  longer  to  respond  to  fricative  sentences,  if  the  numbers  were  alveolar  stops  then 
it  took  longer  to  respond  to  stop  sentences.  They  also  found  the  samp  interaction  with 
respect  to  recall  of  numbers,  with  more  errors  when  numbers  and  sentences  shared 
initial  phonemes.  Since  the  memory  load  numbers  were  visually  distinct  from  each 
other  (7,6,16,77)  as  well  as  from  the  sentence  gmphcmcs,  it  clearly  demonstrates 
that  the  interference  was  not  visual.  Rather,  it  is  specific  interference  between  the 
phonetio  content  of  the  sentence  and  the  memory  load. 
These  studies  show  that  phonological  coding  is  impoi-tant  for  hearing  subjects  during 
the  reading  process.  Lexical  access  can  occur  directly  from  visual  input  and  bypass 
phonological  coding.  However,  phonologiýz_l  coding  seems  to  be  important  as  it 
allows  retention  in  short-term  memory  of  the  surface  structure  of  the  text  so  that 
meaning  can  be  derived  across  clauses  and  sentences  (Baddeley  &  Hitch,  1974;  Huey, 
1908/1968;  Perfetti,  1985;  Shankweiler  &  Crain,  1986). 
One  other  feature  of  the  reading  process  where  phonological  coding  may  aid 
comprehens  ion  is  in  the  use  of  prosodic  structures  (Slowiaczek  &  Clifton,  1980). 
Those  facets  of  spoken  language,  such  as  rhythm,  intonation,  and  stress  are  important 
sources  of  information  in  understanding  speech.  In  contrast,  written  language  by  its 
very  nature  provides  fewer  of  these  cues.  Slowiaczek  and  Clifton  speculate  that 
phonological  codes  may  provide  a  platform  for  obtaining  such  detail.  Kosslyn  and 
Matt  (1977)  have  offered  some  evidence  to  show  that  this  might  be  possible.  In  their 
study  they  showed  that  the  rate  at  which  a  passage  is  read  silently  bý  a  subject  can  be 
influenced  by  the  speaking  rate  of  the  person  said  to  have  written  it.  Prior  to  reading  a 
passage,  subjects  heard  the  voice  of  the  supposed  author.  Where  this  voice  spoke 
quickly,  the  subjects  read  more  quickly  and  vice  versa. 
-13- 1.6  Use  of  phonological  coding  by  deaf 
Since  profoundly  deaf  readers  lack  direct  (ic  auditory)  access  to  spoken  English,  it 
might  be  thought  that  they  would  have  considerable  difficulty  in  acquiring  and  using  a 
phonological  code. 
one  early  study  which  investigated  this  was  by  Chen  (1976),  uýing  an  approach 
utilised  by  Corcoran  (1966)  with  hearing  subjects.  Corcoran  had  his  subjects  read 
passages  of  text  and  cancel  out  all  instances  of  a  particular  letter.  He  found  that  they 
failed  to  detect  silent  letters  (such  as  the  letter  e  in  the  word  tape)  more  often  than 
letters  whicý  are  pronounced  (such  as  e  in  thc.  word  red).  Corcoran  interpreted  this  as 
evidence  that  hearing  subjects  were  using  phonological  coding  as  they  read.  Chen 
(1976)  used  this  technique  to  compare  congenitally  deaf,  partially  deaf  and  hearing 
subjects.  He  found  that  the  hearing  and  partially  hearing  subjects  omitted  more  silent 
letters  but  found  no  difference  between  silent  and  pronounced  letters  with  the 
congenitally  deaf  group,  suggesting  that  they  are  using  a  visual  rather  than  a  phonetic 
code. 
Locke  (1978)  conducted  a  similar  study  to  that  of  Chen  with  deaf  children,  using  three 
target  letters:  c,  g,  and  h.  While  hearing  subjects  were  almost  three  times  as  likely  to 
miss  a  phonemically  nonmodal  use  of  a  letter  (eg  g  in  rage)  than  they  were  to  miss  one 
which  was  phonemically  modal  (eg  g  in  rag).  However  there  were  no  differences  for 
the  deaf  children  suggesting  that  the  deaf  do  not  effectively  mediate  print  with  speech. 
However,  it  is  known  that  performance  in  proofreading  tasks  such  as  those  of 
Corcoran,  Chen,  and  Locke  is  influenced  by  factors  such  as  the  position  of  the  target 
letter  within  a  word,  word  frequency,  and  letter  positional  frequency  (Frith,  1979; 
Smith  &  Groat,  1979).  The  stimuli  of  Chen  (1976)  and  Locke  *(1978)  were  not 
controlled  for  these  factors.  However,  in  a  study  which  controlled  the  position  the 
target  within  a  word,  Dodd  (1987)  found  a  difference  in  target  letter  detection  by  deaf 
children  as  a  function  of  pronunciation.  Similar  differences  in  letter  dctccfion  by  deaf 
-14- children  as  a  function  of  pronunciation  were  found  by  Quinn  (1981)  when  word 
frequency  was  controlled.  However  no  proofreading  study  with  deaf  subjects  has 
controlled  for  letter  positional  frequency  in  words,  yet  this  orthographic  structure 
variable  is  known  to  influence  the  reading  of  deaf  subjects  (Hanson,  1986). 
Other  studies  have  examined  whether  the  deaf  use  forms  of  coding  othcr  than  speech. 
For  example,  Locke  and  Locke  (1971)  compared  deaf  children  who  had  intelligible 
speech  and  deaf  children  who  had  unintelligible  speech  with  hearing  children.  Subjects 
had  to  recall  pairs  of  printed  letters  which  were  similar  to  each  other  phonetically  (B- 
Q,  visually  (P-F),  or  dactylically  (K-P).  The  hearing'childrcn  were  found  to  be  using 
a  phonetic  code,  the  intelligible  deaf  group  using  all  three  coding  systems,  and  the 
unintelligible  deaf  group  relying  on  a  visti4l-dactylic  system.  Odom,  Blanton  & 
McIntyre  (1970),  Moulton  &  Beasley  (1975)  and  Bcllugi,  Klima  &  ýiple  (1974)  have 
shown  that  large  numbers  of  deaf  subjects  encode  printed  words  manually  in  terms  of 
signs. 
Jarvella  (1ý71)  and  Sachs  (1974)  have  shown  that  auditory  short-term  memory  is 
necessary  for  the  temporary  storage  of  surface  material  during  the  reading  process. 
Some  studies,  eg  Hanson  (1982),  Engle,  Cantor  &  Turner  (1989),  Hanson  & 
Lichtenstein  (1990)  have  used  short-terin  memory  studies  to  show  that  prelingually, 
profoundly  deaf  subjects  can  acquire  and  use  a  phonological  code.  For  example,  some 
deaf  subjects  are  sensitive  to  rhyme  and  perform  less  well  in  the  recall  of  printed  lists 
of  rhyming  words  than  non-rhyming  words.  In  addition,  it  has  bcdn  shown  that  the 
use  of  phonological  coding  in  such  short-term  memory  tasks  is  characteristic  of  good 
deaf  readers  but  not  poor  deaf  readers  (Conrad,  1979;  Hanson,  Liberman  & 
Shankweiler,  1984;  Hanson  &  Lichtenstein,  1990).  In  Conrad's  study,  he  found  that 
speech  recoding  was  being  used  by  a  small  percentage  of  profoundly  deaf  children 
who  were  good  readers,  even  those  whose  speech  intelligibility  was  very  poor. 
However,  although  these  studies  indicate  that  phonological  processes  underlie  skilled 
reading,  even  in  deaf  populations,  they  do  not  establish  that  phonological  coding  is 
actually  used  by  these  subjects  during  the  act  of  reading.  Lcybacrt  &  Alcgria  (1993), 
using  the  Stroop  paradigm,  found  interference  for  vocal  and  manual  responses  to 
-15- coloured  letter  strings  presented  on  a  VDU  for  deaf  and  for  hearing  children.  They 
interpret  their  results  as  indicating  that  access  to  orthographic,  semantic  and  even 
phonological  information  can  occur  automatically  when  deaf  children  arc  presented 
with  written  words. 
A  recent  study  (Hanson,  Goodell  &  Perfetti,  1991)  used  tonguc-twistcr  sentences  with 
a  concurrent  memory  load,  following  the  procedures  of  McCutchcn  ct  al  (1991),  to 
ascertain  whether  deaf  college  students  use  a  phonological  code  during  silent  reading. 
Results  show  that  both  groups  of  subjects  make  more  errors  on  acceptability 
judgments  when  reading  tongue-twister  sentences  than  when  reading  control 
sentences,  confirming  the  effects  found  by  Haber  &  Haber  (1982),  McCutchcn  & 
Perfetti  (1982)  and  McCutchen  et  al  (1991)  fcW  hearing  subjects  but  extending  them  to 
deaf  subjects.  As  stated  in  the  previous  section,  criticism  has  been  levelled  at  using 
tongue-twister  effects  alone,  as  there  is  an  inherent  confounding  effect  because  of  the 
similarity  of  visual  and  phonetic  components  in  such  sentences.  However,  the 
Hanson,  Goodell  and  Pcrfetti  (1991)  study  also  found  specific  phonetic  interference 
between  the  tounge-twister  sentences  and  the  concurrent  memory  load  numbers.  Both 
groups  had  difficulty  making  acceptability  judgements  about  alveolar  fricative 
sentences  when  the  memory  load  consisted  of  fricative  numbers,  and  had  difficulty 
with  alveolar  stop  sentences  when  the  load  consisted  of  stop  numbers.  Since  the 
written  forms  of  the  sentences  and  numbers  do  not  overlap,  the  results  cannot  be 
attributed  to  graphemic  similarity  but  rather  must  be  because  of  phonetic  similarity. 
McCutchen  ct  al  (1991)  found,  with  hearing  subjects,  that  the  interference  effect  could 
show  itself  in  poorer  performance  in  either  the  acccptabilityjudgmcnts  of  the  toungc- 
twisters  or  in  poorer  recall  of  the  numerical  data.  In  the  Hanson,  Goodell  &  Perfetti 
(1991)  study,  the  effects  were  only  noticeable  in  the  acceptability  judgments.  The 
results  seem  to  provide  strong  evidence  that  deaf  subjects  do  indeed  use  a  phonetic 
code  when  reading  silently.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  deaf  subjects  in  this  study 
tended  to  have  poorly  rated  speech  production  skills,  as  judged  by  listeners.  They  also 
had  reading  scores  on  standardiscd  reading  tests  which  would  be  considered 
exceptionally  high  for  deaf  readers  generally.  This  supports  the  findings  of  Conrad 
(1979)  and  Hanson  &  Lichtenstein  (1990)  who  found  that  phonological  coding  tended 
-16- to  be  restricted  to  those  deaf  subjects  who  were  good  rcaders. 
A  parallel  study  to  that  of  Hanson,  Goodell  &  Pcrfctti  (1991)  was  carried  out  by 
Trciman  &  Hirsh-Pasek  (1983),  who  used  "f-ingcr-fumblcr"  sentences.  These  were 
sentences  whose  words  had  manual  signs  which  *were  formationally  very  similar  on 
the  hands.  Treiman  &  Hirsh-Pasck  found  that  deaf  subjects  who  were  less  proficient 
readers  had  greater  difficulty  reading  finger-fumbler  sentences  than  control  sentences, 
suggesti,  ng  that  they  may  have  been  using  a  sign  code  to  mcdiate  comprehension.  An 
interesting  finding  is  that  the  best  readers  in  this  study  did  not  show  finger-fumbler 
effects  and  are  likely  to  have  been  using  a  phonetic  code. 
These  studies  show  that  deaf  subjects  can  and  do  use  a  variety  of  coding  systems 
when  reading,,  ranging  from  phonological  through  signing,  dactylic  and  visual. 
However,  it  seems  likely  that  those  who  arc  the  best  readep  use  phonological  coding 
even  although  their  speech  production  may  be  poor,  with  poorer  readers  relying  more 
on  manual  coding  systems. 
1.7  Metalinguistic  skills  -  hearing  children 
As  readers  become  more  skilled,  they  move  from  purely  mechanical,  unconsciously 
applied  processing  to  a  largely  conscious,  more  critical  stance.  Brown  (1980) 
considers  the  distinction  between  these  two  stages  as  defining  the  essential  difference 
between  cognitive  and  metacognitive  aspects  of  performance.  Mctalinguistic  skills  arc, 
broadly  speaking,  those  higher  cognitive  processes  which  consciously  reflect  on  the 
linguistic  process  itself.  -They  relate  to  the  planning,  monitoring,  self-qucstioning,  and 
summarising  skills  used  in  critical  reading  and  studying,  and  assume  an  increasing 
importance  in  middle  school  and  beyond  (from  about  age  9).  Here  the  student  is 
moving  away  from  learning  to  read  to  reading  to  learn.  Skills  vital  to  effective  study 
are  (a)  the  ability  to  delete  unnecessary,  unimportant  or  redundant  information,  (b)  the 
ability  to  substitute  a  superordinate  term  for  lists  of  items  (cg  furniture  for  chair,  table 
etc),  (c)  the  ability  to  substitute  superordinate  actions  for  a  list  of  subcomponents  of 
-17- that  action,  and  (d)  the  summarisation  of  the  essence  of  a  text  by  choosing  a  topic 
sentence  from  the  text  or  (e)  the  invention  of  a  topic  sentence  if  onc  is  not  provided. 
Brown  &  Day  (1980)  studied  how  well  these  rules  were  applied  in  a  large  group  of 
subjects  ranging  in  age  from  10  years  through  to  college  graduatcs.  They  found  that 
even  the  10  year  olds  could  delete  inappropriate  material  effectively.  Studcnts  bccamc 
increasingly  skilled  with  age  in  applying  the  more  complex  rules.  The  most  difficult 
skill,  inventing  a  topic  sentence,  was  hardly  used  at  all  by  the  younger  children  and 
was  used  most  by  the  most  skilled,  older  readers. 
Some  studies,  eg  Brown,  Campione,  &  Day  (1981)  and  Day  (1980),  have  shown  that 
these  skills  can  be  taught  to  students. 
1.8  Metalinguistic  skills  -  deaf  children 
The  study  of  the  metalinguistic  skills  of  deaf  children  has  been  rather  neglected. 
Research  has  really  been  limited  to  studies  of  judgements  of  grammaticality 
(Kretschmer,  1976;  Quigley  et  al,  1976).  Kretschmer  (1982)  suggests  that  future 
work  could  examine  areas  such  as  what  deaf  children  think  reading  is,  or  look  at  their 
study  skills.  Webster  (1986)  quotes  Donaldson's  contention  that  very  young  hearing 
children  can  "decentre"  (contrary  to  Piagetian  theory)  if  the  task  is  meaningful  to  them. 
Their  metalinguistic  skills  are  therefore  well  developed  by  the  time  they  start  school, 
whereas  the  deaf  child  has  many  hurdles  to  overcome,  eg  confronting  a  written  code 
for  a  different  language,  a  different  syntax,  and  discourse  features.  The  explicit 
awareness  of  language  as  a  code  in  its  own  right,  which  is  required  for  reading,  the 
ability  for  detached,  disembedded  thinking  about  language  as  a  tool  to  be  manipulated 
independent  of  its  context,  will  be  less  well  developed  in  hearing  impaired  children. 
Therefore  the  deaf  child  must  rely  on  other  information  sources,  but  Webster  contends 
that  they  are  encouraged  subtly  and  covertly  by  teachers  and  other  adults  to  take  a 
passive  and  receptive  role  rather  than  actively  interact  in  leaming  situations. 
.  18- In  a  recent  study,  Strassman  (1992)  interviewed  deaf  students  to  assess  their 
mctacognitive  knowledge  about  school  related  reading.  She  found  that  subjects' 
schemata  for  this  were  largely  skill  based  and  passive,  lacking  mature  mctacognitive 
knowledge  that  would  enable  them  to  gain  the  most  from  their  reading.  Indeed, 
Erickson  (1987)  has  suggested  that  deaf  subjects  require  a  collaborative  "externally 
guided  thinking"  approach  to  help  them  read  at  an  evaluative  level  rather  than  just 
literally. 
1.9  Figurative  language  -  hearing  childreh 
As  children  become  more  proficient  in  their  use  of  language,  they  tend  to  use 
constructions  which  are  non-literal.  This  figurative  language  can  take  many  forms  but 
the  most  common  are  metaphor,  simile,  and  idiom.  Figurative  language  seems 
pervasive  in  English,  even  in  elementary  reading  textbooks  (Dixon,  Pearson  & 
Ortony,  1980).  However,  comprehension  of  figurative  language  and  ability  to  explain 
what  particular  phrases  mean,  develops  in  an  incremental  manner.  Children  arc  able  to 
recognise  correct  paraphrases  of  figurative  language  first  (Pollio  &  Pollio,  1979),  and 
arc  then  able,  to  paraphrase  figurative  language  independently  (Comcta  &  Eson,  19178). 
At  an  even  later  stage  they  are  able  to  explicate  their  metaphors  (Billow,  1975).  Arlin 
(1977)  and  Billow  (1975)  have  shown  that  different  metaphors  are  understood  at 
different  times,  with  representational  metaphors  (eg  "he  is  a  rock")  being 
comprehended  first,  similarity  metaphors  next  (eg  "night  was  a  blanket"),  and 
proportional  metaphors  (eg  "time  was  a  thief,  robbing  her  of  life")  being  understood 
last  (Giorcelli,  1982).  Increasing  exposure  to  metaphorical  language  improves 
comprehension  of  such  language.  Cometa  &  Eson  (1978)  and  Pollio  &  Pollio  (1979) 
have  shown  that  it  is  easier  for  children  to  understand  commonly  used  metaphors  (cg 
"time  flies")  than  less  commonly  used  phrases  (cg  "curtain  of  hate"). 
-19- 1.10  Figurative  Language  -  deaf  children 
The  difficulties  that  the  deaf  experience  in  learning  English  are  compounded  by  the 
profusion  of  figurative  expressions  in  the  language  in  both  its  written  and  spoken 
form.  Dixon,  Pearson,  &  Ortony  (1980)  have  shown  that  figurative  language  is  used 
in  the  very  earliest  books  of  commonly  used  reading  series. 
Conely  (1976)  studied  the  comprehension  of  idiomatic  expressions  in  the  deaf 
compared  with  hearing  subjects  and  found  no  difference  in  performance  for  students 
matched  for  reading  age  7.0  to  7.9  years  but  a  significant  difference  for  reading  levels 
of  8.0  years  and  above.  Scores  on  the  test  of  idiomatic  expressions  were  significantly 
and  positively  related  to  reading  for  both  groups  of  subjects. 
' 
This  experiment  has  been 
criticised  thqugh,  for  example,  for  using  syntactic  structures  which  were  too  complex 
for  the  deaf. 
Iran-Nejad,  Ortony  &  Rittenhouse  (1981)  used  metaphorical  expressions  controlled 
for  vocabulary  and 
, 
syntax  along  the  lines  suggested  by  Quigley  ct  al  (1976).  They 
found  that  the  deaf  subjects  at  all  age  levels  (9  to  17  years)  scored  highly  on  literal 
comprehension  but  also  obtained  unexpectedly  high  scores  on  the  metaphorical  tasks. 
In  a  related  study  they  showed  that  deaf  children's  comprehension  of  metaphors 
improved  with  practice  and  concluded  that  the  deaf  had  no  cognitive  deficiency  which 
prevented  their  comprehension  of  metaphorical  language  and  their  natural  tendency  to 
interpret  literally  can  be  counteracted  by  practice.  This  is  one  of  the  few  studies  to 
show  positive  results  for  the  deaf.  There  were  design  faults,  cg  how  well  can 
figurative  language  be  presented  when  vocabulary  and  syntax  are  controlled  at  very 
low  levels,  but  at  least  it  demonstrates  that  the  difficulties  deaf  children  have  with 
figurative  language  are  not  caused  by  a  cognitive  deficit. 
A  study  by  Orlando  and  Shulman  (1989)  examined  deaf  and  hearing  children's 
comprehension  of  similes,  metaphors,  idioms,  and  proverbs  in  'single  sentences 
controlled  for  vocabulary  but  not  for  syntax.  They  found  dcaf  subjects  were  poorcr  at 
-20- understanding  these  constructions  than  the  hearing  children  but  that  the  deaf  groups 
responses  became  more  abstract  with  increasing  age  and  with  improved  reading 
ability. 
Several  other  studies  are  quoted  by  King  &  Quigley  (1985)  to  support  the  fact  that  the 
deaf  can  cope  with  figurative  and  idiomatic  language  when  other  factors  such  as 
syntax  are  controlled  eg  Wilbur,  Fraser  &  Fruchter  (1981),  Page  (1981),  and  Houck 
(1982).  These  authors  have  speculated  that  deaf  children  can  understand  idioms  if 
there  is  sufficient  contextual  information  in  the  written  material  or  that  at  least  some  of 
the  idioms  might  be  memorised.  or  learned  as  a  whole  so  that  vocabulary  and  syntax 
present  less  of  a  problem. 
Giorcelli  (1982)  studied  various  aspects  of  figurative  language  in  the  deaf  including 
analogical  and  syllogistical  reasoning,  associative  fluency,  linguistic  problem  solving, 
interpretation  of  anomaly,  and  discrimination  between  pamphra§es  of  novel  and 
idiomatic  metaphors.  Choices  of  idiomatic  phrases,  syntax,  and  vocabulary  were 
carefully  controlled.  Isolated  and  short  and  long  contextual  conditions  were  used.  He 
found  that  the  deaf  scored  significantly  lower  than  the  hearing  controls  on  most  of  the 
subtests  but'that  the  performance  of  the  hearing  impaired  improved  with  addition  of 
context  although  this  was  still  well  below  the  hearing  children's  levels.  The  18  year 
old  deaf  subjects  did  not  perform  as  well  as  the  9  year  old  hearing  subjects. 
Payne  (1982)  studied  the  understanding  of  verb-particle  combinations  in  deaf  and 
hearing  children.  This  structure  is  one  of  the  most  common  ways  in  which  English  is 
expanded.  These  combinations  can  have,  in  some  cases,  a  literal  meaning  (eg  "run  up 
a  hill")  as  well  as  an  idiomatic  meaning  (eg  "run  up  a  bill").  Children  were  assessed  at 
three  levels  (  idiomatic,  semi-idiomatic,  and  litcral),  in  five  syntactic  surface 
structures,  with  vocabulary  controlled  at  the  6  and  7  year  levels.  Payne  found  that  the 
hearing  subjects  scored  significantly  higher  than  the  deaf  on  all  levels  of  semantic 
difficulty  and  for  all  syntactic  structures. 
-21- This  seemingly  contrary  evidence,  and  the  question  of  whether  the  difficulty  for  the 
deaf  is  how  concepts  are  expressed  in  English  or  the  underlying  concepts  themselves, 
is  partly  clarified  by  the  work  done  on  discourse. 
1.11  Discourse  features  -  hearing  children 
The  process  of  reading  can  be  approached  from  two  theoretical  standpoints.  The  first, 
called  "bottom-up"  theories  (Gough,  1972),  see  the  reader  as  viewing  the  words  on 
the  page,  analysing  these  phonetically,  accessing  word  meaning,  and  by  synthesising 
these  into  sentences  using  the  rules  of  grammar/syntax,  building  up  meaning  in  an 
incremental  manner.  The  process  is  text-driven.  The  skills  reviewed  in  the  previous 
sections  are  poncerned  with  these  bottom-up  processes. 
An  alternative  view  of  the  reading  process  are  the  so-called  "top-down"  theories 
(Goodman,  1970).  These  see  the  reader  using  his/her  world  knowledge  to  help 
interpret  what  is  written  on  the  page.  Cognitive  structures  which  organise  this  world 
knowledge,  variously  called  schemata  (Rumclhart,  1975;  Kintsch  &  van  Dijk,  1978), 
scripts  (Schank  &  Abelson,  1977),  scenarios  (Sanford  &  Garrod,  1981),  are  used  to 
help  the  reader  predict  what  can  be  expected  from  the  text.  In  reality,  it  is  generally 
accepted  that  a  combination  of  bottom-up  and  top-down  strategies  are  used  during 
reading. 
One  particular  approach  to  studying  top-down  processes  is  discourse  analysis  and 
story  grammar.  Discourse  analysis  is  concerned  with  how  text  is  constructed  to  aid 
comprehension.  Brewer  (1980)  classified  written  discourse  into  three  basic  types:  (a) 
descriptive  discourse,  (b)  narrative  discourse,  and  (c)  expository  discourse.  Each  of 
these  would  represent  a  different  genre,  cg  descriptive  -  travel  guide,  narrative  - 
detective  story,  expository  -  political  speech. 
Mandler  and  Johnson  (1977)  felt  that  stories  could  be  analysed  to  reveal  the  deep 
structure  which  represented  the  true  or  fixed  order  of  story  events,  and  the  surface 
-22- structure  which,  for  certain  purposes  of  the  author,  might  vary  from  the  order  of 
events  in  the  deep  structure.  The  deep  structure,  tcrmed  story  granunar,  is  linked  to  the 
surface  structure  by  a  series  of  transformations. 
Stein  (1978)  suggested  six  sections  of  a  basic  story  grammar.  These  were  (a)  the 
setting,  (b)  an  initiating  event,  (c)  an  emotional  or  cognitive  response  of  the 
protagonist,  (d)  an  attempt  by  the  protagonist  to  achieve  his/her  goal,  (e)  a 
consequence,  eg  attainment  or  non-attainment  of  the  goal,  and  (f)  a  reaction  from  the 
protagonist  relating  to  the  consequence.  Stein  (1978)  found  that  children  as  young  as 
six  years  of  age  make  few  errors  in  recalling  the  correct  temporal  order  of  stories  that 
correspond  to  the  expected  story  grammar  sequence.  Also,  when  the  story  structure 
deviated  from  the  expected  sequence  as  noted'above,  children  recalled  the  story  in  an 
order  similar  t6the  story  grammar  rather  than  in  the  order  of  presentation. 
Hansche  &  Gordon  (1983),  examining  children's  own  writing,  found  that  more 
categories  of  the  story  grammar  appeared  as  the  children  got  older.  Six  year  olds  only 
included  setting,  initiating  event  and  consequence.  By  age  nine,  they  had  added 
consequence,  and  by  thirteen  all  six  categories  were  included. 
1.12  Discourse  Features  -  deaf  children 
The  study  of  schema  development,  discourse  features  and  top-down  features  in  the 
reading  skills  of  the  deaf  is less  well  documented  (King  &  Quigley,  1985).  Prinz  & 
Prinz  (1985)  describe  discourse  development  in  sign  language  of  a  group  of  deaf 
children.  Their  findings  indicate  that  the  children  were  acquiring  appropriate  discourse 
strategies  comparable  to  those  used  by  hearing  children  in  spoken  conversation  and 
deaf  adults  who  sign. 
KJuwin,  Getson  &  KJuwin  (1980)  showed  that  deaf  adolescents  interpret  ambiguous 
passages  differently  from  hearing  subjects,  confirming  that  they  bring  their  own  world 
knowledge  (schema)  to  the  reading  process.  Gormley  &  Franzen  (1978)  have  shown 
-23- that  deaf  students  comprehend  syntactic  structures  more  easily  in  connected  discourse 
than  in  single  sentences.  Nolen  &  Wilbur  (1985)  also  found  that  the  use  of  context 
facilitates  comprehension  of  more  complex  sentences  for  deaf  children.  McGill- 
Franzen  &  Gormley  (1980)  studied  deaf  chiloren's  comprehension  of  truncated 
passive  sentences,  eg  "The  wolf  was  killed",  presented  in  context  and  in  isolation. 
Hearing  impaired  children  could  not  understand  such  sentences  in  isolation  but  could 
in  the  context  of  a  familiar  fairy  tale,  and  so  the  authors  concluded  that  the  hearing 
impaired  could  understand  passives  in  context.  But  as  Robbins  &  Hatcher  (1981) 
point  out,  the  deaf  children  could  answer  any  questions  without  even  reading  the  text 
if  the  story  was  already  familiar  to  them. 
In  a  latter  study  Iseralite  (1981)  found  that  use  of  context  did  not  aid  correct 
interpretation  of  passive  sentences.  Edwoldt  (1981)  had  deaf  children  read  stories  and 
interpret  them  into  sign  language,  and  videotaped  their  performance.  Using  miscue 
analysis,  cloze  procedures  and  retelling  of  stories  by  the  children,  she  concluded  that 
deaf  children  can  read  and  retell  stories  by  translating  them  into  their  own  sign 
language.  She  states  that  they  used  extensively  the  semantic  and  syntactic  cueing 
systems  but  did  not  did  not  over-rely  on  graphic  information,  thus 
' 
supporting  a  top- 
down  theory.  But  it  is  claimed  from  mainstream  reading  research  (for  example, 
Perfati,  1995)  that  poor  or  beginning  readers  do  use  a  top-down  approach  because 
they  have  not  yet  acquired  automatic/  unconscious  bottom-up  skills.  King  &  Quigley 
(op  cit)  do  not  necessarily  accept  these  findings  as  Edwoldt  gives  only  two  examples 
and  used  only  four  deaf  readers.  They  believe  other  interpretations  can  be  made  of  the 
results. 
Gaines,  Mandler  &  Bryant  (1981)  used  stories  previously  used  by  Mandler  (1978)  to 
compare  deaf  and  hearing  children  on  immediate  and  delayed  recall  of  three  stories, 
one  of  standard  prose,  one  containing  non-phonetic  mis-spcllings  (eg  "throgh"  for 
"through"),  and  one  which  contained  confused  anaphoric  references.  They  found  that 
the  deaf  were  able  to  comprehend  the  overall  meaning  of  the  stories  and  recall  an 
amount  of  story  propositions  similar  to  hearing  children,  but  the  deaf  did  have 
significantly  more  semantic  distortions  than  hearing  subjects.  But  this  would  typically 
.  24- be  expected  from  hearing  readers  who  were  beginning  or  poor  readers.  Gaines  ct  al, 
therefore,  concluded  that  the  deaf  were  using  a  "broad  reconstructive  top-down 
schematic  approach"  to  reading.  The  authors  feel  that  deaf  childicn  often  get  the 
general  idea  of  a  passage  using  top-down  strategies  but  have  a  lack  of  understanding 
or  even  a  misunderstanding  of  important  details.  However,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind 
that  the  deaf  children  used  were  highly  selected,  being  high-flycrs  at  a  particularly 
good  oral  school. 
Sarachan-Deily  (1984)  compared  recall  of  stories  read 
-by 
deaf  and  hearing 
adolescents.  She  found  that  the  hearing  student's  recalled  significantly  more 
propositions  than  the  deaf  students,  but  both  groups  recalled  a  similar  number  of  story 
inferences.  Within  the  deaf  group,  the  better  ria-ders  recalled  more  explicit  information 
than  the  poorer  readers  but  there  was  no  difference  in  recall  of  implicit  information. 
Coggiola  (1983)  has  shown  that  deaf  college  students  arc  less  able  than  their  hearing 
peers  at  identifying  the  level  of  importance  of  idea  units  (or  propositions)  in  a  piece  of 
text.  Also  the  level  of  importance  of  a  proposition  significantly  affected  how  well  it 
could  be  recalled  but  this  was  less  so  for  the  deaf  than  the  hearing  group.  Coggiola 
concludes  that  this  lower  level  of  sophistication  in  identifying  and  using  the  structural 
importance  of  information  in  text  may,  in  part,  contribute  to  the  deaf's  difficulties  in 
reading  comprehension.  However  she  speculates  that  since  they  show  some  sensitivity 
in  this  area,  the  deaf  could  be  trained  in  strategies  to  identify  text  structure  and  rate  its 
importance,  and  that  this  could  lead  to  better  comprehension  and  rctripval. 
Banks,  Fraser,  Fyfe,  Grant,  Gray,  MacAuley,  &  Williams  (1989)  felt  that  deaf 
children  do  not  schemata  when  reading  as  they  are  over-absorbed  in  bottom-up 
processes.  They  found  that  actively  teaching  story  structures  to  these  children,  and 
teaching  the  concepts  necessary  to  understand  each  passage,  improved 
comprehension.  They  interpret  this  as  demonstrating  that  the  pre-existing  schema  for 
each  story  is  being  activated  by  this  cueing  but  it  is  possible  that  the  teaching  of 
necessary  concepts  for  each  passage  is  helping  to  generate  a  schema  where  none 
previously  existed. 
-25- A  recent  study  by  Marscark  et  al  (1994)  compared  the  signed  and  written  structures  of 
stories  by  deaf  7  to  15  year  olds  with  written  stories  of  hearing  controls.  Thcy  found 
that  both  signed  and  written  output  for  the  deaf,  had  similar  discourse  structures  as 
indicated  by  patterns  of  causal  goal  -  acti  on-outcome  episodes.  However,  the 
grammatical  and  lexical  character  of  the  deaf  students'  work  lagged  behind  that  of  the 
hearing  children.  This  might  suggest  that  any  problems  which  are  experienced  by  the 
deaf  may  not  be  due  entirely  to  difficulties  with  reading  alone,  but  may  point  to  aspects 
of  general  language  processing. 
There  is  no  clear  consensus  from  the  studies  quoted  above  about  the  exact  nature  of 
the  discourse  skills  of  deaf  children.  However,  it  is  evident  that  they  can  and  do  use 
broad  top-down  strategies  when  reading,  although  the  exact  nature  of  these  is  yet  to  be 
determined. 
1.13  Anaphoric  relationships:  hearing  children. 
As  a  reader  moves  through  a  text,  the  general  purpose  is  the  accumulation  of 
information.  Each  sentence  should  follow  logically  from  the  previous  one  and  should 
add  some  new  piece  of  information.  It  should  be  linked  to  some  part  of  the  previous 
sentence.  One  common  way  of  achieving  this  is  by  using  anaphora.  These  can  be 
nouns,  noun  phrases,  or  pronouns.  For  example,  a  sentence  referring  to  John  Major 
may  be  followed  by  a  reference  to  "the  premier",  "the  prime  minister",  or  simply  "he". 
In  other  words,  anaphora  are  the  links  which  give  a  narrative  cohesion. 
Bormuth  (1970)  identified  four  major  qpes  of  anaphor,  viz: 
(1) PRO  WORDS  eg  Joe  picked  up  the  box 
He  is  a  good  hittcr. 
-26- (2)  DELE7ED  MODIFIERS 
(3)  ELLIPSIS 
eg  The  boys  pmcfiscd  hard. 
This  [12mctice  helped. 
eg  The.  stands  were  green. 
The  fence  was  [grcen  too. 
(4)  SEMANTIC  SUBSTITUTE  eg  Jim  gathered  the  bats  and  balls. 
He  put  this  Muipment  away. 
Bormuth  (1970)  tested  240  nine  year  olds  on  their  understanding  of  several  of  these 
anaphors  embedded  in  paragraphs  of  465  sentences,  using  multiple-choice 
responses.  He  found  pro-verbs  to  be  easier  than  deleted  nouns,  wfiich  in  turn  were 
easier  than  personal  pronouns  which  were  the  most  difficult  of  the  anaphors  studied. 
However,  this  study  was  criticised  by  Lesgold  (1974)  who  felt  that  too  much 
emphasis  wýs  paid  to  syntax  and  little  or  no  attention  given  to  the  semantic  aspects. 
Correcting  for  these  problems,  he  obtained  different  results  from  Bormuth.  Lesgold 
found  personal  pronouns  to  be  easiest  with  pro-verbs  much  more  difficult.  The  design 
of  his  study  was  different.  Oral  answers  were  obtained  to  the  questions  and  the 
number  of  semantically  plausible  potential  answers  in  each  passage  was  controlled. 
No  information  on  this  last  aspect  is  available  in  the  Bormuth  study. 
Chai  (1967)  has  shown  that  hearing  children's  ability  to  identify  the  referent  of  a 
pronoun  is  a  developmental  skill,  improving  with  age.  Richek  (1976-77)  found  that, 
of  three  anaphoric  forms,  nouns  were  easier  than  pronouns,  which  in  turn  were  easier 
than  null  forms  (where  the  noun  is  deleted).  Bamitz  (1980)  studying  7  to  II  year  olds, 
found  that  pronouns  and  noun  phrases  are  significantly  easier  than  clause  or  sentence 
referents,  while  forward  pronominal  reference  is  easier  than  backward  pronominal 
reference.  It  was  also  easier  if  the  pronoun  and  referent  were  in  the  same  sentence 
rather  than  separate  sentences. 
-27- It  can  be  seen  from  the  above  studies  that  how  hearing  children  use  anaphora  is  not 
entirely  clear.  It  seems  though  that  use  of  anaphora  is  a  developmental  skill  which 
improves  as  children  get  older.  It  also  seems  that  repeated  nouns  or  pronouns  are 
easier  to  comprehend  than  null  or  substituted  forms. 
1.14  Anaphoric  relationships:  deaf  children. 
Stoefen  (1981)  noted  one  linguistic  rule  used  frequently  by  the  deaf  which  deviates 
from  standard  English,  namely  the  "object-subject  deletion  rule".  For  example,  the 
two  sentcnces: 
"  The  boy  kicked  the  cat"  and  "  The  boy  ran  away" 
can  be  conjoined  to  form  the  single  sentence 
"  The  boy  kicked  the  cat  and  ran  away". 
Since  the  subject  of  the  second  sentence  is  coreferential  to  the  subject  of  the  first  (ie 
refers  to  the-same  boy),  conjunction  reduction  can  apply,  in  other  words  the  subject  of 
the  second  sentence  can  be  deleted.  However  for  the  two  sentences: 
"The  boy  kicked  the  cat"  and  "77w  cat  ran  away" 
conjunction  reduction  cannot  be  applied  when  the  subject  of  the  s9cond  sentence  is 
coreferential  with  the  object  of  the  first.  Many  of  the  deaf,  however,  do  apply  this 
conjunction  reduction,  the  so-called  "object-subjcct  deletion  rule",  in  their  written 
output.  Stoefen  considered  how  deaf  children  who  use  this  rule  compared  with  deaf 
children  w4o  did  not,  in  their  understanding  of  the  anaphoric  reference  when 
-28- conjunction  reduction  takes  place  in  semantically  acceptable  and  unacceptable 
conditions.  For  example,  the  rule  could  apply  in  sentence  (a)  below  but  not  in  sentence 
(b),  as  it  would  be  impossible  for  a  tree  to  cry: 
(a)  The  boy  sat  by  the  girl  and  cried. 
(b)  The  boy  sat  by  the  tree  and  cried. 
These  null  forms  of  anaphor  were  compared  with  other  types,  viz  repetition  of  the 
noun,  a  personal  pronoun,  and  a  pro-verb  type,  eg, 
"Joe  eats  ice-crýam  by  the  gallon"  "Jim  does  (so)  too" 
Stoefen  found  that  the  null  forms  proved  to  be  the  most  difficult  for  both  groups  of 
deaf  children,  the  rule  users  and  non-users,  but  only  in  the  semantically  acceptable 
condition.  There  were  no  significant  differences  found  between  the  other  forms  of 
anaphor.  She  also  found  no  differences  between  the  different  genders  of  personal 
pronouns. 
In  summary,  the  deaf  can  use  anaphoric  referents  successfully.  However,  they  do 
have  difficulty  with  one  particular  type  of  construction,  the  so-called  "object-subjcct 
deletion  rule",  when  the  sentence  is  not  semantically  unambiguous. 
1.15  Summary 
It  is  widely  documented  that  deaf  children  have  great  difficulty  Icaming  to  read.  The 
typical  deaf  school  leavcr  has  a  reading  age  of  about  8.5  to  9  years.  They  know  fewer 
words  than  their  hearing  counterparts  and  know  fewer  second  meanings  for  multiple- 
meaning  words.  However  there  is  no  difference  in  their  ability  to  perceptually  analysc 
text. 
-29- Phonological  coding  is  seen  as  important  for  hearing  readers  as  it  allows  them  to  retain 
in  short-term  memory  the  surface  structure  of  material  they  have  read,  so  that  meaning 
can  be  built  up  across  clauses  and  sentences.  Deaf  children,  however,  use  a  variety  of 
coding  systems,  for  example,  sign,  fi  nger-spel  ling,  or  speech,  but  those  who  use  a 
phonological  code  are  usually  the  most  successful  readers. 
The  deaf  have  great  difficulty  with  syntax,  finding  passive  voices  of  verbs,  relative 
clauses,  and  pronominalisation  particularly  problematic.  This  leads  them  to  use  rigid, 
stylised  structures  in  their  written  output. 
Deaf  readers  have  a  poor  understanding  of  figurative  and  idiomatic  language.  They  are 
less  able  to  stand  back  and  dissociate  thernsOves  from  the  reading  process,  and  as  a 
result  tend  to  be  literal  in  their  interpretation  of  the  material  read. 
There  is  some  evidence  to  suggest  that  deaf  children  bring  world  knowledge  to  their 
interpretation  of  meaning  and  they  seem  to  use  similar  discourse  structures  to  hearing 
children.  However,  they  are  less  likely  to  be  able  to  use  the  structuiul  importance  of 
information  in  the  text  to  aid  comprehension. 
1.16  Beyond  the  literal 
The  meanings  of  words,  sentences,  paragraphs,  or  entire  passages  are  affected  by  the 
contexts  in  which  they  occur  and  by  the  prior  knowledge  which  the  reader  has  about 
the  topic  of  the  passage.  As  developing  readers  progress  beyond  anything  but  the  most 
elementary  of  texts,  they  have  to  draw  inferences  beyond  the  literal  meanings  of  the 
words  on  the  page. 
Since  inferencing,  as  it  relates  to  deaf  readers,  is  the  main  topic  of  this  thesis,  it  will  be 
dealt  with  more  fully  in  the  next  chapter.  The  inferencing  skills  of  hearing  children  and 
deaf  children  will  be  examined  first  and  this  will  be  followed  by  a  survey  of  studies 
relating  to  adult  inferencing. 
-30- Chapter  Two 
Inferencing  skills  in  deaf  and  hearing  children 
Anything  beyond  the  most  elementary  of  texts  requires  skills  additional  to  those 
necessary  for  the  literal  understanding  of  the  words  on  the  page.  For  example, 
consider  the  pair  of  sentences  below,  quoted  from  Sanford  and  Garrod.  (198  1): 
Jill  canw  bouncing  down  the  stairs. 
Harry  rushed  off  to  get  the  doctor. 
Most  readers  see  these  two  sentences  as  being  linked  and  interpret  them  in  terms  of  Jill 
falling  on  the  stairs,  injuring  herself,  and  as  a  result  of  this  Harry  calling  the  doctor. 
With  a  slightly  different  second  sentence,  as  below,  a  totally  different  interpretation  is 
given  to  the  same  first  sentence. 
Jill  came  bouncing  down  the  stairs. 
Harry  rushed  over  to  kiss  her. 
This  illustrates  that  readers  go  beyond  the  literal  meaning  of  the  words  on  the  page. 
The  meaning  which  is  conveyed  is  dependent  on  the  reader  bringing  additional  world 
knowledge  to  the  process  in  an  attempt  to  produce  a  coherent  interpretation  of  the  text 
as  a  whole. 
-31- 2.1  Inferencing  ability  in  hearing  children 
Piaget  (1969)  and  Fraisse  (1963)  thought  that  children  at  the  pre-operational  stage  (ie 
younger  than  7--years)  would  be  unable  to  carry  out  the  underlying  operations 
necessary  for  inferencing.  They  believed,  for  example,  that  a  child  of  this  age  could 
not  attend  to  order  and  must,  therefore,  be  unable  to  co-ordinate  separate  items  of 
information  to  draw  a  logical  conclusion  and  make  transitive  inferences.  However 
Bryant  &  Trabasso  (1971)  have  shown  that  transitive  inferences  about  quantity  are 
within  the  capabilities  of  children  as  young  as  4  years  of  ag&  if  one  controls  for  the 
limitations  of  their  memory.  Similarly  Brown  &  Murphy  (1975)  have  shown  that  4 
year  olds  can  reproduce  picture  sequences  as  logical,  holistic  units  when  the  context  is 
meaningful.  Also,  Shatz  (1975)  has  shown  that  in  situations  with  the  context  clearly 
comprehensible  to  the  child,  inferential  behaviour  in  speech  acts  has  been  observed  in 
children  as  young  as  19  months.  Brown  (1975)  looked  at  recognition,  reconstruction, 
and  recall  of  arbitrary  and  logical  sequences  by  children  aged  5-8  years.  He  found 
non-verbal  reconstruction  was  similar  for  pre-operational  and  old6r  children  but  in 
verbal  recall  the  pre-operational  children  were  significantly  poorcr.  Thus  constraints 
on  output  may  mis-represent  the  child's  ability.  Several  studies  have  used  memory  for 
picture  sequences  to  test  the  principles  of  assimilation  theory.  Assimilation  theory 
(Bransford  &  Johnson,  1972)  proposes  that  the  listener  or  reader  actively  constructs 
an  internal  representation  which  is  elaborated  with  successive,  related  scntcntial 
information.  In  both  verbal  recall  (eg  Paris  &  Mahoney,  1974)  and  non-verbal  recall 
(eg  Baggett,  1975)  construction  of  inferences  has  been  shown  to  be  an  implicit  aspect 
of  both  visual  and  verbal  processing. 
Bell  &  Torrance  (1986)  have  shown  that  the  ability  of  children,  aged  4  to  9  years,  to 
make  and  recognise  inferences  shows  marked  improvement  as  they  get  older.  It  is  not 
certain  whether  this  improvement  is  the  result  of  increasing  exposure  to  written 
language. 
-32- 2.2  Inferencing  in  deaf  children 
The  major  study  of  inferencing  abilities  of  deaf  children  is  that  by  Wilson  (1979).  He 
compared  deaf  and  hearing  subjects  matched  for  rbading  age  on  six  types  of  inference, 
presented  in  short  stories  which  were  associated  with  particular  syntactic  structures. 
Each  story  was  followed  immediately  by  sentences  requiring  a  true/false  response. 
One  of  these  verification  sentences  related  to  the  literal  content  of  the  story,  the  other  to 
information  which  had  to  be  infcrrcd.  Half  of  the  stories  were  read  by  the  subjects,  the 
other  half  being  (a)  read  orally  to  the  hearing  subjects,  (b)  simultaneously  signed  and 
read  orally  to  the  deaf  subjects.  Response  times  were  measured  during  the  reading 
task. 
The  six  types  of  inference  examined  were: 
Locative:  eg.  The  shirt  is  dirty. 
The  shirt  is  under  the  bed. 
The  cat  is  on  the  shirt. 
Therefore,  the  cat  is  under  the  bed. 
Predicate  nominalstory  type  allowing  a  transitive  relation  to  be  inferred  based  on  noun 
phrase  equivalence: 
eg 
The  boy  liked  the  movie. 
The  movie  was  Star  Wars. 
Therefore,  the  boy  liked  Star  Wars. 
-33- Passive  story  type  allowing  the  agent  of  an  action  to  be  infcrrcd  cg 
The  boy  was  kissed. 
Mary  liked  the  boy. 
Therefore,  Mary  Idssed  the  boy. 
The  instrumental  story  type  allows  an  instrument  to  be  inferred  as  part  of  an  action 
eg  The  girl  threw  the  ball. 
The  ball  broke  the  window. 
Therefore,  The  girl  broke  the  window  with  the  ball. 
The  negation  story  type  allows  a  negative  relation  to  be  inferred  eg 
The  girl  did  not  have  lunch. 
Father  ate  soup. 
Therefore,  the  girl  did  not  have  soup. 
The  dative  story  type  allows  an  extension  of  an  action  to  be  inferred 
eg 
The  girl  showed  the  boy  the  letter. 
Thcrcforc,  the  boy  rcad  the  Icttcr. 
Wilson  found  that  there  were  minimal  differences  between  the  deaf  and  hearing  on 
measures  of  literal  comprehension  but  that  the  deaf  were  significantly  poorer  at 
inferential  comprehension.  (Davey,  LaSasso,  &  McReady  (1983)  found  similar 
results.  Their  study  is  described  below  in  more  detail).  There  were  also  no  differences 
for  the  hearing  group  in  response  times  for  inferred  and  literal  tasks  but  the  deaf  were 
-34- significantly  slower  injudgements;  involving  inference.  The  order  of  difficulty  for  each 
inference  type  for  each  group  is  shown  in  Table  2.1.  It  should  be  noted  that  there  arc 
only  slight  variations  in  the  order  of  difficulty  for  both  groups.  Wilson  also  found  a 
significant  developmental  trend  in  the  acquisition  of  linguistic  inference  for  the  deaf 
but  not  for  the  hearing  subjects  on  the  material  used.  It  seems  that  the  dcaf  are  going 
through  stages  of  infercntial  development  already  achieved  by  their  hearing  pccrs  who 
have  been  matched  on  reading  ability.  Wilson  found  that  while  the  infcrcncing  ability 
of  the  deaf  was  poorcr  when  they  tackle  texts  with  more  complex  syntactic  structure, 
they  were  also  delayed  in  acquiring  inferential  skills  even  when  they  had  a  complete 
understanding  of  the  syntax  of  the  underlying  scntc'nccs.  It  was  al.  so  noted  that  the 
hearing  subjects  performed  significantly  better  with  the  spoken  presentation  than  with 
reading  while  the  deaf  performed  significantlibettcr  with  the  reading  presentation  than 
with  the  signed  presentation. 
TABLE  2.1  Percentage  of  correct  responses  for  each  inference 
type  (Wilson,  1979) 
Hearing  Group 
Predicate  Nominal  (89%) 
instrumental  (87%) 
Dative  *  (76%) 
Negative  (71%) 
Deaf  Group 
instrumental  (76%) 
Predicate  Nominal  (73%) 
Dative 
Negative  (50%) 
Passive  (67%)  Locative  (47%) 
Locative  Passive  (40%) 
-35- This  last  conclusion  is  supported  by  findings  from  other  studies  which  have  compared 
how  much  material  is  assimilated  by  deaf  subjects  when  different  modes  of 
communication  are  used.  For  example,  White  &  Stevenson  (1975)  found  reading  to  be 
superior  to  the  spoken  word  and  total  communication  (signing  and  speech)  as  a 
method  of  presenting  factual  information  to  deaf  children.  Quigley-&  Frisina  (1961) 
also  reported  that  reading  appeared  to  provide  a  more  stable  means  of  communication 
for  deaf  students  than  does  speech  or  fingcrspclling.  While  Stuckless  &  Pollard 
(1977)  showed  that  deaf  children  who  were  raised  using  fingerspelling  could  process 
written  material  more  readily  than  fingcrspelling. 
A  study  by  Pinhas  (1984)  also  examined  inferencing  in  deaf  children,  specifically 
looking  at  three  questions:  (a)  Is  inferential  processing  of  written  text  more  difficult  for 
deaf  than  for  hearing  children?  (b)  Is  there  a  ny  difference  in  deaf  children's  ability  to 
draw  inferences  if  the  information  is  presented  in  signed  form  compared  with  written 
form?  (c)  Are  some  types  of  inference  easier  to  comprehend  than  others,  specifically 
lexical  compared  with  contextual  inferences?  However,  most  of  the  hypotheses  were 
not  proved  and  results  were  contradictory,  due  mainly  to  design  faults.  For  example, 
response  times  were,  recorded  by  the  experimenter  manually  starting  a  timing  device 
and  stopping  it  when  the  subjects  gave  their  response.  Obviously  the  variation  in  the 
reaction  time  of  the  experimenter  could  lead  to  gross  inaccuracies. 
Several  studies,  cg  Wilson,  Karchman  &  Jcnscma  (1978);  LaSasso  (1980);  Wolk  & 
Schildroth  (1984);  Davey,  LaSasso  &  McReady  (1983)  have  highlighted  the  fact  that 
task  demands  and  test-taking  skills  appear  to  obscure  the  nature  of  inferencing 
processes  in  the  deaf.  For  example,  Davey  et  al  compared  reading  comprehension  of 
deaf  and  hearing  subjects  by  examining  cloze  and  free  response  productions  and 
modified  clozc  and  multiple  choice  recognition  under  look-back  and  no-look-back 
conditions.  They  found  that  hearing  subjects  had  better  comprehension  overall  than  the 
deaf  on  multiple  choice  and  free  response.  Uteral  questions  were  easier  for  all  subjects 
than  inferential  questions.  For  cloze  and  modified  cloze  the  hearing  subjects  were 
superior  to  the  deaf.  Also  modified  cloze  was  easier  for  both  groups  of  subjects  than 
cloze  procedure.  Being  able  to  look  back  and  re-intcrprct  the  text  resulted  in  improved 
-36- performance  for  both  groups  but  more  so  for  the  hearing  subjects.  Thus  not  only  may 
inferential  processing  be  more  difficult  for  the  deaf,  but  certain  test  conditions  and 
procedures  may  measure  these  skills  more  accurately  than  others. 
2.3  Summary 
In  summary,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  inferencing  skills  of  deaf  readers  have  not  been 
extensively  studied.  The  few  studies  which  do  exist  offer  inconsistent  findings  and 
have  designs  and  methodologies  which  are  flawed. 
It  is  clear  that  deaf  readers  have  difficulty  in  d]iawing  inferences  from  textual  material. 
However,  is  this  true  for  all  types  of  inference?  Is  it  a  general  linguistic  problem  which 
is  present  when  an  attempt  is  made  to  draw  an  inference  from  information  which  is 
presented  in  sign  language?  Also,  although  deaf  subjects  may  be  generally  poorer  at 
inferring,  on  those  occasions  when  they  can  successfully  understand  implicit  material, 
what  is  the  mechanism  by  which  this  is  achieved?  The  series  of  studies  reported  in  this 
thesis  attempts  to  address  these  questions. 
Before  this  is  considered,  the  work  on  inferencing  in  hearing  adults  Will  be  examined. 
Much  work  has  been  carried  out  in  this  area  over  the  past  fifteen  years  or  so, 
particularly  with  reference  to  what  inferences  take  place  during  reading  and  when 
during  the  reading  process  they  are  generated.  Since  a  wide  variety  of  approaches  have 
been  used  in  these  studies,  the  associated  methodologies  will  then  be  studied  in  detail 
and  their  applicability  to  the  deaf  population  considered. 
-37- Chapter  Three 
Inferencing  Skills  in  Hearing  Adults 
As  many  researchers  such  as  Sanford  and  Garrod  (1981)  have  argued,  inferencing  is 
vital  to  the  reading  process.  The  meanings  of  words,  sentences,  paragraphs  or entire 
passages  ard  affected  by  the  contexts  in  which  they  occur  and  by  the  prior  knowledge 
of  the  reader  about  the  subject  being  read.  The  details  presented  in  the  text  are 
interpreted  by  the  reader  in  terms  of  his  or  her  prior  knowledge,  the  schemata  which 
have  been  activated  by  the  subject  of  the  text,..  and  by  what  the  reader  predicts  is  ahead 
in  the  text.  Inferencing  is  essential  if  comprehension  beyond  the  most  basic  level  of 
very  literal  material  is  to  be  achieved,  in  other  words,  just  about  all  reading  material 
with  a  reading  difficulty  level  of  about  8  years,  and  probably  much  -that  is  below  that 
level. 
3.1  Taxonomy  of  Inferences 
One  of  the  first  steps  would  seem  to  be  to  define  what  is  meant  by  an  inference. 
Several  attempts  have  been  made  at  classifying  the  process. 
Andcrson  (1981)  suggcsted  a  four  lcvel,  functional  classification. 
(a)  The  first  level  is  lexically  based,  where  the  inference  follows  from  the  meaning 
of  words.  This  depends  on  the  reader's  knowledge  of  the  language  and  is 
relatively  independent  of  context. 
The  second  level  sees  inferences  being  driven  by  the  need  to  connect  textual 
propositions.  This  depends  on  readers  using  their  world  knowledge  as  well  as 
information  contained  in  the  text  to  infer  the  semantic  and  logical  connections 
-38- between  otherwise  unconnected  propositions  or  sentences.  An  example  might 
be. 
John  was  working  at  the  top  of  the  stairs. 
Jill  was  in  the  kitchen.  She  heard  John  scream. 
She  phonedfor  an  ambulance. 
The  reader  uses  his  or  her  world  knowledge  to  infer  thýti  John  must  have  fallen 
down  the  stairs  and  injured  himself  (the  scream)  and  therefore  Jill  summoned 
help  by  phoning  for  an  ambulance. 
(c)  The  tlýird  level  is  involved  when  the  reader's  schemata  or  knowledge  structures 
have  been  activated  by  the  text  and  have  unfilled  slots  (due  to  missing  or 
unsupplied  information)  and  therefore  make  the  schemata  tentative. 
The  forth  level  is  one  step  up  from  the  third  and  involves  the  constant  and 
repeated  interaction  of  text  and  schemata  to  select  and  refine  the  schemata,  thus 
providing  a  constantly  updated  interpretive  framework  for  text  ! comprehension. 
These  inferencing  processes  operate  (as  do  lower  order  skills  such  as  decoding)  at  an 
automatic  and  probably  unconscious  level.  In  fact  these  skflls  become  such  an  integral 
part  of  the  reading  process  that  skilled  readers  often  cannot  distinguish,  at  recall,  what 
they  read  from  a  page  and  what  they  added  by  way  of  inference  (Brewer,  1975;  Spiro, 
1977). 
An  alternative  taxonomy  was  suggested  by  Trabasso,  Nicholas,  Ornanson,  &  Johnson 
(1977). 
(a)  The  first  stage  is  lexically  based  and  is  similar  to  that  already  mentioned  above. 
-39- (b)  The  second  category  is  labelled  inferences  Of  sRace  and  time.  Here  episodes  have 
to  be  linked  by  the  reader  in  a  sort  of  spatio-temporal  framework  for  understanding  of 
the  narrative  text. 
For  example: 
Jim  went  to  Dundee  yesterday. 
-  He  met  his  old  teacher. 
It  is  assumed,  therefore,  that  Jim  met  his  teacher  in  Dundee. 
(c)  The  third  category  is  called  extral2glative  inferences  and  is  similar  to  the  second 
level  of  Anderson's  classification  mentioned  above.  The  reader 
, 
extrapolates  beyond 
the  information  mentioned  in  the  text  and  fills  in  the  gaps  in  what  can  be  regarded  as 
an  "elliptical"  narrative,  thus  providing  the  links  between  the  statements  actually 
appearing  in  the  text. 
(d) This  catýgory  is*  called  evaluative  inferences.  The  reader  uses  the  context  of  the 
narrative  to  evaluate  the  significance  and  effect  of  a  particular  statement. 
For  example: 
Harry  could  onlyfind  one  pound  in  his  pocket. 
(1)  If  this  comes  in  the  context  of  Harry  having  just  eaten  a  large  and  expensive 
meal  in  a  restaurant,  then  he  is  in  trouble  and  the  police  may  be  called. 
If  he  is  on  his  way  to  the  bank,  he  will  know  that  he  needs  to  withdraw  some 
cash. 
-40- 3.2  Backward  vs  Forward  Inferences. 
A  very  important  area  of  study  has  been  exactly  when  an  inference  is  made  during  the 
reading  process.  If  the  inference  is  drawn  in  order  to  establish  coherence  between  the 
present  piece  of  text  and  the  preceding  text,  then  it  is  a  backward  or  bridging 
inference.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  inference  is  not  needed  for  coherence,  but  is 
simply  drawn  to  embellish  the  textual  information,  then  it  is  a  forward  or  elaborative 
inference. 
3.2.1  Bridging  Inferences. 
Clark  (1975)  suggested  that  to  facilitate  communication,  there  is  an  implicit  contract 
between  speaker  and  listener  which  utilises  a  partitioning  of  the  information  conveyed 
into  "Given"  and  "New"  (see  Grice,  1975).  The  "Given"  is  the  assumed  common 
ground  between  speaker  and  listener,  while  the  "New"  is  exactly  that,  new 
information  which  the  listener  then  tries  to  link  to  the  previously  "Given".  This 
strategy  will  allow  the  listener  or  reader  to  understand  anaphori-C  references.  An 
example  is  given  below: 
Herb  unpacked  the  picnic  things. 
77ze  beer  was  warm. 
The  reader  knows  that  "the  beer"  refers  to  one  of  "the  picnic  things"  although  this  is 
not  stated  explicitly.  In  other  words,  it  is  necessary  to  made  a  bridging  inference. 
Haviland  and  Clark  (1974)  showed  that  it  takes  si0ficantly  longer  to  read  a  sentence 
such  as  "The  beer  was  warm"  when  it  follows  a  sentence  which  refers  to  "picnic 
things"  as  above  than  when  it  follows  a  sentence  which  mentions  beer  explicitly,  as 
below: 
-41- Herb  unpacked  the  beer. 
The  beer  was  warm. 
In  other  words,  comprehension  time  is  increased  whenever  a  reader  has  to  make  a 
bridging  inference.  However,  in  the  above  examples  it  could  be  argued  that  the 
advantage  in  reading  times  when  there  is  a  direct  antecedent  present  is  due  merely  to 
lexical  priming. 
Haviland  &  Clark  (1974)  varied  their  material,  an  example  of  which  is  shown  below: 
I  (Tom  wanted  an  alligatorfor  Christmas. 
it  (The  alligator  was  hisfavourite  present. 
2  (Tom  got  an  alligatorfor  Christmas. 
2'  (The  qlligator  was  hisfavourite  present. 
Chafe  (1972)  has  shown  that  verbs  like  "want"  in  the  first  pair  of  sentences  have  the 
unusual  feature  of  not  presupposing  the  existence  of  their  objects.  You  can  want 
something  which  does  not  exist.  Therefore,  the  phrase  "an  alligator"  in  sentence  1 
does  not  necessarily  set  up  a  direct  antecedent  for  the  subsequent  anaphoric  reference 
in  sentence  1'.  Therefore  it  is  necessary  to  make  a  bridging  inference.  Since  a  direct 
antecedent  is  set  up  in  sentence  2,  no  bridging  inference  is  necessary  in  sentence  2'. 
However,  in  both  cases,  the  first  sentence  contains  the  word  "alligator"  and  so  any 
lexical  priming  will  operate  equally  over  both  pairs  of  sentences. 
Haviland  &  Clark  again  found  a  comprchcnsion  timc  advantagc  for  the  condition  with 
the  direct  antecedent.  Thus  bridging  inferences  take  additional  processing  time,  and 
this  occurs  at  the  time  of  encountering  the  critical  sentence. 
-42- Other  authors  have  shown  that  such  bridging  inferences  are  affected  by  the 
relationship  between  the  anaphor  and  its  antecedent.  In  particular,  either  the  anaphor  or 
the  antecedent  can  be  a  generalised  term  or  class  and  the  other  can  be  a  specific 
example  of  that  class.  For  example,  the  antecedent  could  be  "vehicle"  while  the 
anaphor  might  be  "bus"  or  "car".  These  could  be  reversed  with  the  antecedent  being 
the  generalised  term  and  the  anaphor  the  specific  exemplar. 
A  specific  example  of  a  class  membership  mentioned  above  could  either  be  a  common 
exemplar  or might  be  less  common.  For  example,  a  car  would  be  seen  as  being  more 
common  then,  say,  a  tandem,  for  the  class  of  vehicle.  Garrod  &  Sanford  (1977) 
investigated  whether  there  was  any  difference  in  processing  times  for  bridging 
inferences  for  exemplars  which  were  common  (ie  sharing  a  high  conjoint  frequency 
with  the  category)  compared  with  those  that  were  more  uncommon  (sharing  a  low 
conjoint  frequency).  An  example  is  given  below: 
4A  goose  would  sometimes  wander  into  the  house. 
4'  A  robin  would  sometimes  wander  into  the  house. 
5  The  bird  was  attracted  by  the  larder. 
They  found  a  reading  time  advantage  for  the  common  exemplar  (sentence  4')  over  the 
less  common  (sentence  4).  In  other  words,  common  exemplars  allow  bridging 
inferences  to  be  made  more  quickly. 
3.2.2  Elaborative  Inferences. 
As  stated  above,  an  elaborative  inference  is  one  which  is  not  essential  for 
comprehension  at  the  time  it  is  drawn,  but  rather  expands  on  or  further  defines 
explicitly  stated  information  in  the  text. 
-43- The  studies  which  have  been  carried  out  in  this  area  give  equivocal  results.  For 
example,  some  studies  have  found  that  readers  do  not  construct  instrumental 
inferences,  eg  Corbett  &  Dosher  (1978);  Dosher  &  Corbett  (1982);  Singer  (1979).  An 
example  from  Singer  is  shown  below: 
77te  boy  cleared  the  snow  with  a  shovel.  (SrATED) 
The  boy  cleared  the  snow  from  the  stairs.  (UNSTATED) 
The  shovel  was  heavy.  (TEST) 
He  found  that  subjects  took  longer  to  read  the  test  sentence  when  it  followed  a 
sentence  where  the  instrument  was  unstated  than  when  it  was  explicitly  stated.  In  other 
words,  elaborative  inferences  are  not  made,  only  bridging  inferences. 
Other  studies  find  that  subjects  do  construct  instrumental  inferences,  eg  Garrod  & 
Sanford  (1981).  An  example  used  by  them  is  shown  below: 
Keith  was  going  to  give  a  lecture  in  London. 
He  was  taking  his  car  there  overnight.  (STATED) 
He  was  driving  there  overnight.  (UNSTATED) 
Pie  car  had  recently  been  overhauled. 
Did  Keith  go  to  London  by  car?  (TEST) 
They  found  no  advantage  for  the  stated  condition  over  the  unstated  and  interpret  this  as 
showing  that  forward  inferences  are  being  made.  A  fuller  description  of  the  Garrod  & 
Sanford  study  is  given  in  a  later  chapter  in  which  a  version  of  that  study  is  replicated 
and  expanded. 
-44- A  study  by  Cotter  (1984)  suggested  that  the  different  results  obtained  by  two  of  the 
studies  mentioned  above  (viz  Singer  and  Garrod  &  Sanford)  were  due  to  each  study 
using  different  subsets  of  verbs,  the  examples  used  in  the  Garrod  &  Sanford  study 
having  stronger  ýcrb-instrument  links  than  did  the  Singer  study.  These  differences  in 
strength  of  semantic  relatedness  could  not  be  detected  by  the  pretest  questionnaires 
used  but  became  obvious  during  the  reading  task  because  of  the  greater  time  pressures 
therein. 
A  series  of  experiments  by  O'Brien,  Shank,  Myers;  &  Rayner  (1988)  showed  that 
subjects  dogcnerate  and  store  elaborative  inferences  on-line  but  only  under  fairly 
limited  conditions.  Readers  may  draw  elabondfive  inferences  only  when  the  context  is 
sufficiently  rich  and  therefore  constraining.  Without  this  constraint,  the  reader  is  likely 
to  delay  any  inferential  process  until  the  text  indicates  unambiguously  what  the  correct 
inference  is  or  until  it  becomes  necessary  for  comprehension.  Once  generated, 
elaborative  inferences  are  stored  as  part  of  the  long-term  memory  of  a  passage.  An 
slightly  simplified  example  from  O'Brien  et  al  (1988)  illustrates  this: 
_ 
Sentence  (1)  =  High  Context,  Sentence  (2)  =  Low  Context 
Gus  7oved  to  play  gantes  that  allowed  him  to  spend  time  outside. 
(1)  His  dream  of  a  hole-in-one  made  thisparticular  sport  hisfavourite. 
(2)  The  leisurely  pace  made  this  particular  sport  hisfavourite. 
He  used  every  chance  he  could  to  practise. 
Playing  golf  was  something  he  never  got  tired  of  doing. 
In  the  high  context  condition,  readers  infer  that  the  game  is  golf  and  take  less  time 
when  fixating  the  word  "goV'  in  the  last  sentence  than  they  do  in  the  low  context 
condition. 
-45- 3.3  Causal  Structure  of  a  Text. 
Several  researchers  have  thought  that  the  chain  of  causal  relatedness  of  a  narrative  is 
essential  to  the  comprehension  process,  eg  Graesser  &  Clark  (1985)  and  Trabasso, 
van  den  Broek,  &  Suh  (1989).  The  inferences  drawn  link  together  the  various 
propositions  stated  in  the  text  in  a  meaningful  way.  However,  if  the  immediately 
preceding  text  fails  to  provide  a  cause  for  an  action  contained  in  the  sentence  just  read 
(a  "causal  break"),  the  reader  reviews  earlier  segments  of  the  text  in  memory  and,  if 
necessary,  uses  world  knowledge  to  generate  a  bridging  inference  between  the  current 
sentence  and  sentences  read  earlier.  This  ide4  is  supported  by  several  studies  which 
show  that  reading  time  increases  with  decreased  causal  coherence,  eg  Haberlandt  & 
-  Shinjo  &  Duffy  (1987),  Bingham  (1978),  Keenan,  Baillet  &  Brown  (1984),  Myers, 
and  O'Brien  &  Myers  (1985).  The  variations  in  reading  times  are  also  accompanied  by 
variation  in'memory  for  the  text.  When  it  is  difficult  to  generate  a  causal  inference 
memory  is  poor.  However,  when  a  causal  inference  is  easily  drawn  in  response  to  a 
coherence  break  in  the  text,  text  memory  is  actually  better  than  in  those  cases  where 
there  is  no  coherence  break  (Keenan,  Baillet,  &  Brown,  1984;  Myers  &  Duffy,  1991; 
Myers,  Shinjo,  &  Duffy,  1987;  O'Brien  and  Myers,  1985). 
Two  models  of  comprehension  based  around  the  causal  structure  of  a  text  are 
considered  below.  One  views  the  reader  as  being  relatively  passive,  with  causal 
linkages  being  sought  and  constructed  only  in  response  to  coherence  breaks.  The  other 
considers  the  reader  to  be  much  more  active,  constructing  a  richly  interconnected 
network  of  causal  links  between  the  various  elements  of  the  story.  Once  these  models 
have  been  reviewed,  a  number  of  more  recent  studies  are  considered,  each  refining 
methodology  and  design  in  an  attempt  to  build  support  for  one  or  other  of  the 
theoretical  stances. 
-46- 3.3.1  Trabasso's  Model  of  Causal  Structure. 
Trabasso's  model  (Trabasso  &  van  den  Brock,  1985;  Trabasso  &  Sperry,  1985) 
assumes  that  a  text's  causal  structure  is  parsed  into  statements  of  events  which 
correspond  roughly  to  clauses.  All  pairs  of  statements  are  considered  and  event  A  is 
said  to  cause  another,  event  B,  if  in  the  context  of  the  story  B  would  not  have  occurred 
if  A  had  not  occurred.  These  events  are  seen  as  nodes  which  are  connected  to  one 
another  in  a  chain-like  structure. 
An  example  from  Trabasso  and  Sperry  (1985)  which  illustrates  this  is  noted  below: 
A  father  and  his  son  /  were  taking  their  donkey  to  town  /  to  sell  him  /  at  the 
marketplace.  1  They  had  not  gone  a  great  distanced  when  they  met  a  group  of 
pretty  maidens  /  who  were  returning  from  the  town.  1 
.... 
/  The  donkey,  not 
liking  to  be  tied  /  kicked  sojerociously  /  that  he  broke  the  rope,  l  tumbled  off  the 
pole  into  the  water  /  and  scrambled  away  into  the  thicket. 
Some  of  the  causal  connections  are  of  a  physical  nature,  eg  "kicked  so  ferociously" 
being  a  cause  of  "that  he  broke  the  rope.  "  Others  are  less  obvious.  For  example,  "to 
sell  him"  is  A  cause  of  "were  taking  the  donkey  to  town"  as  they  have  to  go  to  town  as 
that  is  were  the  market  is.  In  addition,  "  77zey  had  not  gone  a  great  distance"  can  be 
seen  as  a  cause  of  "they  met  a  group  ofpretty  maidens"  since  they  presumably  would 
not  have  met  them  if  they  had  not  left  home. 
Any  such  causal  structure  can  be  represented  diagramatically.  An  example  of  how  a 
text  may  be  represented  is  shown  in  Figure  3.1  below: 
-47- Figure  3.1:  An  illustration  of  Trabasso's 
causal  structure  for  a  text 
.  48- Each  statement  is  represented  as  a  node  which  is  linked  to  other  nodes  by  a  series  of 
paths,  the  causal  connections.  Some  nodes  have  more  connections  than  others.  For 
example,  node  6  has  three  connections  while  node  8  has  five. 
Some  statements  can  be  on  the  main  causal  chain  while  others  will  be  on  a  side  chain, 
the  main  causal  chain  being  the  link  of  causal  connections  from  the  start  of  an  episode 
(eg  the  introduction  of  the  main  characters)  through  to  the  attaining  or  otherwise  of  the 
goals  of  these  characters.  Nodes  which  are  not  on  the  main  causal  chain  in  the  example 
above  are  9,11,12,  and  14. 
It  has  been  shown  that  recall  of  a  statement  increases  with  the  number  of  connections 
to  that  node  or  statement  (Trabasso  &  van  den  Broek,  1985).  These  authors  also 
showed  that  nodes  which  are  on  the  main  causal  chain  linking  the  opening  and  closing 
statements  of  a  narrative  are  better  remembered  than  those  which  are  on  a  side  chain. 
However,  it  could  be  argued  that  these  effects,  rather  than  reflecting  comprehension 
processes  operating  at  the  time  of  reading,  actually  are  a  function  of  the  reconstructive 
processes  operating  at  a  later  time  when  recall  is  required.  This  is  discussed  in  more 
detail  in  a  later  section  below. 
O'Brien  &  Myers  (1987)  analysed  the  effects  of  causal  structure  upon  reading  times 
and  recall  times  obtained  immediately  after  reading.  They  found  that  times  taken  to 
read  a  statement  containing  an  anaphoric  reference  to  an  antecedent  in  the  text 
decreased  as  the  number  of  causal  connections  to  the  statement  containing  the  anaphor 
increased.  In  a  subsequent  study,  they  measured  the  time  to  produce  an  antecedent  in 
answer  to  a  question  immediately  after  reading  the  text,  eg  "What  was  the  stolen 
object?  "  (The  anaphor  was  dropped  from  the  text  in  this  version)..  They  found  that 
recall  times  were  a  function  of  the  length  of  the  shortest  causal  path  from  the  setting 
information  in  the  passage  to  the  statement  containing  the  targeted  word. 
Therefore,  the  patterns  of  causal  connections  clearly  influence  retrieval  times. 
However  th  critical  aspect  of  the  causal  structure  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  rlý 
retrieval  task.  It  is  likely  that  reinstatement  by  use  of  an  anaphor  and  recall  in  response 
-49- to  a  question  start  at  different  points.  It  can  be  assumed  that  reinstatement  searches 
initiated  by  an  anaphoric  reference  start  from  nodes  corresponding  to  propositions  in  a 
buffer  memory  (Kintsch  &  van  Dijk,  1978).  Since  these  propositions  come  from 
different  parts  of  the  passage,  then  contact  during  such  a  search  is  more  likely  with  a 
targeted  proposition  which  lies  on  many  different  causal  paths,  that  is  one  with  many 
connections.  On  the  other  hand,  recall  in  response  to  a  question  involves  a  search  of 
long-term  memory.  This  involves  a  spread  of  activation  along  causal  links,  beginning 
at  the  first  proposition  encountered.  In  such  a  search,  the  shortest  path  dominates  and 
therefore  path  length  is  critical. 
While  these  findings  would  seem  to  support  the  Trabasso  model,  Myers(1990)  has 
reservations  based  on  the  experimental  design.  He  feels  that  since  many  of  the  results 
rest  upon  regression  analysis  they  are  sensitive  to,  among  others,  (a)  correlations 
among  the  predictors,  (b)  the  sample  sizes  relative  to  the  number  of  predictors. 
Another  inýdel  discussed  next,  would  also  seem  capable  of  predicting  the  results 
found  above. 
3.3.2  Fletcher  and  Blooms  Current  State  Model. 
Fletcher  &  Bloom  (1988)  proposed  a  different  model  which  saw  the  reader  as  a  less 
active  processor.  Each  sentence  is  partitioned  into  statements  using  two  rules.  Firstly, 
a  sentence  boundary  always  terminates  a  statement.  Secondly,  clause  boundaries 
terminate  a  statement  only  if  it  separates  segments  having  different  causal  antecedents 
or  consequeInces.  The  Fletcher  &  Bloom  model  assumes  that  fewer  propositions  are 
maintained  in  an  active  state  and  less  frequent  searches  of  long-term  memory  are 
needed,  compared  to  the  Trabasso  model. 
The  Fletcher  &  Bloom  model  is  very  similar  to  that  proposed  by  Yintsch  &  van  Dijk 
(1978).  The  latter  assumes  that  some  propositions  from  one  "cycle"  are  held  over  to 
the  next  cycle.  New  propositions  are  then  connected  to  these  older  propositions  and  a 
series  of  links  built  up.  Anything  new  which  is  not  able  to  be  connected  remains  in  the 
-50- buffer.  If  nothing  can  can  be  matched,  a  search  can  then  be  made  of  long-term 
memory.  The  longer  propositions  reside  in  short-term  memory,  the  stronger  the  record 
made  in  long-term  memory.  Useful  propositions  held  over  are  those  which  are  richly 
connected  and,  therefore,  likely  to  be  of  importance  (ie  the  theme  or  gist).  Others 
likely  to  be  held  over  are  those  most  recently  mentioned,  as  these  are  more  likely  to 
connect  or  relate  to  to  subsequently  mentioned  propositions  than  to  distant  ones. 
The  main  difference  in  the  Fletcher  &  Bloom  model  is  the  assumption  that  the  most 
recent  statement  or  proposition  which  is  connected  to  an  antecedent  but  not  to  a 
consequence  is  held  in  a  short-term  working  buffer'.  This  can  be  illustrated  by  an 
extract  from  a  text  used  in  a  study  by  Bloom,  Fletcher,  van  den  Broek,  Ritz,  & 
Shapiro  (1990): 
(1)  Danny  wanted  to  have  the  red  bike 
(2)  that  he  saw  in  the  window  of  the  neighbourhood  bike  shop.  1 
(3)  Danny  knew  thatfirst  he  had  to  have  $50 
(4)  to  buy  the  bike.  (5)  ..... 
When  processing  the  first  sentence,  a  link  is  formed  by  the  reader  from  Statement  2  to 
Statement  1:  seeing  the  bike  causes  Danny  to  want  it.  Statement  1  is  held  in  the  buffer  9 
as  the  second  sentence  is  processed  and  is  causally  linked  to  Statement  4;  wanting  to 
have  the  bike  is  causally  related  to  wanting  to  buy  it. 
Fletcher  &  Bloom  (1988)  found  that  propositional  recall  correlated  significantly  with 
the  number  of  cycles  in  the  buffer  and  the  number  of  causal  connections  derived  from 
the  current-state  strategy.  Their  model  accounted  for  more  of  the  variance  in 
propositional  recall  than  either  the  Kintsch  &  van  Dijk  model  or  a  model  akin  to  that  of 
Trabasso. 
-51- Bloom,  Fletcher,  van  den  Broek,  Reitz  &  Shapiro  (1990)  providCd  evidence  from 
reading  time  experiments  which  seems  to  support  the  current-state  model  more  than 
the  Trabasso  model.  They  predicted  that:  (a)  time  is  required  to  connect  statements;  (b) 
causal  connections  between  statements  in  the  same  sentence  (sentence  links)  will  be 
more  rapidly  made  than  connections  between  a  new  statement  and  one  currently  in 
working  memory  (working  memory  connections);  and  (c)  when  no  causal  antecedent 
is  available,  a  search  of  long-term  memory  is  required. 
They  also  distinguished  between  allowable  causal  links  (the  essential  links  of  the 
Fletcher  &  Bloom  model)  and  potential  links  (the  additional  links  in  the  Trabasso 
model).  Normally  a  potential  link  will  not  be  accompanied  by  increased  reading  time 
except  (a)  for  coherence  breaks,  (b)  when  a7statement  satisfies  a  goal  no  longer  in 
short-term  memory,  and  (c)  when  a  statement  frustrates  a  goal  no  longer  in  short-term 
memory. 
They  found  that  potential  links  have  no  effect  on  reading  times  except  for  (a)  and  (b) 
above;  (c)  had  no  effect.  They  also  found  that  both  sentence  links  and  working 
memory  links  do  require  time  to  construct. 
In  contrast  with  the  Trabasso  model,  in  which  all  potential  links  are  encoded,  the 
current-state  model's  assumptions  about  the  processor  seem  more  consistent  with  the 
response  time  data  and  suggest  that  subjects  draw  inferences  only  when  required  to 
maintain  text  coherence  or  when  instructed  to  do  so  (Duffy,  1986;  O'Brien,  Shank, 
Myers  &  Rayner,  1988;  Potts,  Keenan  &  Golding,  1988;  Singer  &  Ferreira,  1983). 
There  are  some  problems  associated  with  the  current-state  model  however.  For 
example,  in  the  Fletcher  &  Bloom  model  it  is  supposed  that  a  statement  is  held  in  the 
buffer  for  another  processing  cycle  only  if  it  has  an  antecedent  cause  but  no 
consequence  in  the  previously  read  text.  However  a  series  of  experiments  by  Duffy 
(1986)  suggest  that  events  which  lack  a  causal  antecedent  in  the  preceding  text  are  very 
likely  to  be  held  in  working  memory.  Consider  the  example  from  Duffy  below: 
-52- John  was  eating  in  the  dining  car  of  a  train.  Die  waiter  brought  him  a  bowl  of 
soup.  Suddenly  the  train  screeched  to  a  halt.  The  soup  spilled  in  John's  lap. 
The  sentence,  "Suddenly  the  train  screeched  to  a  hall" 
, 
has  no  obvious  causal 
antecedent  and,  as  a  result,  tends  to  be  "highlighted"  by  the  readers  important. 
These  occurrences  can  be  viewed  as  script  deviations,  where  something  unexpected 
and  unexplained  happens  in  the  narrative.  The  reader  naturally  focuses  on  it  and 
searches  the  following  text  for  a  cause  or consequence  to  which  it  can  be  connected. 
This  would  seem  to  be  a  necessary  addendum.  to  the  current-state  strategy. 
Another  problem  relates  to  the  assumption  that  reading  a  goal-satisfying  statement 
initiates  a  search  of  long-term  memory.  An  alternative  explanation  is  possible.  The 
goal  is  likely  to  be  stated  early  on  in  the  narrative,  while  the  goal-satisfying  statement 
is  near  the  end.  In  other  words,  the  two  statements  are  likely  to  be  separated  by  several 
intervening  sentences  and  the  initial  goal  is  thus  considerably  backgrounded.  The 
increase  in  reading  time  may  merely  reflect  a  search  to  find  the  antecedent  to  the 
anaphor. 
In  an  effort  to  address  some  of  these  problems,  Dopkins  &  Myers  (1989)  attempted  to 
discover  what  exactly  was  held  in  working  memory  at  each  point  in  the  text  and  what 
connections  were  established  in  long-term  memory.  They  felt  that  goals  are  well 
defincd  causes  of  subsequent  events  and,  as  such,  are  central  to  the  theories  under 
consideration.  From  both  Trabasso's  and  Fletcher  &  Bloom's  models,  it  can  be 
predicted  that  a  concept  will  be  more  accessible  in  long-term  memory  when  it  is  part  of 
a  statement  which  defines  a  goal  than  when  it  is  not,  since  such  a  goal  statement  will 
have  more  connections  and  be  on  the  main  causal  chain.  An  example  of  the  type  of 
passage  used  by  Dopkins  &  Myers  is  shown  below: 
-53- Goal  Version 
Al  aqd  Dave  were  in  the  process  of  breaking  out  of  the  state  pen.  With  snarls 
on  theirfaces,  they  raced  down  a  corridor.  7hey  lookedfor  a  hostage  to 
improve  their  bargaining  position.  Men  the  warden  appeared,  Al  crept  up 
quickly  behind  him. 
Control  Version 
Al  and  Dave  were  in  the  process  of  breaking  out  of  the  state  pen.  With  snarls 
on  theirfaces,  they  raced  down  the  corridor.  They  grabbed  a  hostage  to 
improve  their  bargaining  position.  When  the  warden  appeared,  Al  told  him  to 
keep  back. 
The  goal  version  contained  a  goal  setting  sentence  (They  looked  for  a  hostage... 
while  in  the  control  version,  the  goal  has  been  met  (They  grabbed  a  hostage 
...  ).  To 
test  for  the  accessibility  of  the  goal  word  (hostage),  an  itcm-rccognition  task  was  used. 
Since  in  the  goal  version,  the  goal  setting  statement  should  be  linked  to  the  goal 
satisfaction  statement,  then  the  goal  word  should  be  more  accessible  and  the  target 
word  more  quickly  accessed.  Target  nouns  were  categories  whose  membership  is  not 
well  defined  (anyone  can  be  a  potential  hostage).  This  helps  reduce  the  lexical 
association  between  the  goal  word  (hostage)  and  its  subsequent  instantiation  (warden). 
Anaphoric  reference  to  the  target  word  in  the  last  sentence  is  also  avoided,  and  both 
versions  have  as  similar  wording  as  possible.  Dopkins  &  Myers  found  that  a  word  is 
more  accessible  in  long-term  memory  when  it  is  part  of  a  goal  setting  statement  than  it 
otherwise  would  be  (eg  when  the  goal  has  been  met  early  in  the  text). 
It  might  be  thought  that  this  finding  could  be  as  a  result  of  the  reader  paying  more 
attention  to  the  goal  setting  sentence.  However,  Dopkins  &  Myers  proposed  that  this 
-54- is  not  due  to  increased  attention  but  requires  the  presence  of  a  goal  satisfaction 
sentence.  They  see  a  connection  being  established  between  a  goal  word  and  its  later 
instantiation,  but  only  in  the  condition  in  which  a  goal  has  been  set. 
One  interpretation  of  the  connection  between  the  goal  word  and  its  instantiation  might 
be  that  the  reader  attempts  to  actively  anticipate  subsequent  text  events,  but  this  seems 
unlikely  in  the  face  of  the  many  studies  that  have  failed  to  demonstrate  forward 
inferencing  (eg  Duffy,  1986;  Potts,  Keenan,  &  Golding,  1988). 
A  more  likely  mechanism  is  that  proposed  by  Garrod  &  Sanfoid  (1977)  that  reference 
to  an  object  or  individual  is  checked  against  locations  in  memory  in  order  to  store  the 
new  information.  A  variation  on  their  original  study  by  Dopkins  &  Myers  (1989) 
supported  this  contention.  The  search  for  an  anaphoric  antecedent  is  a  first  response 
and  if  the  resulting  representation  is  coherent,  then  no  further  connections  are  made. 
The  results  seem  to  support  the  position  that  goal-satisfying  statements  are  linked  to 
statements  initially  setting  the  goal  (eg  Bloom,  Fletcher,  van  den  Broek,  Reitz,  & 
Shapiro,  1990;  Fletcher  &  Bloom,  1988;  Trabasso  &  van  den  Brock,  1985). 
However,  Myers  (1990)  believes  that  it  is  not  a  case  of  the  reader  actively  seeking 
causal  relations  between  current  input  and  previously  read  propositions.  Nor  does  the 
connection  between  goal-setting  statements  and  goal-satisfying  statements  seem  to 
occur  as  generally  as  suggested  by  Bloom  et  al  (1990).  The  process  occurs  if  there  is 
an  anaphoric  connection  between  the  two  statements  or  if  there  is  no  better  place  to 
locate  concepts  introduced  in  the  goal-satisfaction  statement.  The  reader's  purpose 
may  not  be  to  establish  a  richly  interconnected  representation  but  to  maintain  what 
McKoon  &  Ratcliff  (1986)  have  labelled  minimal  local  coherence. 
One  problem  with  the  studies  cited  above  is  that  they  say  little  about  which  links  are 
constructed,  and  at  what  point  during  the  reading  process  this  occurs.  The  difficulty 
arises  from  the  methods  used.  The  majority  of  studies  of  causal  comprehension  have 
used  indirect  measures  of  the  comprehension  process  -  recall  scores,  importance 
ratings,  frequency  of  inclusion  in  summaries.  However,  as  will  be  discussed  in  more 
-55- detail  in  the  next  chapter,  these  methods  are  susceptible  to  factors  which  occur  after  the 
text  has  been  read.  What  is  required  is  an  approach  which  utilises  on-line  measures  of 
comprehension.  This  is  now  considered  in  the  work  of  Sanford  and  Garrod. 
3.4  Sanford  and  Garrod's  Model  of  Reading 
Sanford  and  Garrod  (1981)  put  forward  a  model  of  reading  comprehension  which 
emphasises  top-down  processing.  They  state  that  in  order  to  understand  a  piece  of 
discourse,  it  is  necessary  for  the  reader  to  relate  it  to  some  hypothetical  or  real  state  of 
the  world,  in  other  words,  to  determine  to  what  it  is  that  the  discourse  refers.  They 
view  this  process  in  terms  of  the  dynamics  ofiýemory  access. 
Memory  is  viewed  as  being  divided  into  four  partitions,  each  of  which  is 
independently  addressable  by  the  reader.  These  partitions  limit  the  domain  of  any 
search  which  is  needed  to  find  the  relevant  information  for  understanding  of  what  has 
been  read.  Two  of  these  partitions  are  seen  as  being  dynamic  in  nature  since  the 
contents  which  they  hold  change  as  the  text  unfolds.  This  Sanford  and  Garrod  call 
current  focus.  That  partition  of  focus  where  the  memory  representation  derives  purely 
from  interpretation  of  the  text,  called  explicit  focus,  is  of  limited  capacity.  The  second 
partition,  called  implicit  focus,  comprises  representations  derived  from  scenario-based 
sources.  Explicit  and  implicit  focus  provide  a  retrieval  domain  which  incorporates  the 
information'most  pertinent  to  understanding  the  text  at  any  given  time.  In  some  sense, 
they  embody  the  current  topic  of  the  text. 
The  two  remaining  partitions  of  memory  are  viewed  as  being  more  static  and  less 
susceptible  to  change  over  time.  One  of  these  is  the  long-term  memory  of  the  text,  the 
other  is  long-term  semantic  memory,  or  the  knowledge  base  of  the  reader. 
Sanford  and  Garrod  discuss  their  model  mainly  from  the  viewpoint  of  resolving 
references.  After  the  initial  parsing  process,  for  any  entity  mentioned  in  the  text,  an 
-56- attempt  will  be  made  to  map  it  onto  a  representation  of  its  meaning  (a  token)  in  explicit 
focus.  At  the  start  of  a  new  passage,  no  tokens  will  exist  in  short-term  memory  as  yet, 
so  a  new  token  is  set  up  for  the  entity  mentioned.  Any  subsequent  reference  to  this 
entity,  say  by  use  of  a  pronoun,  will  lead  to  the  pronoun  being  mapped  directly  onto 
the  token  in  explicit  focus.  This  mapping  process  is  called  reftieval  by  Sanford  and 
Garrod. 
A  second  process  which  is  involved  is  construction.  No  match  may  exist  in  explicit 
focus  and  reference  resolution  may  result  from  a  search  of  implicit  focus.  There  will 
be  no  token  corresponding  to  the  partial  description  (say  a  pronoun)  but  there  may  be  a 
slot  corresponding  to  it  in  the  scenario.  A  token  is  then  constructed  in  explicit  focus 
which  maps  directly  onto  the  scenario  slot  in  iiýplicit  focus. 
For  example,  consider  the  sentences  below: 
Keith  drove  to  London. 
The  car  bro4  down  halfway. 
Since  "Keith"  is  a  new  entity,  a  token  is  created  in  explicit  focus.  When  "drove  to 
London"  is  encountered,  a  search  of  memory  occurs  for  "drove".  Since  this  too  is  a 
new  entity,  an  appropriate  scenario  is  identified  in  long-term  memory  and  is  moved 
into  implicit  focus.  The  subsequent  referral  to  "car"  can  be  mapped  directly  onto  the 
appropriate  slot  in  the  scenario. 
This  search,  mapping  and  constructing  within  explicit  and  implicit  focus  is  described 
as  primary  processing.  If  this  primary  level  processing  fails  to  select  a  unique  referent 
then  secondary  processing  will  take  place.  It  may  be  that  the  entity  referred  to  has  not 
been  mentioned  recently  and  has  therefore  passed  out  of  current  focus  into  the  long- 
term  memory  representation  of  the  text.  A  search  of  this  area  of  memory  should  find 
an  appropriate  match.  Alternatively,  if  the  entity  has  not  been  mentioned  before  and  no 
-57- slots  can  be  found  within  the  current  scenario,  then  the  scenario  may  be  modified  or  a 
new,  more  appropriate  scenario  chosen.  Any  mapping  with  the  new  scenario  will  be  at 
the  primary  level.  Secondary  processing  is  much  slower  than  primary  processing. 
Characters  or  aspects  of  the  scenario  which  are  highlighted  in  explicit  focus  are  said  to 
be  foregrounded.  Qualifying  an  entity  by  additional  information  serves  to  bring  it  more 
into  the  foreground.  Thus  in  a  restaurant  scenario,  an  "attractive  waiter"  will  be  more 
highly  foregrounded  than  the  simple  mention  of  "a  waiter".  Highly  predicted 
characters  (eg  waiter  in  restaurant  scenario  above)  will  be  less  foregrounded  than 
poorly  predicted  characters  (for  example,  a  dishwasher),  as  they  are  more  readily 
accommoddted  by  the  scenario.  It  is  only  the  poorly  predicted  entities  which  are 
represented  in  explicit  focus. 
Not  only  are  pronominal  or  noun  phrase  references  resolved  but  also  entire  character- 
action  complexes.  If  such  a  whole  event  cannot  be  assimilated  into  a  scenario,  then  it 
should  be  foregrounded,  that  is  highlighted,  and  receive  a  fairly  strong  representation 
in  explicit  focus.  Thus,  while  explicit  focus  will  primarily  represent  such 
foregrounded  information  not  already  represented  in  implicit  focus,  it  will  always 
attempt  to  map  this  into  a  scenario  in  implicit  focus.  It  is  when  this  cannot  be  done, 
that  the  scenario  will  be  modified  or  changed. 
It  should  be  mentioned  that  the  particular  scenarios  evoked  will  be  dependent  on  the 
background,  experience  and  inclination  of  the  reader.  Also  the  contents  of  similar 
scenarios  are  likely  to  vary  between  different  readers.  Garrod  and  Sanford  (1980) 
have  shown  that  if  a  title  is  used  to  introduce  a  piece  of  text,  then  this  serves  to  bring 
in  the  appropriate  scenario.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  sample  text  from  their  study  noted 
below: 
-58- A12prol2ri  ate  Scenario 
IN  COURT  MTLE) 
Fred  was  being  questioned  (by  a  lawyer). 
He  had  been  accused  oftnurder. 
The  lawyer  was  17ying  to  prove  his  innocence.  (TARGE7) 
Inappropriate  Scenajo 
TELLING  A  LIE  MTLE) 
Fred  was  being  questioned  (by  a  lawyer). 
He  couldn't  tell  the  truth. 
The  lahyer  was  trying  to  prove  his  innocence.  (TARGE7) 
The  text  can  have  an  appropriate  or  inappropriate  title  and  the  target  entity  (lawyer)  can 
either  be  stated  or  unstated  in  the  first  sentence.  Garrod  and  Sanford  found  no 
difference  in  reading  times  for  the  target  sentences  between  stated  and  unstated 
conditions  when  an  appropriate  title  is  used.  However,  when  the  title  is  inappropriate, 
the  target  in  the  unstated  condition  takes  significantly  longer  to  read.  Thus  an 
informative  tide  will  invoke  the  appropriate  scenario. 
Anderson  (1982)  empirically  investigated  how  time  shifts  signalled  in  the  text  cause 
changes  in  scenarios  and  the  relative  availability  of  both  topic  characters  who  are 
essential  to  the  narrative  and  scenario  dependent  characters.  If  a  text  contains  a  time 
shift  which  is  outwith  the  normally  expected  range  of  a  scenario  (eg  "five  hours  later" 
when  talking  about  a  child's  birthday  party),  then  it  is  much  more  difficult  to  resolve  a 
subsequent  reference  to  a  character  who  is  bound  in  with  that  scenario  (eg  an 
-59- entertainer  for  the  party  scenario  above).  There  is  no  difference  to  the  status  of  the  key 
topic  character.  Also  the  actual  sentence  which  signals  the  time  shift  is  read  more 
slowly,  reflecting  the  effort  needed  to  switch  off  the  current  scenario  and  either  set  up 
a  new  scenario  or  prepare  for  possible  bridging  operations. 
Thus  Sanford  and  Garrod's  model  attempts  to  describe  a  dynamic  framework  which 
utilises  the  background  knowledge  of  the  reader  and  how  this  links  in  with  partitions 
of  memory  to  help  interpret  narrative  text. 
3.5  McKoon  and  Ratcliff:  The  Minimalist  Hypothesis 
In  contrast,  McKoon  &  Ratcliff  (1992)  in  a  lengthy  paper  attempted  to  separate  which 
inferences  are  automatically  produced  and  which  are  the  result  of  slower,  goal-based 
strategic  processes.  From  such  a  separation,  they  state  their  hope  of  laying  the 
foundation  for  the  development  of  a  greater  understanding  of  the  database  which  is 
provided  within  the  first  few  hundred  milliseconds  of  processing.  This  knowledge 
could  be  used  to  determine  what  information  strategic  processes  have  to  work  on, 
which  strateSic  inferences  are  likely  to  be  easy  and  which  difficult. 
They  do  this  in  what  they  call  the  minimalist  hypothesis.  The  minimalist  standpoint 
assumes  that: 
(1)  Readers  do  not  automatically  construct  inferences  to  fully  represent  the  situation 
described  by  a  text. 
(2)  In  the  absence  of  specific,  goal  directed  strategies,  only  two  types  of  inference 
are  constructed  automatically. 
(a)  those  necessary  to  establish  local  text  coherence, 
(b)  those  from  information  which  is  readilY  available  from  the  text  or  from 
general  knowledge. 
-60- Local  coherence  is  defined  as  those  propositions  of  a  text  that  are  in  working  memory 
at  the  same  time,  ie  no  further  apart  in  the  text  than  one  or  two  sentences.  McKoon  & 
Ratcliff  cite  the  Kintch  &  van  Dijk  (1978)  model  where  propositions  in  short-term 
memory  are  connected  together  through  overlap  of  their  arguments  and  are  ordered 
according  to  the  most  salient  or  topical  proposition.  One  example  of  inference  that  is 
needed  to  establish  local  coherence  is  the  connection  between  an  anaphor  and  its 
referent. 
Global  inferences  connect  widely  separated  picýcs'of  textual  information  into  an 
overall  causal  chain  or  network.  This  information  is  not  available  in  short-term 
memory  and  has  to  be  retrieved  from  long-tený  memory. 
McKoon  &  Ratcliff  contrast  the  constructionist  hypothesis  with  the  minimalist 
hypothesis.  They  do  this  by  considering  previous  studies  on  elaborative  inferences 
such  as  semantic,  instrumental  and  predictive  inferences  as  these  are  not  necessary  for 
local  coherence.  They  interpret  the  data  for  these  studies  (eg  Singer,  1978,1979; 
Corbett  &  Dosher,  1978;  Dosher  &  Corbett,  1982)  as  contradicting  the  constructionist 
standpoint  and  suggest  the  minimalist  hypothesis  as  an  alternative  explanation. 
Another  series  of  studies  considered  by  McKoon  &  Ratcliff  are  "real  life"  situations, 
which  are  again  interpreted  as  supporting  the  minimalist  view.  Several  of  these  real  life 
narratives  (eg  Morrow,  Greenspan,  &  Bower,  1987;  Morrow,  Bower,  &  Greenspan, 
1989)  involve  subjects  being  taught  about  a  situation  prior  to  reading  the  text.  For 
example,  subjects  were  taught  with  the  aid  of  a  map  about  the  rooms  in  a  laboratory 
and  the  layout  of  objects  within  those  rooms.  They  then  read  a  series  of  narratives 
describing  a  charucter  moving  through  the  rooms.  Results  showed  that  sub  ects  were  j 
faster  to  answer  questions  about  the  location  of  objects  when  they  were  relevant  to  the 
character's  current  location  or  the  character's  goal  location.  One  criticism  of  these 
studies  is  that  the  objects  were  made  available  not  as  a  result  of  automatic  (priming) 
processes  but  as  a  result  of  strategic  retrieval  processes  to  rehearse  the  position  of 
objects  within  the  rooms.  This  explanation  is  rejected  by  McKoon  and  Ratcliff  as  they 
-61- believe  it  is  not  possible  to  predict  what  aspects  of  a  situation  are  salient  in  any  given 
circumstances  and  therefore  no  way  of  predicting  which  inferences  should  be  included 
in  the  mental  model.  The  results  are  considered  by  them,  therefore,  as  being  consistent 
with  the  minimalist  standpoint. 
They  then  discuss  the  results  from  five  of  their  own  studies  which  show  that  global 
inferences  are  not  automatically  encoded.  For  example,  in  one  study  they  used  textual 
materials  which  were  locally  coherent,  consisting  of  two  paragraphs,  an  introduction 
followed  by  a  continuation.  In  the  introduction,  a  general  goal  is  set  (eg  to  kill  the 
president)  and  a  goal  which  is  subordinate  to  this  goal  is  also  described  (eg  using  a 
rifle).  For  the  continuation  paragraph,  there  are  three  conditions:  Control,  Try  Again, 
and  Substitution.  In  the  Control  version,  both  goals  are  achieved  (the  president  is 
shot).  In  the  Try  Again  condition,  a  problem  arises  in  attaining  the  subordinate  goal 
(eg  the  telescopefalls  off  the  rifle)  and  the  character  tries  the  goal  again  by  using  the 
rifle  in  a  different  way  (eg  sighting  without  the  scope).  In  the  Substitution  condition,  a 
problem  also  arises  with  the  subordinate  goal,  but  instead  of  trying  again,  the  character 
substitutes  a  new  subordinate  goal  (eg  using  hand  grenades  instead  of  the  rij7e). 
Immediately  after  reading  the  text,  a  recognition  test  word  for  the  general  goal  (A110  is 
presented.  According  to  the  minimalist  hypothesis,  the  general  goal  at  this  stage 
should  no  longer  be  used  for  comprehension  under  any  of  the  three  conditions  and 
there  should  be  no  differences  in  response  times  to  the  test  Probe.  In  contrast, 
according  to  a  constructionist  approach,  response  times  to  the  probe  should  be  faster 
for  the  Try  Again  and  Substitution  conditions  relative  to  the  Control.  condition.  This  is 
because  the  character  is  still  trying  to  achieve  the  general  goal  at  the  end  for  the  first 
two  conditions.  In  the  Control  condition,  the  main  goal  has  been  achieved  and  a  new 
general  goal  takes  over. 
Indeed,  the  results  support  these  predictions  and  McKoon  and  Ratcliff  cite  this  as 
evidence  endorsing  the  minimalist  standpoint.  However  the  design  used  relies  on  the 
null  hypothesis,  ie  the  finding  of  no  differences  to  prove  their  thesis  rather  than 
-62- finding  positive  evidence. 
McKoon  &  Ratcliff  feel  that  there  is  no  evidence  to  directly  support  the  constructionist 
viewpoint  and  in  the  absence  of  such  evidence,  there  is  no  reason  to  reject  a  simpler 
hypothesis  (the  minimalist  view)  and  this  should  be  used  until  such  evidence  can  be 
accrued. 
3.6  Global  Causal  Inferences:  Trabasso  &  Suh 
Trabasso  and  Suh  (1993)  re-cxamincd  the  question  of  whether  global,  causal 
inferences  arc made  during  comprehension.  -  *They  used  a  three  pronged  approach, 
proposed  by  Magliano  &  Graesser  (1991),  which  involved: 
(a)  identifying  potential  inferences  a  priori  in  the  texts  used 
(b)  using  a  "talk  aloud"  procedure  to  evaluate  if  these  predicted  inferences  are 
actually  made 
(c)  using  converging  methods  which  are  less  intrusive  eg  on-line.  reading  times 
Trabasso  &  Suh  consider  goals  to  be  very  important  in  the  study  of  causal  inferences 
as  they  motivate  other  goals  and  actions,  and  organise  complex  structures  into 
episodes.  Fdr  any  motivational  inference  the  question  has  to  be  asked  whether  the  goal 
is  fulfilled  or  not.  The  interpretation  of  any  action  as  an  attempt  to  fulfil  a  goal  depends 
on  whether  or  not  the  goal  is  satisfied  prior  to  the  time  of  action.  If  it  has,  this  would 
lead  to  the  generation  of  a  new  goal/plan  inference. 
They  used  textual  materials  which  include  motivational  inferences  of  a  global  nature 
which  occur  over  large  surface  distances  in  the  text,  and  where 
' 
locally  coherent 
inferences  can  be  easily  made  for  each  sentence,  for  example  because  of  anaphoric 
references.  Contrary  to  the  claims  of  McKoon  &  Ratcliff  (1992)  in  their  minimalist 
hypothesis,  Trabasso  &  Suh  found  that  motivational  inferences  of  a  global  nature  do 
occur.  This  demonstrates  the  advantage  of  the  "talk  aloud"  procedure  in  that  it  is 
-63- possible  to  monitor  exactly  what  inference  (if  any)  the  subject  is  making  at  each  stage. 
The  "talk  aloud"  procedure  also  revealed  that,  in  addition  to  motivational  processes, 
subjects  also  use  operations  to  (a)  maintain,  (b)  retrieve,  (c)  elaborate  and  (d)  explain 
information  in  the  focal  sentence,  with  these  mental  operations  occurring  in  working 
memory. 
The  evidence  obtained  from  these  "talk  aloud"  procedures  identifies  that  those 
inferences  predicted  for  the  textual  materials  do,  in  fact,  occur.  This  is  supported  by 
on-line  measures  such  as  reading  times. 
In  order  to  integrate  the  current  sentence  inf6rmation  with  that  from  prior  text,  the 
current  sentence  has  to  be  maintained  while  the  prior  sentence  is  retrieved  and  used  to 
explain  the  current  sentence  in  working  memory.  These  operations  will  facilitate  a 
story's  coherence  and  long-term  memorability.  However,  if  subjects  tried  to  ek&rate 
and  add  information  that  moved  away  from  the  sentences,  they  were  less  likely  to 
integrate  the  sentence  and  forgot  more  information. 
If  a  sentence  can  be  readily  integrated  into  what  is  know,  then  processing  time  should 
be  reduced-,  if  not  search  and  construction  is  required  and  processing  is  slowed  down. 
How  connected  a  sentence  is  to  other  sentences  in  the  discourse  analysis  and  how 
connected  it  is  in  the  talk  aloud  protocols  are  related  conceptually  ý:  nd  empirically.  A 
sentence  that  is  highly  connected  is  shorter  in  its  distance  in  the  network  to  other 
sentences.  The  operations  of  retrieving,  maintaining  and  explaining  create  connections 
and  reduce  distance.  This  aids  assimilation  which  is  reflected  in  a  faster  reading  time. 
Elaborations  of  consequences  or  associations  reduce  intersentence  connections  and 
increase  distance.  This  hinders  easy  assimilation  with  a  correspondingly  slower 
reading  time. 
Talk  aloud  protocols  have  been  used  in  previous  studies.  Fletcher  (1986)  and  Olson, 
Duffy,  &  Mack  (1984)  used  such  an  approach  to  investigate  what  infonnation  was 
available  to  working  memory  during  the  comprehension  of  sentences.  Subjects  were 
-64- given  explicit  instructions  to  comment  on  what  connections  there  were  with  previous 
text,  and  to  make  predictions  about  what  might  occur.  As  this  approach  is  open  to  the 
criticism  that  subjects  are  being  directed  towards  cognitive  strategies  which  might  not 
occur  otherwise,  Trabasso  &  Suh  generated  a  less  directed  protocol,  with  less  specific 
instructions  than  those  of  Olson  et  al  (1984)  and  Fletcher  (1986).  Subjects  were  given 
more  freedom  of  expression  and  were  only  asked  to  comment  on  their  understanding 
of  each  sentence  and  talk  about  whatever  came  into  their  minds. 
The  verbal  protocol  analysis  method  is  criticiscd  by  Nisbctt  &  Wilson  (1977)  and 
Trabasso  &  Suh  admit  that  the  thinking  aloud  that  occurs  in  the  verbal  protocols,  does 
not  give  diiect  access  to  the  on-line  thought  processes  that  occur.  However  they 
believe  they  are  correlated  with  the  underlying  thought  processes  and  reflect  the 
operations  that  have  been  performed  during  comprehension. 
Trabasso  &  Suh  (1993)  feel  that  McKoon  &  Ratcliff  (1992)  failed  to  find  evidence  of 
global  processing  and  motivational  inferences  because  of  procedural  difficulties  in 
their  study.  They  believe  that  the  McKoon  &  Ratcliff  study  may  have  used  inferences 
which  did  not  relate  to  the  test  sentences,  since  it  was  not  possible  to  say  which,  if 
any,  inferences  the  subjects  actually  made.  Also  they  used  only  reaction  time  measures 
(the  verbal  protocol  methods  used  by  Trabasso  &  Suh  at  least  confirmed  which 
inferences  subjects  were  making  before  on-line  methods  were  used).  McKoon  & 
Ratcliff  also  relied  on  negative  findings  in  their  study  to  make  their  case  by  relying  on 
proving  the  null-hypothesis;  this,  argue  Trabasso  &  Suh,  is  not  good  scientific 
practice  since  there  is  a  95%  chance  of  success.  Trabasso  &  Suh  rely  on 
experimentally  produced  and  statistically  reliable  differences  to  prove  thei  r  claim  that 
their  findings  support  the  constructionist  processing  model. 
-65- 3.7  Superordinate  Goal  Inferences:  Long  &  Golding 
Graeser  and  his  colleagues  in  a  series  of  studies  (Golding,  Graeser  &  Millis,  1990; 
Graeser,  1981;  Graeser  &  Clark,  1985;  Graeser'  Lang  &  Roberts,  1991;  Graescr  & 
Murachver,  1985;  Graeser,  Robertson  &  Anderson,  1981;  Graesser,  Robertson, 
Lovelace  &  Swineheart,  1980)  found  that  when  readers  are  asked  why-questions 
about  characters'  intentional  actions  in  stereotypical  stories,  they  (the  readers)  reliably 
produce  a  small  set  of  causal  inferences.  For  a  typical  fairy  tale  about  a  dragon,  for 
example,  these  include  superordinate  goals  (eg  the  dragon  wanting  to  eat  the  King's 
daughters),  goal  initiating  states  (eg  the  dragon  was  hungry),  causal  antecedent  events 
(the  dragon  saw  the  daughters)  and  enabling  conditions  (the  dragon  was  nearby). 
They  found  that  superordinate  goal  inferences  were  produced  in  response  to  these 
why-questions  more  often  than  other  types  of  causal  inferences  (subordinate  goals). 
Subjects  also  included  superordinate  goal  inferences  in  recall  and  in  summarization 
protocols  in  addition  to  generating  them  as  answers  to  why-questions  (Abbott  & 
Black,  1986;  Black  &  Bower,  1980;  Graeser,  1981;  Graeser  &  Clark,  1985;  Graeser, 
Robertson,  &  Anderson,  1981;  Schank  &  Abelson,  1977;  van  den  Broek  &  Trabasso, 
1986;  Wilensky,  1983). 
However  these  protocols  (recall,  summarization,  and  question-answering  tasks)  do 
not  discriminate  between  inferences  drawn  during  comprehension  alid  those  drawn  at 
the  time  of  the  test  probe. 
The  minimalist  hypothesis  states  that  superordinate  goal  inferences  should  only  be 
drawn  if  (a).  they  are  necessary  for  referential  coherence  or  (b)  they  are  supported  by 
readily  available  world  knowledge.  The  global  coherence  model  sees  text  coherence 
being  established  when  the  reader  is  able  to  construct  a  network  of  causally  interrelated 
actions  and  events.  Inferences  may  be  required  in  order  to  understand  a  statement  even 
though  the  inference  is  not  required  for  referential  coherence. 
-66- Long  &  Golding  (1993)  consider  the  on-line  status  of  superordinate  inferences  as  an 
intcrcsting  tcst  of  the  minimalist/global  cohcrcncc  modcls. 
In  previous  studies,  Long,  Golding,  Graesser,  &Clark  (1990)  and  Long,  Golding,  & 
Graesser  (1992)  reported  evidence  that  readers  do  spontaneously  generate 
suPerordinate  goal  inferences  as  they  read  statements  in  stories  when  they  are  given 
sufficient  time  to  do  so  (ie  when  there  is  a  long  delay  between  the  presentation  of  the 
inference-cliciting  sentence  and  the  test  probe).  Long  and  her  colleagues  compared  the 
activation  level  of  concepts  relating  to  superordinate  goals  and  concepts  relating  to 
subordinate  goals  using  a  lexical  decision  task.  Subjects  read  stories  presented  one 
sentence  at  a  time.  Each  sentence  was  followed  by  a  delay  and  then  a  test  word  chosen 
from  superordinate  goal  inferences,  from  sul;  ýrdinatc 
goal  inferences,  and  from  non- 
words.  Subjects  then  had  to  respond  and  say  whether  the  test  probe  was  a  word  or 
not.  If  an  inference  has  been  drawn,  then  the  level  of  activation  of  that  concept  should 
be  elevated  and  the  subject  should  be  able  to  respond  more  quickly. 
Superordinate  goal  inferences  were  compared  with  subordinate  goal  inferences  rather 
than  unrelated  control  words  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  since  both  superordinate  and 
subordinate  goal  inferences  tend  to  be  generated  from  the  same  knowledge  structures, 
once  these  knowledge  structures  arc  accessed,  all  concepts  within  that  structure  will 
receive  some  activation.  Therefore,  both  inference  types  should  show  activation. 
Secondly,  within  the  tests  used,  each  pair  of  superordinate  and  subordinate  goal 
inferences  was  produced  in  response  to  questions  about  the  same  action  statement. 
Any  differences  in  activation  levels  should  not  be  due  to  differences  in  their 
compatibility  with  the  preceding  context:  thus  both  sets  of  words  should  be  equally 
susceptible  to  the  influence  of  context  checking  at  the  time  testing. 
Long  and  her  colleagues  found  evidence  to  support  the  global  coherence  model. 
Decision  latencies  to  words  from  supcrordinatc  goal  inferences  were  faster  than 
latencies  to  words  from  subordinate  goal  inferences. 
-67- In  the  1990  and  1992  studies,  Long  had  used  a  self-paced  presentation  of  the  text  with 
a  relatively  short  SOA  (stimulus  onset  asynchrony),  ie  the  time  between  the 
presentation  of  the  action  statement  and  the  test  probe.  One  criticism  of  the  findings  is 
that  the  subjects  may  perhaps  have  spontaneously  generated  the  supcrordinate  goal 
inferences  because  they  had  sufficient  time  to  elaborate  the  text  representation.  Till, 
Mross  &  Kintch  (1988)  found  that  subjects  spontaneously  generate  topical  inferences 
after  a  SOA  of  1000  milliseconds  but  not  for  SOA's  which  were  shorter  (cg  250-500 
milliseconds).  The  SOA  used  in  the  1990  and  1992  studies  was  100  milliseconds  after 
subjects  had  read  the  sentence  plus  the  actual  time  to  read  the  sentence,  a  total  in  the 
order  of  2000-2500  milliseconds. 
Therefore  in  the  Long  &  Golding  (1993)  stýdy,  an  attempt  was  made  to  assess  the 
activation  of  superordinate  goal  inferences  under  relatively  demanding  time 
constraints,  again  using  a  lexical  decision  task.  Instead  of  a  self-paced  presentation  of 
text  as  before,  the  material  was  presented  one  word  at  a  time  (a  rapid  serial  visual 
presentation-  RSVP),  with  lexical  decision  targets  presented  after  a  short  SOA.  This 
meant  that  subjects  were  forced  to  read  each  sentence  at  the  rate  dictated  by  the 
presentation  rather  than  at  a  more  leisurely  rate  which  was  possible  in  self-paced 
protocols.  After  all  the  texts  had  been  read,  a  comprehension  test  was  administered. 
Thus  longer  term  retention  is  being  tested  than  in  some  previous  studies  of  inference 
generation,  eg  Till,  Mross,  &  Vintsch  (1988).  Long  and  Golding  found  that: 
(1)  Subjects'  performance  on  the  comprehension  test  varied  considerably.  The  authors 
felt  that  this  might  be  due  to  the  fact  that  an  RSVP  procedure  was  used  instead  of  a 
self-paced  method.  As  a  result,  some  readers  may  have  failed  to  form  a  discourse 
representation  and  thus  performed  poorly  as  regards  comprehension. 
(2)  Superordinate  goal  inferences  are  more  likely  to  be  generated  during 
comprehension  than  were  subordinate  goals  but  only  by  those  subjects  who  performed 
well  on  the  comprehension  test. 
-68- These  findings  support  the  global  coherence  model  and  replicate  the  pattern  of  findings 
from  Long  et  al  (1990)  and  Long  et  al  (1992). 
However,  it  might  be  argued  that  the  faster  decision  latencies  for  superordinate  items 
may  be  due  to  the  influence  of  context  on  the  postaccess  process.  For  example,  Balota 
&  Chumbley  (1984),  Chumbley  &  Balota  (1984),  Forster  (1981),  and  Potts,  Keenan 
&  Golding  (1988)  have  found  that  lexical  decision  time  can  be  facilitated  by  context 
checking  at  the  time  of  testing.  Therefore  subjects  do  not  generate  superordinate  goals 
when  they  comprehend  action  statements  but  rather  a  backward  association  is  elicited 
between  the  test  word  and  the  preceding  action  statement.  This  may operate  for 
superordinate  but  not  subordinate  goal  inferences.  However,  Long  et  al  (1992) 
investigated  a  context-checking  explanation  of  their  results  by  using  a  word  naming 
task,  where  subjects  have  to  say  the  probe  word  out  loud,  and  which  is  less  sensitive 
to  context  checking.  They  again  found  superordinate  goal  inference  words  facilitated 
relative  to  subordinate  goal  inference  words,  and  concluded  that  the  evidence  was 
against  a  context  checking  explanation. 
Long  et  al  (1992)  also  found  that  superordinate  and  subordinate  goal  inference  words 
are  both  facilitated  by  semantic  associations  to  lexical  items  in  the  preceding  action 
statements  but  to  the  same  extent. 
None  of  the  subjects  who  did  poorly  on  the  comprehension  test  reported  any  difficulty 
in  understanding  the  texts  with  the  presentation  rates  used,  but  some  were  surprised 
that  they  could  not  answer  the  comprehension  questions.  Some  readers  commented 
that  they  could  remember  what  the  stories  were  generally  about  but  could  not  recall  the 
details.  One  possible  explanation  is  that  perhaps  they  had  time  to  complete  word  and 
sentence  level  processes  (eg  word  recognition,  case-role  assignment)  but  did  not  have 
time  to  integrate  information  across  sentences  (Perfetti,  1985:  Perfetti  &  Roth,  1981). 
Without  the  information  being  sufficiently  integrated,  no  lasting  memory 
representation  is  created. 
-69- It  appears  that  superordinate  goal  inferences  are  facilitated  relative  to  subordinate  goal 
inferences  within  about  250  milliseconds.  These  findings  are  incompatible  with  the 
minimalist  hypothesis  which  predicts  that  neither  superordinate  nor  subordinate  goal 
information  would  be  generated  as  neither  is  necessary  for  local  text  cohesion.  The 
findings  do  support  the  global  coherence  model.  Superordinate  goal  inferences 
provide  a  causal  network  which  facilitates  overall  textual  coherence  and  offers  support 
for  the  global  coherence  model. 
3.8  The  Time  Course  for  Generating  Causal  Antecedent 
and  Causal  Consequence  Inferences:  Magliano  et  al 
As  well  as  considering  which  types  of  inference  readers  may  or  may  not  make,  the 
question  could  be  asked  as  to  when  these  inferences  are  generated.  Are  they  generated 
at  the  time  of  reading  (ie  on-line)  or  later  when  a  probe  question  is  answered  (ie  off- 
line)?  Even  when  an  inference  is  generated  on-line,  are  all  inferences  generated  with 
the  same  speed? 
Some  researchers  who  have  studied  the  time  course  in  which  inferences  are  generated 
claim  the  time  course  of  inference  activation  varies  with  different  inference  categories. 
For  example,  McKoon  &  Ratcliff  (1986,1989a,  1992)  distinguisli  between  on-line 
inferences  which  are  either  automatically  or  strategically  generated. 
Automatic  inferences  are  generated  without  awareness  and  relatively  quickly  (within 
650  milliseconds  after  comprehending  a  sentence).  They  are  stored  in  highly 
autornized  knowledge  structures  and  consist  primarily  of  those  inference  categories 
needed  to  establish  local  coherence,  such  as  causal  antecedents.  For  example,  if  the 
sentence  "John  left  the  bar  and  got  into  an  accident"  is  read,  a  causal  antecedent  is 
likely  to  be  "John  had  been  drinking". 
-70- Strategic  inferences  depend  on  reader  goals  and  the  text  genre.  They  take  more  time  to 
generate  than  automatic  inferences  and  are  not  mandatory  for  comprehension.  For  the 
same  sentence  in  the  paragraph  above,  a  strategic  inference  could  be  the  causal 
consequence  that  "John  was  hurt". 
Magliano  &  Graesser  (1991)  believe  that,  while  the  above  distinction  is  useful,  some 
inferences  are  inevitably  generated  on-line  but  take  more  time  to  construct  than 
automatic  inferences.  Inevitable  inferences  (to  use  Magliano  &  Graesser's  term)  are 
mandatory  fpr  comprehension  but  are  not  generated  automatically. 
Till,  Mross,  &  Yintsch  (1988)  investigated  the  time  course  of  thematic  inferences, 
inferences  which  capture  the  main  point  of  a  sentence.  They  used  an  RSVP  (rapid 
serial  visual  presentation)  procedure  with  a  varying  SOA  (stimulus  onset  asynchrony) 
intervals  of  200,300,400,500,1000  and  1500  milliseconds,  with  a  lexical  decision 
task  to  measure  activation  of  inferences.  In  other  words,  subjects  read  a  short  text 
presented  one  word  at  a  time  and  displayed  for  a  short  interval  (RSVP).  After  the  last 
word  is  presented,  there  is  a  short  delay  (the  SOA  interval)  before  the  test  word  is 
presented.  These  test  words  were  either  words  related  to  the  inference  or  unrelated,  or 
non-words.  If  an  inference  has  occurred  during  reading  then  the  concept  should  be 
activated  and  response  to  the  test  word  should  be  faster  than  when  the  concept  is  not 
activated.  They  found  that  activation  increases  monotonically  as  the  SOA  increases, 
with  a  critical  interval  of  1000  milliseconds.  In  other  words,  the  inference  is  stronger 
as  the  interval  increases  between  the  presentation  of  the  last  word  of  the  text  and  the 
presentation  of  the  test  probe. 
However  there  are  some  methodological  problems  with  the  Till  ci  al  (1988)  study. 
Firstly,  they  do  not  distinguish  among  inferences  categories.  For  example,  some  texts 
include  superordinate  goal  inferences  while  others  include  inferences  for  unintentional 
events.  It  is  possible  that  some  inference  categories  were  generated  at  SOA  intervals 
shorter  thai;  1000  milliseconds  but  their  effect  was  cancelled  out  by  other  inference 
categories  in  the  statistical  analysis.  Sharkey  &  Sharkey  (1992)  found  facilitation  for 
script-based  inferences  at  an  SOA  interval  of  200  milliseconds.  A  second  criticism  is 
-71- that  the  RSVP  rate  of  333  milliseconds  may  not  allow  enough  time  between  each  word 
presentation  for  subjects  to  comprehend  critical  words.  It  could  also  lead  to  a  high 
amount  of  buffering  (ie  the  holding  of  many  words  in  short-term  memory)  and  thus 
place  high  demands  on  working  memory  at  the  point  when  the  test  probe  is  received. 
This  could  have  an  impact  on  what  inferences  are  generated  as  well  as  the  time  course 
in  which  readers  generate  them. 
Magliano,  Baggett,  Johnson  &  Graesser  (1993)  focused  on  (a)  causal  antecedents, 
which  are  directed  backwards  in  a  causal  network,  and  (b)  causal  consequences, 
which  are  directed  forward  in  such  a  network. 
Causal  antecedent  inferences  establish  text  cýhcrcnce  by  connecting  a  sentence  with 
prior  text  and  arc  generated  on-line  in  narrative  texts  (Keenan,  Baillet,  &  Brown, 
1984;  Myers,  Shinjo  &  Duffy,  1987;  Singer  &  Ferreira,  1983;  Singer,  Halldorson, 
Lear,  &  Andrusiak,  1992;  van  den  Broek,  1990b).  An  example  used  by  Magliano  et  al 
is  the  couple  of  sentences  below: 
A  thirsty  ant  went  to  to  a  river. 
It  became  carried  away  by  the  rush  of  the  stream. 
The  second  sentence  can  be  causally  connected  to  the  first  by  the  inference  "the  antfell 
into  the  strewn".  This  causal  antecedent  establishes  text  coherence. 
Causal  consequence  inferences  predict  or  forecast  subsequent  episodes  in  the  plot  and 
are  not  generated  during  comprehension,  ie  on-line  (Graesser,  Haberlandt  &  Koizumi, 
1987;  McKoon  &  Ratcliff.  1989a;  Millis,  1989;  Potts,  Keenan,  &  Golding,  1988)  or 
at  best  are  only  minimally  inferred  (McKoon  &  Ratcliff,  1986).  For  the  example 
above,  the  reader  might  infer  that  "tIw  ant  drowned". 
Magliano  et  al  (1993)  used  a  three  pronged  approach  advocatcj  by  Magliano  & 
Graesser  (1991),  and  similar  to  that  used  by  Trabasso  &  Suh  (1993).  This  is 
-72- discussed  below: 
(a)  They  used  a  question-answering  methodology  to  expose  what  inferences 
arc  made.  Subjects  were  asked  "why"  and  "what-happens-next"  questions 
as  they  read  the  narrative  statement  by  statement. 
(b)  Three  theories  of  discourse  processing  were  used  to  predict  what 
inferences  are  generated  on-line.  These  were: 
(1)  Textbase  model:  This  model  assumes  that  the  text  is  adequately 
represented  by  a  list  of  explicit  propositions  that  contain  its  meaning  or 
-gist  (Kintsch,  1974;  Kjntsclý..  &  van  Dijk,  1978).  Text  cohesion  is 
established  through  argument  overlap.  The  only  class  of  inference  that 
is  generated  on-line  is  anaphoric  reference.  7his  model  predicts  that 
neither  causal  antecedents  nor  causal  consequences  are  generated  on- 
line. 
(2)  Bridging  model:  This  includes  models  and  hypothesis  by  several 
researchers  eg  Graesser  &  Clark,  1985;  Kintsch,  1988;  McKoon  & 
Ratcliff,  1986,1989a,  1992;  Singer,  Hadorson,  Lear,  &  Andrusiak, 
1992;  van  den  Broek,  1990a;  van  Dijk  &  Kintsch,  1983.  This  model 
assumes  that  the  text  representation  contains  the  explicitly  mentioned 
text  (where  propositions  are  related  by  argument  overlap)  plus 
coherence-based  inferences,  such  as  causal  antecedents  which  connect 
the  current  sentence  with  previous  text.  Causal  consequences  are  seen 
as  elaborative  inferences  which  are  not  normally  generated  on-line. 
(3)  Prediction-substantiation  model:  This  model  has  its  origins  in  both 
artificial  intelligence  (Dyer,  1983;  Schank  &  Abelson,  1977)  and 
cognitive  psychology  (eg  Sharky,  1986).  It  assumes  that  knowledge 
structures  (eg  frames,  scripts,  schemas)  are  used  by  readers  to 
generate  expectations  about  subsequent  events  and  actions  in 
-73- nar-rativcs.  It  prcdicts  the  gcncmtion  on-linc  of  both  causal  anteccdcnts 
and  causal  consequence  inferences. 
(c)  Behavioural  methods  were  used  to  provide  a  rigorous  empirical  test  of 
whether  a  particular  inference  category  was  generated  on-line.  In  this 
Particular  case  a  lexical  decision  task  was  used  in  conjunction  with  a  rapid 
serial  visual  presentation  (RSVP)  of  the  text. 
Magliano  et  al  (1993)  list  some  advantages  of  using  the  three-pronged  method.  Firstly, 
in  other  studies  (eg  Kintsch  &  Mross,  1985)  experimenter  generated  scripts  are  used 
which  intuitively  identify  actions  in  several  script-based  activities  (eg  eating  in  a 
restaurant).  The  question-answering  methodology  reveals  what  (if  any)  inferences 
subjects  actually  make,  not  what  the  experimenter  thinks  they  will  make.  i 
Another  linked  advantage  is  that  such  a  methodology  allows  the  study  of  inferences  in 
the  context  of  naturalistic  texts.  Passages  had  hitherto  used  only  one  or  two  sentences 
(eg  McKoon  &  Ratcliff,  1986;  Potts,  Keenan,  &  Golding,  1988).  These  short  texts 
allowed  the  researchers  greater  experimental  control  over  the  materials.  However  such 
short  passages  seldom  have  a  rich  enough  context  to  support  the  iformal.  volume  of 
inferences  that  arc  presumably  generated  when  reading  naturalistic  text. 
The  design  used  was  similar  to  that  used  by  Till,  Mross,  &  Kintsch  (1988)  but 
because  of  the  difficulties  noted  above,  Magliano  et  al  (a)  manipulated  inference 
category  (antecedent  versus  consequence)  and  (b)  varied  the  RSVP  rate  (250  versus 
400  milliseconds),  as  well  as  the  SOA  interval  (only  the  SOA  interval  was  varied  by 
Till  et  al). 
Subjects  read  short  passages  which  were  presented  one  word  at  a  time  for  either  250 
milliseconds  or  400  milliseconds.  After  the  final  word,  a  target  word  was  presented 
after  intervals  of  250,400,600,  or  1200  milliseconds.  Subjects  had  to  say  if  the  target 
was  a  word  or not:  again  inference  concepts,  non-inference  concepts,  and  non-words 
were  used. 
-74- Magliano  and  his  colleagues  found  evidence  which  supported  the  bridging  model,  ie 
they  found  that  causal  antecedents  were  generated  on-line  but  causal  consequences 
were  not. 
Magliano  and  his  team  point  out  certain  potential  difficulties  with  their  study.  Firstly, 
causal  consequences  have  been  shown  by  other  researchers  to  be  generated  on-line 
when  the  context  is  highly  constrained  and  allows  for  only  one  or  two  possible 
outcomes  rather  than  several  alternatives  (eg  Murray,  Min  &  Myers,  1991;  van  den 
Broek,  1990b).  The  Magliano  passages  possibly  did  not  provide  a  sufficient  amount 
of  contextual  constraints  to  elicit  consequence  inferences. 
Secondly,  the  consequence  inferences  revealed  by  the  question-an§wering  protocols 
extended  far  into  the  future  compared  with  the  antecedents*  which  tended  to  be  more 
locally  bound,  ie  the  consequences  are  a  greater  distance  in  the  causal  network  than  the 
antecedents  and,  as  a  result,  are  less  likely  to  be  generated.  Future  investigations  in 
this  area  wctuld  need  to  equate  the  distance  of  causal  antecedents  and  consequences 
within  the  causal  network. 
With  regard  to  the  time  course  of  inference  generation,  Magliano  et  al  found  that  causal 
antecedents  were  generated  on-line  if  readers  were  given  a  sufficient  amount  of  time  to 
interpret  the  text  and  generate  inferences.  Specifically,  the  presentation  rate  of  text  (the 
RSVP)  had  to  have  an  interval  between  words  of  400  milliseconds  or  greater.  In 
addition,  the  interval  between  the  presentation  of  the  last  word  of  the  text  and  the 
presentation  of  the  test  probe  (the  SOA)  had  also  to  be  400  milliseconds  or  greater. 
This  having  been  said,  Magliano  and  his  colleagues  admit  that  it  is  not  possible  to  say 
exactly  when  within  the  combined  SOA  interval  and  the  decision  latency  period  the 
inference  is  actually  generated. 
The  implications  of  this  study  are  that  adult  readers  tend  to  generate  at  least  causal 
antecedents  on-line.  They  may  generate  causal  consequences  but  the  Magliano  et  al 
-75- (1993)  study  has  certain  implicit  problems  with  design  which  failed  to  stimulate  these 
inferences.  At  the  very  least,  they  have  shown  that  the  generation  of  an  inference 
requires  a  minimum  amount  of  time  of  around  750  milliseconds.  However,  it  is 
possible  that  other  categories  of  inference  may  require  more  or  less  time  than  this. 
3.9  Network  Representations  of  Causal  Relations:  van 
den  Broek  &  Lorch 
The  identification  of  causal  dependencies  in  a  text  can  involve  establishing  connections 
between  a  focal  sentence  and  immediately  preceding  text  or  textual  information  that  is 
further  removed  in  the  surface  structure  of  the  text. 
Two  theoretical  models  have  been  put  forward  to  describe  how  readers  may  connect 
this  information.  Linear  models  see  each  text  unit  connected  to  the  immediately 
preceding  text  unit.  Connections  are  not  established  between  non-adjacent  units  so 
long  as  connections  can  be  made  between  adjacent  units  (eg  Fletcher  &  Bloom,  1988 
(above);  Kintsch,  1988).  Network  models  propose  that  multiple  connections  are 
possible  to  a  single  text  unit.  This  can  include  those  connections  suggested  by  the 
linear  model  as  well  as  others  that  relate  units  which  are  quite  far  apart  in  the  surface 
structure  of  the  text  (eg  Trabasso  &  van  den  Broek,  1985  (above);  Trabasso  &  Sperry, 
1985). 
van  den  Brock  &  Lorch  (1993)  in  a  series  of  studies  tried  to  determine  which  of  these 
models  readers  actually  use,  ie  do  they  use  a  network  of  multiple  relations  or  a  linear 
chain.  The  narrative  texts  which  were  used  in  these  studies  could  be  represented  either 
by  a  linear  chain  or  by  a  network.  An  example  is  shown  below: 
-76- There  once  was  a  boy  named  Bob.  One  day,  Bob  saw  his  friend's  new  10- 
speed  bike.  Bob  wanted  to  get  a  10-speed.  He  looked  through  the  yellow 
pages.  He  called  several  stores.  He  asked  them  about  prices  for  bikes.  He 
went  to  the  bike  store.  He  asked  the  salesperson  about  several  models.  The 
salesperson  recommended  a  touring  bike.  Bob  looked  at  the  selection  of 
touring  bikes.  He  located  some  that  were  his  size.  He  found  a  bike  that  was 
metallic  blue.  Bob  bought  the  beautiful  bike. 
A  speeded  recognition  procedure  was  used  to  test  subjects'memories  for  story  events. 
After  reading  the  text,  a  pair  of  sentences  were  presented  as  the  recognition  task.  The 
first,  the  priming  sentence,  reminded  them  of  either  the  story  (general  prime)  or  a 
specific  event  in  the  story  (specific  prime).  The  second  sentence  was  a  target  sentence. 
The  specific  primes  were  either  causally  related  or unrelated  to  the  target  event,  and 
were  either  adjacent  to  or  distant  from  the  target  in  the  surface  structure  of  the  text.  The 
general  prime  for  the  story  above  was  "  Remember  the  story  about  Bob".  A  specific 
prime  was  "Remember  Bob  looked  through  the  yellow  pages".  One  target  sentence 
paraphrased  a  subsidiary  action  in  the  story  ("Bob  called  several  stores")  while  the 
other  target  par-aphrased  the  outcome  of  the  story  ("Bob  bought  a  bike"). 
van  den  Broek  &  Lorch  found  faster  response  times  when  the  targets  followed  a 
specific  prime  that  was  causally  related  than  when  it  followed  either  a  specific  but 
causally  unrelated  prime  or  general  prime.  Most  importantly,  this  effect  was  found 
both  when  the  specific  prime  and  target  were  adjacent  and  when  they  were  distant  in 
the  surface  structure  of  the  text.  The  textual  materials  used  in  these  studies  always  had 
a  causal  relation  to  the  immediately  preceding  event.  Therefore  from  a  linear  chain 
perspective,  there  was  no  need  for  subjects  to  reactivate  the  distant  information  to 
establish  coherence.  The  fact  that  priming  is  observed  for  both  indicates  that  multiple 
relations  are  represented. 
These  results  converge  with  evidence  from  Trabasso  &  Suh  (1993).  However  the 
present  results  additionally  show  that  the  relations  between  distant  statements  in  a  text 
-77- are  not  only.  detected  but  are  also  incorporated  in  the  reader's  mental  representation  of 
the  text.  They  support  a  network  model  of  the  representation  of  causal  relations  in 
narratives;  they  are  inconsistent  with  a  linear  chain  model. 
3.10  Situation  Model  Construction:  Fincher-Kiefer 
It  is  generally  accepted,  for  example  by  Johnson-Laird  (1983),  Just  &  Carpenter 
(1987),  Mani  &  Johnson-Laird  (1982),  Perfetti  (1989),  Perrig  &  Kintsch  (1985), 
Sanford  &  Garrod  (1981),  and  van  Dijk  &  Kintsch  (1983),  that  when  readers 
comprehend  a  text,  they  construct  a  multilevel  representation  of  the  text.  Initially  a 
surface  structure  representation  is  generated;  this  includes  word  identification  and 
syntactic  parsing.  This  process  is  seen  as  being  obligatory  and  impervious  to 
knowledge  effects  (Perfetti,  Beverly,  Bell,  Rodgers  &  Faux,  1987;  Rayner,  Carlson 
&  Frazier,  1983;  Mntsch  &  Mross,  1985).  A  semantic  analysis  of  the  text  results  in  a 
propositional  textbase  which  provides  the  reader  with  meaning,  albeit  in  a  restricted 
form  (Perfetti,  1989).  Typically  a  more  enriched  level  of  representation  is  constructed 
wherein  the  reader  supplements  the  propositional  textbase  with  prior  knowledge.  This 
has  been  referred  to  variously  as  a  situational  model  (van  Dijk  &  Kintsch,  1983)  or  a 
mental  model  (Johnson-Laird.,  1983).  This  leads  to  much  richer  inferences  being 
possible  (Perfetti,  1989). 
McKoon  &  Ratcliff  (1986,1989b,  1989c)  have  argued  that  inferential  processing 
should  be  considered  within  a  framework  which  allows  for  variability;  in  a  restricted 
context  inferences  may  be  encoded  to  a  "high  degree"  but  others,  such  as  those  that 
concern  predictable  events,  may  be  only  partially  encoded. 
As  little  previous  research  has  been  directed  towards  inferencing  in  light  of  this 
multilevel  representation  model  of  comprehension,  Fincher-Kiefer  (1993)  proposes 
and  tests  another  framework  which  is  consistent  with  that  of  McKoon  &  Ratcliff, 
1986,1989b,  1989c).  She  assumes  that  the  generation  of  the  surface  structure  code 
involves  no-inferential  processing,  while  construction  of  the  propositional  textbase 
-78- entails  limited  inferential  processing  which  is  concerned  with  maintaining  local 
coherence.  The  development  of  the  situational  model  involves  elab6rative  inferential 
processing  eg  predictive  inferences. 
Fincher-Kiefer  assumes  that  different  tasks  tap  different  levels  of  mental 
representations  (Lucas,  Tanenhaus  &  Carlson,  1990).  The  first  experiment  tested  the 
hypothesis  that  predictive  inferential  processes  are  not  employed  in  the  generation  of  a 
propositional  textbase.  Subjects  were  interrupted  during  their  reading  of  predictive 
texts  and  asked  to  make  word  recognition  decisions  for  various  target  types.  For  the 
second  experiment,  the  nature  of  the  decisions  subjects  were  being  asked  to  make 
were  changed  to  reflect  more  closely  the  processes  used  in  constructing  a  situation 
model.  A  word  prediction  task  was  used  in  which  subjects  had  to-decide  if  a  word 
might  appear  in  future  text  instead  of  having  to  decide  if  a  word  had  appeared  in 
previous  text.  The  third  experiment  was  similar  to  the  second  but  used  a  lexical 
decision  task.  Since  this  does  not  require  the  reader  to  address  a  particular  level  of  text 
representation,  it  should  be  sensitive  to  processes  that  occur  in  multiple  levels  of 
representation  (  Lucas  et  al,  1990;  Masson  &  Freeman,  1990). 
An  example  of  the  type  of  text  used  is  shown  below: 
Henry  was  going  to  the  dentist.  This  time  he  especially  dreaded  the  trip 
because  he  knew  he  had  several  cavities.  Sure  enough,  the  dýntist  located 
the  cavities  and  asked  Henry  to  open  his  mouth  wide.  Henry  knew  he 
should  have  been  more  careful  about  flossing.  Every  time  he  went  to  the 
dentist  this  procedure  was  mentioned  to  him,  but  he  just  hated  to  do  it.  The 
dentisi  warned  him  that  gum  disease  was  worse  than  having  cavities  . 
The  predictable  event  which  is  elicited  by  the  first  three  sentences  is  that  Henry  had  his 
teeth  drilled.  The  last  three  sentences  neither  confirm  nor  refute  this  prediction.  Thus 
the  initial  inference  can  generate  expectation  without  there  being  a  later  need  for 
referential  coherence.  The  target  decision  tasks  were  only  presented  to  subjects  after 
-79- the  first  three  sentences  (and  the  predictable  event  had  been  read. 
In  her  first  experiment,  Fincher-Kiefer  compared  word  recognition  response  times  for 
(a)  a  word  associated  with  the  predicted  event  (eg  driH  in  the  example  above)  with  (b) 
a  semantic  associate,  ie  a  word  which  was  appropriate  in  terms  of  general  knowledge 
for  the  situation  described  in  the  story  (eg  teeth  ),  and  (c)  neutral  control  words.  No 
difference  was  found  between  predicted  targets  and  semantic  associates.  This  is 
interpreted  as  supporting  the  idea  that  anticipatory  or  predictive  inferences  are  not 
encoded  into  a  reader's  propositional  textbase,  thus  confirming  previous  findings  eg 
McKoon  &  Ratcliff  (1986). 
The  second  experiment  suggested  that  predictions  are  considered  during  reading. 
When  readers  are  encouraged  to  attend  to  the  meaning  of  a  text  instead  of  what  is 
explicitly  stated  (the  word  prediction  task),  the  predicted  targets  show  greater 
facilitation  effects  than  schematic  associate  targets.  The  third  experiment,  using  a 
lexical  decision  task,  provided  converging  evidence  for  the  results  of  the  second 
experiment.  The  facilitated  response  times  for  the  predicted  targ6ts  show  that  the 
construction  of  a  situational  model  involves  more  than  the  temporary  activation  of 
contextually  appropriate  knowledge;  it  involves  the  generation  of  inferences 
conceming  highly  predictable  actions  and  events. 
Fincher-Kiefer  feels  that  word-naming  is  insensitive  processes 
occurring  at  levels  of  text  analysis  higher  than  the  word  access  level.  The  lexical 
decision  task  is  more  sensitive  to  inferential  processes  that  are  known  to  occur  during 
encoding. 
The  results  of  these  three  experiments  support  a  model  in  which  multiple  levels  of 
representation  are  constructed  during  reading.  The  first  level  appears  to  provide  only 
restricted  meaning  and  approximates  to  the  explicit  text  presented.  If  any  question 
arises  concerning  the  details  of  the  explicit  text,  the  textbase  can  be  consulted.  The 
situation  model,  however,  provides  enriched  meaning  and  interpretation. 
.  80- Both  levels  of  representation  (the  textbase  and  the  situation  model)  occur  in  parallel  in 
that  they  are  initiated  simultaneously.  However,  while  the  propositional  representation 
may  be  generated,  the  situational  model  can  still  be  incomplete,  or at  least  tentative. 
The  situation  model  construction  lags  slightly  behind  the  textbase  construction  because 
the  reader  must  have  basic  propositions  to  work  with  before  a  text  model  can  be  built. 
The  results  support  the  minimalist  view  of  inference  generation.  However  the  data  also 
suggest  that  the  situation  model  is  an  active,  flexible  and  continuous  level  of 
representation,  whose  generation  includes  many  types  of  extratextual  influences, 
including  predictive  inferences. 
3.11  Spatial  Representations  in  Naturalistic  Text: 
Zwaan  &  van  Oostendorp 
Although  many  studies,  as  described  above  have  focussed  on  how  readers  make 
causal  inferences  whilst  reading,  other  types  of  inferencing,  such  as  spatial  relations, 
have  also  been  studied. 
Some  studies  have  shown  that  skilled  adult  readers  are  able  to  construct  rather  detailed 
spatial  representations  and  use  them  in  further  processing  of  the  text*(Moffow,  Bower 
&  Greenspan,  1989;  Morrow,  Greenspan  &  Bower,  1987).  However,  subjects  in 
these  studies  first  memorised  a  layout  of  a  building  and  proceeded  to  read  a  relatively 
simple  story  detailing  actions  in  that  building.  Zwaan  &  van  Oostendorp  (1993)  feel 
that  all  that  these  studies  reveal  is  the  competence  of  readers  to  construct  spatial  models 
but  they  may  not  reflect  their  actual  performance  during  text  comprehension.  If  the 
spatial  information  is  presented  with  little  or  no  context  (eg  in  an  isolated  sentence) 
then  the  only  dimension  for  subjects  to  apprehend  is  spatial  information,  thus 
facilitating  the  construction  of  a  spatial  model.  More  complex  stretches  of  text  may 
yield  other  results. 
-81- In  naturalistic  text,  various  propcrties  of  the  tcxt  structurc  havc  bccn  shown  to  facilitatc 
the  construction  of  spatial  representations.  These  are  (a)  determinancy,  (b)  continuity 
and  (c)  condensation. 
Detenninancy  refers  to  how  restricted  a  text  reference  is  and  evidence  has  been 
reported  by  Mani  &  Johnson-Laird  (1982)  for  its  effect  on  the  formation  of  spatial 
representations.  If  a  text  supports  only  one  representation  (or  better,  class  of 
representations)  readers  tend  to  form  that  representation.  However  if  a  description  is 
indeterminate  (ie  can  give  rise  to  more  than  one  class  of  representations),  readers  only 
form  a  surface  and  propositional  representation  rather  than  a  situational  one.  For 
example,  if  a  text  refers  to  "a  house",  this  is  indeterminant.  However,  mention  of  "a 
bungalow"  can  lead  to  a  particular  spatial  representation,  ie  one  would  expect  all  the 
accommodation  to  be  on  one  level. 
Continuity  describes  how  well  connected  the  text  is.  Ehrlich  &  Johnson-Laird  (1982) 
have  shown  that  for  continuous  descriptions,  where  each  sentence  a6er  the  first  refers 
back  to  an  object  mentioned  in  the  immediately  preceding  sentence,  readers  could 
construct  spatial  representations.  If  this  chaining  principle  is  violated  and  the 
description  is  discontinuous,  then  readers  have  difficulty  integrating  the  spatial 
information  into  a  single  model.  Parallel  research  into  spoken  language  shows  that 
speakers  attempt  to  make  their  spatial  descriptions  continuous  (Levelt,  1989;  Linde  & 
Labov,  1975). 
Even  when  a  description  is  continuous  in  the  sense  that  each  object  and  its  location  is 
mentioned  after  an  adjacent  object,  the  surface  structure  of  the  text  may  not  be 
continuous.  The  spatial  information  may  be  interspersed  with  nonspatial  information, 
eg  the  description  of  the  location  of  a  building  could  be  followed  by  a  description  of  its 
inhabitants  or  of  the  history  of  the  building.  Zwaan  (1993)  has  shown  that  the  amount 
of  nonspatial  information  between  spatial  information  influences  the  quality  of  the 
spatial  representation  constructed.  If  the  spatial  description  is  distributed  over  a  large 
surface  text  area,  even  although  continuous  in  terms  of  the  spatial  modcl,  then  the 
poorer  will  be  the  spatial  representation  which  is  constructed  by  the  reader.  The  more 
-82- condensed  the  description,  the  better  the  spatial  representation.  This  could  be  due  to 
limitations  of  short-term  memory,  and  therefore  is  not  unique  to  spatial  processing 
(Sanford  &  Garrod,  1981). 
It  seems  that  these  three  properties  are  only  partly  present  in  most  naturalistic,  fictional 
narratives;  therefore,  perhaps  the  intention  of  authors  is  to  convey  a  general 
impression  rather  than  a  distinct  spatial  representation. 
If  readers  adopt  a  minimal  coherence  strategy  (McKoon  &  Ratcliff,  1992,1990),  then 
causal  information  is  likely  to  be  more  important  than  spatial  information  in 
constructing  coherence.  Spatial  situation  models  are  only  likely  to  be  considered  more 
important  if  subjects  read  with  a  special  purpose  or  with  particular  instructions, 
perhaps  to  pay  attention  to  spatial  layout. 
Zwaan  &  van  Oostendorp  (1993)  examined  the  effects  of  two  different  reading 
instructions.  Subjects  were  either  told  to  read  the  text  as  they  normally  would  (the 
normal  condition)  or  to  focus  on  spatial  information  and  keep  track  of  the  location  of 
objects  mentioned  in  the  text  (the  spatial  condition).  They  measured  reading  times  on  a 
self-paced  reading  task  and  reading  times  and  accuracy  of  response  on  an  inference 
judgement  task.  They  proposed  that  the  more  accurate  the  inferences  are  drawn,  then 
the  stronger  the  spatial  model  subjects  had  constructed. 
They  had  four  hypotheses: 
(1)  Subjects  in  the  spatial  condition  should  allocate  more  encoding  time  for  spatial 
information  than  subjects  in  the  normal  condition;  therefore  spatial  information  would 
be  encoded  more  slowly  during  the  reading  task. 
(2)  Subjects  in  the  spatial  condition  would  have  a  stronger  spatial  representation  than 
the  controls,  so  that  the  spatial  inference  judgement  task  should  yield  faster  and  more 
accurate  responses. 
-83- (3)  Subjects  in  both  conditions  should  have  relatively  good  representation  of  non- 
spatial  information,  such  as  information  about  actions,  traits,  and  motives  of  the 
characters.  This  test  acts  as  a  control.  If  subjects  in  both  groups  perform  equally  well 
on  non-spatial  inferences,  any  differences  on  spat.  ial  inferences  would  suggest  that  the 
different  reading  instructions  produce  qualitatively  different  modes  of  reading  and 
different  cognitive  representat  ions;  the  difference  could  not  be  explained  by  the  spatial 
condition  subjcctsjust  being  better  overall  at  processing  textual  information. 
(4)  Wender  (1989)  proposes  that  a  well  established  spatial  representation  has 
beneficial  effects  on  the  processing  of  subsequent  information  which  elaborates  or 
transforms  the  spatial  layout.  Zwaan  &  van  Oostendorp  added  such  new  spatial 
information  and  measured  reading  times  for  &s  information  (which  should  be  faster 
for  the  spatial  condition)  and  judgements  about  spatial  inferences  pertaining  to  these 
modifications  of  the  spatial  model  (  for  the  spatial  condition,  these  should  be  more 
accurate). 
The  textual  material  was  naturalistic  and  selected  to  meet  the  conditions  of 
determinacy,  continuity  and  condensation  mentioned  earlier.  In  addition,  a  detective 
story  was  cliosen  as  spatial  representations  are  quite  important  in  this  genre  since  they 
frequently  contain  cl  ucs  about  the  crime.  Experienced  readers  should  have  internalised 
this  conventional  wisdom  and  so  spatial  information  would  not  be  completely  ignored. 
Individual  differences  in  reading  rate  and  spatial  ability  were  partialled  out  using 
covariance. 
Zwaan  &  van  Oostendorp  found  support  for  all  four  hypotheses.  Reading  times  for 
the  spatial  condition  were  indeed  slower  than  than  for  the  normal  condition.  Subjects 
in  the  spatial  condition  made  more  accurate  spatial  inference  judgements  although  there 
was  no  difference  in  response  times.  Subjects  in  both  the  spatial  and  normal 
conditions  had  equally  strong  representations  of  non-spatial  information.  In  the  spatial 
condition,  readers  checked  this  non-spatial  text  for  potentially  relevant  information, 
hence  the  longer  reading  times,  but  this  added  time  did  not  lead  to  better  performance. 
Subsequent  spatial  information  was  processed  more  quickly  and  accurately  by  the 
-84- spatial  subjects. 
Therefore,  construction  of  spatial  representations  does  not  seem  to  be  a  crucial  aspect 
of  naturalistic  story  comprehension.  Under  normal  conditions,  readers  construct 
relatively  weak  spatial  representations.  However,  they  can  construct  relatively  strong 
spatial  representations,  but  only  if  specifically  instructed  to  do  so. 
Zwaan  and  van  Oostcndorp  mooted,  but  did  not  investigate  in  their  study,  that  the 
relevance  of  an  object  to  the  causal  chain  of  a  story  might  influence  the  reader's 
knowledge  of  the  location  of  such  an  object. 
3.12  Overview 
If  one  wishes  to  explore  the  mechanisms  that  constitute  competent  reading,  it  seems 
sensible  to  examine  this  process  in  fluent,  adult  readers.  Since  inferencing  has  been 
seen  as  central  to  the  comprehension  process  (Schank,  1976),  this  has  been  an  area  to 
which  extensive  research  has  been  directed.  However,  despite  almost  twenty  years  of 
such  investigation,  and  continual  refinements  in  methodology  and  experimental 
design,  it  has  proved  very  difficult  to  construct  a  unified  theory  of  inference 
processing. 
The  studies  discussed  above  focus  on  issues  of  current  concern.  In  particular,  what 
inferences  arc  generated  (eg  inferences  concerned  with  local  cohesion  in  the  text  or 
more  global  inferences),  as  well  as  when  these  inferences  are  generated:  arc  they 
generated  on-line  (ie  during  the  comprehension  process)  or  off-line  (  ic  during  a 
subsequent  retrieval  task)?  However,  the  variety  of  studies  quoted  have  tended  to 
focus  on  different  types  of  inference.  Some  categories  of  inferencc  have  been 
extensively  studied  while  others  have  almost  been  neglected  (Gracsscr  &  Krcuz, 
1993).  These  arc  listed  below,  starting  with  the  most  studied  (references)  through  to 
those  least  studied  (readers'  emotions): 
-85- referential  inferences  >  causal  antecedent  >  causal  consequence  >  instrumental 
>  superordinatc  goal  >  subordinate  goal  >  ........  >  thematic  >  motion  of 
reader. 
The  methodologies  used  have  varied  also,  from  memory  probes,  through  latencies  on 
lexical  decision,  to  on-line  measures  of  reading  times.  Each  seems  to  have  advantages 
as  well  as  disadvantages. 
The  majority  of  the  studies  mentioned  in  this  chapter  have  concerned  themselves  with 
establishing  support  for  either  the  constructionist/  gl6bal  inference  theory  (Trabasso, 
Trabasso  &  Suh,  Long  &  Golding,  van  den  Broek  &  Lorch),  or  the  minimalist/local 
coherence  theory  (Fletcher  &  Bloom,  Mckoon  &  Ratcliff,  Magliano  et  al).  The 
constructionist  standpoint  sees  the  reader  as  making  elaborative  inferences  which 
embellish  the  text  representation  while  the  minimalists  see  the  reader  as  making 
bridging  inferences  for  local  text  cohesion.  Fincher-Kiefer  proposes  a  multilevel 
processing  model  in  which  the  reader  tends  to  adopt  a  minimalist  approach  but  also 
constructs  a  situational  model,  although  this  is  likely  to  be  tentative  and  incomplete. 
Although  these  studies  fall  into  two  theoretical  camps,  the  types  of  inference  used  in 
each  cut  across  the  divide.  Trabasso  &  Suh  and  van  den  Broek  &  Lorch  consider 
bridging  inferences  while  Fincher-Kiefer,  Long  &  Golding,  and  Magliano  et  al 
consider  elaborative  inferences.  (In  the  Magliano  et  al  study  antecedent  inferences  are 
used.  Although  these  are  backward  directed,  they  are  not  bridging  inferences  since  the 
antecedent  goal  does  not  appear  in  the  text.  They  are  considered  to  bq  elaborations). 
There  is  remarkable  consistency  in  the  findings  of  the  Trabasso  &  Suh  and  the  van  den 
Brock  &  Lorch  studies.  Texts  were  locally  coherent  and  attempts  were  made  to  control 
for  context  qhecking  of  the  test  probe.  van  den  Brock  and  Lorch  also  tried  to  address 
the  issue  of  lexical  priming.  Trabasso  &  Suh's  approach  had  the  advantage  of 
converging  results  from  three  sources:  the  inferences  predicted  from  their  theoretical 
model  matched  the  inferences  which  readcrs  reported  they  had  made,  with  the 
additional  evidence  of  reading  times  to  confirm  that  these  inferences  were  made  on- 
-86- line.  These  two  studies,  along  with  that  of  Long  &  Golding,  provide  support  for  the 
global/constructionist  view. 
Although  the  second  group  of  studies  examined  elaborative  inferences,  each  looked  at 
a  different  subset  of  causal  elaboration.  Long  &  Golding's  included  superordinate  and 
subordinate  goals:  Magliano  et  al  included  superordinate  goals  with  causal 
consequences:  Fincher-Kiefer  included  causal  consequences.  Despite  some 
discrepancies  among  these  studies,  they  do  provide  some  evidence  of  elevated 
activation  of  causal  elaborations  during  (compared  to  other  inference  categories). 
The  efficacy  of  a  single  word  probe  (as  in  naming  or  lexical  decision  tasks)  has  been 
questioned  by  Magliano  &  Graesser  (1991)..  Can  such  a  probe  access  an  adequate 
level  of  representation  of  a  complex  inference?  A  sentence  or  phrase  would  seem  to  be 
better,  for  example,  "Did  the  dragon  eat  theprincesses?  "  would  seem  to  be  better  than 
"eat".  An  obvious  disadvantage,  though,  is  that  use  of  a  longer  phrase  does  permit 
context  checking  to  occur  more  easily.  Trabasso  &  Suh  and  van  den  Broek  &  Lorch 
presented  probes  in  this  more  complete  way. 
It  is  obvious,  when  investigating  knowledge-based  rather  than  text-based  inferences, 
that  the  readers  should  have  a  sufficient  knowledge  base,  in  order  to  generate  such 
inferences.  This  is  an  evident  advantage  of  the  "talk-aloud"  procedures  used  by 
Trabasso  &  Suh  and  the  question  answering  protocols  used  by  Long  &  Golding  and 
Magliano  et  al  in  that  they  allow  the  experimenter  to  check  what  inferences  the  readers 
are  actually  making,  and  not  rely  on  speculation  about  which  they  might  be  making. 
While  it  cannot  be  claimed  absolutely  that  what  readers  report  is  exactly  what  they 
infer,  the  reported  items  can  at  least  be  viewed  as  very  likely  candidates  for  on-line 
detection.  Conversely,  an  item  which  does  not  appear  in  the  protocols  can  be  regarded 
as  being  very  unlikely  to  accompany  comprehension.  However,  one  major 
disadvantage  of  talk-aloud  protocols  is  that  such  procedures  might  orient  the  reader  in 
a  particular  way,  such  that  inferences  could  be  drawn  that  would  otherwise  not  be 
made.  At  the  very  least,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  whole  process  bears  little 
resemblance  to  normal  reading. 
-87- Another  point  which  is  important  but  often  overlooked  is  the  fact  that  the  type  of 
material  being  read  and  the  readers  purpose  in  reading  it  can  have  an  effect  on  which 
inferences  are  likely  to  be  made.  Zwaan  &  van  Oostendorp  have  shown  that  readers' 
goals  determine  how  much  spatial  information  is  constructed  when  reading  a  mystery 
novel.  Thus  text  genre  may  determine  the  particular  goals  that  readers  adopt  during 
comprehension.  For  example,  keeping  track  of  the  spatial  layout  of  a  house  might  be 
useful  when  reading  a  thriller  about  a  jewel  thief  but  not  when  reading  a  romance 
novel. 
Although  it  is  difficult  to  incorporate  all  the  findings  of  the  above  studies  into  one 
overall  model,  some  general  precepts  can'ýe  drawn.  Inferences  which  aid  local 
coherence  of  a  text  probably  occur  automatically.  More  global  infýrences  occurring 
over  a  greater  surface  distance  of  the  text  arc  likely  to  occur  if  there  is  a  break  in 
cohesion.  However,  the  motivation  of  the  reader  is  also  important,  and  such  global 
inferences  may  occur  if  the  reader  is  actively  seeking  causal  relationships  within  the 
text,  for  example,  if  it  is  a  spy  thriller.  More  elaborative  types  of  inference  also  seem 
possible  but  perhaps.  only  in  circumstances  where  the  context  is  highly  constrained. 
Given  the  range  of  experimental  techniques  which  have  been  used  in  the  various 
studies  considered  so  far,  the  next  chapter  examines  the  advantages  and  drawbacks  of 
each  technique  more  closely. 
-88- Chapter  Four 
Methodological  Problems  when  Studying  Inferencing. 
As  mentioned  in  previous  sections,  the  results  of  various  studies  on  inferencing  often 
produce  contradictory  results.  Keenan,  Potts,  Golding  &  Jennings  (1990)  cite  several 
examples  of  studies  which  give  differing  results  from  different  studies,  not  only 
between  different  types  of  elaborative  inferencing  but  alsoL  different  results  from 
various  studies  of  the  same  type  of  inference;  for  example,  Doshcr  &  Corbett  (1982); 
Lucas  et  al'(1987);  McKoon  &  Ratcliff  (1981);  Paris  &  Lindauer  (1976);  Singer 
(1979)  -  INSTRUMENTAL  INFERENCES;  Anderson  &  Ortony  (1975);  Garrod  & 
Sanford  (1977);  McKoon  (1988);  O'Brien  et  al  (1988);  Whitney  (1986)  - 
INSTANTIATIONS  OF  GENERAL  TERMS;  Duffy  (1986);  McKoon  &  Ratcliff 
(1986);  Potts  et  al  (1988);  Singer  &  Ferreira  (1983)  -  LIKELY  CONSEQUENCES 
OF  EVENTS. 
These  studies  havecOncerned  themselves  primarily  with  what  type  of  inference  (if 
any)  was  drawn.  They  used  a  variety  of  paradigms  and  materials  varied  greatly,  from 
singles  sentences  in  some  cases  to  paragraphs  in  others.  In  some  paragraphs  previous 
mention  is  made  of  the  inference  concept,  in  others  the  context  is  highly  constrained. 
Two  different  methods  are  used  to  detect  whether  an  inference  has  been  drawn, 
usually  memory  measures  or  activation  measures.  Additionally,  the  time  when  the  test 
probe  is  initiated  can  vary  from  during  the  reading  process  itself,  tojust  after  the  text  is 
read,  to  a  slightly  greater  delay  after  reading.  Each  of  these  methodological  aspects 
will  be  considered  below.  Inherent  difficulties  will  be  discussed  and  possible  solutions 
suggested. 
Activation  measures,  which  will  be  described  in  more  detail  below,  detect  inferences 
by  seeing  whether  an  inference  concept  is  primed,  in  other  words,  whether  it  is  more 
activated  after  reading  an  implicit  version  of  the  text  compared  to  a  control  version. 
.  89- Activation  measures  include  naming,  lexical  decision  and  the  modified  Stroop  task.  An 
inference  concept  can  be  activated  by  (a)  intralexical  associations  or  word-based 
priming,  and  (b)  the  reader  drawing  the  inference  from  his  or  her  knowledge  of  the 
situation  described  in  the  text.  Most  researchers  would  not  consider  word-based 
priming  to  be  true  inferencing  and  would  try  to  control  for  it  in  their  experimental 
designs  (eg  Keenan,  Golding,  Potts,  Jennings  &  Aman,  (1990);  McKoon  &  Ratcliffe 
(1986). 
Memory  measures,  which  again  will  be  described  later,  require  the  reader  to  access  his 
or  her  representation  of  the  text  to  see  if  the  inferential  information  is  part  of  that 
representation.  They  include  cued  recall,  sentence  verification,  question  answering, 
and  recognition  tasks. 
Which  type  of  measure  is  used  (activation  or  memory)  often  depends  on  what  the 
researcher  considers  constitutes  an  inference.  Simple  activation  of  a  concept  can  be 
considered  as  an  inference  and  so  an  activation  method  seems  appropriate.  Others 
might  consider  activation  of  a  set  of  concepts  through  to  activation  of  a  higher  order 
structure  such  as  a  schema  to  be  necessary  before  considering  an  inference  to  have 
been  drawn.  They  would,  therefore,  reject  activation  of  a  single  concept  as  sufficient. 
Their  counterparts  could  in  turn  argue  that  activation  of  a  whole  set  of  concepts  can  be 
detected  by  measuring  the  activation  of  a  single  concept  from  that  set. 
Another  factor  which  is  often  considered  is  the  level  to  which  an  inference  is 
processed.  This  can  range  from  simple  activation,  through  incorporation  in  working 
memory,  to  inclusion  in  the  long-term  representation  of  the  text  (Kintsch,  1988). 
Those  who  believe  that  a  true  inference  is  only  that  which  is  included  in  the  final 
representation  of  the  text  will,  therefore,  prefer  memory  measures  over  activation. 
-90- 4.1  Cued  Recall 
Cued  recall  was  one  of  the  earliest  techniques  used  to  detect  elaborative  inferences.  An 
cxamplc  from  Corbctt  &  Doshcr  (1978) 
illustrates  its  use: 
The  athlete  cut  out  an  article  with  scissorsfor  his  friend.  EXPLICIT 
T1w  athlete  cut  out  an  articlefor  hisftiend.  IMPLICIT 
After  reading  a  sentence  such  as  the  above,.  -the  information  which  is  either  stated 
explicitly  or  implied  (in  this  case  the  scissors)  is  used  as  a  cue  and  the  subject  is  asked 
to  recall  the  sentence.  Paris  &  Lindauer  (1976)  found  that  P  instrument  was  just  as 
effective  as  a  cue  to  recall  in  the  implicit  sentence  as  well  as  the  explicit.  They 
concluded,  therefore,  that  the  instrument  had  been  inferred  during  encoding. 
Singer  (1978)  challenged  this  conclusion  and  suggested  that  the  cued  recall  reflects  a 
reconstruction  process  which  occurs  during  retrieval  rather  than  the  inference 
occurring  at  encoding.  Since  the  cued  recall  occurred  some  time  after  encoding,  the 
sentence  is  not  readily  available  and  must  be  retrieved  from  memory.  This  involves 
processing  the  sentence  again  which  could  induce  construction  of  information  (the 
inference)  which  was  not  part  of  the  original  encoding.  In  other  words,  the  test 
demands  themselves  could  have  caused  the  inference  to  be  made. 
Singer  verified  this  suggestion  by  using  the  cued  recall  method  for  sentences  which 
contained  actions  such  as  "stiffed  the  soup".  Such  an  action  can  imply  two  possible 
instruments,  spoon  and  ladle.  However,  these  instruments  do  not  relate  to  the  verb 
"stir"  in  a  symmetrical  way.  There  is  a  strong  forward  but  weak  backward  association 
between  "stir  the  soup"  and  spoon,  whereas  there  is  a  strong  backward  and  weak 
forward  ass6ciation  between  the  action  phrase  and  ladle.  If  the  instrument  is  inferred 
during  reading,  then  the  subject  should  infer  "spoon"  more  often  than  "ladle"  because 
-91. it  is  more  strongly  associated  in  that  direction.  However,  if  the  inference  is  made  at 
retrieval,  then  "ladle"  should  be  more  likely  than  "spoon"  due  the  stronger  backward 
association  of  that  word.  This  is  indeed  what  Singer  found,  confirming  that 
inferencing  is  occurring  as  a  result  of  reconstruction.  ' 
4.2  Sentence  Verification 
This  approach  involves  the  subject  reading  either  an  implicit  or  explicit  piece  of  text 
and  then  responding  "true"  or  "false"  to  a  sentence.  An  example  from  Keenan  & 
Kintsch  (1974),  which  involves  backward  or  bridging  inferences,  'is  shown  below, 
although  the  technique  has  been  used  to  detect  forward  inferences  also  (eg  implied 
instruments,  Singer,  1979;  inferences  concerning  the  consequences  of  events,  Singer 
&  Ferreira,  1983): 
Gas  leakedftom  a  butane  tank. 
The  explosion  levelled  a  service  station  and  a  new  home. 
IMPLICIT 
Gas  leakedftom  a  butane  tank  and  caused  an  explosion. 
77te  explosion  levelled  a  service  station  and  a  new  honw. 
EXPLICIT 
The  subject  is  then  asked  to  respond  by  answering  true  or  false  to  the  statement:  A  gas 
leak  caused  the  explosion.  If  subjects  are  just  as  fast  to  verify  the  information  after  the 
implicit  condition  as  they  are  after  the  explicit  version,  then  it  was  assumed  that  they 
drew  the  inference  while  reading. 
However,  there  is  a  problem  with  the  above  logic  as  the  paradigm  involves  accepting 
the  null  hypothesis.  That  is,  evidence  for  the  inference  having  been.  made  depends  on 
finding  no  significant  diffcrcncc  bctwccn  the  two  conditions.  Of  coursc,  a  lack  of 
-92- significant  difference  could  be  caused  by  other  reasons,  for  example  lack  of  power  in 
the  statistical  analysis  being  used. 
Another  problem  with  this  approach  has  been  pointed  out  by  Keenan  &  Kintsch 
(1974)  and  by  McKoon  &  Keenan  (1974).  The  probe  statement  to  be  verified  will 
have  been  presented  explicitly  in  the  control  version  of  the  text  but  not  in  the  implicit 
version.  It  is  possible,  therefore,  that  the  subject's  memory  for  the  surface  form  of  the 
statement  can  facilitate  or  prime  the  processing  of  the  test  statement  following  the 
control  con4ition.  Consequently,  it  could  be  that  subjects  consistently  draw  inferences 
in  the  implicit  condition  but  that  this  is  masked  by  the  decrease  in  verification  times 
under  the  control  version  because  of  priming. 
A  further  problem  can  arise  when  sentence  verification  is  used  to  detect  forward 
inferences.  It  has  already  been  noted  that  elaborative  inferences  are  likely,  but  not 
necessarily  true,  elaborations  of  the  text.  As  a  result,  when  the  subject  is  faced  with  a 
verification  statement,  he  or  she  knows  that  the  statement  is  likely  to  be  true,  but  since 
it  was  not  stated  explicitly  in  the  text,  there  is  always  the  possibility  that  it  may  not  be 
true.  A  example  from  Singer  &  Ferreira's  (1983)  study  was: 
Bob  threw  the  report  into  thefire. 
It  is  likely  that  the  report  was  burned  but  it  is  also  possible  that  Bob  had  a  poor  aim 
and  missed  the  fire  altogether.  Certainty  can  only  be  assumed  in  the  explicit  version  or 
in  a  version  where  a  backward  inference  can  be  drawn,  eg  The  report's  ashes  went  up 
theflue. 
Therefore,  even  when  subjects  do  make  forward  inferences,  they  may  hesitate  to 
endorse  it  as  readily  as  they  would  under  explicit  or  bridging  inference  conditions. 
This  could  slow  down  the  verification  times,  suggesting  that  no  inference  was  drawn 
when  in  fact  it  had  been. 
-93- 4.3  Sentence  Reading  Times 
Because  of  the  difficulties  mentioned  when  using  the  two  methods  considered  above, 
it  was  realised  that  to  assess  inferences  occurring  at  the  time  of  encoding,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  test  during  encoding,  that  is,  on-line. 
Use  of  sentence  reading  time  measures  has  already  been  mentioned  in  section  3.2.1 
above.  Haviland  &  Clark  (1974)  showed  that  for  bridging  inferences,  an  implicit 
version  of  a  text  takes  significantly  longer  to  process.  This  is  so  even  when  word- 
based  priming  effects  are  controlled. 
This  use  of  -the  reading  time  paradigm  for  bridging  inferences  works  well  because 
evidence  for  the  inference  is  an  increase  in  reading  time.  However,  its  use  in  detecting 
elaborative  inferences  is  less  sft-aightforward.  To  illustrate,  the  example  from  Haviland 
&  Clark  (1974)  quoted  earlier  can  be  used: 
Herb  unpacked  the  picnic  things.  IMPLICIT  VERSION 
The  beer  was  warm. 
If  the  subject  makes  an  elaborative  inference  that  includes  beer  among  the  picnic  things 
when  reading  the  first  sentence  (because  the  subject  knows,  perhaps,  that  Herb  would 
never  go  on  a  picnic  without  taking  along  some  beer),  then  the  time  to  read  the  second 
sentence  would  be  the  same  under  implicit  and  explicit  conditions.  The  difficulty  then 
arises  that  to  accept  that  an  inference  has  been  drawn  requires  one  to  accept  the  null 
hypothesis.  Therefore,  the  same  results  would  be  obtained  as  when  no  inference  is 
drawn  under  either  condition  (ic  no  significant  difference  is  obtained). 
One  possible  solution  to  this  difficulty  is  to  design  the  materials  so  that  the  target 
sentence  does  not  confirm  the  expected  elabomtive  inference,  but  mther  contmdicts  it. 
-94- This  should  result  in  the  reader  taking  longer  to  read  the  target  sentence  if  the  inference 
is  drawn.  An  example  from  Sanford  &  Garrod  (1981)  illustrates  this: 
(JohnIThe  teacher)  was  on  his  way  to  schooL 
The  bus  trundled  slowly  along  the  road. 
Last  week  he  had  trouble  controlling  the  class. 
If  the  reader  makes  the  elaborative  inference  that  John  is  a  school  boy,  then  it  will  take 
longer  to  read  the  final  sentence  than  if  the  reader  had  not  made  that  inference,  as  in  the 
teacher  version.  However,  in  the  example  above,  there  is  still  the  problem  of  word- 
based,  associative  priming  noted  earlier.  The  explicit  version,  which  contains 
"teacher"  is  more  likely  to  prime  words  in  the  target  sentence,  such  as  "class"  and 
"control",  than  would  the  implicit  version.  A  possible  solution  to  this  problem  is 
suggested  by  Keenan,  Golding,  Potts,  Jennings,  &  Aman  (1990),  They  suggest 
incorporating  "teacher"  into  the  implicit  version  as  well: 
As  John  was  on  his  way  to  school,  he  thought  IWLICIT 
about  what  an  effective  teacher  would  be  like. 
As  he  was  on  his  way  to  school,  the  teacher  EXPLICIT 
thought  about  what  it  would  be  like  to  be  effective. 
One  disadvantage  of  the  sentence  reading  time  paradigm  is  that  it  does  not  allow  one  to 
know  exactly  when  an  inference  is  drawn.  A  more  exact  process  is  to  use  word-by- 
word  reading  times  by  using  eye  movement  measures  (eg  Rayner  &  Pollatsck,  1989). 
This  procedure  is  discussed  later  in  this  chapter. 
Another  possible  disadvantage  of  reading  time  measures  is  that  increased  reading  time 
on  the  target  sentence  could  simply  reflect  a  diffcrencc  in  the  case  with  which  the  target 
-95- sentence  can  be  integrated  with  the  first  sentence  because  of  the  different  syntactic 
structures  of  the  f  irst  sentences  under  the  explicit  and  implicit  conditions. 
In  addition  to  the  above,  the  reading-time  paradigm  does  not  reveal  exactly  what 
inference  is  drawn.  In  the  example  from  Sanford  &  Garrod  above,  the  "John"  version 
may  show  that  the  reader  does  not  infer  John  to  be  a  teacher,  but  it  does  not  indicate  if 
he  is  inferred  to  be  a  schoolboy,  a  bus  driver  or  someone  else.  The  measures 
considered  next  address  this  problem  of  what  the  content  of  the  inference  is. 
4.4  On-line  Question  Answering 
This  metho4ology  involves  interspersing  various  questions  throughout  the  text  to  tap 
into  the  reader's  developing  representation  of  text  meaning,  checking  unspecified 
information  about  what  has  and  what  is  going  to  happen  (Graesser  &  Clark,  1985; 
Olson,  Duffy  &  Mack,  1984).  Although  this  method  can  be  used  at  any  point  in  the 
text  and  can  reveal  the  content  of  inferences,  it  is  still  the  case  that  those  inferences 
might  not  be  drawn  in  the  absence  of  the  questions.  The  measure  itself  is  invasive, 
perhaps  causing  inferences  to  be  drawn  that  would  not  normally  be  made  during 
reading.  It  is  none-the-less  useful  for  revealing  potential  inferences  that  a  subject  may 
make  when  reading. 
4.5  Recognition 
Like  the  last  method  above,  recognition  requires  the  subject  to  access  his  or  her 
representation  of  the  text  but  it  does  not  ask  the  subject  to  make  the  inference.  After 
reading  an  implicit  or  a  control  version  of  a  text,  the  subject  has  to  determine  whether  a 
test  word  representing  the  inference  actually  occurred  in  the  text.  If  an  inference  has 
been  drawn  in  the  implicit  version,  then  the  concept  will  have  been  a6fivated  and  it  will 
be  more  difficult  to  state  if  the  test  word  actually  occurred  in  the  text  or  not,  leading  to 
longer  response  times. 
-96- Again  the  drawback  with  this  method  is  that  it  is  impossible  to  know  whether  the 
inference  was  drawn  while  the  text  was  being  read  or  drawn  during  test. 
Keennan  et  al  (1990)  point  out  another  potential  difficulty  with  this  method.  If  the 
subject  is  led  to  draw  the  inference  while  checking  the  test  probe,  this  would  slow  the 
response  time.  (One  may  not  have  thought  of  an  instrument  used  to  stir  the  soup,  but 
when  presented  with  "spoon",  infer  that  it  would  be  an  appropriate  instrument).  This 
is  exactly  the  same  result  one  would  expect  if  the  inference  was  made  while  reading 
the  text  (the  concept  of  "spoon"  is  activated  when  the  inference  is  made  and  this  delays 
confirmation  of  the  test  probe). 
McKoon  &  Ratcliff  (1986)  recommend  the  use  of  a  deadline  procedure  with  the 
recognition  task  in  order  to  eliminate  the  possibility  of  subjects  drawing  inferences  at 
the  time  of  testing.  With  a  strict  deadline,  it  was  felt  that  subjects  would  not  have  time 
for  the  strategic  comparisons  of  the  probe  to  the  text  that  would  allow  an  inferencc  to 
be  drawn  at  retrieval.  However,  Keenan  et  al  (1990)  argue  that  this  restriction  does  not 
completely  -eliminate  the  comparison  process  and  therefore  does  not  remove  the 
problems  mentioned. 
4.6  Activation  Measures 
In  order  to  guard  against  inferences  occurring  at  the  time  of  testing,.  it  is  necessary  to 
use  a  test  that  does  not  require  subjects  to  evaluate  the  probe  against  the  text. 
Activation  measures  are  designed  to  do  just  that.  If  an  inference  has  been  drawn,  then 
the  activation  level  of  the  inference  concept  is  elevated,  thus  facilitating  lexical  access. 
Thus  tests  involving  lexical  access  can  be  used  to  assess  whether  an  inference  has 
been  drawn  (eg  reading,  naming,  lexical  decision,  and  modified  Stroop). 
Unfortunately,  as  Keenan,  Potts,  Golding,  &  Jennings  (1990)  point  out,  these  tasks 
involve  not  just  lexical  access,  but  other  processes  as  well.  For  example,  Schustack, 
-97- Ehrlich  &  Rayner  (1987)  have  shown  that  single  word  reading  time  or  gaze  duration 
involves  the.  time  to  carry  out  lexical  access  plus  time  to  integrate  the  word's  meaning 
with  the  preceding  text.  Therefore,  if  an  inference  has  been  drawn  in  an  implicit 
version  of  a  text,  then  gaze  duration  on  the  inference  word  will  be  shorter  than  in  the 
control  version.  However,  it  is  not  possible  to  say  which  process  caused  this 
facilitation,  lexical  access  priming  or  the  post-access  process  of  integrating  the  word 
with  the  text  (which  might  be  easier  in  the  implicit  version).  In  a  sense,  it  does  not 
matter  as  either  process  constitutes  evidence  for  an  inference  having  been  drawn.  If 
lexical  access  is  being  primed,  then  it  is  a  forward  inference;  if  post-acccss  integration 
is  facilitated,  then  it  is  a  backward  inference. 
4.7  Lexical  Decision 
In  some  ways  this  is  similar  to  recognition.  The  subject  rcads  a  passage  in  its  implicit 
or explicit  control  version  and  then  has  to  say  whether  a  string  of  letters  is  a  word  or 
not.  This  involves  two  components:  lexical  access  and  the  decision  process.  Since 
they  have  only  to  say  whether  the  letter  string  is  a  word  or  not,  subjects  have  no 
reason  to  compare  the  letter  string  to  the  text.  This  should,  therefore,  render  any 
relatedness  between  the  probe  and  text  irrelevant.  Since  this  could  otherwise  affect  the 
decision  process,  then  lexical  decision  would  appear  to  be  a  good  measure  of  priming 
and  thus  of  inferencing. 
Unfortunately,  a  number  of  studies  have  suggested  that  such  a  comparison 
nevertheless  occurs  (cg  Balota  &  Chumbley,  1984;  Chumblcy  &  Balota,  1984; 
Forster,  1981;  Neely,  Keefe  &  Ross,  1989;  Seidenberg,  Waters,  Sanders  &  Langer, 
1984-,  West  &  Stanovich,  1982).  This  context  checking  occurs  after  lexical  access  in 
order  to  help  the  decision  process;  if  the  target  is  related  to  the  text,  this  promotes  the 
decision  to  say  it  is  a  word. 
Studies  by  Keenan,  Potts,  Jennings  &  Golding  (1988)  and  Potts,  Keenan,  &  Golding 
(1988)  suggest  that  the  lexical  decision  process  may  overestimate  the  occurrence  of 
-98- inferences.  They  suggest  that  it  may  be  possible  to  eliminate  this  context  check-Ing  by 
forcing  subjects  to  respond  quickly  through  the  use  of  a  deadline  procedure. 
4.8  Naming 
After  reading  the  text,  subjects  are  presented  with  the  inference  word  and  have  to  say  it 
out  loud.  The  naming  process  thus  reflects  the  time  for  lexical  access  and  the  time  for 
articulation.  As  there  appears  to  be  no  connection  between  theyost-access  process  (ie 
articulation)  and  the  relatedness  of  the  probe  to  the'text,  this  method  is  sometimes 
viewed  as  a  purer  measure  of  lexical  access.  It  has  been  shown  that  it  is  not  affected 
by  factors  such  as  whether  the  target  and  prime  are  related  or  the  presence  of  backward 
association  between  them  (Seidenberg,  Waters,  Sanders,  &  Langer,  1984).  Balota, 
Boland  &  Shields  (1989)  have  shown  semantic  effects  on'articulation  but  Keenan, 
Potts,  Golding,  &  Jennings  (1990)  feel  these  are  spillover  effects  from  lexical  access. 
One  possible  disadvantage  of  this  method  is  that  it  may  have  a  reduced  sensitivity  to 
detecting  inferences  compared  with  other  methods  (Potts,  Keenan,  &  Golding,  1988). 
Another  potential  disadvantage  is  that  subjects  may  learn  to  anticipate  what  the  probe  is 
going  to  be,  a  type  of  expectancy  priming  (Neely  &  Keefe,  1989).  However,  Keenan, 
Potts,  Golding,  &  Jennings  (1990)  asked  subjects  to  try  to  guess  what  the  probe 
might  be,  and  under  these  optimum  guessing  conditions  found  that  correct  guesses 
were  made  only  about  15%  of  the  time.  Nevertheless  this  may  still  affect  the 
significance  of  the  findings  of  any  study  which  uses  this  approach.. 
4.9  Modified  Stroop  Task 
The  original  Stroop  test  (Stroop,  1935)  involved  subjects  naming  the  colour  of  ink  in 
which  a  colour  name  such  as  red  was  printed.  The  modified  Stroop,  task  involves 
subjects  reading  a  text  and  then  naming  the  ink  colour  of  a  non-colour  test  probe.  If 
-99- the  test  probe  has  been  activated  or primed  by  the  text,  then  it  should  take  longer  to 
name  the  ink  colour  used  for  that  word  (Conrad,  1974).  For  example,  it  should  take 
longer  to  name  the  colour  of  ink  for  "doctor"  following  a  text  about  hospitals  than  one 
about  restaurants. 
The  modified  Stroop  task  has  been  used  to  study  forward  inferences  for  the 
instruments  of  certain  actions  (Dosher  &  Corbett,  1982),  instantiation  of  general  terms 
(Whitney,  1986;  Whitney  &  Kellas,  1984)  and  the  likely  conse4uenccs  of  events 
(Keenan  et  al,  1988). 
As  well  as  the  priming  of  lexical  access,  the  time  to  articulate  the  ink  colour  is  also 
included  in*latency  measures.  Like  naming,  *  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  this  can  be 
affected  by  the  relatedness  of  the  probe  to  the  text. 
Since  latency  times  tend  to  be  longer  than  for  naming  (Keenan  et  al,  1988),  the 
modified  Stroop  is  more  likely  to  avoid  potential  floor  effects.  Also,  since  the  subject 
is  focusing  on  ink  colour,  this  should  discourage  expcctancy  priming. 
A  major  advantage  of  this  method  is  that  it  allows  distinction  between  priming  at  the 
conceptual  level  and  priming  at  the  lexical  level.  In  the  example  already  given  above, 
the  latency  response  time  is  increased  for  a  word  like  "doctor"  following  a  text  about 
hospitals  (inference  at  conceptual  level).  However,  if  the  probe  "doctor"  has  been 
preceded  by  the  explicit  generation  of  the  lexical  form  "doctor",  then  the  opposite 
effect  occurs,  ie  the  ink  colour  of  the  probe  is  identified  faster  than  if  it  had  been 
preceded  by  a  control  version  of  the  text  (Doshcr  &  Corbett,  1982;  Whitney,  1986). 
4.10  Movements  of  the  Eyes 
Perhaps  one  of  the  most  powerful  techniques  to  emerge  in  recent  years  has  been  the 
study  of  eye  movements.  Indeed,  Rayncr  &  Pollatsek  (1989)  claim  that  "eye 
movements  ýre  by  far  the  best  tool  to  understand  the  process  of  normal  silent  reading" 
-100- (pl  15).  This  has  been  due  to  the  refinement  of  the  technology  used  to  measure  such 
movements  and  also  to  the  accumulating  bank  of  knowledge  of  what  our  eyes  actually 
do  when  we  perceive  words  printed  on  a  page,  the  perceptual  processes  involved  and 
what  these  perceptions  tell  the  brain. 
From  a  large  pool  of  experimental  data,  it  is  now  known  that  the  eyes  of  a  reader  do 
not  sweep  continuously  across  a  page  of  text  (as  one  may  intuitively  think).  Rather  the 
eyes  move  in  synchrony  with  one  another  (Rayner,  1978a)  but  move  in  a  series  of 
jumps  or  "saccadcs".  The  eyes  come  to  rest  on  a  word  (called  a  "fixation")  for  a  period 
of  about  200  to  250  milliseconds,  although  this  can  vary  anywhere  from  between  150 
and  500  msecs).  The  eyes  then  move,  usually  to  the  right  in  English  text,  the  duration 
of  the  saccade  typically  taking  about  20  to  35-mscc.  It  is  known  from  several  studies, 
eg  Matin,  1974;  Campbell  &  Wurtz,  1978;  Wolverton  &  Zola,  1ý83)  that  input  of 
visual  information  to  the  brain  during  a  saccade  is  suppressed,  or  if  any  information 
does  get  in,  it  is  of  little  practical  importance.  With  each  saccade  the  eyes  generally 
move  forward  by  about  7  to  9  characters. 
While  most  of  the  saccades  made  are  forward  (ie  towards  the  right  of  the  page  in 
English  text),  a  small  number,  about  10  to  15  percent  for  fluent,  adult  readers,  move 
backward  in  the  text;  these  are  called  "regressions".  Readers  are  usually  unaware  of 
these  regressions.  When  the  eyes  near  the  end  of  a  line  of  text,  they  move  rapidly  to 
near  the  beginning  of  the  next  line;  this  is  called  a  return  sweep.  The  return  sweep 
usually  starts  about  5  to  7  character  spaces  from  the  end  of  the  line  and  generally  goes 
to  somewhere  between  the  third  and  seventh  character  space  of  the  next  line.  This  may 
land  on  the  second  word  of  the  new  line  and  often  there  is  an  additional  short  right-to- 
left  saccade.  These  small  saccades  are  probably  corrections  for  errors  in  aiming  the 
eyes.  There  are  also  slight  movements  of  the  eyes  called  microsaccadcs  or  drifts,  small 
and  rather  slow  movements  caused  by  the  less  than  perfect  control  of  the  oculomotor 
system  by  the  nervous  system.  When  this  happens,  there  is  often  a  small  and  rapid 
microsaccade  to  bring  the  eye  back  to  where  it  was.  Such  drifts  arc  usually  considered 
to  be  noise  and  arc  ignored  when  eye  movement  data  is  analysed. 
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- Various  mepures  have  been  used  when  studying  eye  movements.  Those  generally 
agreed  to  be  the  most  useful  arc: 
(a)  firstfixation  duration  .  This  is  the  length  of  the  first  fixation,  when  the  eye  first 
lands  on  a  word. 
(b)  gaze  duration.  The  eyes  may  fixate  a  word  and  then  move  to  another  character 
within  the  same  word.  Gaze  duration  is  the  sum  of  these  fixation  times  before  the  eyes 
move  off  to  another  word. 
(c)  total  viewing  time.  This  measure  includes  fixation  times  for  first  pass  fixations  as 
well as  for  regressive  fixations. 
(d)  saccade  length.  This  is  the  average  number  of  character  spaces  within  a  saccadc 
and  gives  an  estimate  of  how  far  the  eyes  travel  during  each  sweep  across  the  text. 
(e)  percentage  of  regressions.  This  indicates  how  often  the  eyes  look  back  from  the 
current  position  to  an  earlier  place  in  the  text. 
Although  it  can  be  said  that  most  words  are  fixated  during  reading,  some  types  of 
words  will  be  fixated  more  often  than  other  types.  A  distinction  is  often  made  between 
function  w6rds  and  content  words.  Content  words  include  nouns,  verbs,  and 
adjectives,  function  words  are  prepositions,  conjunctions,  articles  and  pronouns. 
Adverbs  can  be  classed  either  way  depending  on  context  and  use.  Fluent  adult  readers 
on  average  fixate  about  90%  of  all  content  words  but  only  about  30%  of  function 
words  (Rayner,  1995). 
Various  factors  may  influence  eye  movements.  For  example,  there  is  un  optimal  length 
of  line  which  seems  to  facilitate  the  reading  process  (Tinker,  1963,1965;  Morrison 
and  Inhoff,  1981).  This  appears  to  be  about  52  characters.  Since  readers  extract 
information  from  more  than  one  word  on  a  line  during  a  fixation  (McConkie  & 
Rayner,  197:  5),  this  optimal  length  may  be  explained  by  a  trade-off  between  extracting 
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return  sweep  if  the  line  is  too  long. 
Orthographic  factors  also  appear  to  influence  ho 
'w 
the  eyes  move.  It  has  been  found 
that  for  those  languages  which  use  different  characters  or  symbols  for  the  written 
forms  of  the  language,  the  length  of  saccadcs  varies  greatly.  For  example,  while 
readers  of  English  typically  have  saccades  of  about  7  to  9  character  spaces  in  length, 
readers  of  Hebrew  have  saccadcs  of  about  5.5  characters  (Pollatsek,  Bolozky,  Well, 
&  Rayner,  1981),  readers  of  Japanese  about  3.6  characters  (Ikeda  and  Saida,  1978), 
and  readers  of  Chinese  about  2  characters  (Stem,  1978).  The  important  factor  seems 
to  be  density  of  information  contained  within  the  text;  as  this  increases  so  does  the 
length  of  saccade  decrease.  There  is  a  corresponding  variation  in*average  fixation 
times  with  longer  fixations  for  the  more  densely  packed  text. 
This  pattern  is  also  noticed  within  English  when  one  examines  different  types  of  text 
(Rayner  &  Pollatsek,  1989),  with  more  difficult  text  (eg  a  physics  textbook)  requiring 
longer  fixations,  shorter  saccades,  and  more  regressions  than  an  easier  piece  of  text 
(eg  light  fiction). 
It  is  generally  accepted  that  first  pass  fixations  reflect  primary  processes  such  as  lexical 
access.  Lengthy  gaze  durations,  say  at  the  end  of  a  sentence,  are  likely  to  reflect 
processes  such  as  sentence  wrap-up  or  places  where  the  reader  pauses  slightly  while 
making  a  bridging  inference.  Regressions  and  second  pass  fixations  are  thought  to 
indicate  places  where  confusion  or  ambiguities  have  arisen  and  the  reader  re-reads  the 
text  seeking  clarification. 
4.11  Summary: 
The  range  of  methodologies  discussed  above  illustrates  that,  no  matter  which  is 
adopted,  there  will  be  advantages  as  well  as  disadvantages  to  its  use.  The  debate 
begins  when  attempts  are  made  at  defining  exactly  what  constitutes  ap  inference.  Some 
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activated  whilepthers  insist  that  the  inference  should  be  incorporated  into  the  reader's 
long-term  representation  of  the  text  (see  Kintsch,  1988).  The  former  would  accept 
activation  measures  such  as  lexical  decision  or  modified  Stroop  as  being  sensitive 
enough  to  detect  if  an  inference  had  been  processed  while  the  latter  would  insist  on 
using  a  memory  probe. 
It  can  be  argued  that  any  probe  which  is  used  after  the  text  has  been  read,  such  as  cued 
recall  or  sentence  verification,  could  itself  cause  the  inference  to  be  made,  rather  than 
the  inference  being  made  on-line. 
Even  measures  which  are  taken  on-line,  such  as  sentence  reading  times,  rely  for  their 
efficacy  on  establishing  the  null-hypothesis.  It  is  possible  to  set  the  target  so  that  it 
contradicts  the  expected  elaborative  inference  and  so  leads  to  a  measurable  increase  in 
reading  time.  However,  difficulties  then  arises  with  associative  priming. 
On-line  question-answering  seems  attractive  in  that  it  allows  the  redder's  developing 
representation  of  the  text  to  be  mapped.  But  again  this  method  is  intrusive  and  may 
cause  an  inference  to  be  made  which  would  not  otherwise  have  taken  place. 
Activation  Measures  theoretically  do  not  require  the  reader  to  evaluate  the  probe  against 
the  text  but  rather  rely  on  measuring  ease  of  lexical  access.  However,  even  with  lexical 
decision,  there  can  still  be  a  degree  of  context  checking.  This  is  reduced  with  naming 
but  this  procedure  can  give  rise  to  expectancy  priming.  This  in  turn  can  be  decreased 
by  using  the  modified  Stroop  procedure. 
However,  perhaps  the  most  effective  protocol  is  that  of  eyetracking.  The  exact 
movements  of  the  reader's  eyes  can  be  studied,  how  long  particular  words  are  f  ixatcd, 
which  words  are  referred  back  to  in  earlier  text,  can  all  be  precisely  measured  and  their 
significance  assessed.  The  process  is  also  close  to  "normal"  reading. 
-104- The  current  consensus  is  that  there  are  trade-offs  associated  with  each  methodology, 
that  no  single  protocol  is  adequate  by  itself,  and  that  the  wisest  approach  is  to  use 
multiple  methodologies  (Keenan,  Golding,  Potts,  Jennings,  &  Aman,  1990). 
4.12  Overview  of  the  literature: 
From  the  literature  reviewed  in  the  preceding  three  chapters,  it  can  be  seen  that  there 
are  several  facets  of  the  reading  process  which  cause  difficulties  for  the  deaf.  While  it 
seems  that  the  deaf  are  equally  as  good  as  their  hearing  counterparts  in  visual  analysis 
of  text  and  other  basic,  bottom-up  skills,  they  nonetheless  have  a  poorer  vocabulary. 
Not  only  do  they  know  fewer  words  but  they  are  also  less  likely  to  know  alternative 
meanings  for  multi-meaning  words. 
Studies  have  shown  that  deaf  subjects  can  and  do  use  a  variety  of  systems  for 
recoding  the  words  that  they  read  on  a  page.  The  majority  use  visual,  sign  or 
fingerspelling  modes,  but  a  small  number  of  the  profoundly  deaf  use  phonetic 
recoding  and  these  seem  to  be  the  best  readers. 
The  syntax  of  the  English  language  is  another  major  stumbling  block  for  deaf  readers. 
They  do  not  hear  language  and  find  it  difficult  to  assimilate  the  language  structure. 
They  are  likely  to  use  a  manual  form  of  communication  such  as  British  Sign 
Language,  which  has  a  totally  different  structure.  For  similar  reasons,  the  deaf  are 
likely  to  find  figurative  or  idiomatic  language  rather  difficult  to  grasp. 
As  a  result  of  these  difficulties,  deaf  students  are  much  less  likely  to  be  able  to  stand 
back  and  view  language  as  a  tool,  to  experiment  with  language  or  to  play  language 
games.  This  is  reflected  in  their  rather  impoverished  written  output. 
Even  when  factors  such  as  vocabulary  and  syntax  are  controlled  for,  the  deaf  still  have 
more  difficulty  in  comprehending  text  than  hearing  subjects.  They  seem  to  level  off  at 
a  point  where  textual  material  becomes  more  implicit  in  content.  The  few  studies 
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experience  difficulty.  Not  only  do  deaf  children  infer  less  well  than  hearing  children, 
they  do  not  seem  to  use  their  prior  knowledge  to  construct  appropriate  schemata  to 
help  interpret  the  text. 
In  contrast,  much  work  has  been  directed  towards  the  inferencing  process  in  hearing 
adults.  Recent  research  has  examined  what  type  of  inferences  take  place,  when  they 
take  place,  the  role  of  the  causal  chain  of  the  narrative,  the  effect  of  local  text 
coherence,  etc.  Although  many  slightly  different  models  have  been  proposed,  and 
different  methodologies  have  been  used,  there  now'seems  to  be  a  consensus  about 
how  and  when  hearing,  fluent  readers  draw  inferences  from  textual  material.  It  seems 
likely  that  elaborative  inferences  are  not'drawn  on-line  unless  the  context  is 
constraining  enough  to  make  an  inference  very  likely.  Otherwise  readers  will  not 
make  elaborative  inferences  as  the  consequences  of  doing  so  in  terms  of  computational 
load  would  be  too  great  and  could  lead  to  comprehension  difficulties.  Unless  the 
context  makes  certain  inferences  more  or  less  a  certainty,  they  will  not  usually  be 
made.  The  reader  tends  to  adopt  a  "wait  and  see"  approach. 
The  present  set  of  studies  will  attempt  to  investigate  the  infercncing  processes  in  a 
sample  of  9evere  to  profoundly  deaf  children  as  they  read  textual  materials,  by 
adopting  the  general  Sanford  and  Garrod  model,  which  views  the  reading  process 
from  the  stance  of  the  subject  employing  background  knowledge  in  the  form  of 
scenarios.  A  variety  of  approaches  will  be  used  in  an  attempt  to  avoid  some  of  the 
methodological  difficulties  mentioned  above. 
-106- Chapter  Five: 
Can  deaf  children  draw  inference's 
from  simple  textual  material 
5.1  Introduction 
From  earlier  sections,  it  can  be  seen  that  there  is  a  paucity  of  studies  relating  to 
inferencing  skills  in  deaf  children.  Those  which  have  been  carried  out  offer  at  best 
inconclusive,  and  sometimes  conflicting  results.  Given  that  bearing  impaired  children 
face  so  maný  additional  difficulties  when  they  come  to  read,  can  we  be  certain  that  it  is 
the  inferencing  process  which  is  failing  them  and  not,  for  example,  their  limited 
vocabulary  or  the  complexities  of  English  syntax  which  is  having  the  greater  effect? 
Many  questions  remain  unanswered.  For  example,  if  deaf  children  can  draw 
inferences  on  occasion,  is  the  quality  of  these  inferences  commensurate  with  their  level 
of  competence  in  reading?  Are  the  inference  concepts  activated  briefly  or  arc  they 
incorporated  into  the  reader's  longcr-term  representation  of  the  text? 
Do  the  hearing  impaired  have  difficulty  with  all  types  of  inference  or  are  some  easier 
or  more  difficult  than  others,  for  example,  considering  the  work  of  Zwaan  and  van 
Oostendorp  (1993),  can  spatial  inferences  be  made  more  easily  than  say  causal? 
Another  important  question  which  needs  to  be  addressed  is  when  any  such  inference 
might  take  place.  Does  it  occur  as  the  text  is  read  or  later  during  some  retrieval 
process,  ie  does  it  occur  on-line  or  off-line?  If  it  occurs  on-line,  is  the  inference 
elaborative  or  bridging? 
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decided  to  initially  investigate  the  infercncing  abilities  of  deaf  adolescents  in  rclation  to 
a  group  of  hearing  children  matched  for  reading  age  and  a  group  of  hearing  children 
who  were  nearer  in  chronological  age.  This  allows  infercricing  skills  to  be  cxamincd  in 
those  deaf  children  who  have  acquired  some  basic  literacy  skills  but  who  have  reached 
a  plateau  in  their  progress,  as  described  by  Brooks,  1978;  Reich  &  Reich.  1974; 
DiFrancesca,  1972.  Using  a  group  of  younger  children  who  approximate  in  reading 
ability  to  those  deaf  children  being  studied,  allows  direct  comparison  of  infercricing 
skills  across  both  groups.  In  other  words,  can  the  deaf  children  infer  as  well  as 
hearing  children  with  the  same  level  of  rcading,  skills?  The  older  group  of  hearing 
children  are  nearer  in  chronological  age  and  should  be  more  closely  matched  in  terms 
of  emotional  maturity  and  experience  to  the  hearing  impaired  children. 
This  initial  study  proposed  to  look  at  a  large  group  of  severely  and  profoundly  hearing 
impaired  children  from  a  range  of  schools.  It  would  include  children  who  used 
different  methods  of  communication  (oral  methods  and  total  communication),  children 
who  were  pre-lingually  deafened  as  well  as  those  who  were  deafened  after  the 
acquisition  of  speech,  children  whose  parents  might  be  dcaf  as  well  as  those  whose 
parents  are  ýearing.  The  only  provisos  were  that  the  children  had  to  fall  within  the 
average  range  of  ability,  not  suffer  from  any  additional  handicap  and  have  an  average 
hearing  loss  in  the  better  ear  of  at  least  7OdB. 
The  study  used  simple  material  similar  in  style  to  that  used  by  Wilson  (1979). 
However,  a  different  system  of  classification  of  inference  types  was  used,  spatial, 
causal,  and  temporal,  this  last  being  considered  by  several  experienced  teachers  of  the 
deaf  to  cause  hearing  impaired  children  particular  difficulty.  The  material  was 
particularly  simple,  being  controlled  in  terms  of  vacabulary  and  syntax.  Any  inference 
which  might  be  drawn  by  the  subjects  was  in  each  case  fairly  straightforward. 
Unlike  Wilson's  study,  the  present  project  included  dcaf  children  from  a  wide  range  of 
backgrounds,  those  who  were  prclingually  dcaf  as  well  as  those  who  lost  their  hearing 
after  acquiring  speech,  those  from  an  ethnic  minority  background,  and  not  excluding 
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wider,  less  select  population  of  deaf  children. 
5.2  METHOD 
5.2.1  Subjects 
One  experimental  group  and  two  comparison  groups  were  used.  The  experimental 
group  comprised  39  deaf  children  (25  boys,  14  girls)  with  hearing  losses  of  70dI3  or 
greater  in  the  better  ear  averaged  over  the  four  frequencies  within  the  range  500- 
4KHz.  Losses  ranged  from  75  dB  to  116  dB,  with  a  mean  loss  of  99  d13  (standard 
deviation  11.  dB).  All  were  within  the  normal  range  of  intellectual  ability.  Their  most 
recently  recorded  IQ  had  to  fall  within  the  average  range.  Ages  ranged  from  12  years 
2  months  to  18  years  6  months  with  a  mean  age  of  14  years  and  5  months  (standard 
deviation  16  months).  A  few  of  the  children  were  from  ethnic  minority  backgrounds. 
Both  prelingually  and  postlingually  deafened  children  were  included  in  the  group.  All 
the  children  attended  special  schools  for  the  deaf  or  units  for  the  hearing  impaired 
attached  to  mainstream  secondaries  in  Strathclyde  Region. 
The  first  comparison  group  comprised  39  normally  hearing  children  (18  boys,  21 
girls)  at  the  Primary  4  stage  in  a  local  primary  school,  aged  from  8  years  0  months  to  9 
years  0  moqths,  with  a  mean  age  of  8  years  6  months  (standard  deviation  4  months). 
The  second  comparison  group  contained  39  normally  hearing  children  (15  boys,  24 
girls)  in  the  first  year  of  a  local  secondary  school,  aged  from  12  years  0  months  to  13 
years  1  month,  with  a  mean  age  of  12  years  6  months  (standard  deviation  4  months). 
Since  deaf  children's  reading  skills  tend  to  plateau  at  about  the  8.5  year  level,  the 
younger  control  group  could  be  expected  to  match  the  deaf  children  on  reading 
achievement  level,  while  the  older  control  group,  although  slightly  younger,  would  be 
approaching  the  deaf  children's  level  of  emotional  and  conccptual  maturity. 
-109- 5.2.2  Materials 
The  test  materials  consisted  of  four  booklets.  the  first  booklet  contained  9  short  pieces 
of  text  each  of  which  was  followed  by  a  question  designed  to  assess  infcrcncing 
ability.  These  were  preceded  by  four  practice  items.  The  second  booklet  contained 
cued  recall  items  designed  to  measure  the  number  of  propositions  correctly 
remembered  from  the  text  in  the  first  booklet  (see  Appendix  AI).  The  third 
bookletprescnted  a  further  9  pieces  of  text  with  inference  questions,  while  the  fourth 
booklet  contained  cued  recall  material  for  these  items.  Three  types  of  inference  were 
examined,  viz.  spatial  (could  subjects  infer  th6  relative  positions  of  objects),  temporal 
(could  they  infer  the  time  sequence  of  events),  and  causal  (could  they  infer  cause  and 
effect).  Examples  of  each  type  of  inference  are  given  below.  -  The  full  list  of  text  items 
is  given  in  Appendix  A1 
Temporal 
The  car  crushed  into  the  wall. 
The  car  was  badly  smashed. 
Later  the  policeman  came. 
Did  the  car  crash  before  the  policeman  came? 
Causal 
The  children  were  playing  with  a  ball. 
John  threw  the  ball  to  Susan. 
The  ball  broke  a  window. 
Did  John  break  the  window? 
-110- Spatial 
The  bread  Nýas  in  the  cuPboard. 
The  buttcr  was  beside  the  bread. 
The  cheese  was  on  the  table. 
Was  the  buttcr  on  the  table? 
The  vocabulary  was  carefully  controlled,  having  been  selected  from  lists  published  by 
Bench  and  Bamford  (1979),  of  words  which  should  be  known  by  deaf  childrcn 
similar  to  those  in  the  experimental  group.  Bench  and  Bamford  had  rccordcd  groups 
of  deaf  children  orally  telling  stories  based  on  a  set  of  pictures.  Thus  if  the  deaf 
children  spontaneously  used  a  word,  it  could  be  taken  that  this  word  was  indeed 
familiar  to  -them.  The  groups  of  words  were  then  catcgorised  according  to  the 
children's  degree  of  hearing  loss  and  level  of  intclligcncc.  Only  those  words  used  by 
children  of  average  or  below  intelligence,  and  with  an  average  hcaring  loss  of  70  dB 
or  greater  were  included  in  the  texts  of  the  present  study.  The  syntax  of  the  text  was 
also  carefully  controlled  bearing  in  mind  the  findings  of  Quigley,  Wilbur,  Power, 
Montanclli,  &  Steinkamp  (1976),  for  example,  nouns  andnoun  phrases  were  used  in 
preference  to  pronouns  wherever  possible.  The  passages  were  scored  for  level  of 
reading  difficulty  using  the  Fry  graph  (1977)  which  gave  a  difficulty  level  of  6  years, 
and  the  Spache  formula  (1953)  which  gave  a  difficulty  level  of  6.9  years,  wcll  within 
the  capabilities  of  all  three  groups  of  subjects.  The  question  types  were  randomly 
distributed  týroughout  the  book-lets.  Response  requirements,  ie  affirmative  or  negative 
response,  were  also  randomly  distributed. 
The  aim  was  to  make  the  reading  of  the  texts  within  the  capabilities  of  the  deaf  subjects 
so  that  any  difficulties  which  they  do  face  with  comprehension  can  be  ascribed  to 
failures  in  drawing  inferences  and  not  to  problems  with  other  textual  features  such  as 
syntax  or  vocabulary. 
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A  30  factorial  repeated  measures  design  was  used.  The  first  factor,  between  subjects 
or  treatments,  was  subject  group  and  had  three  levels  -  deaf,  primary  agcd,  and 
secondary  aged.  The  second  factor,  a  within  subjects  factor,  was  inference  type  and 
had  three  levels  -  spatial,  temporal,  and  causal. 
5.2.4  Procedure 
The  four  booklets  were  administered  to  the  subjects  by  their  class  teachers  following  a 
standardised  protocol  (see  Appendix  A2).  For  the  first  booklet  the  subjects  were  given 
two  practice  items  with  the  answers  given  to  illustrate  what  was  required  and  a  further 
two  practice  items  which  they  had  to  attempt  by  themselves.  They  were  also  given  two 
items  to  illustrate  what  was  required  with  the  recall  test  in  the  second  booklet. 
Teachers  were  allowed  to  help  with  any  difficulties  which  arose  at  this  stage.  Apart 
from  this,  nb  help  or  coaching  was  allowed.  The  booklets  were  presented  in  order, 
one  booklet  being  removed  before  the  next  was  presented.  This  ensured  that  on  the 
cued  recall  items,  subjects  could  not  check  back  on  the  original  texts.  Subjects  were 
allowed  a  maximum  of  one  minute  for  each  piece  of  text  or  recall  item.  For  the 
questions  in  book-lets  one  and  three,  subjects  were  expected  to  respond  with  a  ycs/no 
answer  to  the  inference  question  but  also  to  expand  upon  this  response.  In  the  recall 
items,  book-lets  two  and  four,  they  were  given  the  first  sentence  of  each  passage  as  a 
cue  and  had  to  complete  the  remainder  of  the  story.  The  children  were  forewarned  that 
they  would  be  asked  to  recall  what  they  had  read  after  a  few  passages,  but  care  was 
taken  not  to  suggest  either  rote  memory  or  gist  memory.  There  were  six  passages  for 
each  inference  type,  making  eighteen  passages  in  total. 
-112- 5.3  RESULTS 
5.3.1  Inference 
The  accuracy  of  the  inferences  (ie  the  number  of  questions  answered  correctly)  were 
recorded  by  totalling  the  number  of  correct  responses  for  cach  infcrcncc  type  for  each 
subject.  These  were  then  averaged  for  each  group  of  subjects.  The  mean  scores  for  the 
two  comparison  groups  and  the  experimental  group  for  each  of  the  infercricing  types 
are  shown  in  Table  5.1  below.  (Scores  out  of  a  possible  maximum  of  6): 
TABLE  5.1:  Inference  Scores 
Spafial  Tcmporal  Causal 
Deaf  4.5385  (76%)  3.6667  (61%)  4.4359  (74%) 
Primary  5.5385(92%)  5.4615(91%)  5.4872(91%). 
Secondary  5.8462(97%)  5.8205(97%)  5.9487(99%) 
Thus  while  the  secondary  group  are  achieving  a  success  rate  of  98%  overall  inference 
types  and  the  primary  group  92%,  the  deaf  group  only  make  correct  inferences  in  70% 
of  the  texts. 
5.3.1.1  First  Analysis 
These  results  were  analysed  using  a2  way,  repeated  measures  analysis  of  variance, 
collapsing  across  questions  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  with  infcrcncc 
type  as  within  subject  repeated  measure  and  deaf,  primary,  and  secondary  group  as 
between  subject  grouping  factor.  This  revealed  a  significant  main  cffcct  between  the 
-113- groups  (172,114'.  65.390,  p<0.001).  Post-hoc  Tukcy  tests  showed  that  the  deaf  group 
was  significantly  poorer  overall  at  infcrcncing  than  the  primary  or secondary  groups 
and  that  there  was  no  difference  between  the  comparison  groups  (deaf=  4.2137, 
primary=  5.4957,  secondary=  5.8718).  There  was  also  a  significant  interaction  effect 
(F4,228--  4.054,  p<0.005)  between  group  and  inference  type.  A  Tukcy  test  found  that 
all  the  deaf  -results  were  significantly  poorer  than  all  the  comparison  groups'  results 
(p<0.01)  and  that  there  were  no  differences  within  or  between  the  comparison  groups. 
Within  the  deaf  group,  temporal  infercricing  was  significantly  poorer  than  the  other 
two  types  (p<0.01)  -  see  Table  5.1.  The  analysis  of  variance  also  revealed  a 
significant  main  effect  between  inference  types  (F2.22g=  3.909,  p<0.01),  with  post- 
hoc  Tukey  tests  indicating  that  temporal  items  were  poorer  than  either  causal  or  spatial 
(p<0.01)  -  temporal=  4.9829,  spatial=  5.3077  causal=  5.2906. 
Clark  (1973)  discussed  the  methodological  errors  often  made  by  researchers  in 
psycholinguistics,  paying  particular  attention  to  the  "languagc-as-a-fixcd-effcct 
fallacy".  Clark  points  out  that  in  order  to  generalise  one's  findings  beyond  the  specific 
example  of  language  used  in  the  experiment,  one  has  to  apply  statistical  analysis  to  the 
language  materials  themselves.  In  other  words,  the  textual  material  itself  cannot  be 
regarded  as  a  fixed  entity.  It  is  only  one  sample  of  many  other  possible  samples  of 
language  and  must,  therefore,  be  regarded  as  a  random  effect.  Clark  recommends 
ideally  the  calculation  of  a  so-called  quasi  F-ratio,  after  Winer  (1971),  which  takes 
account  of  the  random  effects  of  subjects  and  textual  materials.  simultaneously. 
However,  in  practice,  it  is  easier  to  calculate  min  P,  the  minimum possible  value  of 
the  range  of  quasi-P.  If  min  P  is  significant  then  so  too  must  quasi-F  be.  Thus  the 
treatment  effect  can  be  confidently  expected  to  generalisc  beyond  the  specific  textual 
material  used  in  any  one  experiment. 
An  analysis  of  variance  was  carried  out,  therefore,  collapsing  across  subjects  and 
treating  texts  as  random  variables.  For  ease  of  calculation,  the  raw  scores  were 
converted  to  percentages.  This  analysis  confirmed  the  main  effect  between  the  groups 
(F2.30=  85.034,  p<0.01).  A  Tukcy  test  confirmed  as  before  that  the  deaf  group  was 
-114- significantly  poorer  at  infcrencing  than  the  primary  and  the  secondary  groups 
(p<0.01),  but  in  addition  revealed  the  primary  group  to  be  significantly  poorer  than  the 
secondary  group  (p<0.05).  The  by-matcrials  analysis  of  variance  also  confirmed  the 
30=  2.606,  p<0.06).  Although  interaction  effect  between  group  and  inference  type  (F4 
this  result  just  fails  to  reach  statistical  significance,  comparisons  of  differences 
between  means  on  a  Tukey  test  revealed  a  similar  pattern  of  results  to  that  of  the  by- 
subjects  analysis  thus  confirming  those  results,  viz  that  all  the  deaf  results  were 
significantly  poorer  than  all  the  comparison  groups'  results  (p<0.01)  and  that  there 
were  no  differences  within  or  between  the  comparison  groupý.  Also  within  the  deaf 
group,  temporal  inferencing  was  significantly  poorer  than  the  other  two  types 
(p<0.05).  The  by-matcrials  ANOVA  did  not  support  the  main  effect  found  for 
inference  type  in  the  by-subjects  ANOVA  (F2,15=  1.008,  p>0.05).  This  may  have 
been  caused  by  some  factor  within  the  materials  themselves.  For  example,  upon  visual 
inspection  of  all  the  raw  data,  two  questions  in  particular,  one  temporal  and  one 
spatial,  did  seem  to  produce  lower  than  average  results  for  all  three  groups  of  subjects. 
Since  variance  measures  the  sum  of  the  squares  of  deviations  of  scores  from  the  mean 
of  the  distribution,  it  is  particularly  susceptible  to  outliers,  that  is  scores  which  are 
judged  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  rest  of  the  sample  on  some  objective  grounds 
(Collett  &  Lewis,  1976).  Such  spurious  scores  can  distort  the  means  of  samples 
significantly.  Other  approaches  use  more  robust  measures  of  dispersion.  One  such 
method  for  detecting  outliers  is  to  regard  any  score  which  is  more  than  one  and  a  half 
times  the  interquartile  range  above  the  third  quartile  or  below  the  first  quartile  as 
suspect  (Lovie,  1986). 
5.3.1.2  Second  Analysis 
Notched  boxplots  were  drawn  for  the  by-materials  distribution  of  scores  in  each  of  the 
cells  used  in  the  ANOVA,  eg  Deaf-Spatial,  etc.  Using  the  criterion  mentioned  above, 
only  one  trtfe  outlier  was  detected,  namely  the  third  text  in  the  spatial  set.  This  was 
-115- clearly  an  outlier  for  both  the  primary  and  secondary  groups  and  on  inspection,  was 
the  poorest  text  for  the  deaf  group  with  only  fifty  percent  correct  responses  on 
average,  ie  no  better  than  chance.  (The  boxplot  for  the  secondary  group's  causal  items 
indicated  a  possible  outlier,  text  5,  but  on  inspccýion  this  proved  to  be  false.  Since  all 
scores  in  this  section  but  one  were  100%,  the  median,  first  ccntilc,  and  third  ccntilc 
were  represented  on  the  boxplot  by  a  single  line.  Therefore  the  score  for  text  5,  a 
respectable  95%,  or  indeed  any  different  score  from  100%  would  fit  the  criterion 
defined  above  for  detecting  outliers.  Also  text  5  did  not  seem  to  cause  any  particular 
difficulties  for  the  other  two  groups.  Therefore  this  was  not-countcd  as  an  outlier.  ) 
Text  3  in  the  spatial  section  was  removed  and  the  remaining  scores,  collapsing  across 
texts,  were  prorated  for  each  subjects  scores  in  all  three  groups.  The  distribution  of 
subjects  scores  was  then  examined  for  outliers.  Four  scores  in  the  dcaf-spatial  ccl  I  and 
two  in  the  primary-temporal  cell  were  replaced  by  the  rcspcctivc  new  cell  averages. 
These  new  sets  of  by-subjccts  and  by-materials  raw  data  were  analysed  as  before,  by 
ANOVA. 
A  significant  main  effect  was  found  between  groups  in  both  the  by-subjects  analysis 
(F2,1147-  64.316,  p<0.001)  and  the  by-materials  analysis  (F2,30=90.386,  P<0.001), 
with  a  significant  min  F2,114--  37.577,  p<0.001.  Analysis  by  post-hoc  Tukey  tests 
revealed  that  the  deaf  group  was  significantly  poorer  than  the  two  comparison  groups 
(p<0.01)  for  both  by-subjects  and  by-materials  analyses.  The  post-hoc  tests  also 
revealed  a  borderline  effect  (p<0.08)  in  the  by-subjects  analysis  and  a  significant 
difference  (p<0.01)  in  the  by-materials  analysis,  with  the  primary  group  performing 
more  poorly  than  the  secondary  group.  A  significant  main  effect  was  discovered 
between  types  of  inference  in  the  by-subjccts  analysis  (F2,228=  19.55,  p<0.001)  and  a 
borderline  effect  in  the  by-materials  analysis  (F2,15=  3.615,  p<0.06),  with  a 
borderline  min  F'2,21=  3.051,  p<0.07.  Post-hoc  Tukey  tests  failed  to  indicate  a 
similar  pattern  of  significance  for  mean  differences  in  the  by-subjects  and  by-matcrial 
analyses.  In  the  by-subject  approach,  spatial  texts  were  significantly  better  than  causal 
and  temporal  (p<0.01)  and  causal  were  significantly  better  than  temporal  (p<0.05). 
-116- However,  in  the  by-materials  approach,  only  spatial  texts  were  significantly  better  than 
temporal  (p<0.05).  This  apparent  mis-match  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  by- 
materials  ANOVA  revealed  a  difference  for  inference  type  of  bordcrlinc  significance, 
with  a  consequent  borderline  value  for  min  P.  Therefore,  according  to  Clark's  (1973) 
arguments,  the  only  result  within  the  inference  type  area  which  could  be  reliably 
reproduced  with  different  subject  and  language  samples  is  that  spatial  inferences  are 
significantly  easier  than  temporal  ones. 
If  the  textual  materials  are  examined  closely,  it  is  obvious  that  certain  passages  within 
the  temporzq  grouping  are  causing  particular  diff  iculty,  especially  for  the  deaf  children. 
The  third  temporal  passage  appears  to  be  more  difficult  than  the  others  for  the  deaf  and 
primary  groups:  Deaf  49%  correct  (average  for  all  temporal  items  is 61%),  primary 
74%  correct  (average  91%).  The  passage  is  reproduced  below: 
Tlw  car  crashed  into  the  wall. 
The  car  was  badly  smashed. 
Later  the  policeman  came. 
Did  the  car  crash  before  the  policeman  came? 
Four  of  the  five  remaining  passages  conform  to  a  similar  pattern,  viz.  "Event  A.... 
then  Event  B.  "  The  passage  above  breaks  this  pattern  by  using  "later"  to  signal  a  time 
shift  and  thus  a  sequential  order.  It  would  seem  that  the  deaf  and  primary  children  are 
susceptible  to  this  change  in  form. 
Additionally  the  deaf  group  found  two  further  temporal  texts  particularly  difficult,  ie 
the  second  and  sixth  passages.  These  arc  noted  below: 
The  millanan  dropped  the  bottle. 
The  milkinan  got  a  brush  and  bucket. 
Then  the  milkinan  cleaned  up  the  iness. 
Did  the  millanan  clean  up  the  mess  before  he  dropped  the  boule? 
-117- One  possible  explanation  might  be  that  nowadays  milk  is  sold  mostly  in  cartons,  not 
bottles.  The  deaf  children,  with  their  limited  life  experience  gcnerally,  may  not  rcalise 
that  the  bottle  which  was  dropped  contained  milk  which  would  make  a  mess.  The 
mess,  in  their  minds,  could  already  exist  and  would  thus  be  unconnected  to  the  event 
of  the  bottle  being  dropped.  Also  more  bottles  are  being  made  from  plastic  rather  than 
glass  nowadays  that  this  may  be  an  additional  source  of  confusion  for  them,  as  such 
an  item  would  not  shatter  when  dropped. 
Ann  was  walking  along  the  street. 
Ann  slipped  on  some  ice. 
Anti  fell  down. 
Did  Ann  fall  down  before  she  slipped  on  Me  ice? 
Just  over  half  the  deaf  children  who  took  part  in  this  study  were  educated  in  schools  or 
units  which  used  total  communication  (56%).  As  this  system  uses  signing,  it  is 
possible  that  these  children,  at  least  in  part,  code  the  read  text  in  signs  (Odom,  Blanton 
&  McIntyre,  1970).  Unfortunately  the  signs  in  BSL  or  Signed  English  for  "slip"  and 
"fall  down"  arc  rather  similar  in  form  and  would  tend  to  be  merged  into  one  movement 
thus  veiling  the  distinct  elements  of  the  action.  Emmorcy  &  Lillo-Martin  (1995, 
footnote  3,  p  636)  illustrate  how  more  than  one  English  word  is  sometimes  nccdcd  to 
translate  a  single  sign  in  American  Sign  Language. 
The  ANOVAs  also  revealed  a  significant  interaction  effect  between  subject  group  and 
inference  type  in  both  the  by-subjects  (F2,2287-  13.107,  p<0.001)  and  the  by-matcrials 
analyses  (F2,30=  4.033,  p<0.05)  with  a  significant  min  F'4,51=  3.084,  p<0.05. 
However,  while  there  was  overall  agreement  between  the  by-subjccts  and  by-materials 
post-hoc  comparisons  for  the  majority  of  the  means,  one  significant  item  in  the  by- 
subjects  comparisons  (deaf  spatial  significantly  poorcr  than  primary  spatial)  was  not 
supported  in  the  by-materials,  and  one  significant  itcrn  in  the  by-matcrials  (deaf  spatial 
significantly  better  than  deaf  causal)  was  not  supported  in  the  by-subjccts 
-118- comparisons.  Out  of  36  possible  comparisons,  it  can  be  seen  that  these  mis-matchcs 
represent  only  a  small  percentage  of  the  total.  For  the  reasons  given  above  (Clark,  op 
cit),  these  two  comparisons  could  not  be  considered  to  offer  reliable  evidence  of  true 
differences.  However,  from  the  other  comparisons,  dcaf  temporal  and  causal 
inferences  were  significantly  poorer  than  all  types  of  inference  for  the  two  control 
groups.  Deaf  spatial  inferences  were  significantly  poorer  than  all  types  of  inference  for 
the  secondary  aged  control  group  but  there  was  no  difference  compared  to  all  types  of 
inference  made  by  the  primary  aged  group.  Finally,  within  the  dcaf  group  itself, 
temporal  inferences  proved  to  be  significantly  poorer  than  spatial  or  causal,  with  no 
significant  difference  between  the  last  two. 
The  new  mean  scores  after  removing  outliers  f6r  each  group  on  each  inference  type  arc 
shown  below  in  Table  5.2: 
TABLE  5.2:  Inference  Scores 
Spatial  Temporal 
Deaf  5.2564  (88%) 
Primary  5.7436  (96%) 
Secondary  5.9744  (100%) 
3.6667  (61%) 
5.6667  (94%) 
5.8205  (97%) 
Causal 
4.4359  (74%) 
5.4872  (91%) 
5.9487  (99%) 
In  summary,  the  second  analysis  clarifies  uncertainties  in  the  first  analysis.  The  by- 
subjects  ANOVA  in  the  first  analysis  was  not  fully  matched  in  the  by-matcrials 
ANOVA  on  the  two  main  effects,  ic  between  group  differences  and  differences  for 
inference  type.  In  the  second  analysis  these  two  by-subjcct  main  effects  arc  fully 
matched  in  the  by-materials  ANOVA.  It  is  now  clear  that  the  deaf  group  performs 
significantly  more  poorly  than  both  comparison  groups  and  that  the  primary  group 
does  more  poorly  than  the  secondary.  Also  temporal  items  arc  more  difficult  overall 
than  the  other  two  types  of  inference. 
-119- The  by-subjects  interaction  effect  in  the  original  analysis  was  matchcd  on  the  by- 
materials  and  showed  that  the  deaf  group  were  poorcr  at  infcrcncing  than  both  hcaring 
groups  but  also  that  the  deaf  found  temporal  infcrcncing  more  difficult  than  the  other 
two  types.  The  second  analysis  again  revealed  a  matched  by-subjccts/by-matcrials 
interaction  effect  with  almost  the  same  results.  Again  the  deaf  group  do  more  poorly 
over  all  inference  types  than  the  secondary  group.  The  deaf  also  find  temporal 
infcrcncing  more  difficult  than  causal  or  spatial.  However,  while  the  deaf  do  more 
poorly  than  the  primary  subjects  on  temporal  and  causal  infcrencing,  there  is  no 
significant  difference  between  the  deaf's  spatial  infcrcncing  and  all  types  of 
infercncing  by  the  primary  group. 
5.3.2  Recall 
Book-lets  2  and  4  were  marked  for  the  number  of  propositions  correctly  recalled  by 
each  subject.  All  marking  was  by  the  author  and  was  blind,  ie  the  scorer  did  not  know 
which  group  the  subject  belonged  to,  nor  if  the  subject  was  male  or  femaIc.  A 
proposition  was  defined  as  a  basic  idea  within  the  text  which  was  distinct  and  separate 
and  added  some  new  piece  of  information.  This  is  illustrated  below  for  the  examples 
already  given  in  the  Materials  section.  Since  the  first  sentence  is  given  in  each  case  as  a 
cue,  it  is  not  included  in  the  scoring: 
Temporal 
The  car  crashed  into  the  wall. 
The  car  /  (was)  badly  /  smashed. 
Later  /  the  policeman  /  came. 
-120- Causal 
The  children  were  playing  with  a  ball. 
John  /  threw  I  the  ball  /  to  /  Susan. 
The  ball  /  broke  /a  window. 
Spalial 
The  bread  was  in  the  cupboard. 
The  butter  /  was  beside  /  the  brcad. 
The  cheese  /  was  on  /  the  table. 
To  be  scored  as  correct,  recalled  material  had  to  include  the  basic  content  of  each 
proposition.  For  example,  in  the  temporal  item  given  abovc,  incoiTect  tense  of  the 
auxiliary  verb  would  not  be  counted  as  wrong;  thus  "was  smashed"  and  "is  smashed" 
would  both  be  considered  correct.  The  fact  that  the  auxiliary  verb  is  separated  from  the 
verb  proper  did  not,  mean  that  it  was  scored  as  a  separately.  However,  a  synonym 
would  be  c6unted  as  incorrect  eg  "mangled"  for  "smashed".  Prcpositions  had  to  be 
correct.  For  example,  in  the  causal  item  illustrated  above,  "John  threw  the  ball  to 
Susan"  was  acceptable,  but  "John  threw  the  ball  at  Susan"  was  not  acccptablc. 
Propositions  which  were  in  the  original  text  but  which  were  rccallcd  out  of  sequence 
or  in  isolation  were  also  scored  as  being  correct.  A  few  examples  of  how  recalled 
material  was  scored  is  shown  below: 
EXAMPLE  1:  The  car  /  smashed  /  very  /  bad. 
(PRIMARY)  Then  /  the  police  man  /  came. 
The  word  "bad"  rather  than  "badly"  is  scored  as  correct.  "Then"  rather  than  "Later"  is 
counted  as  an  error.  The  subject  is  not  penalised  for  splitting  "policeman"  into  "police 
man".  The  score  given  was  5  correct  propositions  and.  2  errors. 
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- EXAMPLE  2:  The  car  /  was  badly  /  damaged. 
(PRIMARY)  Later/  on/  the  policeman/  came. 
"Damaged"  is  rated  as  an  error  as  is  the  addition  of  "on".  The  score  given  was  5 
propositions  and  2  errors. 
EXAMPLE  3:  The  cup  /  was  on  /  the  table. 
(PRIMARY)  The  butter  /  was  beside  /  the  bread. 
"The  cup"  is  scored  as  an  error.  The  fact  that  the  sentences  arc  in  the  incorrect  order  is 
ignored.  The  score  given  was  5  propositions  and  I  error. 
EXAMPLEA  John  /  threw  /  at  /  Susan. 
(DEAF)  The  window  /  was  /  bread. 
The  substitution  of  "at"  for  "to"  is  counted  as  an  error.  The  fact  that  "window"  is  now 
the  subject  rather  than  the  object  of  the  sentence  is  not  regarded  as  a  mistake.  "Was" 
and  "bread"  are  obviously  wrong.  Thescore  given  was  4  propositions  and  3  errors. 
EXAMPLE  5:  The  cheek  /  on  /  the  table. 
(DEAF)  The  bread  /  was  on  /  the  top  of  /  cupboard. 
The  mistaken  use  of  "check"  for  "cheese"  is  rated  an  error.  The  second  use  of  "(was) 
on"  when  "on"  has  already  been  used  in  the  previous  sentence  is  also  an  error.  (Only 
one  "on"  appears  in  the  original  text.  )  The  score  given  was  2  correct  propositions  and 
errors. 
Since  the  total  number  of  propositions  contained  in  the  texts  was  different  for  each 
inference  type,  the  number  recalled  by  each  subject  in  each  category  was  converted  to 
a  percentage  so  that  direct  comparison  could  be  made  for  each  subject  group  across 
inference  type.  The  mean  scores  for  the  percentage  of  propositions  correctly  recalled 
for  each  group  is  shown  below  in  Table  53: 
-122- TABLE  5.3:  Percentage  of  propositions  correctly  recalled. 
Spatial  Temporal  Causal 
Deaf  50.68  43.85  49.56 
Primary  53.74  45.95  49.90 
Secondary  79.23  75.85  74.49 
5.3.3  Inter-rater  reliability 
Since  the  partitioning  of  the  material  recalled  by  subjects  into  propositional  units  calls 
for  some  degree  of  subjective  judgement,  a  second  scorer  was  used  to  rate  a  sample  of 
the  responses  (all  the  responses  of  10  deaf  subjects  and  5  subjects  from  each  of  the 
control  groups  chosen  at  random).  This  second  scorer  was  given  general  guidelines  as 
to  how  the  propositions  were  defined  in  the  original  scoring  (similar  to  that  noted  in 
the  early  paragraphs  of  the  Recall  section  above)  but  was  left  to  define  the  exact  details 
of  her  own  scoring  criteria  for  each  passage.  For  example,  it  was  noted  that  auxiliary 
verbs  were  not  counted  separately  from  the  main  verb;  thus  "were  playing"  is  counted 
as  one  propositional  unit.  Also  a  preposition  and  the  verb  to  be  were  counted  as  one 
unit  in  phrases  such  as  "was  on".  Definite  and  indefinite  articles  were  not  counted  as 
separate  units.  Adverbial  prepositions  which  could  take  alternative  forms  on  recall 
were  counted  as  separate  units,  for  example,  "John  /  thrcw  /  the  ball  I  to  /  Susan"  not  " 
at  ".  The  second  scorer's  marking  criteria  corresponded  closely  with  those  of  the 
original  scorer.  The  second  scorer's  results  were  then  compared  with  the  original 
results  for  these  selected  subjects  (Pearson's  product  moment  correlation):  r--0.9896, 
df=18,  p<0.01.  Because  of  the  spread  of  scores,  especially  for  the  deaf  group,  it  was 
necessary  to  compare  the  second  scorer's  results  with  the  original  scorer's  results  for 
exactly  those  same  subjects.  Therefore,  the  original  scoring  would  appear  to  be 
reliable. 
-123- 5.3.4.1  First  Analysis  (of  recalled  material) 
These  results  were  analysed  using  a2  way,  repeated  measures  analysis  of  variance, 
collapsing  across  texts  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  with  passage  type  as 
within  subject  repeated  measure  and  subject  group  as  a  between  subject  factor.  This 
revealed  a  significant  main  effect  between  the  groups  (F2.1  I=  45.489.  P<0.00  1).  Post- 
hoc  Tukey  tests  revealed  that  the  secondary  group  recalled  significantly  more 
propositions  (76.52%)  than  either  the  deaf  group  (48.03%)  or  the  primary  group 
(49.86%)  at  the  p<0.01  level.  There  was  no  significant  difference  between  the  primary 
subjects  and  the  deaf  subjects.  The  analysis  of  variance  also  revealed  a  significant 
main  effect  between  inference  types  (F2,228=  13.356,  p<0.001)  with  Tukcy  tests 
indicating  that  temporal  items  were  significantly  poorer  than  causal  (p<0.05)  and 
spatial  (p<0.01),  and  causal  significantly  poorer  than  spatial  (p<0.05)  [temporal: 
55.21%,  causal:  57.98%,  spatial:  61.21%].  The  interaction  of  group  membership  by 
inference  type  failed  to  reach  significance  (F4,228F  1.854,  p>0.05).  In  other  words, 
all  groups  showed  the  same  pattern  of  recall  results  by  infercncc  typc  although  the 
secondary  pupils  recall  more. 
An  analysis  of  variance,  collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  texts  as  random 
variables,  confirmed  the  main  effect  between  the  groups  (F2,3o=  77.403,  p<0.001) 
and  yields  a  significant  min  F2,124--  28.651,  p<0.001.  Tukcy  tests  on  the  by- 
materials  data  disclosed  a  similar  pattern  to  the  by-subJcct  analysis,  thus  confirming 
that  the  secondary  group  recalled  significantly  more  text  propositions  than  the  other 
two  groups  (p<0.01)  with  no  difference  between  the  primary  and  deaf  children 
[secondary:  77.22%,  primary:  51.33%,  deaf.  49.72%].  The  significant  main  effect  on 
passage  type  in  the  by-subject  analysis  was  not  supported  in  the  by-matcrials  analysis 
(F2,15=  0.960,  p>0.05). 
-124- 5.3.4.2  Second  Analysis  (of  recalled  material) 
Since  the  by-materials  analysis  did  not  support  the  by-subjccts  finding  of  a  significant 
difference  on  inference  type,  the  procedure  uscd  in  the  previous  scction  to  rcmovc 
outliers  was  utiliscd.  From  inspection,  only  the  temporal  section  containcd  any 
outliers,  text  5  for  the  primary  group  and  text  2  for  the  sccondary  group.  Since  tcxt  3 
in  the  spatial  section  was  considered  to  be  inappropriate  whcn  analysing  the  accuracy 
scores,  it  was  also  omitted  for  all  three  groups  in  the  present  analysis.  The  cmpty 
values  created  by  omitting  these  outliers  were  filled  with  the  nc-w  average  for  each  cell 
(eg  primary  temporal).  With  the  outlier  texts  removcd,  the  subjccts'  scorcs  were  rc- 
averaged,  collapsing  across  the  remaining  texts  and  the  distributions  of  subJcct  scorcs 
examined  for  outliers,  using  the  same  method  as  above.  Out  of  a  total  of  351  subject 
scores,  only  10  were  omitted  as  outliers,  viz.  one  in  the  spatial  and  one  in  the  temporal 
section  for  the  primary  group,  and  two  in  the  spatial,  three  in  the  temporal  and  three  in 
the  causal  sections  for  the  secondary  group. 
The  new  percentage  of  propositions  correctly  rccallcd  for  each  group  after  the 
omission  of  outliers  is  shown  below  in  Table  5A 
TABLE  5.4:  New  percentage  of  proposifions  correctly  recalled. 
Spatial  Temporal  Causal 
Deaf  49.28  43.85  49.56 
Primary  54.74  42.51  49.90 
Secondary  *  76.21  79.72  76.90 
These  new  arrays  of  raw  data  were  again  analysed  using  ANOVA.  This  revealed  a 
significant  main  effect  between  the  groups  in  the  by-subjects  analysis  (172.114ý 
63.114,  p<0.001)  and  in  the  by-matcrials  analysis  (F2,30=  85.157,  p<0.001),  with  a 
-125- significant  min  F2,112=  36.249  p<0.001.  As  before,  post-hoc  Tukcy  tests  on  both  the 
by-subjccts  and  the  by-materials  data  showed  that  the  deaf  and  primary  groups  were 
significantly  poorer  than  the  secondary  group  (p<0.01)  and  that  thcrc  was  no 
difference  between  the  deaf  and  the  primary  groups.  A  significant  main  effect  bctwccn 
inference  types  was  again  found  in  the  by-subjccts  analysis  (F2,228=  8.360,  p<0.001) 
but  this  was  not  reproduced  in  the  by-materials  analysis  (F2,15=  1.590,  p>0.05;  min 
F12,21=  1.336,  p>0.05). 
A  new  significant  interaction  between  group  and  inference  type  was  found  on  the  by- 
subjects  analysis  (F4,228,,,:  7.956,  p<0.001)  but  this  was  not  reproduced  in  the  by- 
materials  analysis  (F4,30=  2.168,  M.  10;  minF2,48=  1.704,  p>0.05). 
Thus  the  removal  of  outliers  from  the  arrays  of  raw  data  has  not  clarified  the  analysis. 
A  visual  inspection  of  the  test  material  was  made  to  see  if  any  particular  text  may  have 
caused  the  pattern  of  results  obtained,  eg  were  some  temporal  texts  especially  difficult, 
were  some  spatial  texts  easier  than  the  others  etc.  Unfortunately,  no  obvious  pattern 
emerged;  the  temporal  text  which  was  the  most  difficult  for  the  deaf  group  was 
different  from  the  one  which  was  most  difficult  for  the  controls.  Similarly,  the  easiest 
spatial  passage  varied  across  the  groups.  This  variation  would  have  been  allowed  for 
to  some  extent  in  any  case  by  the  removal  of  outliers. 
In  summary,  it  can  be  stated  that  the  older  hearing  subjects  recall  significantly  more 
propositions  than  the  younger  hearing  subjects  or  the  deaf  children,  with  no  difference 
being  found  between  the  last  two. 
One  possible  explanation  for  the  results  obtained  in  these  analyses  is  that  what  is  being 
measured  is,  in  fact,  the  total  amount  of  material  recalled,  regardless  of  whether  it 
comes  from  texts  whose  questions  have  been  answered  correctly  or  not.  If  some 
relationship  exists  between  accuracy  of  answering  text  questions  (ic  comprehension  of 
the  text)  and  correct  recall  of  the  material  of  the  text,  then  the  results  could  be  re- 
analysed  in  the  light  of  this  finding. 
-126- 5.3.5  Accuracy  of  inferencing  and  amount  recalled 
To  examine  whether  any  relationship  existed  between  the  number  of  propositions 
recalled  and  how  well  inferences  were  drawn  from  the  text,  a  Pearson  product  moment 
correlation  was  carried  out.  The  number  of  correct  inferences  made,  arranged  over  all 
inference  types,  correlated  positively  with  the  number  of  propositions  in  the  text  which 
were  correctly  recalled  for  both  the  deaf  and  the  primary  group.  However,  the 
secondary  subjects  did  not  show  this  correlation,  perhaps  because  they  are  skilled  at 
inferencing  and  have  reached  a  ceiling  with  the  relatively  simple  materials  used  in  this 
study.  This  is  obvious  when  one  consWis  that  for  the  secondary  group,  the 
percentage  of  material  recalled  over  all  three  types  of  inference  ranged  from  45  to  92 
with  a  mean  of  77  and  standard  deviation  of  10.  The  other  two  groups  by  comparison 
have  lower  amounts  recalled  and  the  distribution  of  scores  is  much  more  scattered: 
deaf  scores  range  from  10%  to  79%  (mean  of  48,  standard  deviation  of  19),  primary 
group  scores  from  12%  to  83%  (mean  of  50,  standard  deviation  of  14).  The 
correlations  are  shown  below  in  Table  5.5 
TABLE  5.5:  Correlation  between  inference  and  recall. 
Dcaf:  r--0.6875,  P<0.01,  df=37  r2=0.473 
Primary:  r--0.4726,  P<0.01,  df=37  r2=0.223 
Secondary:  r--O.  1238,  p=ns,  df=37  r2=0.015 
This  pattern  is  also  found  when  each  type  of  inference  is  examined  separately,  with  the 
exception  that  for  the  primary  group  there  is  no  significant  correlation  for  temporal 
items.  The  data  are  shown  in  Table  5.6  below: 
-127- TABLE  5.6:  Correlation  matrix  by  infcrcnce  typc. 
Spatial  Temporal  Causal 
Deaf  Group  r--0.6161  r--0.3791  r--0.6925  df=37 
P<0.01  P<0.05  P<0.01  for  all 
Prim  Group  r--0.4219  r--0.2141  r--0.3403  corrclation 
P<0.01  p=ns  P<0.05 
Sec.  Group  r--0.2290  r--0.1359  r--0.0444 
p=ns  p=ns  p--ns 
5.3.6  Re-analysis  of  Recalled  Material 
Since  it  has  been  shown,  therefore,  that  a  direct  relationship  exists  between  the  amount 
of  material  recalled  and  the  number  of  correct  inferences  made,  at  least  for  the  deaf  and 
primary  groups,  it  would  seem  wise  to  re-analysc  the  data  for  percentages  recalled 
over  inference  type  for  the  deaf  and  primary  groups,  but  only  for  those  questions 
which  have  been  answered  correctly. 
The  mean  scores  for  the  percentage  of  propositions  corrcctlY  recalled  for  those 
questions  which  have  been  correctly  answered  are  shown  below  in  Table  5.7: 
TABLE5.7:  Percentage  of  propositions  correctly  recalled  for 
those  questions  correctly  answered. 
Spatial  Temporal  Causal 
Deaf  51.97  48.72  51.97 
Primary  53.59  48.05  48.72 
-128- These  results  were  analysed  as  before  using  a2  way,  repeated  mcasurcs  analysis  of 
variance,  cQllapsing  across  texts  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  with 
passage  type  as  within  subject  repeated  measure  and  subject  group  as  a  betwccn 
subject  factor.  This  failed  to  show  any  significant  main  cffccts  or  intcractions.  The  F- 
ratios  and  relevant  means  are  shown  below: 
Dcaf.  -  50.89  Primary:  50.12  Fi,  76=  0.038,  p>0.05 
Spatial:  52.78  Temporal:  48.39  Causal:  50.35  F2,152=  2.645,  p>0.05 
Group  x  inference  type  interaction:  F2,152=  0.810,  p>0.05 
An  analysii  of  variance,  collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  texts  as  random 
variables,  also  failed  to  show  any  significant  main  effects  or  interaction  (means  and  F- 
ratios  below). 
Deaf.  54.17  Primary:  51.22  Fi.  i  5=  0.950,  p>0.05 
Spatial:  55.25  Temporal:  50.08  Causal:  52.75  F2,  i5=0.468,  p>0.05 
Group  x  inference  type  intemction:  F2,  i5=  0.204,  p>0.05 
In  other  words,  the  deaf  children  do  not  appear  to  be  performing  any  differently  from 
the  primary  children.  For  those  passages  where  a  question  was  answered  correctly, 
both  groups  Subsequently  recall  similar  amounts  of  information.  Also,  for  both 
groups,  no  type  of  inference  is  any  better  or  any  worse  than  any  other. 
The  deaf  and  younger  hearing  group  recall  a  roughly  similar  number  of  propositions 
(approximately  48%  and  50%  respectively).  However,  the  primary  subjects  infer 
correctly  in  about  94%  of  the  texts  whereas  the  deaf  only  infer  correctly  about  74%  of 
the  time.  Therefore,  since  the  deaf  appear  to  recall  a  disproportionate  number  of 
propositions  overall  in  relation  to  their  level  of  comprehension,  it  would  seem  that  they 
must  be  recalling  information  correctly  in  some  cases  where  comprehension  has  failed. 
-129- It  could  be  argued  that  recall  of  propositional  content  or  surface  structure  is  a  poor 
measure  of  degree  of  comprehension  (Johnson-Laird  &  Stevenson,  1970).  It  is  also 
true  that  the  recall  task  in  the  present  study  occurred  after  subjects  had  read  several 
texts.  However,  subjects  were  asked  to  elaborate  on  their  answer  and  not  to  simply 
respond  with  a  "Yes"  or  "No"  immediately  after  they  read  each  text.  Examination  of 
these  responses  for  the  deaf  subjects  showed  that  when  they  responded  correctly  to  the 
question,  in.  most  cases  they  also  appeared  to  genuinely  understand  what  they  had 
rcad.  This  applicd  ovcr  all  inferencc  typcs. 
5.3.7Accuracy  of  inferencing  and  nature  of  recalled 
material 
Several  studies,  eg  Anderson,  Pichert,  Goetz,  Schollert,  Stevens,  &  Trollip  (1976), 
Garnham  (1979),  Brewer  (1975),  and  Spiro  (1977),  have  all  shown  that  fluent  non- 
deaf  readers  do  not  recall  accurately  exactly  what  they  have  read.  They  tend  to  recall 
the  complet6d  inference  and  not  the  implied  version  presented  to  them  originally. 
With  these  findings  in  mind,  the  recalled  material  for  each  subject  in  which  the 
inference  question  was  answered  correctly  was  classified  as  either  containing  the 
completed  inference  or  not.  Paraphrasing  was  allowed  so  long  as  the  inference  was 
completed.  For  cxample:  "Mary  could  not  rind  Tom"  was  just  as  acceptable  as  "Mary 
could  not  see  Tom"  in  one  of  the  Spatial  texts  used  (see  Appendix  A  1). 
The  percentages  of  cases  were  the  completed  inference  was  made  and  those  were  it 
was  not  made  are  shown  averaged  over  all  inferencc  types  for  each  of  the  three  groups 
in  Table  5.8-below: 
-130- TABLE5.8:  Completed  and  uncompleted  inferences  in  rccallcd 
material. 
Inference  completed  Inference  not  completed 
Dcaf  Group  13.6%  86.4% 
Primary  Group  17.0%  83.0% 
Sccondary  Group  5.7%  94.3% 
Analysis  of  these  results  by  wests  reveals  that  significantly  more  texts  are  remembered 
in  the  non-completed  inference  form  than  in  the  completed  form  by  all  groups  (Table 
5.9): 
TABLE  5.9:  Completed  Vs  Incompleted  Inferences. 
Deaf  Group  t=14.2876  df=38  p<0.001 
Primary  Group  t=18.5627  df=38  p<0.001 
Secondary  Group  t--34.9858  df=38  p<0.001 
Similar  results  were  found  when  each  inference  type  is  analysed  separately.  These  are 
shown  in  Table  5.10  below: 
-131 
- TABLE  5.10:  t-tcst  rcsults  for  cach  infcrcncc  typc. 
Dcaf  Group 
Primary  Group 
Sccondary  Group 
Spatial  t=8.6600  df=38  p<0.001 
Tcmporal  t=  11.1050  df=38  p<0.001 
Causal  t=14.2876  df=38  P<0.001 
Spatial  t=7.1241  df=38  P<0.001 
Tcmporal  t--25.0299  df=38  P<0.001 
Causal  t--9.2516  df=38  P<0.001 
Spatial  t--21.0748  df=38  P<0-001 
Tcmporal  t--74.3ýý  df=38  P<0.001 
Causal  t--23.8777  df=38  P<0.001 
If  the  percentage  of  those  questions  which  were  answered  correctly  and  recalled  in  the 
completed  ihfcrcncc  form  are  compared  for  each  group,  no  significant  difference  is 
found  (Chi-squared=5.555,  df=2,  p>0.05).  Thus  the  deaf  are  recalling  the  textual 
material  in  a  similar  manner  to  the  hearing  children. 
5.4  DISCUSSION 
From  the  accuracy  results,  it  can  be  seen  first  and  foremost  that  the  deaf  are 
significantly  less  accurate  at  drawing  inferences  than  either  hearing  children  matched 
on  reading  achievement  age  or  hearing  children  nearer  in  chronological  age  (70% 
accuracy  compared  with  92%  and  98%  for  the  primary  and  secondary  groups 
respectively).  There  was  a  greater  spread  of  scores  for  the  deaf  group,  ranging  from  6 
to  18  correct  responses  (standard  deviation  of  3.32),  compared  with  a  range  of  9  to  18 
correct  for  the  primary  group  (standard  deviation  of  1.76),  and  16  to  18  for  the 
secondary  group  (standard  deviation  of  0.54).  It  should  be  noted  that  some  deaf 
subjects  scored  as  well  as  the  best  of  both  the  comparison  groups  and  indeed  better 
-132- than  the  lowest  scorers  of  these  group1s.  In  general,  however,  these  results  confirm 
the  findings  of  Wilson  (1979)  and  Davey,  LaSasso  &  McRcady  (1983)  that  deaf 
children  find  difficulty  in  drawing  inferences  from  textual  material,  even  when  the 
material  has  been  designed  for  maximum  case  of  reading. 
The  results  also  indicated  a  trend  where  the  younger  primary  agcd  children  performed 
more  poorly  than  the  older  secondary  aged  children.  This  would  confirm  the  findings 
of  many  studies  that  inferencing  ability  is  a  developmental  skill  that  improves  with 
age,  eg  Paris  &  Mahoney  (1974),  Stein  &  Glenn  (1979),  Paris  &  Carter  (1973),  and 
Paris  &  Upton  (1976). 
It  was  also  found  that,  as  well as  being  poorer  generally  at  infcrencing,  the  deaf  found 
some  kinds  of  temporal  inferencing  significantly  more  difficult  than  either  causal  or 
spatial  inferencing.  There  may  be  good  reasons  why  this  is,  the  case  and  these  issues 
have  already  been  discussed  in  the  Results  section.  It  certainly  shows  that  particular 
care  must  be  exercised  when  constructing  materials  for  the  deaf  to  read  as  several 
extraneous  factors  may  have  a  bearing  on  the  results  obtained.  However,  the  present 
results  would  seem  to  confirm  the  findings  of  Ormanson,  Warren  &  Trabasso  (1978) 
that  inferencing  ability  increases  with  age  since  the  primary  group  perform  less  well 
than  the  older  children  in  the  secondary  group.  However,  Ormanson  et  al  (op  cit) 
found  that  no  particular  form  of  inferencing  causes  any  special  problems  whereas  in 
the  present  study  it  is  found  that  spatial  items  arc  found  to  be  easier  than  other  forms 
of  inferencing  by  all  groups  of  children.  Wilson  (1979)  did  find  that  some  types  of 
inference  were  more  or  less  difficult  than  other  types  for  both  deaf  and  hearing 
subjects.  In  Wilson's  case,  however,  different  types  of  inference  were  examined  than 
in  the  present  study. 
In  the  present  study,  spatial  texts  were  answered  as  accurately  by  deaf  subjects  as  by 
hearing  subjcctss  matched  on  reading  age,  but  the  deaf  found  temporal  items 
particularly  difficult. 
-133- One  reason  why  deaf  readcrs  find  spatial  inferences  easiest  might  be  -that  they  develop 
an  expectancy  that  certain  passages  will  contain  a  spatially  formulated  storylinc.  and 
therefore,  a  spatial  inference  will  be  required.  If  subjects  can  anticipate  in  this  way, 
then  they  could  orientate  themselves  and,  according  to  Zwaan  and  van  Oostcndorp 
(1993),  create  a  spatial  representation,  so  helping  them  with  the  inference.  A  quick 
inspection  of  the  texts  used,  however,  shows  that  there  is  no  such  obvious  pattern 
discernablc  from  the  first  sentences  of  the  stories. 
It  is  possible  that  temporal  infcrencing  causes  particular  difficulty  for  the  deaf  simply 
because  the  questions  for  these  texts  generally  contain  more  propositions  than  either 
causal  or  spatial  types  and  are  therefore  more  difficult  to  retain  in  short  term  memory 
or  require  more  reasoning  to  figure  out  the  rel  . ýtionship  between  two  propositions  than 
to  comprehend  a  single  proposition.  This  is  unavoidable  when  asking  such  questions 
as  the  two  incidents  have  to  be  juxtaposed;  did  event  A  occur  before  event  B7  The 
question  of  toad  imposed  on  short-term  memory  by  temporal  items  is  considered  later 
when  the  evidence  from  the  recall  data  is  examined. 
Alternatively  it  might  be  that  the  deaf  find  it  more  difficult  to  cope  with  the  temporal 
nature  of  the  information,  because  they  have  been  deprived  of  auditory  input  which  in 
itself  is  necessarily  in  a  temporal  form  compared  with  visual  input  which  would 
generally  be  considered  to  be  both  temporal  and  simultaneous  in  nature.  In  other 
words,  the  deaf  might  have  had  less  practice  handling  temporally  sequenced 
information  than  hearing  children.  Blair  (1957)  found  that  deaf  children  performed  as 
well  or  better  than  hearing  children  on  tests  of  spatial  memory  but  poorer  on  tests  of 
temporal-scquential  memory.  The  finding  from  the  present  study  that  deaf  children's 
spatial  inferencing  is  no  different  from  any  type  of  infercricing  by  the  primary  group 
would  appear  to  lend  strength  to  this  argument,  as  the  deaf  obviously  operate  mostly 
through  the  visual  modality,  and  thus  having  such  experience  can  compete  effectively 
with  their  hearing  counterparts. 
A  third  possible  explanation  arises  later  when  consideration  is  given  to  the  form  in 
which  the  material  is  recalled.  It  should  be  noted  that  both  these  findings  arc  observed 
-134- even  with  very  simple  textual  material,  controlled  for  both  vocabulary  and  syntax.  It  is 
conceivable,  however,  that  despite  this  attempt  at  control,  the  syntactic  structure  of  the 
tcrnporal  texts  was  beyond  the  ability  of  many  of  the  dcaf  subjects. 
The  deaf  and  the  primary  aged  subjects  show  no  significant  difference  in  the 
percentage  of  correct  propositions  recalled  but  both  groups  remember  significantly 
fewer  propositions  than  the  secondary  group.  This  applies  over  all  inferencc  types. 
This  could  be  because  the  secondary  children  have  reached  a  ceiling  and  presumably 
the  reading  and  inferencing  are  automatic  for  them,  therefore  they  can  concentrate 
more  on  remembering  what  they  read,  whereas  for  the  primary  and  the  deaf  groups, 
the  reading  and  inferencing  tasks  make  greater  cognitive  demands  and  therefore  less  is 
remembered. 
For  the  deaf  and  the  primary  groups  the  number  of  propositions  that  can  be  recalled 
about  a  text  is  related  to  whether  or not  the  inference  has  been  understood,  and  since 
the  correlation  co-efficient  is  larger  for  the  deaf  group  than  for  the  primary,  this 
connection  would  appear  to  be  operating  more  strongly  for  the  deaf.  Therefore  when 
the  recall  data  is  re-analysed  only  for  those  items  which  have  been  inferred  correctly 
(ie  comprehended),  we  find  that  there  is  no  difference  in  the  amount  recalled  by  the 
deaf  or  primary  groups.  In  other  words,  both  groups  recall  the  same  amount  of 
information  proportionately  when  they  comprehend  the  textual  material.  The 
comprehension  question  responses  may  on  some  occasions  underestimate  the  deaf 
rcadcrs'  ability.  They  got  something  from  the  passage  even  when  they  got  the  question 
wrong. 
Following  on  from  this,  it  would  seem  unlikely  that  the  first  explanation  as  to  why 
dcaf  children  find  temporal  inferences  most  difficult,  is  valid.  Since  no  difference  is 
found  between  the  deaf  and  primary  groups  or  between  any  inference  type  on  the 
amount  of  information  recalled  when  a  text  is  correctly  comprehended,  memory 
overload  caused  by  lengthy  temporal  texts  cannot  be  offered  by  way  of  explanation. 
-135- A  third  explanation  to  possibly  explain  why  temporal  inferencing  appears  to  present 
so  much  difficulty  for  deaf  subjects  is  now  discussed.  First  it  is  necessary  to  consider 
the  manncr.  in  which  textual  information  is  recalled  and  how  this  relates  to  what  is 
known  from  other  studies  on  this  topic.  Are  the  deaf  children  and  the  younger 
comparison  group  assimilating  the  information  contained  in  the  texts  into  their  pre- 
existing  cognitive  schemata  when  they  comprehend  successfully  (as  judged  by 
whether  a  question  is  answered  correctly  or  not)?  If  this  were  so,  then  there  might  be 
more  inaccuracies  on  recall  as  the  textual  material  becomes  absorbed  into  a  pre-existing 
schema,  with  a  resulting  altering  of  both  schema  and  textual  material.  Such  a  view 
would  be  consistent  with  the  findings  of,  for  example,  Anderson  et  al  (1976), 
Garnham  (1979),  Brewer  (1975),  and  Spiro  (1977)  who  found  that  for  fluent,  non- 
deaf  readers  it  is  the  completed  inference  which  is  recalled  and  not  the  original  implicit 
version.  However,  from  the  present  study  it  is  obvious  that  none  of  the  groups  is 
following  this  pattern.  For  each  group  and  for  all  inference  types,  what  is  recalled  is 
not  the  completed  inference  but  the  non-inferred  version.  With  the  secondary  group, 
recall  was  generally  fairly  accurate,  either  verbatim  or  a  close  paraphrase  on  the 
original.  It  is  possible  that  because  these  subjects  manage  accurate  recall,  they  have  no 
need  to  infer.  The  deaf  also  recalled  in  this  fashion  but  to  a  much  lesser  extent,  more 
frequently  introducing  a  few  inaccuracies,  or  in  some  cases  failing  to  recall  any 
information  for  some  texts.  The  primary  children  could  also  re6ll  verbatim  or  in 
paraphrase,  but  not  nearly  as  well  as  the  older  hearing  children.  It  was  this  younger 
group  who  tended  to  invent  plausible  but  totally  inaccurate  stories  when  their  memory 
for  the  original  text  failed,  along  the  lines  proposed  by  Bartlett  (1932). 
Spiro  (1975)  has  argued  that  the  demand  characteristics  of  an  experimental  situation, 
the  nature  of  the  materials  used,  and  the  relatively  isolated  context  in  which  discourses 
are  presented  all  increase  the  likelihood  that  subjects  will  tend  to  isolate  the  read 
material  from  prc-cxisting  cognitive  structures  and  treat  them  purely  as  an  exercise 
somewhat  removed  from  a  real  life  situation.  Obviously  some  interaction  with 
cognitive  structures  must  go  on,  but  Spiro  contends  that  this  will  be  minimal.  This 
may  be  what  is  happening  in  the  present  experiment.  The  materials  used  were  rather 
short  and  simple  in  construction  (necessarily  so  to  reduce  syntax  and  vocabulary 
-136- difficulties  for  the  deaf).  From  the  way  the  temporal  items  were  recalled,  it  was  noted 
that  the  secondary  hearing  children  tended  to  recall  almost  verbatim,  eg  "James 
finished  his  apple.  Then  he  put  his  book  down"  The  deaf  group  also  recalled  temporal 
items  in  a  similar  manner.  The  primary  hearing  children  too  recalled  in  this  form,  but 
occasionally  might  recall  as  follows:  "When  he  had  eaten  the  apple,  James  put  his 
book  down".  This  is  close  to  what  would  be  expected  for  recall  in  the  inferred  form: 
"After  he  had  catcn  the  apple,  James  put  his  book  down".  Therefore  it  is  possible  that 
the  temporal  items  have  been  presented  in  the  most  acceptable  form  within  the  text,  ie 
event  A  then  event  B.  So  that  the  form  used  in  the  questions,  the  completed  inference 
form,  ie  event  A  before/after  event  B,  is  less  acceptable  to  the  subjects  of  all  groups. 
Brewer  (1975),  in  a  study  of  synonym  substitution  in  recalled  material,  found  that 
substitution  tended  to  take  place  in  one  direction  only.  For  example,  the  sentence:  "The 
nightgown  was  too  little"  was  always  recalled  as  "The  nightgown  was  too  sinall"  and 
never  in  the  reverse  direction.  These  favoured  words  were  rated  by.  subjccts  as  being 
more  "natural".  Therefore,  in  the  present  experiment  it  is  possible  that  something 
similar  is  happening  and  that  the  temporal  items  are  already  in  the  most  "natural"  form 
for  the  subjects  as  they  are  presented  in  the  body  of  the  text,  with  the  completed, 
infcrrcd  forrP  used  in  the  question  being  unnatural. 
In  summary,  the  present  study  has  confirmed  the  findings  of  previous  authors,  namely 
that  the  deaf  find  it  difficult  to  draw  inferences  from  textual  material,  even  compared 
with  younger  children  matched  on  reading  age.  The  wide  variation  in  reading  skill 
noted  within  the  deaf  group  is  also  predictable  from  the  literature. 
The  relative  efficiency  or  otherwise  of  processing  different  types  of  inferred  material 
by  the  deaf  is  less  clear.  The  disparate  types  of  inference  which  have  been  used 
throughout  the  literature  have  failed,  unsurprisingly,  to  show  any  homogeneous 
pattern.  In  the  present  study,  it  is  found  that  one  type,  spatial,  is  processed  by  the  deaf 
as  efficiently  as  all  inference  types  by  the  younger  comparison  group.  This  could  be 
because  of  the  experience  of  the  deaf  in  using  a  limited  range  of  modalities  to 
communicate  hampering  temporal  and  possibly  causal  inferencing,  but  their  "normal" 
spatial  experience  enhancing  their  performance  with  spatial  items. 
-137- Some  types  of  temporal  items  arc  particularly  poor  for  the  deaf.  This  would  seem  to  be 
because  the  deaf  are  especially  sensitive  to  the  form  in  which  such  texts  arc  presented. 
For  those  texts  which  are  comprehend  correctly,  the  deaf  can  recall  a  similar  amount  of 
information  as  the  primary  group.  They  also  recall  in  a  similar  style,  without 
completing  the  inference.  This  is  probably  due  to  the  simplistic  nature  of  the  material 
used. 
One  advantage  of  the  present  design  is  that  the  process  undertaken  by  subjects  is  akin 
to  "normal"  reading,  in  that  they  are  presented  with  the  complete  text  on  the  page,  can 
read  at  their  own  pace,  and  can  look  back  to  earlier  parts  of  the  text  if  necessary  to 
clarify  any  ambiguities. 
While  this  study  offers  some  reassuring  findings,  it  also  presents  some  unanswered 
questions.  For  example,  do  the  deaf  and  younger  hearing  children  infer  in  similar 
ways;  do  they  assimilate  textual  information  into  their  cognitive  schemata?  Because  a 
memory  probe  is  used,  it  is  not  possible  to  say  whether  inferences  are  occuring  on-line 
or  off.  Neither  is  it  possible  to  distinguish  between  bridging  and  elaboration. 
Further  studies  arc  required  using  textual  materials  which  arc  more  challenging,  while 
bearing  in  mind  the  limiting  aspects  of  vocabulary  and  syntax  on  dcaf  reading  skills. 
Temporal  items  in  particular  would  need  to  be  presented  in  an  alternative  form  which 
would  eliminate  some  of  the  complicating  factors  discussed  above.  In  the  present 
study,  the  probe  question  is  presented  after  the  text  has  been  read.  As  mentioned  in  the 
chapter  on  methodological  difficulties,  it  is  possible  that  the  probe  itself  could  cause 
the  inference  to  be  drawn.  To  examine  these  issues  further,  it  will  be  necessary  to  use 
on-line  procedures  in  the  next  study. 
-138- Chapter  Six: 
Do  deaf  children  draw  Inferences 
at  time  o  rea  ing? 
6.1  Introduction 
From  the  results  of  the  first  study,  it  can  be  seen  that  deaf  children  have  more 
difficulty  in  comprehending  inferred  material 
" 
ýhan  their  hearing  counterparts.  In  order 
to  examine  whether  or  not  deaf  children  infer  in  a  similar  manner  to  hearing  children, 
on-line  methods  are  needed.  In  other  words,  a  method  is  needed  which  will  determine 
whether  deaf  children  draw  inferences  as  they  read  as  opposed  making  the  inference  at 
a  later  stage,  for  example,  during  a  subsequent  retrieval  task.  It  was  decided  that 
methods  similar  to  those  used  by  Sanford  &  Garrod  (1981)  should  be  employed.  In 
other  words.,  by  using  a  reaction  time  method  it  would  be  possible  to  estimate  how 
easy  or  difficult  any  particular  sentence  is  to  comprehend  by  calculating  the  time 
subjects  take  to  read  it.  The  actual  process  is  described  more  fully  in  the  Method 
section  below. 
If  we  consider  the  theory  outlined  by  Sanford  &  Garrod.  (1981),  and  the  empirical 
evidence  which  they  use  to  substantiate  their  speculations,  then  it  is  possible  to  devise 
a  procedure  which  will  confirm  or  refute  the  hypothesis  of  the  present  study  that  deaf 
children  use  different  cognitive  processes  when  attempting  to  comprehend  a  piece  of 
discourse  than  do  hearing  children.  It  should  be  noted  that  Sanford  &  Garrod's 
empirical  investigations  and  the  studies  of  most  of  the  other  researchers  in  this  area 
have  concentrated  on  adult  subjects  who  arc  fluent  readers.  It  would  remain  to  be 
seen,  therefore,  whether  the  younger  subjects  of  the  control  group  did  indeed  process 
text  in  a  similar  manncr  to  the  adult  sub  ccts  used  in  these  other  studies.  j 
-139- In  their  theory  of  how  discourse  is  processed,  Sanford  &  Garrod  (1981)  describe  how 
rcadcrs  usc*forcgrounding  and  topicalisation  as  well  as  syntactic  information  to 
resolve  pronominal  reference  to  entities  mentioned  explicitly  in  the  text.  They  also 
propose  a  mechanism,  founded  on  much  cmpiricql  evidence,  of  how  rcadcrs  use  what 
they  describe  as  "scenarios"  to  bring  background  knowledge  to  help  interpret  material 
which  required  inferences  to  be  drawn  for  full  comprehension.  As  the  text  is  read  an 
appropriate  scenario  is  invoked  by  the  reader  and  this  provides  an  extended  domain  of 
reference  which  can  be  used  for  direct  mapping  of  subsequently  mentioned  entities  in 
the  text  onto  slots  in  that  scenario.  These  slots  provide  roles  and  the  necessary 
connecting  relationships  between  them,  giving  a  programmatic  component  to  the 
scenario.  The  role  slots  also  bring  a  certain  predictability  of  behaviour  for  the 
characters  they  represent.  The  main  characters  arc  so  closely  bound  in  with  the 
scenario  that  if  the  scenario  fades  from  current  "focus",  they  too  fade.  Secondary 
characters  which  are  less  strongly  bound  in  with  the  scenario  can  be  more  highly 
foregrounded  because  of  their  unexpectedness  in  that  particular  scenario,  (Anderson, 
Garrod  &  Sanford  1983).  Unusual  or  unexpected  adjectival  attributes  also  serve  to 
foreground  characters.  Scenarios  do  change  with  appropriate  cues  in  the  text,  the  old 
scenario  fading  from  current  focus.  If  a  scenario  fails  to  scrvr,  as  an  adequate 
mechanism  for  interpretation  of  the  text,  then  secondary  processing  takes  place  and  a 
search  is  made  for  a  more  appropriate  scenario. 
Garrod  and.  Sanford  (1980)  presented  evidence  in  support  of  their  model.  They  had 
subjects  read  short  passages,  each  of  which  was  introduced  by  a  title.  If  a  suitable  title 
is  used,  then  an  appropriate  scenario  should  be  invoked  by  the  reader;  some  other  title 
would  invoke  an  inappropriate  scenario.  For  example,  if  the  title  "In  Court"  is  used, 
then  subsequent  reference  to  "a  lawyer"  should  cause  no  particular  difficulty  as  this 
entity  can  be  mapped  directly  onto  an  appropriate  slot  in  that  scenario.  A  more  general 
title  such  as  "Telling  a  Lie"  would  not  be  expected  to  invoke  a  courtroom  scenario  and 
any  subsequent  reference  to  "a  lawyer"  is  likely  to  lead  to  time-consuming  bridging 
processes.  Indeed  Garrod  and  Sanford  found  such  an  increase  in  reading  times  for 
those  texts  where  the  title  was  inappropriate. 
-140- A  particular  scenario  can  become  redundant  as  the  reader  proceeds  through  a  text.  For 
example,  the  action  can  shift  to  another  location  or  there  can  be  a  time  change,  either  to 
later  or  earlier  than  the  current  situation.  In  such  a  case  the  original  scenario  will  have 
become  inappropriate  and  would  make  interpretation  more  difficult.  Thus  a  scenario 
which  involved  having  dinner  in  a  restaurant  would  be  expected  to  include  a  default 
slot  for  "waiter".  No  additional  time  is  needed  when  such  a  person  is  mentioned  for 
the  first  time  in  this  context.  However,  a  sudden  temporal  and  spatial  shift  to,  say,  the 
journey  home  afterwards,  would  lead  to  difficulty  in  resolving  a  reference  to  a  "taxi 
driver".  In  these  circumstances  the  appropriate  linguistic  cucs  usually  result  in  the 
reader  fairly  rapidly  changing  the  scenario  to  one  that  is  more  appropriate.  However 
the  sentence  which  contains  the  signal  for  a  scenario  shift  will  be  read  more  slowly 
(Anderson,  1981). 
Scenarios,  as  used  by  Sanford  and  Garrod,  refer  to  stereotypical  events  such  as  going 
to  a  restaurant,  appearing  in  court,  etc.  The  restaurant  scenario  is  invoked  by  an 
appropriate  title  and  provides  default  information  about  waiters,  tables,  menus  and  so 
on.  This  information  makes  it  possible  for  the  reader  to  draw  inferences  on-line. 
Howevcr,  other  researchers  see  the  reader  as  using  more  general  world  knowledge  to 
make  elaborative  inferences  which  embellish  the  text  representation,  eg  Trabasso  & 
van  dcn  Brock  (1985),  Trabasso  &  Suh  (1993),  Long  &  Golding  (1993),  van  den 
Brock  &  Lorch  (1993).  The  reader  goes  beyond  the  stereotypical  but  still  uses 
gcnemlly  accepted  world  knowledge  to  help  interpret  the  text.  The  reader  constructs  a 
situational  model  derived  from  this  world  knowledge  rather  than'a  scenario  in  the 
Sanford  &  Garrod  sense. 
In  the  present  study,  a  series  of  texts  were  presented  in  two  forms,  containing 
informatioir  which  is  either  stated  explicitly  or  is  implied.  From  the  title  and  the 
"setting"  of  the  text,  it  is  hypothcsiscd  that  it  should  be  a  relatively  simple  matter  to  set 
up  an  appropriate  scenario.  Other  of  the  texts  draw  upon  more  general  world 
knowledge  which  one  would  expect  to  reasonably  be  available  for  each  of  the 
situations  described  in  the  texts. 
-141 
- Two  types  of  inference  were  examined,  causal  and  temporal.  In  the  explicit  version  of 
a  causal  text,  a  particular  link  between  two  events  in  the  text  is  openly  stated;  in  the 
other  version,  this  link  is  implicit  and  the  rcadcr  has  to  infer  it  for  himself.  For 
example,  one  text  is  about  driving  in  the  country..  The  explicit  version  states  that  the 
car  stops  as  it  has  run  out  of  petrol  while  in  the  implicit  version  the  car  stops  and  the 
driver  takes  an  empty  can  to  the  garage.  From  the  studies  mentioned  so  far,  it  would 
be  expected  that  for  fluent  adult  readers  there  would  be  no  diff6rcric6  in  reading  times 
between  explicit  and  implicit  forms  as  the  reader's  background  knowledge  should 
provide  the  "missing"  linking  information. 
The  sccond*typc  of  inference  examined  texts  in  which  a  teml2L)ral  shift  occurs.  As 
mentioned  above,  scenarios  change  in  response  to  appropriate  textual  cues.  In  the 
prcsent  study  a  standard  format  was  used,  viz  in  the  implicit  form  the  scenario  change 
was  signalled  by  a  time  shift  beyond  the  normally  expected  time  span  of  the  first 
scenario  (Anderson,  1981).  For  example,  in  one  text  the  first  setting  is  in  a  church  on 
a  Sunday.  An  event  then  happens  three  hours  later,  which  is  normally  much  longer 
than  most  church  services  last  and  so  should  signal  a  shift  to  outwith  the  church 
setting.  This  shift  is  openly  stated  in  the  explicit  version. 
It  should  be  noted  that  there  are  several  different  types  of  inference  which  can 
potentially  be  drawn  when,  for  example,  a  novel  is  read.  The  reader  might  generate 
inferences  about  the  motivcs  behind  characters'  actions,  their  traits  or emotions,  the 
spatial  relationship  of  certain  objects,  possible  future  events,  the  attitude  of  the  writer, 
and  so  forth  (Graesser  &  Krcutz,  1993).  Genre  can  influence  which  arc  likely  to  be 
made,  for  example,  spatial  location  might  be  important  in  solving  a  crime  in  a  detective 
story  but  not  in  a  romantic  novel  where  characters'  traits  and  emotions  are  highlighted 
more.  In  the  present  study,  it  is  those  inferences  which  arc  more  automatic  which  are 
examined  and  not  those  more  concerned  with,  say,  the  author's  intentions  or  attitude. 
Wilson  (1979)  found  that  dcaf  subjects  took  longer  to  respond  to  questions  which 
required  thcpi  to  draw  an  inference  than  to  questions  where  the  information  was  stated 
explicitly  in  the  text.  This  leads  to  a  prediction  for  the  present  experiment  that  hearing 
-142- readers  infer  on-line  while  deaf  readers  use  bridging  processes  to  make  the  inference  at 
the  time  of  reading  the  question. 
6.2  METHOD 
6.2.1  Subjects 
Two  groups  were  used,  one  experimental  group  of  deaf  children  and  one  comparison 
group  of  normally  hearing  children  of  secondary  school  age. 
The  experimental  group  comprised  20  deaf  children  (13  boys,  7  girls)  with  hearing 
losses  of  70  dB  or greater  in  the  better  ear  averaged  over  the  four  frequencies  within 
the  range  50OHz-4KHz.  Losses  ranged  from  75  dB  to  116  dB,  with  a  mean  loss  of 
100  dB  (standard  deviation  12  dB).  All  were  within  the  normal  range  of  intellectual 
ability.  Ages  ranged  from  12  years  7  months  to  18  years  9  months  with  a  mean  age  of 
14  years  and  9  months  (standard  deviation  19  months).  Their  most  recently  recorded 
IQ  had  to  fall  within  the  average  range  of  ability.  All  children  came  from  homes  where 
English  is  the  only  language  spoken.  Only  children  who  were  prelingually  deafened 
were  included,  as  it  has  been  well  established  over  the  years  that  children  who  are 
deafened  after  the  acquisition  of  speech  usually  have  a  great  advantiLge  linguistically 
over  those  deafened  before  it  (eg  Conrad,  1979).  In  addition,  only  those  children 
whose  parents  were  normally  hearing  were  included  as  it  is  well  documented  that  the 
small  group  of  deaf  children  whose  parents  are  also  deaf  seem  to  have  a  linguistic, 
social  and  dcadcmic  advantage  over  other  deaf  children  (eg  Meadow,  1967,1968; 
Stucklcss  &  Birch,  1966;  Vernon  &  Kho,  1970).  Children  with  any  additional, 
significant  handicap  were  also  discounted  as  this  could  adversely  affect  the  results 
obtained.  The  criteria  used  above  to  select  the  children  for  inclusion  in  the 
cxpcrimcntal  group  are  broadly  similar  to  those  advocated  by  Meadow  (1978).  All  the 
children  attended  special  schools  for  the  deaf  or  units  for  the  hearing  impaired  attached 
to  mainstream  schools  in  Strathclyde  Region,  and  all  but  two  had  taken  part  in  the  first 
-143- study. 
The  comparison  group  comprised  20  normally  hearing  children  (10  boys,  10  girls)  in 
the  first  year  of  a  local  secondary  school.  Ages  ranged  from  12  years  3  months  to  13 
years  4  months,  with  a  mean  age  of  12  years  9  months  (standard  deviation  4  months). 
All  of  the  children  had  taken  part  in  the  first  study. 
Only  the  secondary  aged  comparison  group  was  used  as  these  children,  although 
slightly  younger  than  the  deaf  group,  would  be  approaching  their  level  of  emotional 
and  concepiual  maturity,  certainly  more  so  than  thc'pnmary  aged  children.  Since  it 
was  the  purpose  of  this  study  to  examine  the  top-down  processes  involved  in  reading, 
the  older  hearing  group  could  be  expected  to  have  world  experiences  and  therefore 
possibly  similar  cognitive  schemata  to  the  deaf  children  than  would  the  primary  group. 
The  subjects  in  each  group  were  randomly  split  into  two  subgroups,  and  assigned  to 
one  of  two  trials  (see  materials  section  below). 
6.2.2  Materials 
The  test  material  consisted  of  15  short  texts  presented  to  the  subjects  on  the  visual 
display  unit  of  an  Apple  Macintosh  microcomputer.  The  material  contained  either 
explicitly  presented  information  or  information  which  required  an  inference  to  be 
made.  The  layout  of  the  short  stories  was  kept  uniform  across  all  texts,  using  the 
format  outlined  below: 
Titlc. 
First  scntcncc. 
Sccond  scntcncc. 
F-xplicit/implicitmatcrial. 
Fillcr  scntcrxcc. 
Qucstion. 
-144- Two  types  of  inference  were  used,  temporal  and  causal.  The  temporal  items  were 
included  because  these  caused  significantly  more  difficulty  for  the  deaf  in  the  first 
study  than  the  other  two  types.  One  explanation  for  this  fact  which  was  mooted  at  the 
conclusion  6f  the  previous  chapter  was  that  the  format  used  in  that  study  could  in  itself 
have  led  to  a  poorer  performance  by  the  deaf.  Therefore,  in  the  present  study  the  form 
of  presentation  of  the  temporal  items  was  changed.  In  each  case  a  time  shift  was 
signalled  by  stating  that  after  a  specific  time  interval  something  happened.  The  time 
interval  was  such  that  the  event  asked  about  in  the  question  would,  by  implication, 
clearly  have  taken  place  before  or  after  another  event.  For  example, 
FOOTBALL 
James  went  to  the  football  match. 
It  was  a  good  game. 
After  the  game  he  saw  his  sister.  )  Explicit  form 
Four  hours  later  he  saw  his  sister.  )  Implicit  form 
He  kissed  her. 
Q/Did  James  kiss  his  sister  after  the  game? 
The  causal  questions  were  included  in  preference  to  the  spatial  ones  because,  from  the 
previous  study,  it  was  revealed  that  the  deaf  can  process  spatial  inferences  as 
efficiently  aý  hearing  children  matched  on  reading  age.  It  was  also  felt  that  spatial  texts 
were  too  simplistic  in  form  whereas  causal  items  gave  greater  scope  for  more  subtle 
inference  presentations  and  thus  allowed  for  a  more  realistic  pieces  of  text  to  be  used. 
An  cxamplc  of  a  causal  infcrcncc  is  givcn  bclow: 
-145- A  DAY  IN  THE  COUNTRY 
Tom  was  driving  in  the  country. 
The  car  stopped  suddenly  at  the  side  of  the  road. 
He  noticed  that  the  petrol  tank  was  empty.  Explicitform 
He  took  an  empty  can  to  the  garage.  Implicitform 
He  was  cross  about  all  this. 
Q/Did  the  car  run  out  of  petrol? 
It  should  be  noted  that  for  all  passages,  both  the  explicit  and  the  implicit  forms  of  each 
text  are  identical  except  for  the  critical  sentence  (sentence  3).  Since  the  time  taken  to 
read  each  sentence  is  being  measured,  care  was  taken  to  ensure  that  both  explicit  and 
implicit  forms  of  sentence  3  contained  exactly  the  same  number  of  words. 
In  addition  to  the  15  texts  used  in  the  experiment,  5  practice  texts  following  the  same 
layout  were  used. 
The  complete  list  of  text  items  used  is  given  in  Appendix  A3. 
No  attempt  was  made  to  restrict  the  vocabulary  as  in  the  first  study.  There  it  was 
shown  that  deaf  children  experienced  difficulty  with  infcrcncing  even  when  such 
factors  were  carefully  controlled.  Therefore  the  aim  in  the  present  study  was  to  attempt 
to  provide  more  realistic  pieces  of  text,  closer  to  what  might  be  found  in  the  reading 
material  used  in  schools.  Such  texts  also  provide  a  richer  environment  for  more  subtle 
inferences  to  be  made.  Similarly  the  restrictive  forms  of  syntax  employed  in  the  first 
study  were  also  abandoned,  eg  pronoun  referents  were  used  instead  of  repetition  of 
the  noun  phrase.  The  passages  were  scored  for  level  of  reading  difficulty  using  the 
Fry  graph  (1977)  which  gave  a  difficulty  level  of  6.0  years  for  both  trials,  and  the 
Spachc  formula  (1953)  which  gave  a  difficulty  level  of  7.3  years  for  both  trials.  The 
difficulty  level  is,  therefore,  very  similar  to  that  of  the  material  used  in  the  first  study 
and  should  be  within  the  capabilities  of  the  subjects  of  both  groups.  It  should  be 
-146- noted,  however,  that  from  both  methods  of  calculating  difficulty  level,  there  is  a  slight 
increase  in  the  use  of  more  difficult  or  less  common  vocabulary,  which  tends  to  give 
the  passages  a  more  realistic  context.  The  inferrcd/cxplicit,  tcrnporal/causal,  ycs/no 
responses  were  randomly  distributed  in  their  presentation. 
Thus  each  subject  read  35  texts  in  total,  the  first  5  of  which  were  practice  items.  Of  the 
remaining  30  texts  half  were  temporal,  half  causal.  Two  "trials"  were  run  for  both  the 
deaf  subjects  and  the  controls.  The  first  trial  comprised  7  explicit  and  8  implicit 
temporal  items,  and  8  explicit  and  7  implicit  causal  items.  In  the  second  trial  the 
explicit  and  implicit  items  were  reversed,  so  that  there  were  8  explicit  and  7  implicit 
temporal  texts,  and  7  explicit-and  8  implicit  causal  texts.  Half  the  subjects  of  the  deaf 
and  control  groups  were  given  the  first  trial  while  the  other  half  were  given  the  second 
trial. 
6.2.3  Design  of  Study 
A  2x2x2  factorial  repeated  measures  design  was  used.  The  first  factor,  between 
subjects  or  treatments,  was  subject  group  and  had  two  levels,  deaf  *and  hearing.  The 
second  factor,  a  within  subjects  factor,  was  inference  type  and  had  two  levels, 
temporal  and  causal.  The  third  factor,  another  within  subjects,  had  two  levels,  inferred 
and  cxplicit.  Subjccts  in  both  the  deaf  and  the  control  groups  were  split  into  two 
sections,  eadh  section  receiving  one  trial  of  the  test  materials.  One  trial  contained  half 
explicit  and  half  implicit  items  randomly  distributed.  The  second  trial  contained  the 
reverse  conditions  of  the  material,  ie  the  implicit  items  in  the  first  trial  became  the 
explicit  in  trial  two  and  explicit  became  the  implicit.  Half  of  the  questions  required 
"Yes"  responses,  half  "No"  responses,  and  both  these  types  were  randomly 
distributed. 
-147- 6.2.4  Procedure 
Each  subject  was  seated  individually  before  the  visual  display  unit  of  an  Apple 
Macintosh  microcomputer.  Each  text  was  presented  one  sentence  at  a  time  on  the 
screcn.  As  each  new  sentence  appeared,  the  old  sentence  disappeared.  Each  new 
sentence  of.  the  text  was  displayed  when  the  subject  pressed  the  space  bar  on  the 
computer  keyboard,  which  was  marked  "Next".  The  question  was  presented  when  the 
subject  was  ready  by  the  subject  pressing  a  key  marked  "Ready".  The  subject  then 
responded  to  the  question  by  pressing  one  of  two  keys  marked'  "Y"  and  "N".  The  next 
text  was  displayed  by  the  subject  again  pressing  the  "Ready"  key  once  more. 
Response  times  from  the  initial  display  of  a  sentence  or  question  until  the  next 
keypress  were  recorded  by  the  computer.  The  accuracy  of  the  response  to  each 
question,  ic  whether  it  was  answered  correctly  or  incorrectly,  was  also  recorded. 
The  instructions  (which  are  given  in  Appendix  A3  )  were  read  to  the  hearing  subjects 
and  signed  and  gestured  to  the  deaf  group.  The  five  trial  items  were  used  to  ensure  that 
subjects  fully  understood  what  was  required.  This  was  achieved  for  most  subjects  by 
the  end  of  the  first  practice  item  and  for  all  subjects  by  the  end  of  the  second. 
6.3  RESULTS 
6.3.1  Correct  responses  to  Questions 
In  order  to  determine  whether  an  inference  has  been  drawn,  it  is  assumed  that  if  a 
subject  answers  the  question  correctly,  then  the  passage  has  been  understood  and  the 
appropriate  inference  has  been  made. 
The  number  of  questions  answered  correctly  for  the  deaf  and  hearing  groups  for  the 
temporal  and  causal  items  under  explicit  and  implicit  conditions  arc  shown  as 
-148- percentages  in  Table  6.1  below: 
TABLE  6.1:  Percentage  of  questions  answered  correctly 
TEMPORAL  CAUSAL 
Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
Deaf  63%  49%  79%  80% 
Hearing  77%  67%  92%  85% 
These  results  were  analysed  using  a3  way,  repeated  measures  analysis  of  variance, 
collapsing  across  questions  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  in  the  manner 
used  previously.  This  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  between  the  groups 
(FI.  38:  --17.463,  p<0.01)  with  the  deaf  answering  fewer  questions  correctly  than  the 
hearing  subjects  (68%  compared  with  80%).  The  analysis  of  variance  also  revealed  a 
significant  main  effect  between  temporal  and  causal  items  (FI.  38=83.005,  p<0.01) 
with  fewer  temporal  items  being  answered  correctly  (64%  compared  with  84%  for 
causal).  In  addition  the  analysis  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  (FI.  38:  --9.832, 
p<0.01)  with  more  explicit  than  implicit  items  being  answered  correctly  (78% 
compared  with  70%). 
An  analysis  of  variance  was  carried  out,  collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  the 
question  responses  as  random  variables.  This  analysis  supported  the  main  effect 
between  the  groups  (FI,  56--20.900,  p<0.01),  the  main  effect  with  temporal  items  over 
causal  (FI.  56=22.221,  p<0.01),  and  almost  supported  the  main  effect  between  explicit 
I 
and  implicit  forms  of  the  texts  (FI,  56=3.178,  p<0.08).  This  last  result  is  only  a  trend 
and  fails  to  reach  significance,  but  the  trend  is  in  the  expected  dircction. 
On  the  by-subjccts  ANOVA  there  was  found  a  trend  towards  an  interaction  between 
group  mcmbcrship  and  tcmporal/causal  itcms  (FI,  38=2.640,  p<O.  11).  A  post-hoc 
-149- Tukey  test  revealed  that  temporal  items  prove  to  be  significantly  more  difficult  for  both 
groups  (p<0.01)  than  causal  items,  but  particularly  so  for  the  deaf.  These  trends  were 
confirmed  by  a  Tukey  test  on  the  by-materials  results  (p<0.01). 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  deaf  answer  temporal  implicit  items  correctly  49%  of 
the  time.  This  is  little  better  than  chance.  Since  each  question  can  only  be  answered 
"yes"  or  "no",  it  is  possible  to  apply  the  binomial  distribution  to  the  above  results.  The 
standard  deviation  for  a  binomial  distribution  can  be  calculated  from  -lp--qn,  where  p  is 
the  chance  of  making  a  correct  guess,  ie  0.5,  q  the  chance  of  making  an  incorrect 
guess,  also  0.5,  and  n  is  the  number  of  attempts,  in  this  case  100  since  we  are  dealing 
with  percentage  scores.  In  other  words,  a  score  of  5%  will  account  for  one  standard 
deviation.  Therefore,  a  score  of  60%  or  moriý  will  be  two  standard  deviations  above 
the  chance  level  of  50%,  ie  almost  certainly  beyond  guessing  (P<O.  '-').  Thus  apart 
from  deaf  temporal  implicit  responses,  all  of  the  results  above  can  be  accepted  as  being 
beyond  chance  levels. 
Summary  of  results: 
The  hearing  subjects  answer  more  questions  correctly  than  do  the  deaf.  Implicit  texts 
appear  to  be  more  difficult  to  understand  than  those  where  the  information  is  stated 
explicitly.  A  trend  was  discovered  which  suggests  that  this  might  operate  more 
strongly  for  the  dcaf  than  for  the  hearing  group. 
Fewer  temporal  items  were  answered  correctly  than  causal,  with  the  deaf  having 
particular  difficulty  with  implict  temporal  items. 
6.3.2  The  critical  sentence  and  the  question 
In  the  original  studies  by  Sanford  and  Garrod,  the  unit  of  measurement  was  reading 
time  for  the  critical  sentence.  However,  in  the  present  study  this  was  not  the  most 
-150- suitable  measure.  Although  within  one  type  of  inference  (ie  temporal  or  causal)  the 
passages  are  similar  between  explicit  and  implicit  conditions  except  for  the  critical 
sentence,  and  then  each  condition  contains  the  same  number  of  words,  the  difficulty 
arises  when  comparison  is  made  between  different  types  of  inference.  The  critical 
sentences  of  the  temporal  and  causal  items  on  average  are  likely  to  have  different 
lengths. 
Indeed  for  the  question  response  times,  the  recorded  times  are  actually  a  measure  of 
both  the  time  taken  to  read  the  question  and  the  time  taken  to  formulate  and  respond 
with  an  answer.  If  one  examines  the  the  questions  it  is  obvious  that  the  temporal  items 
are  on  averdge  longer  than  causal  questions.  This  is  necessary  by  the  very  nature  of 
the  temporal  questions  themselves.  Since  ea:  6h  temporal  question  asks  whether  one 
incident  happened  before  or  after  another,  they  will  inevitably  contain  two 
propositions  (using  the  definition  used  in  the  first  study).  Causal  questions  usually 
only  contain  the  one  proposition. 
Since  the  critical  sentences  and  questions  for  temporal  and  causal  inferences  will  have 
different  average  lengths,  it  would  be  invalid  to  use  reading  times  for  comparison.  A 
better  measure  in  the  present  study  would  seem  to  be  rate  of  reading.  Just  and 
Carpenter  (1980)  suggest  that  a  suitable  measure  for  reading  rate  is  syllables  per 
second,  as  the  syllable  would  seem  to  be  a  more  useful  unit  in  reading  than  either  the 
single  word  (since  words  can  vary  greatly  in  length)  or  the  single  letter  (since  single 
letters  are  used  along  with  diphthongs,  consonant  clusters  etc). 
6.3.2.1  Sentence  3: 
1 
The  mean  reading  rates  in  syllables  per  second  for  the  deaf  and  hearing  groups  on 
Sentence  3  for  temporal  and  causal  items  under  explicit  and  implicit  conditions  are 
shown  in  Table  6.2  below: 
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- TABLE  6.2:  Mean  reading  rates  in  syllables  per  second  for  Sentence  3 
TEMPORAL  CAUSAL 
Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
Deaf  3.654  3.826  3.525  3.393 
Hearing  4.897  4.677  4.278  4.016 
The  results  are  for  all  texts  whether  answered  correctly  or  not.  Since  the  number  of 
texts  requiring  yes  and  no  answers  were  proportionally  equal,  only  one  ANOVA  was 
carried  out,  combining  both  types. 
These  results  were  analysed  using  a3  way,  repeated  measures  analysis  of  variance, 
collapsing  across  texts  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  with  inference  type 
as  the  first  within  subject  repeated  measure,  explicit  or  inferred  as  the  second  within 
subject  repeated  measure,  and  deaf  and  hearing  group  as  between  subject  grouping 
factor.  This  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  between  the  groups  (FI.  38=5.586, 
p<0.05).  The  deaf  were  significantly  slower  overall  at  reading  than  the  controls  (3.600 
syllables  per  second  compared  with  4.467). 
The  analysis  of  variance  also  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  between  temporal  and 
causal  items  (FI,  38=31.677,  P<0.001),  with  temporal  items  being  read  faster  than 
causal  (4.264  syllables  per  second  compared  with  3.803).  There  was  also  a  significant 
interaction  effect  between  group  membership  and  inference  type  (FI,  38=4.857, 
p<0.05).  Post-hoc  Tukey  tests  revealed  that  temporal  items  were  being  read 
significantly  more  quickly  than  causal,  items  by  the  hearing  subjects  (P<0.0  1)  but  that 
this  effect  was  only  of  borderline  significance  for  the  deaf  children  (p<O.  (Y7).  It  should 
be  noted  that  the  deaf  were  slower  than  the  hearing  subjects  on  all  measures. 
An  analysis  of  variance  was  carried  out,  collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  texts 
as  random  variables.  This  analysis  confirmed  the  main  effect  between  the  groups 
-152- (Fl.  56=150.209,  p<0.001)  with  the  deaf  again  being  significantly  slower  overall  at 
reading  than  the  hearing  group.  The  analysis  also  confirmed  the  second  main  effect 
with  temporal  items  being  significantly  faster  than  causal  items  (FI,  56=9-150, 
p<0.005).  The  interaction  effect  found  in  the  by-subject  analysis  was  also  repeated  in 
the  by-materials  analysis  (FI,  56=4.00,  p<0.05).  Post-hoc  Tukey  tests  again  revealed 
a  similar  pattern  to  the  by-subjects  analysis,  the  temporal  items  being  significantly 
quicker  than  the  causal  for  both  groups  (p<0.01),  but  this  effect  being  more  marked 
for  the  hearing  subjects  than  for  the  deaf  group. 
Summary  offindings: 
The  deaf  read  the  texts  more  slowly  than  the  hearing  children.  This  might  be  expected 
considering  the  much  documented  evidence  of  how  poorly  they  perform  generally 
when  reading. 
Causal  items  are  processed  more  slowly  than  temporal.  This  effect,  while  true  for  both 
groups,  is  greater  for  the  hearing  subjects. 
It  should  be  noted  that  there  is  no  difference  between  explicit  and  implicit  texts.  This 
runs  contrary  to  the  findings  of  Wilson  (1979). 
6.3.2.2  Re-analysis  of  Sentence  3: 
In  the  above  analysis,  rate  of  reading  was  used  as  the  metric  rather  than  reading  times. 
While  this  might  seem  sensible  because  of  the  varying  lengths,  on  average,  of 
temporal  and  causal  passages,  there  is  some  evidence  to  suggest  that  it  might  be 
inappropriate  even  to  compare  rates  directly  (Trueswell,  Tanenhaus,  & 
Garnsey,  1994). 
-153- It  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  as  a  piece  of  text  increases  in  length,  it  takes  longer 
to  read,  and  that  this  relationship  is  linear.  Under  ideal  conditions,  the  slope  for  this 
graph,  represented  by  the  equation  y=  mx,  would  pass  through  the  origin  as  shown  in 
Figure  6.1  below: 
reading  time 
Figure  6.1:  Ideal  reading  time  plotted 
against  passage  length 
However,  in  reality  this  graph  does  not  pass  through  zero.  There  is  a  positive  intercept 
on  the  y-axis  (time),  as  shown  below  in  Figure  6.2.  This  is  represented  by  the 
equation  y=  mx  +  c. 
reading  time 
Figure  6.2:  Actual  reading  time  plotted 
against  passage  length 
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passage  length 
passage  length This  means,  in  effect,  that  if  reading  rate  (rather  than  reading  time)  is  plotted  against 
passage  length,  one  does  not  obtain  a  constant,  as  would  be  the  case  if  the  slope 
passed  through  the  origin.  Rather  a  non-linear,  inverse  curve  as  shown  in  Figure  6.3 
is  obtained: 
reading  rate 
Figure  6.3:  Reading  rate  plotted 
against  passage  length 
In  other  woids,  as  the  length  of  text  increases,  reading  rates  will  be  reduced.  As  the 
length  of  text  becomes  shorter,  reading  rates  are  increased.  One  way  to  avoid  such 
distortion  would  be  to  adjust  subjects'  reading  times  by  subtracting  the  intercept,  thus 
creating  data  which  will  pass  through  the  origin  (Trueswell  et  al,  1994).  When  reading 
times  are  converted  to  reading  rates,  the  variance  associated  with  text  length  is 
removed. 
The  average  reading  times  for  each  passage  were  plotted  against  passage  length 
(measured  in  syllables),  for  deaf  and  for  hearing  subjects.  A  regression  analysis  was 
carried  out  which  gave  a  residual  time  of  1238  milliseconds  for  the  deaf  subjects  and  a 
residual  of  909  milliseconds  for  the  hearing  subjects.  These  times  were  then  subtracted 
from  subjects'  original  reading  times,  the  results  converted  into  new  reading  rates,  and 
seven  outliers  removed  from  the  data.  These  reading  rates  are  shown  below  in  Table 
63: 
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passage  length Table  6.3:  Mean  reading  rates  (syll/scc)  for  Sentence  3 
after  removal  of  residual  time  component 
TEMPORAL  CAPSAL 
Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
Deaf  7.634  6.955  8.922  7.994 
Heafing  9.005  7.189  7.942  8.721 
These  results  were  analysed  using  a3  way,  repeated  measures  analysis  of  variance, 
collapsing  across  texts  and  treating  subjcct.  as  random  variables,  as  above.  This 
revealed  no  significant  factors  or  intcractions.  Similar  findings  were  obtained  when  the 
results  were  analysed  by  collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  texts  as  random 
variables. 
Thus,  when  the  effects  of  transforming  reading  times  into  reading  rates  are 
considered,  and  the  distortions  which  this  can  cause  are  removed,  a  different  picture 
emerges. 
There  is  no  longer  any  difference  between  the  deaf  and  hearing  subjects.  While  the 
overall  reading  rate  for  the  deaf  might  be  slower,  as  from  the  unadjusted  times,  the 
actual  processing  speed  would  appear  to  be  similar  for  both  groups.  Similarly,  the 
adjusted  rates  show  that  there  is  no  difference  in  processing  speed  for  temporal  or 
causal  items.  As  before,  there  is  no  difference  between  explicit  and  implicit  texts. 
6.3.2.3  Sentence  4: 
The  times  taken  to  read  Sentence  4  were  also  analysed.  This  is  the  sentence  following 
the  critical  manipulation  within  the  text  and  it  has  been  suggested  that  any  additional 
processing  time  which  may  be  required  could  "spill  over"  into  this  region  of  the  text. 
-156- This  is  similar  in  effect  to  the  "wrap  up"  pauses  described  by  Just  &  Carpenter  (1980) 
which  reflect  an  integrative  process  at  the  end  of  a  sentence.  Reading  times  were  used 
rather  than  reading  rates  since  Sentence  4  is  the  same  under  both  explicit  and  implicit 
conditions.  Also  the  average  number  of  words  for  temporal  and  causal  types  is  the 
same  (4.667). 
The  mean  reading  times  in  milliseconds  for  the  deaf  and  control  groups  on  Sentence  4 
for  temporal  and  causal  items  under  explicit  and  implicit  conditions  are  shown  below 
in  Table  6A 
TABLE  6.4:  Mean  reading  times  for  Sentence  4  (msecs) 
TEMPORAL  CAUSAL 
-  Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
Deaf  2073  2101  1983  2220 
Hearing  1639  1600  1656  1678 
These  results  were  analysed  using  a3  way,  repeated  measures  analysis  of  variance, 
collapsing  across  questions  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  similar  to  the 
procedure  used  with  Sentence  3  above.  This  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  between 
the  groups  (FI,  38=6.849,  p<0.05)  with  the  deaf  group  reading  Sentence  4  more 
slowly  than  the  hearing  group.  This  by-subjccts  finding  was  replicated  in  the  by- 
materials  analysis  (FI,  54--115.337,  p<0.001).  The  by-subjects  analysis  also  revealed  a 
significant  interaction  between  group  membership  and  explicit/implicit  conditions 
(FI.  38=4.355,  p<0.05).  A  post-hoc  Tukey  test  showed  that  implicit  items  were 
significantly  more  difficult  than  explicit  (p<0.05)  for  the  deaf  group  but  not  for  the 
hearing  subjects.  However  this  interaction  effect  although  not  reaching  significance  on 
the  by-materials  analysis  did  reveal  a  trend  in  the  same  direction  (FI,  54--2.366, 
p<O.  13).  Post-hoc  testing  again  revealed  a  trend  with  explicit  items  faster  than  implicit 
-157- for  the  deaf  group  (p<0.10)  only.  This  would  suggest  that  implicit  processing  is 
delayed  until  the  sentence  following  the  critical  manipulation  for  the  deaf  subjects  but 
not  the  hearing  children.  The  fact  that  the  by-materials  analysis  does  not  fully  match 
the  by-subjects  would  seem  to  reflect  the  greater  variability  in  the  materials 
themselves. 
Summary  offindings: 
No  differente  was  found  between  temporal  and  causal  texts.  It  could  be  argued  that 
this  is  to  be  expected  since  Sentence  4  is  a  "filler"  which  follows  the  critical  sentence 
and  would  thus  not  be  involved  in  the  process  of  temporal  or  causal  inferencing. 
Again  the  deaf  read  more  slowly  than  the  hearing  subjects,  reflecting  the  general 
difficulty  with  reading. 
Some  implicit  items  were  processed  more  slowly  than  the  explicit  texts  by  the  deaf  but 
not  by  hearing  subjects.  This  would  suggest  that  any  extra  processing  time  which 
might  be  re4uired  by  the  deaf  to  process  implicit  items  is  being  delayed  until  the 
sentence  following  the  critical  manipulation. 
6.3.2.4  Question-Response 
This  set  of  results  is  the  response  times  between  the  appearance  of  -the  Question  and 
the  pressing  of  a  response  key,  either  "Yes"  or  "No".  Thus  it  is  a  measure  of  both  the 
time  taken  to  read  the  question  and  the  time  taken  to  formulate  and  respond  with  an 
answer.  As  with  Sentence  3,  these  reading  times  were  converted  into  reading  rates 
(measured  in  syllables  per  second),  to  allow  for  differences  in  question  length  between 
temporal  and  causal  items. 
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question-  response  for  the  temporal  and  causal  items  under  explicit  and  implicit 
conditions  are  shown  below  in  Table  6.5: 
TABLE6.5:  Mean  reading  rates  for  Question-Response  (in  syll/sec) 
TEMPORAL  CAUSAL 
Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
Deaf  2.351  2.598  1.865  1.604 
Hearing  3.177  2.947  2.309  2.044 
The  results  were  for  correctly  answered  questions  only  as  it  is  these  texts  in  which  the 
inference  has  been  correctly  made.  Again  since  the  numbers  of  "Yes"  and  "No" 
questions  were  equally  balanced,  only  one  ANOVA  was  carried  out. 
These  results  were  analysed  using  a  three  way,  repeated  measures  analysis  of 
variance,  collapsing  across  questions  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  with 
inference  type  as  the  first  within  subject  repeated  measure,  explicit  or  inferred  as  the 
second  within  subject  repeated  measure,  and  deaf  and  hearing  group  as  the  between 
subject  grouping  factor.  This  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  of  groups 
(FI,  38=8.879,  p<0.01).  The  deaf  were  significantly  slower  at  reading  and  responding 
to  the  question  than  were  the  hearing  subjects  (2.105  syllables  per  second  versus 
2.619). 
The  analysis  of  variance  also  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  of  inference  type,  with 
temporal  items  being  read  more  quickly  than  the  causal,  FI,  38=69.507,  p<0.001, 
(2.768  syllables  per  second  compared  with  1.956). 
An  analysis  of  variance  was  carried  out,  collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  texts 
as  random  variables.  This  analysis  confirmed  the  main  effect  between  the  groups 
-159- found  in  the  by-subjects  analysis  (FI,  54;  =46.127,  p=0.01),  with  the  deaf  again  being 
significantly  slower overall  at  reading  than  the  hearing  group.  The  analysis  also 
confirmed  the  second  main  effect  with  temporal  items  being  significantly  faster  than 
causal  items  (FI,  54)=  26.367,  p<0.01).  No  significant  difference  was  found  between 
the  implicit  and  explicit  versions  of  the  texts  in  any  of  the  analyses. 
Summary  offindings: 
Using  the  overall  reading  rates  (that  is,  the  rates  for  reading  and  responding  to 
questions),  the  deaf  are  again  slower  at  processing  than  the  hearing  subjects. 
As  with  Sentence  3,  causal  items  are  slower  than  temporal  but  there  is  no  interaction 
effect  and  the  finding  holds  equally  for  both  groups  of  subjects. 
There  was  no  significant  difference  between  explicit  and  implicit  items. 
6.3.2.5  Re-analysis  of  Question-  Response 
As  was  argued  above  when  considering  the  critical  sentence,  conversion  from  times  to 
rates  can  cause  distortions  if  comparisons  are  made  of  texts  which  have  different 
average  lengths. 
Thus  the  average  reading  times  for  each  question  were  plottcd  against  question  length 
(in  syllables)  for  deaf  and  for  hearing  subjects.  A  regression  analysis  was  carried  out 
which  gave  a  residual  time  of  1926  milliseconds  for  the  deaf  subjects  and  1942 
millisccondg  for  the  hearing  subjects.  These  times  were  subtracted  from  subjects' 
original  reading  times,  the  results  converted  into  new  reading  rates,  and  five  outliers 
removed  from  the  data. 
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in  which  the  inference  has  been  correctly  drawn.  For  this  reason  the  data  for  temporal 
texts  for  the  deaf  have  been  dropped  from  the  analysis,  as  previouý  results  (Section 
6.3.1)  have  shown  these  to  be  no  better  than  chance.  The  corrected  reading  rates  are 
shown  in  Table  6.6  below: 
TABLE  6.6:  Adjusted  reading  rates  (syll/sec)  for  Question-Response 
TEMPORAL  CAUSAL 
Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
Deaf  -----  -----  5.431  4.558 
Control  7.806  7.538  7.899  6.956 
Since  the  deaf  temporal  data  have  been  deleted,  the  remaining  results  were  analysed  in 
two  parts,  firstly  deaf  causal  compared  with  hearing  causal,  then  temporal  compared 
with  causal  for  the  hearing  group  only. 
A  two  way  analysis  of  variance,  with  deaf  or  hearing  group  as  the  between  subject 
grouping  factor  and  explicit  or  inferred  as  the  within  subject  repeated  measure  revealed 
that  the  hearing  children  had  a  faster  rate  than  the  deaf  (7.427  syllables  per  second 
compared  with  4.995),  both  by  treating  subjects  as  random  variables  (171,38--  6.734, 
p<0.01  and  by  treating  texts  as  random  variables  (]71,28ý  5.447,  p<0.05).  No  other 
effects  or  interactions  were  found. 
Summary  offindings: 
When  corre  ctions  are  made  for  the  distortions  caused  by  using  reading  rates  and 
different  lengths  of  text  material,  the  difference  found  previously  between  temporal 
and  causal  items  vanishes. 
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- The  deaf  again  process  the  material  more  slowly  than  the  hearing  group,  but,  as 
before,  there  is  no  difference  between  explicit  andimplicit  items. 
6.4  DISCUSSION 
One  of  the  main  findings  of  this  study  is  that  the  deaf  consistently  process  the  text 
significantly  more  slowly  than  the  hearing  children  for  the  critical  sentence  (when 
uncorrected  reading  rate  is  used),  the  sentence  following  the  critical  sentence,  and  for 
the  Qucstion-Responsc.  When  corrected  reading  rates  arc  used,  there  is  no  difference 
between  the  deaf  and  hearing  groups  at  the  critical  sentence  stage.  The  deaf  also 
answer  significantly  fewer  questions  correctly  than  the  hearing  group.  These  results 
are  consistent  with  the  findings  of  the  first  study  that  the  deaf  appear  to  have  more 
difficulty  with  inferencing.  They  also  confirm  similar  findings  by  Wilson  (1979)  and 
Pinhas  (1984).  It  might  be  thought  that  what  is  being  observed  is  merely  the  fact  that 
the  deaf  children,  although  older  chronologically,  have  poorer  general  reading  skills  as 
measured  on  standard  tests  of  literacy.  However,  the  textual  material  used  was 
relatively  simple  and  well  within  the  capabilities  of  both  groups  of  subjects  as  regards 
vocabulary  and  syntactic  structure.  Some  other  factor  must  be  influencing  their 
performance. 
Some  studies,  for  example  Omanson,  Warren,  &  Trabasso  (1978),  show  that  no 
particular  form  of  inferencing  causes  any  greater  difficulty  than  any  other.  The  types 
and  classifications  of  inference  used  in  the  Omanson  study  are  similar  to  the  types 
used  in  the  present  study  and  follow  the  taxonomy  of  inferences  proposed  by  Nicholas 
&  Trabasso  (1980).  However,  Omanson  and  his  colleagues  were  measuring  only 
accuracy  of  processing  inferences  md  not  speed  of  processing.  In  the  present  study, 
temporal  items  apear  to  be  more  difficult  to  process  than  causal,  particularly  for  the 
deaf.  Yet  when  corrections  are  made  for  the  distortions  caused  by  different  text  lengths 
when  using  reading  rate  as  the  metric,  there  is  no  difference  in  processing  time 
between  temporal  and  causal  texts. 
-162- The  accuracy  results  of  the  present  study,  however,  indicate  that  significantly  fewer 
temporal  questions  are  answered  correctly,  confirming  the  result  from  the  first  study 
that  the  deaf  find  temporal  inferences  the  most  difficult,  but  additionally  show  that  the 
controls  also  find  these  items  more  difficult,  although  the  difference  is  more  marked  in 
the  case  of  the  deaf.  Although  great  care  was  taken  to  control  the  syntactic  structures 
used  in  the  texts,  it  is  conceivable  that  the  deaf  find  the  particular  construction  used  in 
the  implicit  temporal  items  particularly  difficult  to  understand. 
From  the  perspective  of  those  theories  which  suggest  the  use  of  situational  models  (eg 
Sanford  &  Garrod,  1981;  Fincher-Kiefer,  1993;  Kintsch,  1988),  perhaps  the  most 
interesting  finding  to  emerge  from  this  study  is  the  fact  that  no  significant  difference 
was  found  between  the  reading  rates  for  explicit  and  implicit  materials  for  both  groups 
for  either  the  critical  sentence  or  the  question-response.  This  would  suggest  that  both 
groups  of  readers  are  making  elaborative  inferences  on-line.  The  situational  model 
used  by  the-reader  brings  with  it  a  certain  predictability  in  the  persons,  actions  and 
likely  outcomes  so  that  inferences  can  be  made  as  the  text  is  read.  There  is  no  need  for 
the  reader  to  made  time  consuming,  bridging  inferences. 
In  the  temporal  items,  one  might  expect  that  the  critical  sentence,  which  contains  the 
implicit  temporal  shift,  would  take  slightly  longer  to  read  as  it  involves  a  change  of 
scenario  (cf  Anderson,  1982).  However  in  the  present  study  even  the  explicit  version 
of  the  text  contains  a  time  shift,  albeit  overtly  signalled,  and  this  too  would  require  the 
reader  to  change  scenarios.  Thus  any  additional  time  would  apply  equally  to  both 
conditions  and  this  is  indeed  reflected  in  the  results  obtained. 
For  the  sentence  following  the  critical  manipulation  (the  "filler"),  the  deaf  again 
process  the  text  more  slowly  than  Cie  hearing  subjects,  but  there  is  no  difference  in 
processing  rate  between  temporal  and  causal  types.  However,  the  deaf  read  this 
sentence  more  slowly  in  implicit  passages  than  in  those  where  the  links  are  explicitly 
stated.  The  by-materials  analysis  indicates  a  trend  in  the  same  direction.  This  would 
indicate  that  perhaps  some  but  not  all  of  the  passages  were  causing  this  effect.  It  raises 
the  question  as  to  whether  the  deaf  are  indeed  inferring  on-line,  or  are  they  making 
-163- bridging  inferences  but  delaying  the  process  until  the  sentence  following  the  critical 
manipulation? 
An  alternative  explanation  may  be  appropriate.  Just  &  Carpenter  (1980)  discovered 
that  subjects  often  pause  at  the  end  of  a  sentence  to  search  for  referents  that  have  not 
been  assigned  while  reading,  to  construct  interclause  relations  and  to  handle  any 
inconsistencies  that  could  not  be  resolved  within  the  sentence.  This  "sentence  wrap- 
up"  can  occur  even  when  comprehension  occurs  on-line.  Aaronson  &  Scarborough 
(1976)  and  Mitchell  &  Green  (1978)  found  that  subjects  tended  to  pause  longer  on  the 
word  or  phrase  that  terminates  a  sentence  when  the  subjects  are  allowed  to  self-pace 
the  presentation  of  the  text,  as  in  the  present  study. 
Just  &  Carpenter  (1980)  found  that  wrap-up  can  occur  on  the  final  word  of  a 
paragraph  as  well  as  on  the  final  word  or  phrase  of  a  sentence.  They  found  that  for 
fluent,  adult  readers  an  additional  71  milliseconds  on  average  was  required  for  wrap- 
up  at  the  end  of  a  sentence  but  an  additional  157  milliseconds  for  wralp-up  at  the  end  of 
a  paragraph.  (This  latter  measurement  also  includes  a  small  amount  of  time  for 
subjects  to  operate  a  keypress).  In  the  present  study,  the  sentence  following  the  critical 
manipulation  is  also  the  final  sentence  of  each  text.  The  average  extra  time  for  implicit 
passages  wAs  133  milliseconds  for  the  deaf  but  only  9  milliseconds  for  hearing 
subjects.  Thus  the  deaf  seem  to  be  taking  a  small  amount  of  time  at  the  end  of  some  of 
the  texts  at  least,  for  general  reflection  and  integration. 
This  being  so,  it  might  be  expected  that  such  "wrap-up"  pauses  would  occur  equally 
for  the  deaf  and  the  controls.  However,  Jarvella  (1971)  and  Perfetti  &  Lesgold  (1977) 
have  shown  that  verbatim  memory  for  recently  comprehended  text  declines  after  a 
sentence  boundary,  and  attributes  this  decline  to  interference  between  sentence  wrap- 
up  processes  and  the  maintenance  of  verbatim  information  in  working  memory.  In  the 
first  study  both  deaf  and  secondary  aged  children  recalled  significantly  more  textual 
propositions  in  a  verbatim  or  near  verbatim  form.  However,  the  deaf  were  shown  to 
have  a  weaker  memory  and  recalled  significantly  fewer  propositions  overall  than  the 
secondary  aged  children.  Thus  the  weaker  memory  of  the  deaf  subjects  would  make 
-164- them  more  prone  to  such  interference  and  could  result  in  a  greater  wrap-up  time  at  the 
end  of  certain  implicit  texts. 
The  findirip  discussed  above  are  evidence  of  an  on-line  method  of  processing  textual 
material  by  both  deaf  and  hearing  children. 
The  deaf  answer  fewer  questions  correctly  than  the  hearing  group.  This  would  be 
expected  from  the  findings  of  the  first  study.  However,  a  further  finding  to  emerge  is 
that  significantly  fewer  implicit  questions  were  answered  correctly  than  were  explicit, 
for  both  hearing  and  deaf  subjects.  This  effect  seems  to  operate  more  strongly  for  the 
deaf.  These  findings  are  still  consistent  with  both  groups  of  subjects  operating  an  on- 
line,  concept  driven  approach  to  text  processing  as  only  those  questions  which  were 
answered  correctly  were  included  in  the  reading  rate  analysis  above.  In  other  words, 
both  groups  are  using  the  mechanisms  suggested  when  they  infer  successfully  but 
perhaps  these  skills  are  insufficient  or  ineffective  for  some  passages  which  may 
involve  situations  outwith  their  general  life  experience.  Further  and  more  detailed 
examination  of  particular  aspects  of  how  the  subjects  process  text  will  be  needed. 
The  above  findings  contradict  some  of  the  studies  previously  carried  out  in  this  area. 
For  example,  Wilson  (1979)  found  that  deaf  children  were  slower  in  their  response 
times  to  inferential  questions  compared  with  literal  questions  whereas  there  was  no 
difference  for  hearing  children.  A  later  study  by  Pinhas  (1984)  predicted  that  hearing 
children  would  show  equivalent  response  times  when  answering  inferential  or  literal 
questions  while  deaf  children  would  answer  literal  questions  more  quickly.  In  other 
words,  hearing  children  would  behave  like  constructive  readers  using  a  combination 
of  top-down  and  bottom-up  skills,  while  deaf  children  would  behave  like  non- 
constructive  readers.  In  fact  the  opposite  findings  to  thos?.  predicted  emerged.  Pinhas' 
hearing  group  were  slower  at  inferential  questions  and  the  deaf  group  showed  no 
difference  in  response  times  between  the  two  types  of  question. 
It  is  likely  that  these  differences  have  arisen  from  differences  in  methodology  between 
the  present  study  and  those  of  Wilson  and  Pinhas.  In  the  Pinhas  study,  passages  were 
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determined  by  pre-testing.  She  used  an  external  timing  device  to  record  the  subjects' 
response  times  (in  milliseconds).  This  timer  was  started  by  the  experimenter  as  the  last 
written  word  appeared.  There  is  no  detailed  description  of  the  procedure  for  the 
Wilson  study  but,  since  it  is  obvious  from  its  layout  etc  that  the  Pinhas  study  is  based 
on  Wilson,  it  is likely  that  similar  methods  were  used  in  the  earlier  study.  However 
this  methodology  is  likely  to  be  highly  inaccurate.  The  timer  is  started  on  the 
appearance  of  the  last  word  by  the  examiner  but  the  examiner's  reaction  time  to  the 
appearance  of  the  word  and  her  reaction  time  in  pressing  the  button  to  start  the  timer  is 
likely  to  vary  over  time  due  to  fatigue,  distractibility  etc.  In  the  present  study  the  timer 
for  recording  the  response  times  to  the  questions  is  started  by  the  microcomputer  as 
soon  as  the  question  appears  on  the  screen.  The  unit  of  measurement  was  also  the 
millisecond  but  the  human  variability  of  the  experimenter  is  removed. 
Also,  there  is  no  guarantee  in  the  Pinhas  study  that  every  student  has  comprehended 
each  sentence  of  the  text.  The  subject  has  no  control  over  the  presentation  rate  which  is 
an  average  obtained  by  pre-testing.  The  presentation  rate  might  be  too  fast  for  some 
subjects.  The  self  paced  nature  of  the  present  study  also  leads  to  a  more  precise  picture 
of  what  is  actually  happening  as  subjects  read  the  texts.  Each  subject  controls  the  rate 
of  presentation  of  each  sentence  by  pressing  the  appropriate  button  on  the  computer 
when  he  or  she  has  comprehended  the  previous  sentence.  This  leads  to  a  more 
accurate  insight  of  the  reading  process  than  presenting  sentences  at  a  standard  rate  to 
all  subjects  on  the  basis  of  pre-testing. 
Wilson  found  that  deaf  children  answered  inferential  questions  less  accurately  than 
literal  questions  whereas  there  was  no  difference  between  types  of  question  for 
hearing  children.  Pinhas  found  similar  significant  results  for  hearing  children  but  only 
a  trend  for  deaf  children  although  in  a  similar  direction  to  that  of  Wilson.  ln  the  present 
study,  inferential  questions  prove  to  be  more  difficult  than  literal  questions  for  both 
deaf  and  hearing  groups.  However,  conflicting  results  arc  obtained  in  those  studies 
from  mainstream  research  which  compare  hearing  children's  literal  and  inferential 
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both  types  of  statement  with  equivalent  response  times  and  equal  accuracy.  In  contrast 
Kail,  Chi,  Ingram,  &  Danner  (1977)  found  that  answers  to  literal  questions  were  more 
accurate  and  faster  than  than  answers  to  inferential  questions  in  two  groups  of  children 
of  different  agcs.  'These  discrepant  findings  may  be  attributed  to  differences  in  task 
demands  as  well  as  differences  in  the  types  of  inferential  processing  required. 
While  measures  of  reading  time  can  detect  bridging  inferences  successfully,  their  use 
with  elaborative  inferences  is  less  straightforward.  In  the  present  study,  if  elaborative 
inferences  are  made  then  no  additional  processing  time  should  be  necessary  to  respond 
to  questions  under  implicit  conditions.  However,  this  means  that  detection  of  an 
inference  having  been  made  relies on  proving  the  null  hypothesis,  ie  finding  no 
difference  in  reading  times  between  implicit  and  explicit  texts.  However,  the  same 
results  would  be  obtained  if  no  inference  was  made. 
One  possible  solution,  mentioned  in  Chapter  4,  would  be  to  introduce  a  statement 
following  that  in  which  the  inference  occurs,  which  contradicts  (or  at  least  does  not 
confirm)  the  elaboration,  and  so  causes  an  increase  in  reading  time.  Doing  this  in  the 
present  study,  however,  would  make  the  texts  seem  unnatural. 
By  using  the  question  responses,  only  those  texts  which  had  been  understood  were 
included  in  the  analysis.  In  ither  words,  if  the  text  was  understood  then  the  inference 
must  have  been  drawn.  However,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  question  itself  is 
intrusive.  It  is  possible  that  the  inference  might  not  be  drawn  on-line  and  is  only  made 
in  response  to  the  probe  question.  If  this  were  so,  the  reader  would  be  making  a 
back-ward  inference  by  retrieving  the  appropriate  information  from  memory.  this 
would  take  some  additional  processing  time  compared  "  ith  a  text  where  the  links  are 
stated  explicitly.  However,  no  such  difference  in  response  time  was  found. 
Another  potential  difficulty  in  using  reading  time  measurements  is  that,  for  causal 
texts,  it  could  be  argued  that  in  the  explicit  version  there  is  the  possibility  of  word- 
based,  associative  priming  (Keenan,  Potts,  Golding,  &  Jennings,  1990).  For  the 
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the  explicit  version  mentionspetrol  and  this  could  facilitate  the  reading  of  the  question. 
However,  in  these  texts  there  is  an  additional  (filler)  sentence  between  the  critical 
sentence  and  the  question.  This,  therefore,  should  reduce  any  effects  of  lexical 
priming  (Meyer&  Schvaneveldt,  1971). 
From  the  present  study  it  can  be  stated  that  deaf  children  seem  to  process  inferential 
information  in  a  similar  way  to  hearing  children.  It  is  also  likely  that  both  groups 
generate  knowledge-based  inferences  on-line  during  text  comprehension,  using 
situational  models.  In  this  respect,  they  seem  to  be  operating  in  a  similar  manner  to 
fluent  adult  readers. 
The  findings  in  the  present  study  apply  to  reading.  Other  studies  in  this  area  have 
examined  how  deaf  children  draw  inferences  in  what  might  be  considered  by  some  to 
be  their  native  language,  ie  signing.  It  is  proposed  to  examine  this  ýspect  in  the  next 
study. 
-168- Chapter  Seven 
Do  deaf  children  draw  inferences  from  sign 
as  well  as  they  do  from  text? 
7.1  Introduction 
From  the  results  of  the  second  study,  it  was  noted  that  deaf  sub  ects  answer  questions 
about  texts  where  the  information  is  implicit  less  accurately  than  when  the  information 
is  explicitly  stated.  Also  temporal  items  prove  to  be  more  difficult  than  causal  items, 
particularly  .  for  the  deaf.  In  addition,  no  extra  time  is  required  by  both  groups  to 
process  implicit  material  than  to  process  explicit  material.  This  latter  point  suggests 
that  both  groups  are  making  elaborative  inferences  on-line,  at  the  time  of  reading, 
using  situational  models  in  their  analysis  of  discourse  similar  to  those  proposed  by, 
among  others,  Sanford  &  Garrod  (1981). 
Sanford  &  Garrod  suggest  that  hearing  subjects  also  use  these  -mechanisms  for 
analysis  of  spoken  discourse.  This  has  not  really  been  tested  experimentally  as  in  live 
conversation  there  are  many  opportunities  for  interaction  between  the  participants.  If 
one  person  fails  to  understand  the  other,  he  or  she  can  interrupt  and  seek  clarification. 
This  may  not  be  possible  in  more  structured  situations  such  as  formal  lectures  when 
interruption  would  be  viewed  unfavourably.  It  is  certainly  not  possible  in  written 
methods  of  communication,  where  a  felicitous  style  is  essential  if  comprehension  is  to 
succeed. 
The  question  can,  therefore,  be  asked  as  to  whether  the  deaf  draw  inferences  when 
using  sign  langauge  in  a  similar  way  to  that  operating  when  they  read.  textual  material. 
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deaf  children  (eg  Wilson,  1979)  show  that  deaf  subjects  take  longer  to  respond  to 
questions  about  inferred  material  than  about  explicit  material.  Wilson  also  shows  that 
no  such  difference  exists  for  his  control  group  of  hearing  subjects  when  the  material  is 
presented  to  them  in  spoken  form.  The  experimental  set-up  did  not  allow  interaction 
between  the  communicator  and  the  receiver  as  in  live  conversation  and  is,  to  some 
extent,  an  artificial  situation.  However,  this  would  suggest  that  for  more  "natural" 
media  of  communication,  viz  speech  for  the  hearing  and  signing  for  the  deaf, 
processes  similar  to  those  described  by  Sanford  &  Garrod  are  operating  for  the 
hearing  subjects  but  not  for  the  deaf. 
A  recent  study  by  Emmory  and  Lillo-Martin  (1995)  has  shown  that  a  pronoun  which 
is  signed  automatically  reactivates  its  referent  which  has  been  mentioned  earlier  in  the 
discourse.  Because  of  the  unique  practice  of  associating  the  sign  for  a  person  or  object 
with  a  particular  location  in  space,  this  operates  even  for  "nul  I  -pronominal  s". 
Emmory,  Norman,  &  O'Grady  (1991)  have  shown  that  for  overt  pronouns  in 
American  Sign  Language,  this  reactivation  process  is  not  immediate  and  requires  some 
time,  occuring  about  1000  milliseconds  downstream  from  where  the  pronoun  is  first 
encountered.  This  is  similar  to  referent  reactivation  by  a  pronoun  when  text  is  read 
(MacDonald  &  MacWhinney,  1990).  This  would  suggest  that  the  fairly  automatic 
process  of  lexical  inferencing  at  least  is  occuring  on-line. 
The  present  study  sets  out  to  examine  whether  more  global  inferences  are  drawn  when 
the  mode  of  communication  is  sign  language,  and  if  so,  whether  such  inferences  are 
made  on-line. 
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7.2.1  Subjects 
Since  the  construction  of  appropriate  videotape  material  and  electronic  hardware  and 
the  writing  of  a  suitable  computer  program  took  some  considerable  time,  some  of  the 
subjects  who  took  part  in  the  second  study  had  left  school.  Also  since  it  was  the 
intention  to  examine  subjects  inferential  abilities  through  the  medium  of  manual 
signing,  only  those  children  in  the  second  study  who  were  being  taught  in  a  total 
communication  environment  would  be  eligible  for  inclusion  in  the  present  study. 
Some  of  these  students  were  used  in  trial  runs  to  check  the  equipment  and  program  as 
they  were  being  developed.  Therefore  the  numbers  of  subjects  who  had  taken  part  in 
the  second  study  and  who  were  eligible  for  the  present  study  were  greatly  reduced. 
Only  three  children  from  the  original  deaf  group  were  used,  the  others  coming  from  a 
school  for  the  deaf  in  Lothian  Region. 
Only  one  group  of  deaf  children  was  used.  It  comprised  16  children  (12  boys,  4  girls) 
with  hearing  losses  of  70  dB  or  greater  in  the  better  ear  averaged  over  the  four 
frequencies  within  the  range  50OHz-4KHz.  Losses  ranged  from  99  dB  to  120  dB, 
with  a  mean  loss  of  110  dB  (standard  deviation  7  dB).  All  were  within  the  normal 
range  of  intellectual  ability  (according  to  their  most  recently  recorded  IQ).  Ages  ranged 
from  12  years  5  months  to  17  years  5  months  with  a  mean  age  of  14  years  9  months 
(standard  deviation  18  months).  All  children  came  from  homes  where  English  was  the 
only  language  spoken.  Only  children  who  were  prelingually  deafened  and  whose 
parents  have  normal  hearing  were  included  in  *e  study.  These  are  the  same  conditions 
applying  in  the  second  study,  for  the  same  reasone  mentioned  therein. 
The  subjects  were  randomly  split  into  two  groups  and  assigned  to  one  of  two  trials 
(see  materials  section  below). 
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The  test  material  consisted  of  the  same  30  short  passages  and  5  practice  items  used  in 
the  second  study..  The  two  trials  were  the  same  as  those  used  in  that  study  so  that 
infcrred/cxplicit,  tcmporullcausal,  yes/no  responses  were  randomly  distributed  in  their 
presentation. 
The  passages  were  presented  on  a  videotape  monitor  in  British  Sign  Language  (BSL) 
by  a  deaf  adult  who  uses  BSL  as  her  natural  communication  medium  and  who  also 
works  as  an  auxiliary  in  a  school  for  the  deaf  and  is,  therefore  conversant  with  the 
way  deaf  children  tend  to  communicate,  the  limitations  (if  any)  of  their  signing,  and 
the  normal  pace  of  delivery  that  such  children  could  cope  with. 
It  was  a  moot  point  which  particular  manual  form  of  communication  to  use.  Most 
schools  tend  to  use  Signed  English  or  Sign  Supported  English.  Signed  English  uses 
manual  signs  in  the  correct  order  of  spoken  or  written  English  while  Sign  Supported 
English  uses  manual  signs  and  finger  spelling  in  the  same  order  as  English.  It  is for 
this  reason  that  schools  are  k-ccn  on  its  use.  However  when  the  textual  material  used  in 
the  second  study  was  translated  into  either  of  these  manual  forms  it  proved  to  be 
awkward  and  pedantic.  However  BSL  was  much  more  elegant.  In  addition  many 
people  would  argue  that  BSL  is  a  complete  language  in  itself  with  a  complete 
morphology  and  rules  of  syntax  etc,  for  example,  Klima  &  Bellugi  (1979),  Fischer  & 
Gough  (1978),  and  Liddell  (1975)  with  American  Sign  Language  (ASQ,  and 
Brennan,  Colville,  &  Lawson  (1980)  with  British  Sign  Language  (BSL).  Although 
there  arc  fundamental  differences  in  the  two  systems,  ASL  can  be  considered  to  be  the 
American  equivalent  of  BSL.  It  is  also,  matiy  would  argue,  especially  the  deaf 
community  itself,  the  "natural"  language  of  deaf  people.  For  example,  Dalgleish 
(1975)  contends  that  sign  language  is  the  preferred  mode  of  communication  for  deaf 
children  in  America,  Holland,  and  England. 
-172- In  the  present  study,  no  formal  assessment  was  undertaken  of  each  subject's 
familiarity  with  and  fluency  in  BSL,  but  their  teachers  reported  that  they  would 
experience  no  difficulty  with  the  materials  used.  One  teacher  who  signs  regularly  for 
the  deaf  on  television,  and  is  therefore,  fairly  fluent  in  BSL,  and  the  native  user  of 
BSL  who  appeared  on  the  videotape  presentation  in  this  study  both  confirmed  this 
assessment. 
7.2.3  Design  of  Study 
AW  factorial  repeated  measures  design  was  used.  Only  one  group  of  subjects  was 
used.  The  first  within  subjects  factor  was  inference  type  and  had  two  levels,  temporal 
and  causal.  The  second  within  subjects  factor  had  two  levels  also,  inferred  and 
explicit.  Each  subject  was  randomly  assigned  to  one  trial  of  the  test  material.  One  trial 
contained  half  explicit  and  half  implicit  items  randomly  distributed.  The  second  trial 
contained  the  reverse  conditions  of  the  material,  implicit  items  in  the  first  trial  became 
the  explicit  items  in  the  second  trial  and  the  explicit  became  the  implicit.  Half  the 
questions  required  "Yes"  responses,  half  "No"  responses,  and  both  of  these  types 
were  randomly  distributed. 
7.2.4  Procedure 
The  passages  were  presented  in  British  Sign  Language  by  a  native  user  of  this 
language  on  a  videotape  monitor.  The  texts  were  presented  exactly  as  in  the  second 
study,  ie  Title,  Text,  Question.  As  the  final  sign  of  the  question  was  presented,  a1 
KHz  tone  was  sounded  on  the  videotape  for  exactly  one  second.  The  positioning  of 
this  tone  is,  of  necessity,  somewhat  arbitrary  but  a  professional  tape  editing  machine 
was  used  for  extra  accuracy.  The  tone  was  initiated  15  frames  before  the  end  of  the 
last  sign  used  in  the  question.  The  tone  thus  generated  was  fed  through  the  analogue 
input  of  a  BBC  B  microcomputer  and  used  to  trigger  the  internal  clock.  The  subject 
was  then  expected  to  respond  by  pressing  one  of  two  buttons  ("Yes"  or  "No").  This 
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together  with  a  note  of  whether  the  response  was  accurate  or  inaccurate.  Because  of 
the  nature  of  the  computer  used,  response  times  were  in  ccntiscconds.  If  no  response 
was  made  within  15  seconds,  the  program  would  note  this  fact  and  would  rcsct  the 
computer  for  the  next  passage  on  the  videotape. 
A  copy  of  the  control  program  is  presented  in  Appendix  A4. 
7.3  RESULTS 
7.3.1  Response  Accuracy 
The  number  of  questions  responded  to  correctly  are  shown  as  percentages  in  Table  7.1 
below: 
TABLE  7.1:  Percentage  of  questions  correctly  answered 
TEMPORAL  CAUSAL 
Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
66.9  54.1  79.1  68.8 
These  results  were  analysed  using  a  two  way,  repeated  measures  analysis  of  valiance, 
collapsing  apross  texts  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  with  inference  type 
as  the  first  within  subjects  repeated  measure,  and  explicit  or  implicit  as  the  second 
within  subjects  repeated  measure.  This  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  between 
temporal  and  causal  items  (FI,  15=4.439,  p<0.05)  with  fewer  temporal  than  causal 
items  being  answered  correctly  (60.5%  compared  with  74.0%).  There  was  also  a 
significant  main  effect  between  explicit  and  implicit  items  (FI.  15=7.091,  p<0.05), 
with  fewer  implicit  than  explicit  items  being  answered  correctly  (.  61.4%  compared 
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An  analysis  of  variance  was  carried  out,  collapsing  across  subjects  and  using  texts  as 
random  variables.  This  analysis  confirmed  the  main  effect  between  temporal  and 
causal  items  (171,14--12.059,  p<0.01)  with  fewer  temporal  than  causal  being  answered 
correctly.  However,  comparison  of  explicit  with  implicit  forms  revealed  only  a  trend 
towards  fewer  implicit  being  answered  correctly  (FI.  14=2.984,  p<O.  11). 
However,  the  score  of  54.1%  temporal  implicit  items  is  no  better  than  chance  (for  the 
reasons  given  earlier  in  Section  6.3.1).  If  this  score  is  removed,  comparison  can  then 
be  made  between  temporal  and  causal  texts  in  which  the  explicitly  stated.  Comparison 
can  also  be  made  explicit  and  implicit  versions  of  causal  texts. 
Since  the  deaf  subjects  score  very  poorly  on  implicit  temporal  items,  it  is  possible  that 
this  is  depressing  the  overall  score  for  implicit  and  temporal  items.  A  West  comparing 
causal  explicit  with  causal  implicit  found  no  significant  difference.  When  temporal 
explicit  items  were  compared  with  causal  explicit,  a  borderline  effect  was  observed, 
t  (df=15)  =  1.878,  p=  0.08,  with  temporal  poorer  than  causal  (66.94%  compared  with 
79.13%).  A  similar  trend  was  also  found  analysing  by-materials. 
7.3.2.1  Response  Times 
Since  the  rate  of  presentation  of  all  the  material  is  fixed  by  the  videotape  and  the  timing 
device  is  started  after  the  questions  have  been  presented,  only  the  response  times  to  the 
questions  are  measured.  Thus  differentials  between  temporal  and  causal  items  which 
complicated  matters  slightly  in  the  second  study  do  not  apply  in  the  present  study  and 
response  times  can  be  compared  directly.  Only  items  which  were  answered  correctly 
were  included  in  the  analysis.  Since  the  number  of  texts  requiring  yes  and  no  answers 
were  proportionally  equal,  only  one  ANOVA  was  carried  out. 
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7.2: 
TABLE  7.2:  Mean  response  times  (csec)  for  Questions 
TEMPORAL  CAUSAL 
Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
169  200  206  229 
The  data  were  examined  and  three  outlying  values  were  removed  from  the  by-matcrials 
distribution  and  four  from  the  by-subjects  distribution. 
These  results  were  analysed  using  a  two  way,  repeated  measures  analysis  of  variance, 
collapsing  across  texts  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  with  inference  type 
as  the  first  within  subjects  repeated  measure,  and  explicit  or  implicit  as  the  second 
within  subjects  repeated  measure.  This  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  between 
temporal  and  causal  items  (FI,  15=  4.812,  p<0.05),  with  temporal  items  being 
responded  to  more  quickly  than  causal  (1.84  seconds  compared  with  2.18  seconds).  A 
by-materials  analysis  also  supported  this  main  effect  (FI,  56-  14.318,  P<0.001).  The 
comparison  between  explicit  and  implicit  items  failed  to  reach  significance  in  both  the 
by-subjets  and  the  by-materials  analyses. 
7.3.2.2  Re-analysis  of  Response  Times 
The  arguements  used  in  the  previous  chapter  concerning  the  comparison  of  texts 
which  have  different  average  lengths  apply  equally  in  the  present  study  (Trueswell, 
Tanenhaus,  &  Garnsey,  1994).  Since  the  previous  study  used  reading  rates  as  the 
metric  and  the  present  study  uses  reading  times,  it  might  be  thought  that  no 
adjustments  need  to  be  made.  However,  in  the  present  study,  the  times  used  are  from 
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means  that  the  subject  is  reading  the  signed  presentation  and  starting  to  formulate  his 
or  her  answer  before  the  signer  has  finished.  Thus  on  longer  questions  the  subject  has 
more  time  to  develop  a  response  and  so  reaction  times  will  tend  to  be  shorter.  There 
would  appear  to  be  no  easy  solution  to  this  problem.  It  is  not  possible,  therefore,  to 
compare  temporal  and  causal  texts. 
Since  it  was  noted  above  that  the  accuracy  of  the  responses  to  implicit  temporal  items 
were  no  better  than  chance,  the  only  further  comparison  that  can  be  fruitfully  made  is 
between  explicit  and  implicit  versions  of  causal  texts,  and  between  explicit  versions  of 
temporal  and  causal  texts. 
The  results  for  causal  texts  in  explicit  and  implicit  forms  were  analysed  using  a  t-test. 
This  revealed  no  significant  difference  in  either  the  by-subjects  or  by-materials 
analysis. 
Comparison  of  temporal  explicit  with  causal  explicit  by  t-test  revealed  no  significant 
difference,  either  by  subjects  or  by  materials. 
7.4  DISCUSSION 
The  original  aim  of  the  present  study  was  to  examine  whether  or  not  the  results  found 
in  the  previous  study  would  be  duplicated  when  deaf  children  use  another  medium  of 
language,  namely  signing.  In  the  previous  study  it  was  shown  that  d.  eaf  children  infer 
when  reading  from  implicit  material  in  a  manner  similar  to  hearing  children.  Both 
groups  would  seem  to  be  using  a  situation  modcl,  top-down  approach  to 
comprehension  when  reading.  Does  this  approach  apply  equally  well  in  other  areas  of 
language  co!  nprehension  orjust  when  reading?  Sanford  &  Garrod  (1981)  assume  that 
this  mechanism  does  operate  for  all  modes  of  discourse  with  hearing  subjects. 
However,  other  studies  have  found  differences  in  the  inferencing  ability  of  deaf 
-177- children  depending  on  mode  of  presentation  of  material,  eg  Wilson  (1979)  and  Pinhas 
(1984). 
In  the  present  study,  it  was  found  that  response  times  were  significantly  quicker  for 
temporal  than  for  causal  items  when  the  deaf  subjects  used  signing.  However,  as 
mentioned  above,  this  is  probably  an  artcfact  introduced  because  temporal  and  causal 
questions  are,  on  average,  of  different  lengths.  On  longer  questions  (the  temporal 
texts),  subjects  have  more  time  to  formulate  their  response  as  the  question  is  being 
signed,  and  tend,  therefore,  to  respond  more  quickly.  Because  of  the  nature  of  the 
present  experimental  design,  there  is  no  way  round  this  problem. 
However,  it  was  found  that  temporal  items  presented  a  significantly  greater  degree  of 
difficulty  than  causal  for  deaf  subjects,  both  for  material  which  was  read  and  signed. 
In  other  woids,  fewer  temporal  items  were  answered  correctly  under  both  presentation 
conditions.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  hearing  children,  when  reading,  also  found 
temporal  items  more  difficult.  In  the  previous  chapter,  it  was  mooted  whether  the 
particular  syntactic  structure  of  implicit  temporal  material  was  causi  ng  difficulty  for  the 
deaf.  Given  that  they  are  having  similar  difficulty  when  the  material  is  presented  in 
signed  form  might  suggest  that  it  is  not  the  syntax  per  se  which  is  causing  the 
difficulty,  since  the  signed  presentation  will  follow  the  particular  morphology  of  BSL, 
which  presumably  is  different  from  that  of  written  English. 
Also,  for  material  presented  in  both  formats,  the  deaf  subjects  could  answer  more 
explicit  than  implicit  items  correctly.  Under  both  presentations  the  by-subjccts  analysis 
was  significant  while  the  by-matcrials  analysis  revealed  only  trends,  but  in  the  same 
direction.  Again  this  holds  for  hearing  children  when  reading. 
It  can  therefore  be  seen  that  as  far  as  signed  presentation  is  concerned,  the  deaf 
perform  as  they  do  when  reading.  This  is  also  similar  to  how  the  hearing  subjects 
perform  when  reading,  except  of  course  that  the  hearing  group  is  qu.  icker  overall  than 
the  deaf. 
-178- Again,  perhaps  the  most  interesting  finding  to  emerge  is  the  fact  that  no  significant 
difference  was  found  between  the  response  times  for  explicit  and  implicit  questions  for 
the  deaf  group.  It  could,  therefore,  be  argued  that  Sanford  &  Garrod's  mechanism  for 
text  comprehension  already  discussed  applies  equally  well  when  the  material  to  be 
understood  is  presented  in  signed  form  as  it  is  when  presented  in  written  form. 
These  findifigs  contradict  the  results  of  Wilson  (1979)  and  Pinhas  (1984).  Wilson 
found  that  deaf  subjects  performed  significantly  better,  with  a  greater  degree  of 
accumcy,  when  material  was  presented  in  written  form  than  when  it  was  signed.  The 
explanation  offered  was  that  the  written  form  offers  a  more  stable  format  for  deaf 
subjects  than  the  more  transient,  ephemeral  nature  of  sign.  However,  if  the  overall 
percentages  of  correct  responses,  averaged  over  both  inference  types  and  over  explicit 
and  implicit  conditions,  are  compared  for  the  deaf  subjects  for  the  reading  presentation 
(the  previous  study)  and  for  the  signed  presentation  (the  present  study),  then  no 
difference  in  performance  is  noted.  For  the  reading  presentation,  the  deaf  subjects 
responded  correctly  on  average  67.8%  of  the  time  while  for  the  signed  presentation 
they  responded  correctly  67.2%  of  the  time.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  group  of 
subjects  under  both  presentations  was  substantially  different.  Only  3  of  the  original 
group  who  took  part  in  the  second  study  also  took  part  in  the  third  study,  and  even 
then  it  was  several  months  later,  so  there  would  be  very  little  chance  of  them 
remembering  the  material. 
Pinhas  predicted  that  deaf  children  would  show  no  difference  in  accPracy  of  response 
between  literal  and  inferential  questions  which  were  presented  in  sign.  However,  she 
only  found  a  trend  but  in  the  predicted  direction.  This  is  the  opposite  of  the  the 
findings  of  the  present  study  but  even  in  the  present  study,  although  the  by-subjects 
analysis  did.  reveal  a  significant  difference  in  favour  of  explicit  items,  the  by-matcrials 
analysis  revealed  only  a  trend.  Therefore  these  particular  findings  should  be  treated 
with  some  caution. 
Pinhas  also  failed  to  show  that  for  signed  material,  deaf  subjects  show  equivalent 
response  times  for  both  literal  and  inferred  questions.  In  fact  the  inferred  material  took 
-179- longer.  The  present  study  found  that  no  difference  existed  between  response  times  for 
explicit  and  implicit  material.  Pinhas's  findings  would  seem  to  suggest  that  deaf 
subjects  use  a  "text"  driven  approach  when  interpreting  signed  material.  The  findings 
of  present  study,  however,  are  consistent  with  those  of  the  study  in  the  previous 
chapter  and  suggest  that  the  deaf  use  a  concept  driven,  scenario  type  approach  when 
comprehending  signed  as  well  as  writtcn/printed  material. 
The  same  arguments  put  forward  in  the  second  study  also  hold  for  the  discrepancies 
noted  above.  Although  the  exact  methodology  of  Wilson's  study  is  unclear,  it  seems 
likely  that  a  "live"  signer  was  used.  This  certainly  was  the  case  with  Pinhas.  The 
difficulties  on  such  an  arrangement  are  immediately  obvious.  Each  presentation  of  the 
material  can  vary  due  to  fatigue,  distractions,  etc.  Also  it  is  not  possible  to  guarantee  a 
uniform  presentation  as  regards  exactness  of  signed  sequences.  British  Sign  Language 
and  American  Sign  Language  are  active,  functional  languages  and  are  liable  to  slight 
variations  in,  perhaps  the  order  of  signs  or  substitutions  of  similar  but  subtly  different 
signs.  As  in  speech  presentation,  a  particular  sign  (or  word)  can  be  emphasised 
slightly  more  or  less  on  different  occasions,  thus  adding  slight  nuapces  and  possibly 
changing  meaning  in  very  subtle  ways.  It  puts  a  great  burden  on  the  signer  to  ensure 
exact  similarity  of  presentation  each  time.  The  method  used  in  the  present  study  of  a 
videotaped  presentation  ensures  uniformity.  Each  subject  sees  exactly  the  same  thing. 
Both  trials  were  carefully  checked  for  uniformity  before  use  in  the  experiment. 
Also,  in  the  present  study,  the  triggering  of  the  timer  was  much  more  accurately 
controlled.  The  trigger  tone  was  exactly  the  same  for  each  subject  and  the  timing 
process  was  under  computer  control.  With  Pinhas  and  probably  for  Wilson,  an 
external  timer  was  started  by  the  examiner  after  the  last  sign  was  presented.  This 
would  be  most  likely  to  lead  to  variations  in  reaction  time  and  judgement  of  the 
examiner.  Thus  the  present  study  brings  much  more  precision  to  the  problem. 
In  the  previous  study,  it  was  argued  that,  although  they  draw  correct  inferences  less 
frequently,  the  deaf  can  infer  in  a  similar  manner  to  hearing  children.  It  was  also  noted 
that  their  rate  of  reading  was  generally  slower  overall,  even  when  reading  text  which 
-180- was  not  critical  to  the  inference  process.  However,  in  the  present  study,  the  deaf  still 
experience  the  level  of  difficulty  with  certain  forms  of  implicit  material,  even  when  no 
reading  is  required. 
This  would  suggest  that  the  difficulties  may  not  result  from  problems  with  reading  per 
se.  Since  they  occur  in  more  than  one  modality  of  communication,  they  may  arise 
from  more  general  language  processing  or  conceptual  problems. 
The  present  findings  would  suggest  consistency  over  reading  and  sign  interpretation 
and  similarity  of  mechanisms  to  those  employed  by  hearing  subjects  when  reading. 
This  is  a  much  more  optimistic  standpoint  as  it  emphasises  the  "normality"  of  the  deaf 
in  this  respect.  However,  for  some  reason  the  deaf  seem  to  have  more  difficulty  in 
drawing  inferences  than  their  hearing  counterparts.  A  closer  look  at  the  mechanism 
involved  when  interpreting  inferred  material  is  the  subject  of  the  next  study. 
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- Chapter  Eight: 
Can  deaf  children  make  instrumental  inferences? 
8.1  Introduction 
The  results  of  the  previous  studies  showed  that  deaf  children  draw  inferences  from 
textual  material  in  a  similar  manner  to  hearing  children.  The  deaf,  it  seems,  also  employ 
such  a  mechanism  when  drawing  inferences  which  have  been  presented  to  them  in  the 
from  of  sign  language. 
The  present  study  moves  from  the  perspective  taken  previously  of  examining  the 
narrative  from  a  global  overview  to  a  more  detailed  molecular  viewpoint. 
Comprehension  involves,  at  least  in  part,  the  formation  of  a  coherent  representation  of 
the  text  in  the  mind  of  the  reader  by  relating  each  new  phrase  in  the  text  to  what  has 
already  been  read.  One  commonly  used  and  convenient  aspect  for  study  is  anaphoric 
reference,  in  which  a  noun  phrase  or  pronoun  relates  to  an  entity  mentioned  earlier  in 
the  text,  for  example: 
Herb  got  some  beer  out  of  the  trunk. 
The  beer  was  warin. 
The  word  beer  in  the  second  sentence  can  be  read  more  rapidly  in  the  above  instance 
than  if  it  is  referred  to  indirectly  as  in  the  example  below: 
Herb  unpacked  the  picnic  suppliesfrom  the  trunk. 
Tite  beer  ivas  warin. 
-182- The  reason  given  by  Haviland  and  Clark  (1974)  for  the  example  above  is  that  beer  can 
be  one  of  several  members  of  the  class  "picnic  supplies",  so  that  a  bridging  link 
between  the  two  sentences  has  to  be  made,  taking  extra  processing  time.  In  the  first 
instance  there  was  a  direct  antecedent  and  no  extra  time  was  required. 
Several  others,  eg  Garrod  &  Sanford  (1977,1978),  Sanford  &  Garrod  (1977)  and 
Kennedy  (1979)  have  shown  that  the  time  taken  to  map  one  noun  phrase  onto  another 
is  a  function  of  the  class-membership  relation  between  the  noun  antecedent  and 
anaphor.  Since  in  the  example  from  Haviland  &  Clark  (op  cit)  quoted  above,  the 
mental  representation  of  "picnic  supplies"  does  not  seem  to  readily  or  directly  include 
an  entity  for  beer,  Garrod  &  Sanford  (1981)  ponder  the  extent  of  complexity  which 
can  be  ascribed  to  the  meaning  representation  of  a  sentence.  They  consider  in 
particular  the  case  of  verbs. 
Garrod  &  Sanford  quote  the  work  of,  for  example,  Norman,  Rumelhart  &  LNR 
(1975),  Schank  (1973)  and  Just  &  Clark  (1973)  on  their  descriptions  of  verbs  as 
being  related  sets  of  atomic  concepts  that  together  make  up  the  complete  meaning  of 
the  verb.  Examples  would  be: 
KICK  .............. 
MOVEMENT  of  the  FOOT 
GIVE  .............. 
TRANSFER  something  to  a  RECIPIENT 
PROHIBIT  .......  ALLOW  with  a  NEGATIVE  component 
Garrod  &  Sanford  speculate  as  to  whether  or  not  a  sentence  is  represented  in  a 
"dccomposdd"  from  with  the  various  elements  already  available  or  whether  such 
decomposition  only  takes  place  when  it  is  needed.  They  quote  evidence  from  Kintsch 
(1974)  which  concludes  that  decomposition  does  not  talýc  place  at  time  of  encoding,  as 
more  complex  decompositions  would  be  more  difficult  to  retrieve  from  memory. 
However  Gentncr  (1981)  has  shown  that  what  is  important  is  how  well  connected  the 
entities  of  the  decomposition  are,  and  concluded  that  decomposition  does  indeed 
occur.  Carpenter  &  Just  (1977)  have  also  shown  that  subjects  treat  vcrbs  like  "forget" 
as  NOT-rcmembcr,  thus  offering  support  for  the  decomposition  hypothesis. 
-183- If  verbs  are  represented  in  decomposed  form  in  the  mind  of  the  reader,  then  this  will 
affect  how  subsequent  sentences  are  processed.  Incoming  text  could  be  mapped 
directly  onto  the  elements  of  the  decomposition,  including  those  elements  which  are 
implied  by  the  verb,  for  example  "car"  being  an  clement  implied  by  the  verb  "drive". 
Therefore  the  time  taken  to  read  a  target  sentence  containing  the  anaphor  "car" 
following  on  from  an  implicit  antecedent  would  take  no  longer  than  that  following  on 
from  an  explicit  antecedent.  Another  example  is  the  verb  "dress"  and  the  anaphor 
"clothes": 
Mary  dressed  the  baby.  (implicit) 
The  clothes  were  made  ofpink  wool. 
Mary  put  the  clothes  on  the  baby.  (explicit) 
The  clothes  were  made  ofpink  wool. 
Early  studies,  for  example  Anderson  &  Ortony  (1975)  with  adults,  and  Paris  & 
Lindaucr  (1976)  with  children,  suggested  that  such  instrumental  inferences  are 
routinely  drawn.  Subjects  read  passages  which  contained  sentences  such  as  "771e 
container  hqld  the  apples".  At  the  end  of  the  passage,  a  cue  word  was  presented 
("basket"  or  "bottle"  for  the  example  given),  and  subjects  were  asked  to  recall  the 
original  sentence.  It  was  found  that  "basket"  leads  to  a  quicker  recall  of  the  sentence 
than  "bottle",  this  being  interpreted  as  evidence  that  the  specific  type  of  container  (ie  a 
basket)  is  inferred  at  the  time  of  reading  the  sentence. 
However,  the  memory  technique  used  in  these  studies  has  subsequently  been  criticised 
(Alba  &  Hasher,  1983;  McKoon  &  Ratcliff,  1981,1986;  Singer,  1979).  It  is  possible 
that  the  findings  could  be  due  to  differential  ability  in  finding  "container"  in  memory  at 
the  time  of  recall.  Singer  (1980)  used  instrumental  cues  which  have  different 
association  strengths  with  verbs.  For  example,  "spoon"  has  a  strong  forward 
association  with  "stirring  soup"  but  a  weak  reverse  association.  "Ladle"  has  a  strong 
reverse  association  with  this  verb  phrase  but  a  weak  forward  association.  By  showing 
that  it  was  the  backward  association  from  the  instrumental  cue  to  the  verb  phrase 
-184- (rather  than  the  forward  associations)  which  predicts  the  case  of  recall,  Singer 
indicated  that  in  the  study  by  Anderson  &  Ortony  (1975),  the  cued  recall  task  was 
tapping  search  processes  at  the  time  of  recall,  rather  than  the  inference  having  been 
drawn  at  thcý  time  of  reading. 
Garrod  &  Sanford  (1981)  used  reading  times  in  their  study  and  found  that 
instrumental  inferences  arc  made  as  the  text  is  read.  They  found  that  it  took  subjects  no 
longer  to  read  a  sentence  containing,  for  example,  a  reference  to  "the  car'  when  it 
followed  a  sentence  containing  the  verb  "drive"  (and  no  explicit  mention  of  "cur")  than 
when  a  car  was  mentioned  explicitly  in  the  preceding  sentence. 
Singer  (1979),  using  a  similar  experimental  design  to  Garrod  &  Sanford,  found  that 
subjects  did  in  fact  take  longer  to  read  a  sentence  which  contained  an  instrument,  if 
this  instrument  had  only  been  implied  by  use  of  a  verb  in  the  preceding  sentence.  For 
example,  it  took  longer  to  read  "The  shovel  was  heavy"  following  on  from  the  first 
sentence  below  than  the  second: 
"The  boy  cleared  the  snowfroin  the  stairs"  (Implied) 
"The  boy  cleared  the  snow  with  a  shovel"  (Explicit) 
One  possible  explanation  for  the  discrepant  results  from  the  two  studies  quoted  above 
is  put  forward  by  Cotter  (1984).  By  examining  the  dictionary  definitions  of  the  verbs 
used  in  each  study,  and  using  a  word  recognition  task,  she  suggests  that,  in  effect, 
two  differept  subsets  of  verbs  are  used.  For  those  used  by  Garrod  &  Sanford,  the 
instruments  seem  to  be  a  more  inherent  part  of  the  definition  of  the  verbs  than  those 
used  by  Singer.  She  also  felt  that  these  differences  were  tapped  by  the  reading  task, 
where  subjects  are  under  a  degree  of  pressure,  but  not  detected  at  the  more  relaxed 
pre-testing  stage  when  subjects  completed  a  questionnaire  to  define  each  verb. 
Examination  of  the  textual  material  used  in  the  Garrod  &  Sanford  study  and  the  Singer 
study  suggests  a  possible  alternative  explanation.  Garrod  &  Sanford  use  passages 
containing  three  sentences  while  Singer  uses  passages  which  contain  only  two 
-185- sentences.  O'Brien,  Shank,  Myers,  &  Rayner  (1988),  using  eye  movement  data,  have 
shown  that  subjects  do  make  elaborative  inferences  at  the  time  of  reading  if  the  context 
is  sufficiently  constraining,  or  if  they  are  encouraged  to  do  so  by  a  demand  sentence 
which  focusses  attention  on  the  inferred  concept.  It  could  be  argued  that  the  Garrod  & 
Sanford  texts,  because  of  their  greater  length,  offer  a  slightly  richer  and  therefore  more 
constraining  context.  However,  in  a  subsequent  paper,  Garrod,  O'Brien,  Morris,  & 
Rayner  (1990)  reanalysed  the  results  of  O'Brien  et  al  (1988)  and  conducted  an 
experiment  which  showed  that  inferences  were  drawn  on-line  in  constraining 
contextual  conditions  only  where  a  definite  anaphoric  relationship  exists  between  the 
anaphor  and  its  antecedent.  In  other  words,  an  inference  would  only  be  drawn 
automatically  when  reference  was  made  to  a  definite  instrument  (eg  the  shovel)  rather 
than  an  indefinite  reference  (eg  a  shovel)..  Yet  it  would  appear  that  in  both  the  Singer 
and  the  Garrod-Sanford  materials  it  is  definites  which  are  used. 
Corbett  &  Doshcr  (1978)  used  the  Stroop,  technique  (described  earlier  in  Chapter  4)  to 
investigate  whether  instrumental  inferences  arc  made.  Subjects  read  sentences  similar 
to  that  used  by  Singer,  eg 
The  boy  cleared  the  snowftom  the  stairs. 
This  was  followed  by  a  probe  which  was  either  a  semantic  associate  of  "shovel"  or  an 
unrelated  word.  The  probe  was  written  in  coloured  ink  and  subjects  had  to  name  the 
colour.  If  the  target  word  is  activated,  then  because  of  interference,  it  should  take 
longer  to  name  the  colour.  Corbett  &  Dosher,  however,  found  no  evidence  for 
instrumental  inferences  occurring,  unless  subjects  were  instructed  to  make  such 
inferences. 
A  recent  study  by  van  Meter  &  Pressley  (1994)  used  a  recognition  probe  consisting  of 
a  word  fragment  based  on  the  implied  instrument  to  examine  whether  children  (agcd 
10  to  14  years)  make  instrumental  inferences  on-line  when  reading  single  sentences. 
However,  results  indicated  that  such  inferences  were  not  made  spontaneously  but 
were  made  when  subjects  were  instructed  to  do  so. 
-186- The  evidence  as  to  whether  instrumental  inferences  are  generated  during  the  reading 
process  is  equivocal.  It  is  possible  that  such  inferences  may  occur  with  particular 
verbs  but  not  with  others.  Since  the  present  study  seeks  to  use  essentially  the  same 
verbs  as  were  used  by  Garrod  &  Sanford  and  a  similar  experimental  design,  it  would 
be  expected  that  hearing  subjects  would  generate  instrumental  inferences  at  the  time  of 
reading.  Since,  from  the  evidence  of  the  studies  in  the  two  previous  chapters,  deaf 
children  appear  to  infer  in  a  similar  manner  to  hearing  children,  it  is  further 
hypothesised  that  the  deaf  will  also  generate  instrumental  inferences  on-line. 
8.2  METHOD 
8.2.1  Subjects 
Two  groups  were  used,  one  experimental  group  of  hearing  impaired  children  and  one 
comparison  group  of  normally  hearing  children  of  secondary  school  age. 
The  experimental  group  comprised  19  deaf  children  (14  boys,  5  girls)  with  hearing 
losses  of  70  dB  or  greater  in  the  better  ear  averaged  over  the  four  frequencies  within 
the  range  500  Hz  to  4  KHz.  Losses  ranged  from  75  dB  to  116  dB,  with  a  mean  loss 
of  99  dB  (standard  deviation  11  dB).  Ages  ranged  from  12  years  3  months  to  16  years 
11  months,  with  a  mean  age  of  14  years  9  months  (standard  deviation  14  months).  All 
the  subjects  were  within  the  normal  range  of  intellectual  ability,  as  determined  by  their 
most  recently  recorded  IQ.  All  children  came  from  homes  where  English  is  the  only 
language  spoken.  Also,  only  children  who  were  prelingaally  deafened  were  included, 
for  the  same  reasons  given  in  the  second  study,  viz  children  who  have  been  deafened 
after  the  acquisition  of  speech  are  generally  considered  to  have  a  great  advantage 
linguistically  over  those  deafened  after  this  stage  (eg  Conrad,  1979).  Additionally, 
only  those  children  whose  parents  were  normally  hearing  were  included  as  it  is  well 
documented  that  the  small  group  of  deaf  children  whose  parents  arc  also  deaf  seem  to 
-187- have  linguistic,  social  and  academic  advantage  over  other  deaf  children  (eg  Meadow, 
1967,1968;  Stuckless  &  Birch,  1966;  Vernon  &  Kho,  1970).  Children  with  any 
additional,  significant  handicap  were  also  discounted  as  this  could  adversely  affect  the 
results  obtained.  All  the  children  attended  schools  for  the  deaf  or  units  for  the  hearing 
impaircd  in  Strathclyde  Region,  and  all  but  four  had  taken  part  in  the  second  study. 
The  four  new  subjects  were  substituted  for  subjects  who  had  left  school  or  were  ill 
when  the  present  study  was  run. 
The  comparison  group  comprised  20  normally  hearing  children  (12  boys,  8  girls)  in 
the  second  year  of  a  local  secondary  school.  Ages  ranged  from  12  years  11  months  to 
13  years  9  months,  with  a  mean  age  of  13  years  4  months  (standard  deviation  3 
months).  All  but  five  of  the  children  had  taken  part  in  the  second  study. 
8.2.2  Materials 
The  test  material  consisted  of  20  short  texts  presented  to  the  subjects  on  the  visual 
display  unit  of  an  Apple  Macintosh  microcomputer.  These  were  preceded  by  four 
practice  items  using  the  same  format. 
The  material  contained  those  verbs  used  by  Garrod  &  Sanford  (1981)  in  their  study  on 
vcrb  dccomposition.  Only  13  of  the  original  16  vcrbs  wcrc  includcd,  the  othcr  3  bcing 
discarded  as  it  was  felt  they  may  be  inappropriate  for  children.  Those  verbs  not  used 
were: 
grow  ....  (height) 
ki  ss  .....  (1  i  PS) 
sell  ......  (money) 
The  reasons  given  by  Garrod  and  Sanford  themselves  as  to  possible  confusion  with 
these  verbs  were  thought  to  possibly  operate  more  strongly  in  the  case  of  children.  For 
example,  "grow"  could  refer  to  human  height  or  the  cultivation  of  flowers  or 
-188- vegetables;  "kiss"  could  imply  lips  or  mouth;  "sell"  would  suggest  firstly  supplying 
goods,  with  receiving  money  for  this  service  as  a  secondary  albeit  important 
component. 
In  order  to  obtain'more  possible  verbs  which  could  be  included  with  the  experimental 
material,  the  same  procedures  used  by  Garrod  and  Sanford  were  adopted.  A  list  of 
verbs  with  one  word  of  context,  if  necessary,  were  presented  to  a  group  of  subjects 
who  were  asked  to  define  the  verbs,  based  on  the  example:  CARVE.  -  Use  a  knife  to 
slice  meat.  The  material  was  pretested  on  a  group  of  14  adults  (teachers, 
psychologists,  civil  servants)  who  were  unaware  of  the  purpose  of  the  study. 
This  list  is  given  below  in  Table  8.1,  with  the  one  context  word  in  brackcts,  where 
one  was  given,  and  the  expected  noun  phrase.  The  percentage  of  subjects  who 
responded  with  the  expected  noun  phrase  (instrument)  is  shown  for  each  verb. 
TABLE8.1:  Percentage  of  responses  mentioning  the  expected  noun  phrase. 
PAINT  .................................  brush 
SWIM  ....................................  water 
EAT  .......................................  food 
READ  .....................................  book 
SING  ......................................  song 
SHOOT  (rabbit)  .........................  gun 
CLIMB  (to  roof)  ........................  ladder 
SIT  ........................................  seat 
BOIL  (water)  ............................  kettle 
TIE  (shoe)  ................................  laces 
DIG  (gardcn)  ............................  spade 
CLEAN  (teeth)  ...........................  toothbrush 
WASH  (hands)  ..........................  soap 














79%  * 
-189- Garrod  and  Sanford  used  the  criterion  for  inclusion  of  material  that  at  least  70  %  of  the 
subjects  included  the  implied  entity  in  their  definition.  Those  itemý  marked  with  an 
asterisk  in  the  above  list  were  included;  this  includes  all  items  over  70%,  with  only 
one  verb  ("shoot")  achieving  slightly  less  than  this  level  (64%). 
The  full  set  of  materials  is  listed  in  Appendix  A5. 
The  layout  of  the  texts  followed  a  pattern  similar  to  that  used  by  Garrod  and  Sanford. 
This  comprised  three  sentences  followed  by  a  question.  An  example  of  the  type  of 
passage  used  is  shown  below: 
Tom  was  going  to  London. 
He  was  taking  his  car. 
He  was  driving  there. 
The  car  had  beenfixed. 
(Explicit  form. 
(Implicit  form. 
(Noun  phrasc. 
It  hadjust  been  fixed.  (Pronoun. 
QI(Did  Tom  go  to  London  by  car?  Y 
(Did  Tom  go  to  London  by  Irain?  N 
Thefirst  sentence  sets  the  scene  for  the  short  narrative. 
The  second  sentence  contained  either  an  implicit  version,  where  the  entity  or 
instrument  is  left  unstated  and  is  only  implied  by  use  of  a  verb,  or  an  explicit  version, 
where  a  paraphrase  is  used  with  the  noun  phrase  explicitly  mentioned. 
The  thirdsentence  was  the  target  sentence  containing  the  entity  or  instrument  as  an 
anaphoric  referent.  This  was  mentioned  explicitly  as  a  noun  phrase  as  in  the  Sanford- 
Garrod  experiment,  or  indirectly  as  a  pronoun.  It  should  be  possible  to  correctly 
-190- assign  meaning  to  the  pronoun  following  explicit  mention  of  the  entity  or  instrument  in 
the  second  sentence  but  much  more  difficult  following  the  implicit,  verb  version.  For 
the  example  noted  above,  it  should  be  fairly  straightforward,  even  in  the  implicit 
version,  to  assign  the  subsequent  noun  phrase  "Ihe  car"  to  the  vehicle  which  was 
being  driven.  However,  if  a  pronoun  follows  an  implicit  sentence,  there  is  a  conflict 
(Sanford,  Garrod,  Lucas,  &  Henderson,  1983).  Subjects  would  need  to  make  a 
greater  effort  to  resolve  the  pronoun,  and  make  more  bridging  inferences  to  try  to 
connect  it  to  something  in  the  previous  text.  Although  this  should  be  more  difficult,  it 
should  still  be  possible  for  hearing  subjects  at  least  (Sanford,  1990,  p524).  It  may, 
however,  be  too  difficult  for  deaf  subjects,  given  the  problems  they  seem  to  have  with 
pronouns  (eg  Quigley  et  al,  1974,1976,1977). 
The  question  then  asks  if  the  particular  entity  or  instrument  was  used  or  mentioned  in 
the  narrative,  this  requiring  an  affirmative  answer.  For  one  in  every  five  trials,  an 
alternative  entity  or  instrument  was  used  which  would  require  a  negative  answer,  this 
procedure  being  used  to  ensure  that  subjects  read  for  meaning. 
Measures  of  reading  times  were  taken  for  the  third  sentence  and  for  the  question 
response.  Whether  a  question  was  answered  correctly  or  not  was  also  noted. 
8.2.3  Design  of  Study 
A  2x2x2  factorial  repeated  measures  design  was  used,  with  subject  group  as  the 
between  subject  grouping  factor,  implicit/explicit  condition  as  the  first  within  subject 
repeated  measure,  and  noun/pronoun  as  the  second  within  subject  repeated  measure. 
Subjects  were  given  one  of  four  trials.  Texts  were  presented  in  either  explicit  or 
implicit  form,  with  a  noun  phrase  or  pronoun  anaphor.  One  text  in  each  group  of  five 
required  a  negative  response  to  the  question,  this  being  done  as  a  check  to  ensure  that 
subjects  read  for  meaning.  The  cxplicit/implicit,  noun/pronoun,  ycs/no  conditions 
were  distrib6tcd  randomly  throughout  the  trials. 
-191 
- 8.2.4  Procedure 
Each  subject  was  seated  individually  before  the  VDU  of  an  Apple  Macintosh 
microcomputer.  Each  text  was  presented  one  sentence  at  a  time  on  the  screen.  As  each 
new  sentence  appeared,  the  old  sentence  disappeared.  Subjects  controlled  the  rate  of 
presentation  and  gave  their  responses  to  the  questions  by  pressing  selected  keys  on  the 
computer  keyboard.  The  response  times  between  the  presentation  of  one  sentence  and 
the  appearance  of  the  next  and  the  responses  to  the  questions  (ycs/no)  were  recorded 
by  the  computer. 
8.4  RESULTS 
Measures  were  taken  of  (a)  the  percentage  of  questions  answered  correctly,  (b)  the 
time  (in  milliseconds)  to  read  the  third  sentence,  which  follows  the  critical 
manipulation  of  the  material  and  contains  the  anaphoric  referent  in  either  noun  phrase 
or  pronoun  form,  and  (c)  the  time  (in  msecs)  taken  to  read  and  respond  to  the 
question. 
8.4.1  Number  of  Correct  Responses 
The  percentages  of  questions  which  were  answered  correctly  under  each  condition  by 
each  group  are  shown  in  Table  8.2  below.  Only  those  questions  which  required  an 
affirmative  response  were  included,  the  "no"  responses  being  included  merely  as  a 
check  that  subjects  were  reading  for  meaning.  While  Garrod  and  Sanford  used 
responses  to  all  questions  in  their  analysis,  their  subjects  were  undergraduates,  who 
would  be  expected  to  have  a  high  level  of  literacy.  From  the  results  of  the  studies 
reported  in  earlier  chapters,  it  is  known  that  the  subjects  in  the  present  series  of 
studies,  particularly  the  hearing  impaired,  are  poorer  at  drawing  inferences 
-192- successfully.  Subjects  could  respond  correctly  to  questions  which  require  a  negative 
response  but  it  really  remains  unknown  whether  they  have  drawn  the  expected 
inference.  In  the  example  given  above  about  Tom  driving  to  London,  it  is  possible  to 
answer  the  question  "Did  Tom  go  to  London  by  train?  "  correctly  by  answering  "no". 
However,  it  could  just  be  possible  that  the  reader  might  think  he  travelled  by  plane  or 
helicopter.  It  is  only  for  those  questions  which  require  an  affirmaýivc  response  that 
there  can  be  any  certainty  that  the  correct  inference  has  been  drawn. 
TABLE  8.2:  Percentages  of  questions  correctly  answered. 
EXPLICIT  INPLICIT 
Noun  Pronoun  Noun  Pronoun 
Deaf  88%  87%  82%  70% 
Hearing  91%  96%  89%  91% 
These  results  were  analysed  using  a3  way  repeated  measures  analysis  of  variance, 
collapsing  across  texts  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables.  This  revealed  a 
significant  main  effect  between  groups  (FI,  37--:  13.375,  p<0.001)  with  the  deaf 
answering  fewer  questions  correctly  than  the  hearing  subjects  (81.6%  compared  with 
91.9%).  The  analysis  also  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  between  explicit  and 
implicit  conditions  (FI,  37=  6.292,  p<0.02)  with  fewer  implicit  texts  than  explicit  being 
answered  correctly  (82.8%  compared  with  90.6%).  In  addition,  the  analysis  revealed 
a  trend  in  the  interaction  between  group  membership  and  noun/pronoun  presentation 
(FI,  37=  3.791,  p<0.06).  Post-hoc  simple  effects  analysis  indicated  that  the  deaf  were 
significantly  poorcr  at  dcaling  with  the  pronoun  condition  than  werc  the  hcaring  group 
(p<  0.001),  while  there  was  a  trend  for  the  deaf  to  make  more  errors  with  pronouns 
than  noun  phrascs. 
The  results  were  then  analysed  by  collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  texts  as 
random  vari  ables.  This  ANOVA  replicated  the  main  effect  between  groups  (FI,  60"ý 
-193- 11.072,  p<0.005),  with  the  deaf  again  poorer  than  the  hearing  subjects.  The  second 
main  effect  between  explicit  and  implicit  material  was  also  replicated  (FI,  60-,,:  6.066, 
p<0.05),  with  implicit  again  being  more  difficult  than  explicit.  The  analysis  also 
replicated  the  trend  in  the  interaction  between  group  membership  and  noun/pronoun 
presentation*(F1.6'0:  _  1.424,  p<0.07),  with  post-hoc  testing  revealing  a  similar  pattern 
as  in  the  by-subjects  analysis. 
Summary  offindings: 
The  deaf  make  fewer  correct  responses  than  hearing  subjects. 
Fewer  implicit  items  are  answered  correctly  by  both  hearing  and  deaf  subjects. 
The  deaf  find  pronoun  referents  more  difficult  to  understand  than  hearing  subjects. 
8.4.2  Third  Sentence 
The  reading  times  for  Sentence  3  are  shown  in  Table  8.3  below: 
Table  8.3:  Reading  times  (msecs)  for  Sentence  3. 
EXPLICIT  IMPLICIT 
Noun  Pronoun  Noun  Pronoun 
Deaf  2296  2185  2363  2381 
Hearing  1778  1781  1982  2125 
The  results  arc  for  all  texts  whether  answered  correctly  or  not.  They  were  analysed 
using  a3  way,  repeated  measures  analysis  of  variance,  collapsing  across  texts  and 
treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  with  explicit  or  implicit  as  the  first  within 
-194- subject  repeated  measure,  noun  or  pronoun  version  as  the  second  within  subject 
repeated  measure,  and  deaf  and  control  group  the  between  subject  grouping  factor. 
This  revealed  a  borderline  significant  main  effect  between  the  groups  (FI,  37=  3.610, 
p<0.06).  Therefore  the  deaf  are  significantly  slower  overall  at  reading  than  hearing 
subjects  (2306  milliseconds  compared  with  1917).  The  analysis  of  variance  also 
revealed  a  significant  main  effect  between  explicit  and  implicit  items  (F1,37-  6.754, 
p<0.01),  with  implicit  items  being  read  more  slowly  than  explicit  (2213  milliseconds 
compared  with  2010).  There  were  no  other  significant  main  effects  or  interactions. 
An  analysis  of  variance  was  carried  out,  collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  texts 
as  random  variables.  This  analysis  confirmed  the  main  effect  between  groups  (FI,  76'ý 
46.650,  p<0.001)  with  the  deaf  again  being  significantly  slower  overall  at  reading 
than  the  comparison  group.  The  analysis  also  confirmed  the  second  main  effect  with 
implicit  items  being  read  significantly  more  slowly  than  explicit  (FI,  76=  3.815, 
p<0.05).  Again  there  were  no  other  significant  main  effects  or  interactions. 
Summary  offindings: 
The  deaf  read  the  texts  more  slowly  than  hearing  subjects,  this  finding  being 
consistent  with  the  results  found  in  previous  studies  and  reflecting  how  poorly  the 
deaf  perform  when  reading. 
Implicit  items  are  processed  more  slowly  than  explicit  by  both  groups.  This  finding  is 
contrary  to  what  one  might  expect  given  the  findings  of  Sanford  &  Garrod's  verb 
study. 
8.4.3  Question-Response 
Only  those  questions  which  were  answered  correctly  were  analysed.  The  times  (in 
milliseconds)  taken  to  read  and  respond  to  the  question  are  shown  in  Table  8.4  below: 
-195- TABLE  8.4:  Question-Response  times  (msecs) 
EXPLICIT  IMPLICIT 
Noun  Pronoun  Noun  Pronoun 
Deaf  3170  3315  3592  3656 
Hearing  2395  2506  2642  2735 
These  results  were  analysed  using  a3  way,  repeated  measures  analysis  of  variance, 
collapsing  across  texts  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  similar  to  the 
procedure  used  with  Sentence  3  above.  This  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  of 
Group  (F,,  37ý  12-273,  p<0.001)  with  the  deaf  group  reading  and  responding  to  the 
question  more  slowly  than  the  hearing  group  (3433  milliseconds  compared  with 
2569).  This  analysis  also  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  of  inference  type  (F1,37,  = 
11.483,  p<0.002)  with  implicit  items  being  read  and  responded  to  more  slowly  than 
explicit  items  (3156  milliseconds  compared  with  2846). 
An  analysis  of  variance  was  carried  out,  collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  texts 
as  random  variables.  This  analysis  replicated  the  main  effect  between  groups  (FI,  60": 
47.040,  p<0.001)  with  the  deaf  again  reading  and  responding  more  slowly  than  the 
controls.  However  the  main  effect  between  explicit  and  implicit  texts  was  not 
reproduced  in  this  by-materials  (FI,  64=  2.405,  p<0.14).  This  would  seem  to  indicate 
that  only  some  of  the  texts  are  causing  the  significant  main  effect  between  explicit  and 
implicit  conditions  on  the  by-subjects  analysis. 
The  text  were  examined,  particularly  those  verbs  which  were  introduced  in  the  present 
study  but  not  included  in  the  original  Sanford  &  Garrod  experiment.  In  light  of 
Cotter's  (1984)  findings,  particular  attention  was  paid  to  the  presence  of  any  so-called 
Singer  verbs.  Cotter's  "dictionary  exercise"  was  used,  ic  the  six  "new"  verbs  were 
looked  up  in  the  Oxford  English  Dictionary  to  see  if  and  how  often  an  instrument  was 
-196- cited  as  part  of  the  dictionary  definition.  Two  such  Singer  verbs  were  discovered,  viz 
"tie"  and  "clean".  These  verbs  were  removed  from  the  data  array  and  the  new  raw  data 
re-analysed. 
This  re-analysis  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  between  groups  in  both  the  by- 
subject  analysis  (FI.  38=  15.670,  p<0.001)  and  the  by-materials  analysis  (FI,  56= 
64.500,  p<0.001)  as  well  as  a  significant  main  effect  between  explicit  and  implicit 
texts,  again  in  both  by-subjects  (FI,  38=  12.344,  p<0.005)  and  by-materials  analyses 
(FI,  56=  5.520,  p<0.05). 
This  last  finding,  however,  runs  contrary  to  what  one  might  expect.  It  would  seem 
more  likely  to  find  a  significant  difference  between  explicit  and  implicit  texts  for  the 
Singer  verbs  and  not  for  the  Garrod-Sanford  material.  In  effect,  the  difference  is 
enhanced,  not  reduced,  by  the  removal  of  the  two  Singer  verbs. 
Summary  offindings 
The  deaf  read  and  respond  to  the  questions  more  slowly  than  hearing  subjects.  For 
some  of  the.  textual  material,  implicit  texts  would  seem  to  be  read  more  slowly  than 
expliciL 
8.5  Eliciting  definitions  for  verbs:  hearing  subjects 
Garrod  &  Sanford  pretested  their  list  of  verbs  on  a  group  15  subjects  by  having  them 
define  each  verb.  The  criterion  used  for  selecticn  was  that  a  high  percentage  (in  effect 
70%  or  greater)  of  responses  included  the  the  expected  noun  phrase,  for  example, 
"clollies"  for  the  verb  "dress".  However,  the  subjects  used  by  Garrod  and  Sanford  in 
this  selection  process  were  adults. 
-197- The  materials  used  in  the  present  study  were  essentially  those  used  by  Garrod  & 
Sanford,  with  the  addition  of  seven  new  verbs.  These  additions  were  selected  using 
the  same  procedure,  pretesting  on  a  group  of-adults.  However,  it  is  possible  that 
children  might  produce  different  responses  if  they  were  asked  to  dcrine  the  list  of 
verbs. 
The  pool  of  verbs,  from  which  the  seven  were  selected,  were  presented  post-hoc, 
along  with  those  chosen  from  Garrod-Sanford,  to  a  group  of  42  secondary  pupils  of 
the  same  age  as  the  control  group.  They  were  asked  to  define  each  verb  following  the 
Garrod-Sanford  procedures.  The  percentage  of  responses  which  contained  the 
expected  instrument  or  noun  phrase  are  shown  in  Table  8.5  below: 
TABLE8.5:  Percentage  of  responses  for  expected  noun  phrase:  hearing  children. 
PAINT  ..................  36%  DRIVE  ..................  86%  * 
SWIM  ..................  83%  CUT  (hair)  .............  71% 
EAT  .....................  64%*  FREEZE  ................ 
57% 
READ  ...................  40%  PHOTOGRAPH  ...... 
76% 
SING  ...................  12%  POST  (letter)  ........... 
67% 
SHOOT  (rabbit)  .......  71%  RIDE  .................... 
ý4% 
CLIMB  (to  roof)  ......  7%  BAKE  ..................  67% 
SIT  ...................... 
33%  SAIL  .................... 
69%  * 
BOIL  (water)  ..........  17%  DRESS  .................  71%  * 
TIE  (shoe)  .............. 
52%  SMOKE  ................  60% 
DIG  (garden)  .......... 
36%  BUY  ....................  79%  * 
CLEAN  (teeth)  ........  64%  *  UNLOCK 
..............  81%  * 
WASH  (hands)  ........  48%  FLY 
.....................  71%  * 
STIR  (spoon)  .......... 
86%  * 
-198- It  can  be  seen  that  five  of  the  seven  new  verbs  which  scored  over  64%  response  with 
the  adults  also  scored  over  64%  with  the  hearing  children,  viz  swiln,  eat,  shoot 
(rabbit),  and  clean  (teeth).  Only  two  of  the  new  verbs  failed  to  reach  the  dcsircd  cut  off 
point,  tie  (shoe)  and  dig  (garden). 
For  those  verbs  selected  from  the  Garrod-Sanford  list,  all  except  two  (freeze  and 
smoke)  have  64%  or  over  of  responses  which  contain  the  expected  instrument  or 
entity. 
Although  Garrod  and  Sanford  use  a  70%  cut  off  as  the  criterion  for  including  a  verb  in 
their  materials,  they  do  not  specify  the  exact  percentage  response  for  each  verb. 
Therefore  it  is  not  possible  to  compare  the  children's  responses  directly  with  those  of 
the  adults.  However,  from  the  pool  of  new  verbs,  from  which  seven  were  selected, 
there  is  a  similar  pattern  between  child  and  adult  responses(compare  Table  8.5  with 
Table  8.1).  It  seems  as  though  there  is  broad  agreement  between  the  two  groups,  with 
the  children's  responses  being  perhaps  slightly  more  diverse  (the  adults  rated  9  verbs 
with  80%  or  greater  agreement,  the  children  only  rated  2  verbs  at  this  level  of 
agreement).  * 
8.6  Discussion 
The  above  results  confirm  those  from  earlier  studies,  that  the  deaf  children  read  more 
slowly  than  the  hearing  subjects  at  both  the  critical  sentence  and  question  response. 
They  also  answer  fewer  questions  correctly  than  the  controls.  Apart  from  this  finding 
there  is  no  difference  between  the  deaf  and  hearing  children,  other  than  the  greater 
difficulty  experienced  by  the  deaf  when  dealing  witi)  pronouns.  This  is  to  be  expected 
as  it  has  beeh  well  documented  by  several  authors  that  pronominalisation  is  one  of  the 
syntactic  structures  of  written  English  which  presents  some  difficulty  for  the  deaf,  cg 
Quigley,  Power,  &  Steinkamp  (1977). 
-199- What  is  more  interesting  is  the  fact  that  elaborative  inferences  appear  not  to  be  made  by 
both  groups*of  subjects.  It  would  seem  that  the  verbs  arc  not  stored  in  a  decomposed 
form  as  was  postulated  by  Garrod  &  Sanford  (1981).  Implicit  items  take  longer  to 
read  for  both  groups  at  both  the  critical  sentence  and  question  response.  Therefore, 
subjects  appear  to  be  making  backward  bridging  inferences  rather  than  forward 
elaborative  inferences.  No  evidence  was  found  in  the  present  study  for  the  instruments 
associated  with  each  verb.  The  findings  are  more  consistent  with  those  of  Singer 
(1979). 
Cotter  (1984)  re-examined  the  material  used  in  both  the  Singer  and  the  Garrod  & 
Sanford  studies.  She  felt  that  the  different  results  which  were  obtained  were  due  to 
two  different  subsets  of  verbs  being  used  in  each  experiment.  Those  used  by  Garrod 
&  Sanford  had  a  stronger  semantic  relationship  between  verb  and  associated 
instrument,  as  was  evident  from  the  dictionary  definition  of  the  verb,  which  cites  the 
instrument  as  part  of  the  definition.  Those  used  by  Singer  did  not. 
In  the  present  study,  the  majority  of  verbs  used  were  those  from  Garrod  &  Sanford 
(1981)  with  seven  additions.  These  seven  were  selected  by  the  same,  procedures  used 
by  Garrod  &  Sanford,  being  rated  by  a  group  of  adults.  When  these  seven  verbs  were 
subsequently  rated  by  a  group  of  hearing  adolescents,  only  five  of  them  qualified 
using  the  Garrod-Sanford  criteria.  Of  the  others  chosen  from  those  used  by  Garrod 
and  Sanford.  in  their  original  study,  all  but  two  met  the  necessary  criterion.  However, 
the  children's  responses  seemed  to  be  more  diverse  than  those  of  the  adults,  with 
responses  during  the  rating  exercise  reaching  a  slightly  lower  level  of  agreement. 
Perhaps  children  use  different  cognitive  strategies  when  dealing  with  verbs  than  do 
adults.  While  this  is  one  possible  explanation,  other  factors  could  be  operating. 
A  more  likely  hypothesis  is  to  be  found  in  the  layout  of  the  textual  passages 
themselves.  A  series  of  studies  by  O'Brien,  Shank,  Myers,  &  Rayner  (1988)  showed 
that  as  the  context  of  a  passage  became  increasingly  constraining,  and  therefore 
increasingly  richer,  there  was  more  likelihood  that  readers  would  make  elaborative 
inferences  on-line.  Readers  tend  to  take  a  cautious  approach  by  not  making  any 
-200- inference  which  is  not  necessary  at  the  time  (eg  Pcrfetti,  1993).  They  do  not  commit 
themselves  to  an  interpretation  which  might  prove  to  be  incorrect  later  on.  Within  a 
fairly  rich  context,  elaborations  can  be  made  more  safely  as  the  passage  is  unlikely  to 
throw  up  any  surprises  or  unexpected  twists. 
As  mentioned  in  Section  8.1,  a  subsequent  study  by  Garrod,  O'Brien,  Morris,  & 
Rayner  (1990)  showed  that  inferences  should  be  drawn  automatically  in  a  constrained 
context  only  when  definite  reference  is  made  to  the  instrument.  However,  all  texts 
used  in  the  present  study  contained  definite  references  to  the  instruments.  -  None  had  an 
indirect  reference,  yet  inferences  were  not  drawn  on-line.  This  would  also  appear  to  be 
true  for  the  Singer  (1979)  and  the  Corbett  &  Dosher  (1978)  studies  cited  earlier. 
Therefore,  the  particular  linguistic  constraints  stated  by  Garrod  et  al  (1990)  would  not 
appear  to  be  operating  in  these  cases. 
This  could  explain  the  differences  found  between  the  Garrod  &  Sanford  and  Singer 
studies.  The  Singer  passages  consisted  of  only  two  lines  of  text  whereas  Garrod  & 
Sanford  usea  three  lines.  This  additional  line  might  be  enough  to  add  sufficient  context 
to  allow  elaborative  inferences  to  occur  on-line. 
However  it  would  seem  that  this  one  additional  line  of  text  is  insufficient  for  the 
younger  readers  who  participated  in  the  present  study.  Both  the  hearing  and  deaf 
subjects  failed  to  draw  elaborative  inferences  on-line.  In  the  earlier  on-line  study  in 
Chapter  6  and  in  the  signing  study  in  Chapter  7,  subjects  were  inferring  on-line. 
However,  the  material  which  was  used  in  both  these  studies  was  much  richer  in 
content,  comprising  four  lines  of  text  as  well  as  a  title  to  help  set  up  a  more  specific 
context.  It  is  possible  that  younger  readers  are  more  cautious  than  adults  and  require 
even  more  context  before  committing  themselves  to  elaboration. 
The  adult  subjects  in  the  Garrod-Sanford  and  Singer  studies  were  undergraduates,  of 
above  average  ability  and  with  (presumably)  well  developed  literacy  skills.  The 
children  used  in  the  present  study  were  within  the  average  ability  range  and  could 
reasonably  be  expected  to  have  less  well  devclopcd  literacy  skills  (for  example, 
-201- metalinguistic  skills  -  see  Section  1.7).  It  is  possible  that  the  children  lack  the 
confidence  of  the  adults  and  for  this  reason  are  less  likely  to  commit  themselves  to 
making  firm  elaborations  when  reading  passages  which  do  not  have  a  rich  and, 
therefore,  relatively  constrained  context. 
Thus  the  findings  of  the  present  study  arc  consistent  with  the  current  consensus  of 
opinion  regarding  instrumental  inferences.  It  is  now  widely  accepted,  even  by 
proponents  of  the  constructionist  viewpoint  who  see  the  reader  as  making  elaborative 
inferences,  that  instrumental  inferences  are  not  normally  generated  on-line  (eg 
Graesser,  Singer,  &  Trabasso,  1994). 
It  has  been  suggested  in  previous  chapters  that  the  deaf  have  some  difficulty  with 
drawing  inferences  from  implicit  material  when  this  is  presented  in  either  written  or 
signed  form.  However,  when  they  do  draw  inferences  correctly  they  do  so  on-line  in  a 
manner  similar  to  that  of  their  hearing  counterparts.  The  question  may  be  asked, 
therefore,  as  to  why  the  deaf  infer  successfully  only  some  of  the  time.  It  was 
suggested  earlier  that  this  might  be  because  they  lack  certain  experiences  and,  as  a 
result,  have  difficulty  in  calling  upon  appropriate  scenarios  and  background 
knowledge  when  necessary.  It  is  towards  this  consideration  that  we  turn  our  attention 
in  the  next  study. 
-202- Chapter  Nine 
How  do  subjects  construct  scenarios? 
9.1  Introduction 
The  studies  in  previous  chapters  have  shown  that  deaf  children  are  less  successful  at 
drawing  inferences  than  hearing  children,  but  that  when  they  do,  they  do  so  in  a 
manncr  similar  to  their  hearing  counterparts.  It  seems  that  some  textual  passages  may 
cause  greater  difficulty  for  the  deaf  than  others. 
it  was  postulated  that  perhaps  the  deaf  have  impoverished  life  experiences  because  of 
their  communication  difficulties.  They  are  less  likely  than  hearing  children  to  absorb 
information  from,  say,  television  and  videos.  When  a  hearing  child  watches  a 
programme  on  TV,  there  is  likely  to  be  discussion  of  the  programme  content  with 
parents  or  siblings  which  extends  the  child's  knowledge  base.  For  a  deaf  child, 
communication  levels  with  those  around  him  are  likely  to  be  less  fluid,  with,  possibly, 
a  lower  level  of  elaboration. 
This  is  only  one  source  of  possible  reduced  input.  A  deaf  person  is  much  less  likely  to 
read  for  information  or  pleasure.  Cornett  (1975),  noticed  when  he  came  to  work  at 
Gallaudctt  University  (a  university  for  the  deaf)  how  few  students  read  for  pleasure. 
Cornett  estimated  the  figure  to  be  as  low  as  5  percent,  yet  these  are  very  bright  deaf 
students. 
The  purposc  of  this  study  was  to  attcmpt  to  cxaminc  the  knowlcdgc  basc  of  dcaf 
children,  at  least  with  regard  to  those  scenarios  or  stereotypical  situations  used  in  the 
carlier  studics. 
-203- 9.2  Estimates  of  scenario  duration 
9.2.1  Rationale: 
The  purpose  of  this  part  of  the  study  was  to  explore  how  subjects  would  estimate 
typical  time  limits  for  a  variety  of  scenarios.  In  the  on-line  study  described  earlier,  the 
time  shifts  used  in  the  texts  were  devised  by  the  experimenter  in  consultation  with  a 
small  number  of  colleagues.  Times  were  chosen  so  as  to  be  clearly  outwith  what  was 
seen  as  the  "usual"  time  span  for  various  situations.  For  example,  one  text  describes  a 
football  match  and  goes  on  to  mention  a  time  shift,  "four  hours  later",  which  is  clearly 
outwith  the  normal  time  span  of  such  an  event  (usually  about  1  hour  45  minutes).  It 
might,  of  course,  be  argued  that  events  such  as  football  matches  are  biased  towards 
males.  However,  the  time  shift  chosen  (4  hours)  is  of  such  a  length  that  it  should 
intuitively  seem  to  be  too  long  for  playing  any  game.  Most  games,  other  than  perhaps 
something  like  marathon  running,  would  not  take  so  long;  any  game  or  sport  lasting  4 
hours  would  demand  considerable  stamina. 
While  all  texts  were  constructed  in  the  manner  described  above,  with  the  intention  of 
clearly  signalling  a  shift  in  scenario,  the  following  study  attempts  to  measure  more 
precisely  how  children  measure  the  various  situations  in  terms  of  time  span. 
Given  that  the  deaf  subjects  are  likely  to  have  less  enriched  experience  of  life  due  to 
their  communication  difficulties,  it  is  possible  that  they  will  generate  time  estimates 
which  are  substanatially  different  from  those  of  the  hearing  group,  for  at  least  some  of 
the  scenarios  used  in  the  on-line  and  signing  studies.  It  might  be  expected  that  the 
hearing  subjects  would  estimate  time  spans  similar  to  Chose  given  by  ihe  adult  raters. 
-204- 9.2.2  Subjects: 
The  experimental  group  comprised  19  deaf  subjects  with  hearing  losses  of  70  dB  or 
greater  in  the  better  ear  averaged  over  the  four  frequencies  within  the  range  50OHz- 
4KHz.  Losses  ranged  from  82  dB  to  115  dB,  with  a  mean  loss  of  99  dB  (standard 
deviation  9  dB).  All  were  within  the  average  range  of  ability.  Ages  ranged  from  12 
years  9  months  to  17  years  0  months,  with  a  mean  age  of  14  years  6  months  (standard 
deviation  14  months).  The  comparison  group  comprised  46  hearing  children.  Ages 
ranged  from  12  years  3  months  to  13  years  9  months,  with  a  mean  age  of  13  years  4 
months  (standard  deviation  4  months). 
9.2.3  Method  and  Materials: 
The  subjects  were  given  a  sheet  of  paper  with  a  list  of  the  various  scenarios  used  for 
0 
the  temporal  items  of  the  on-line  study.  These  were  not  the  titles  of  those  texts  but 
rather  a  more  general  and  fuller  description  of  each  scenario.  Along  side  each  was  0 
space  for  the  subject  to  estimate  the  time. 
The  instructions  given  were: 
"  Different  things  take  different  times  to  do.  For  example, 
(a)  eating  a  bag  of  crisps  would  take  about  5  minutes.  1ý  0 
(b)  going  to  the  dentist  might  take  half  an  hour.  00 
(c)  watching,  a  video  could  take  2  hours. 
0 
How  long  do  the  following  things  usually  take9  ........ 
9.2.4  Results: 
Mean  times  for  each  scenario  for  deaf  and  control  groups  is  shown  in  Table  9.1 
below,  along  with  the  time  shift  used  in  the  text:  0 
-205- Table  9.1:  Estimates  of  scenario  dumtion 
Mean  Times  Range  (SDI  Time  in 
Scenario  Deaf  Hearing  Deaf  Hearing  Text 
Church  63min  52min  10-150min  (34min)  40-60min(8m)  '  3hr 
Funfair  47min  6min  1  -1  80min  (50min)  2-15min  (3min)  30min 
Ferry  1.9hr  2.3hr  5m-8hr  (1.7hr)  25min-6hr  (1.4hr)  3hr 
Bath  23min  28min  5-60min(16min)  10-60min  (I  Ornin)  2hr 
Friend's  1.4hr  1.8hr  2min-3hr  (0.8hr)  10min-4hr(lhr)  5hr 
house 
TV  Repair  48min  37min  1  min-4hr  (56min)  1  0-90min  (20min)  3hr 
Football  1.6hr  1.7hr  Smin-5hr  (1.1  hr)  1-3hr  (0.4hr)  Or 
Swim  at  38min  62min  3min-2hr  (31  min)  5min-4hr  (65min)  2hr 
seaside 
Train  to  54min  12min  15min-2hr  (40min)  1-40min  (9min)  2hr 
school 
Dance  2hr  2.1  hr  5min-7hr  (1.9hr)  1  Omin-4hr  (1  hr)  5hr 
Shop  12min  4min  3sec-1  hr  (1  5min)  5sec-1  Omin(3m)  30min 
window 
Train  25min  4min  3-85min  (26min)  10sec-20m  (4m)  30min 
moving 
Letter  48min  26min  5min-3hr  (54min)  10-60min  (I  2mIn)  1  hr 
Film  2.1  hr  2.1  hr  7min-4hr  (O.  8hr)  30min-4hr  (0.7hr)  5hr 
Tea/cafe  26min  24min  4-90min  (24min)  10-60min  (I  I  min)  1  hr 
Note:  min  =  minute(s);  hr  =  hour(s);  SID  =  standard  deviation  of  sample 
**  greater  than  the  time  used  in  text;  *  borderline 
-206- 9.2.5  Discussion: 
All  the  mean  time  estimates  by  the  control  group  are  comfortably  within  the  time  shifts 
used  in  the  texts  of  the  on-line  study.  Only  for  two  scenarios  does  the  range  of 
estimates  fall  beyond  that  used  in  the  text.  However,  for  the  deaf  group,  the  mean  time 
estimate  for  one  scenario  (Funfairride)  was  well  over  the  time  shift  in  the  text  while 
two  others  (  time  between  getting  on  a  train  and  it's  moving  off,  and  writing  a  letter) 
could  be  considered  borderline.  For  three  scenarios  (viz,  having  a  bath;  taking  tea  in  a 
cafe;  and  watching  afilm)  the  range  of  estimates  for  both  groups  were  very  similar. 
Apart  from  these,  the  deaf  always  had  a  much  wider  range  of  estimates  for  each 
situation. 
Perhaps  the  wide  ranges  estimated  by  the  deaf  indicates  the  limited  extent  of  their 
experience  of  real  life  events  or  that  their  experiences  are  less  consistentlY  labelled 
linguistically  by  the  deaf  child. 
It  is  unusual  that  the  deaf  group,  while  smaller  in  number,  shows  greater  variability 
than  the  hearing  group.  In  order  to  examine  the  variability  within  each  group,  the  time 
estimates  for  each  scenario  were  compared  with  the  time  shifts  used  in  the  texts  for 
each  subject  using  the  Sign  test.  For  the  hearing  group,  this  showed  that  the  estimates 
by  all  subjects  were  significantly  less  than  those  used  in  the  texts.  For  the  deaf  group, 
similar  results  were  found  for  all  subjects  but  one.  This  particular  subject  had  a  wide 
range  of  estimates  which  in  six  of  the  fifteen  narratives  were  beyond  those  used  in  the 
texts. 
When  the  Sign  test  was  us,  ýd  to  compare  the  average  time  estimates  for  each  scenario 
by  the  deaf  group  with  those  of  the  hearing  group,  no  significant  difference  was 
found. 
-207- 9.3  Eliciting  of  scenarios  for  causal  texts 
9.3.1  Rationale 
Just  as  for  temporal  texts,  it  is  possible  that  the  deaf  and  hearing  children  invoke 
substantially  different  scenarios  for  causal  texts. 
The  purpose  of  this  part  of  the  study  was  to  investigate  what  constituted  various 
scenarios  for  the  groups  of  subjects.  If  given  a  free  hand  to  describe  various 
scenarios,  what  characters,  activities,  objects,  etc  would  they  include? 
If  the  deaf  do  have  a  more  impoverished  representation  for  certain  situations,  this 
should  be  reflected  when  they  attempt  to  describe  entities  associated  with  each 
scenario.  It  is  hypothesised  that  fuller  and  wider  ranging  descriptions  will  be  produced 
by  the  hearing  subjects. 
9.3.2  Me  thod 
Subjects  were  given  a  number  of  sheets  of  paper  at  the  top  of  which  was  printed  a 
title.  The  rest  of  the  sheet  was  left  blank.  Titles  were  those  of  the  causal  texts  used  in 
the  online  study.  Subjects  were  asked,  for  example: 
"Please  list  as  many  things  you  can  think  of  (people,  objects,  things  you  might 
do)  that  are  usual  Iy  to  do  with: 
EATING  DINNER:  " 
It  was  possible  to  combine  together  scenarios  for  more  than  one  textual  passage.  For 
example,  the  scenarios  for  "Waiting  at  the  bus  stop",  "Going  home",  and  "Going  to 
-208- sclOol",  were  incorporated  into  one  sheet,  entitled  "Waiting  for  a  bus".  However, 
there  were  still  twelve  scenarios  to  be  completed.  It  is  possible  that  subjects  could  tire 
towards  the  end  and  so  give  fewer  responses  than  to  earlier  items.  In  order  to  avoid 
such  a  systematic  error,  the  response  sheets  were  randomised  in  each  bundle,  so  that 
no  one  scenario  or  grouping  of  scenarios  was  coming  consistently  at  the  end. 
9.3.3  Subjects: 
The  experimental  group  comprised  15  deaf  subjects,  aged  from  12  years  9  months  to 
15  years  11  months,  with  a  mean  age  of  14  years  3  mo 
' 
nths  (standard  deviation  12 
months).  All  were  within  the  normal  range  of  ability.  Hearing  losses  in  the  better  ear 
over  the  frequencies  500  Hz-4KHz  ranged  from  85  dB  to  115  dB,  with  a  mean  loss  of 
100  dB  (standard  deviation  9  dB). 
The  comparison  group  comprised  36  hearing  subjects.  Ages  ranged  from  12  years  8 
months  to  13  years  9  months,  with  a  mean  age  of  13  years  4  months  (standard 
deviation  3  months). 
Some  subjects  participated  in  all  three  parts  of  this  study.  However,  the  various  parts 
were  administered  on  different  occasions,  each  several  days  apart.  Most  importantly, 
sections  9.1  and  9.2  were  administered  before  section  9.3  which  is  described  next. 
Section  9.3  i1ses  a  technique  which  requires  subjects  to  continue  a  story  by  adding  a 
sentence  to  part  of  the  texts  used  in  the  online  experiments.  It  was  necessary  to  do  this 
after  subjects  had  given  their  own  time  estimates  or  continued  a  causal  text  in  their 
own  fashion.  If  they  had  been  exposed  to  section  9.3  first,  it  would  have  been 
possible  that  their  own  cstimates.  -tc  would  have  been  contaminated. 
-209- 9.3.4  Scoring  of  responses: 
A  content  analysis  was  carried  out  on  all  responses.  Each  separate  entity  properly 
associated  with  a  particular  scenario  which  was  mentioned  was  totalled  A  certain 
degree  of  subjectivity  is  unavoidable  but  subjects'  written  responses  were  grouped 
under  the  following  four  broad  categories: 
PeoLe  :  This  would  include  all  people  normally  associated  with  that  scenario,  for 
example,  mum  and  dad  and  other  family  members  would  normally  be  associated  with 
"eating  dinner"  since  dinner  is  usually  eaten  at  home.  However,  if  dinner  was  eaten  at 
a  restaurant  then  it  is  reasonable  to  mention  a  waiter.  Any  of  these  entities  would  be 
accepted  in  the  scoring. 
Considering  another  scenario,  "ambulance  at  scene  of  accident  ",  it  is  reasonable  to 
expect  firemen,  ambulance  personnel  and  the  police  would  be  associated  with  such  a 
situation.  Other  people  likely  to  be  mentioned  would  be  the  driver,  and  possibly 
pedestrians  or  witnesses.  Family  members  would  not  usually  be  included  (although 
they  could  be,  of  course,  if  they  happened  to  be  travelling  in  the  car,  but  not  as  a 
general  rule).  It  was  noticed  that  the  deaf  tended  to  include  family  members  more  often 
than  hearing  subjects  in  various  scenarios  where  the  connection  was  tenuous.  Such 
entities  were  not  included  in  the  analysis. 
Objects  :  This  is  more  straightforward  and  includes  all  objects  whi6h  could  normally 
be  associated  with  various  scenarios.  For  example,  "eating  dinner"  is  likely  to  include 
knives,  forks,  plates,  table,  food,  etc.  The  "carcrash"  might  include  tow  truck, 
ambulance,  bandages,  broken  glass,  etc. 
Actions  :  This  includes  all  actions,  activities  etc  normally  associated  with  a  particular 
scenario.  For  example,  eating,  chewing,  and  talking  might  be  mentioned  for  "dinner", 
while  rescue,  help,  or  scream  could  be  mentioned  for  "carcrash". 
-210- Lescri  ri  ta  associated  ptive:  Credit  was  given  for  additional,  appropriate  dcsc  ptivede  ils 
with  a  scenario,  eg  for,  say  "A  Walk  in  the  Country",  adjectives  like  "muddy",  "cold 
and  miserable",  or  "warm  and  sunny"  would  be  scored  in  this  category. 
9.3.5  Results: 
The  average  number  of  entities  mentioned  per  scenario  is  shown  below  for  each  group 
in  Table  9.2.  The  lower  figure  in  brackets  is  the  percentage  of  the  total  number  of 
entities  which  were  in  that  category. 
Table  9.2:  Mean  number  of  entities  in  each  category  mentioned 
for  causal  scenarios 
Persons  Obiects  Activities  Desaipfive  TOTAL 
Deaf  0.86  8.33  1.27  0.74  11.31 
(8%)  (74%) 
Hearing  0.72  4.81 
(9%)  (63%) 
(11%)  (7%) 
1.60  0.45 




It  can  be  seen  that  the  deaf  on  average  write  down  49%  more  entities  associated  with 
the  listed  scenarios  than  do  the  controls  (an  average  of  11.31  items  per  scenario 
compared  with  7.60).  This  might  be  thought  surprising  considering  the  well 
documented  difficulties  the  deaf  have  with  written  work  and  what  might  be  thought  of 
as  a  consequent  reluctance  to  put  pen  to  paper.  None  of  the  administrations  of  the  tests 
(by  class  teachers)  was  time  limited;  subjects  were  given  enough  time  to  write  as  much 
or  as  little  as  they  wanted. 
There  arc  remarkable  similarities  in  the  percentages  of  persons  and  descriptive  terms 
listed  by  each  group.  However,  while  both  groups  tended  to  list  objects  most 
frequently,  the  controls  mentioned  fewer  objects  than  the  deaf  group  but  did  list  almost 
-211- twice  as  many  activities. 
There  is large  variability  in  the  responses  from  both  the  deaf  and  the  control  group. 
However,  the  range  of  responses  is  very  similar.  For  example,  for  "EatingDinner" 
most  subjects  in  both  groups  tended  to  list  items  of  food,  pieces  of  cutlery,  family 
members  who  would  be  present,  etc.  However,  some  subjects  in  each  group  gave  an 
extended  list.  For  instance,  both  groups  mentioned  wai  ters/wai  tresses,  cafes  and  so 
on.  One  person  in  the  deaf  group  included  going  to  the  butchers  to  get  meat  for  the 
dinner,  while  a  few  in  the  control  group  described  setting  the  table  and  washing  up 
afterwards. 
Eating  dinner  would  be  regarded  a  fairly  normal,  mundane  activity  compared  to,  say, 
horse  riding  which  fewer  people  are  likely  to  have  experience  of.  Surprisingly,  even 
here  there  were  similar  responses  from  both  groups.  Apart  from  the  obvious 
responses  (eg  horse,  saddle,  ride,  jump,  etc),  a  few  subjects  in  each  group  mentioned 
more  specialised  terms  associated  with  this  activity.  For  example,  the  deaf  listed 
people  such  as  grooms  and  jockeys,  equipment  such  as  jodhpurs,  bit,  and  reins.  The 
controls  listed  people  such  as  jockeys  and  instructors,  equipment  such  as  bridle  and 
whip,  and  actions  such  as  canter,  trot  and  gallop. 
The  relative  richness  or  otherwise  of  the  various  scenarios  as  generated  by  each  group 
is  discussed  later  in  Section  9.5. 
9.4  Continuation  of  stories 
9.4.1  Rationale  of  Study: 
The  purpose  of  this  study  was  to  investigate  how  subjects  would  continue  a  set  of 
short  stories  (the  texts  used  in  the  earlier  on-line  and  verb  studies)  given  the  first  part 
of  the  stories,  up  to  and  including  the  critical  sentence,  ic  the  sentence  where  the 
-212- experimental  manipulation  takes  place.  For  the  tempoml  items  in  the  on-line  study  this 
manipulation  involves  stating  a  time  shift  and,  by  implication,  a  new  scenario.  For  the 
causal  items,  the  critical  sentence  implied  some  event  or situation  which  would  take 
place  as  a  consequence  of  what  was  stated.  For  the  verb  items,  the  critical  sentence 
used  a  verb  which  should  imply  the  use  or  inclusion  of  a  particular  instrument  or 
object. 
Would  subjects  continue  the  stories  in  a  similar  manner  to  the  originals  or  in  some 
other  way?  Would  the  story  structure  constrain  their  responses  or  suggest  a  plethora  of 
alternatives? 
9.4.2  Method  and  Materials: 
Each  of  the  subjects  was  given  a  booklet  containing  each  of  the  texts  used  in  the  on- 
line  experiment  along  with  those  used  in  the  verb  experiment.  The  passages  were 
randomly  mixed.  The  texts  from  the  on-line  study  were  presented  with  titles  (as  in  the 
original)  while  those  from  the  verb  study  were  not  (again,  as  in  the  original).  Beneath 
the  last  line  of  each  text  was  a  blank  line.  Subjects  were  asked  to  write  the  next  line  for 
each  story.  ' 
Examples  of  the  materials  are  given  below: 
GOING  TO  SCHOOL 
John  was  on  his  way  to  school.  CAUSAL 
He  went  by  bus. 
He  had  to  wait  a  long  time. 
I  mpl  ication  is  that  John 
is  late  for  school. 
-213- IN  CHURCH 
It  was  Sunday. 
Ian  wcnt  to  Ourch. 
Three  hours  later  he  saw  his  sister. 
Peter  was  in  the  garden. 
He  was  digging  up  some  flowers. 
TEMPORAL  ImplicatiOn  is  that  whcn 
Ian  saw  his  sistcr  thcy 
were  not  in  church. 
VERB:  The  implication  is  that 
9.4.3  Subjects: 
Pctcr  was  using  a  spadc. 
The  comparison  group  comprised  50  children  coming  to  the  end  of  their  first  year  of 
secondary  education  in  a  large  comprehensive  school  in  west  of  Scotland.  Ages 
ranged  from  12  years  9  months  to  13  years  9  months,  with  a  mean  age  of'13  years  3 
months  (standard  deviation  4  months).  They  were  picked  randomly  from  two  typical 
classes. 
The  deaf  group  was  rather  small,  only  8  subjects.  They  met  the  conditions  mentioned 
above  with  regard  to  hearing  loss,  level  of  ability,  age  of  onset  of  deafness  etc.  Losses 
ranged  from  85  dB  to  115  dB,  with  a  mean  loss  of  101  dB  (standard  deviation  9  dB). 
Ages  ranged  from  13  years  5  months  to  15  years  11  months,  with  a  mean  age  of  14 
years  6  months  (standard  deviation  14  months). 
9.4.4  AnalYsis  of  Responses: 
Each  story  can  be  continued  in  several  ways.  Using  the  classification  described  below, 
subjects  responses  were  scored  according  to  these  categories  and  converted  to 
-214- percentages.  The  analysis  of  responses  is,  to  an  extent,  subjective,  but  examples  of 
how  responses  were  scored  are  given  in  the  next  section. 
Temporal  Items: 
The  story  could  either  continue  logically  or  not.  If  the  story  continued  logically  then 
what  was  written  can  refer  to  either  the  "old"  scenario,  ie  the  scenario  in  the  first  part 
of  the  text,  or  it  could  refer  to  the  "new"  scenario,  ie  the  scenario  suggested  by  the 
time  shift.  Alternatively,  the  story  could  continue  logically  but  be  ambiguous  in 
relation  to  the  scenario  operating  at  that  stage. 
CausalItenu: 
As  above,  the  story  can  continue  in  a  logical  manner  or  it  may  not.  If  the  continuation 
is  logical  then  what  is  written  can  show  that  the  intended  inference  is  indeed  made.  It 
could  also  show  that  this  inference  is  missed.  A  third  possibility  is  that  an  alternative 
inference  to  the  one  intended  is  made;  this  can  be  so  such  that  it  is  not  possible  to  state 
whether  the  originally  intended  inference  is  made  or  not. 
Verb  Itents: 
Again  the  story  can  be  continued  logically  or  not.  If  it  is  continued  logically  then  the 
instrument  associated  most  commonly  with  that  verb  (as  conjectured  in  the  original 
experiment)  can  be  mentioned  in  the  continuation  or  it  can  be  omittcd. 
These  alternative  routes  for  continuing  a  story  are  shown  diagrammatically  in  Figure 
9.1: 
-215- Figure  9.1:  How  stories  could  be  continued 
Id  scenario 
nued  logicall  ambiguous 
new  scenario 
Teml2gm] 
not  continued  logically 
i.  ntc,  ndcd  inf.  madc 
logically<  intcnded  inf.  misscd 
""' 
Aý 
altcmative  inf.  madc 
Causal 
not  continued  logically 
continued  logically< 
instrument  stated 
instrument  not  stated 
Verb 
not  continued  logically 
9.4.5  Results: 
From  the  control  group  of  fifty,  only  44  subjects  were  used  in  the  analysis.  The 
remaining  6  were  discarded  mainly  because  these  subjects  had  not  completed  the  task 
and  had  many  blank  sections  on  their  returns. 
For  the  deaf  group,  the  returns  from  half  of  the  subjects  had  to  be  discarded,  again 
because  of  failure  to  complete  the  task.  Also  a  large  portion  of  the  written  responses 
of  these  children  contained  mere  repetition  of  parts  of  the  text,  with  no  attempt  being 
-216- made  to  continue  the  story.  Therefore  because  of  the  small  number  of  subjects,  these 
results  must  be  interpreted  with  caution. 
Examples  of  subjects'  responses  for  temporal  and  causal  texts  and  how  they  were 
scored  are  given  below.  The  scoring  of  verbal  texts  is  much  more  straightforward;  the 
instrument  or  entity  is  either  mentioned  or  it  is  not. 
TEMPORAL  "In  Church" 
Old  scenario:  "And  went  to  the  church  hall  for  a  cup  of  tea.  " 
Ambiguous:  "He  said  hello.  " 
New  scenario:  "Then  they  went  to  the  shops.  " 
CAUSAL  "Going  to  School" 
Original  inf.  mentioned  "And  he  was  late  for  school.  " 
"  inf  not  mentioned  "But  soon  the  bus  came.  " 
Alternativeiýference  "The  bus  had  a  flat  tyre.  " 
The  results  for  the  both  groups  are  shown  in  Table  9.3  below. 
-217- Table  9.2  Continuation  of  Stories  Cont  De.  -& 
N=  44  4 
Continued  logically  -  new  scenario  Cý 
26%  23% 
TEMPORAL  Continued  logically  -old  scenario  23%  38% 
Continued  logically  -  ambi  pous  51%  38% 
Not  continued  logically 
0 
0%  0% 
Continued  louically  -  inf.  mentioned  0 
44%  48% 
CAUSAL  Continued  logically  -  inf.  not  4%  5% 
Continued  logically  -  alternative  inf  0  50%  43% 
Not  continued  logically 
0  2%  4% 
Continued  louically  -  instr.  named  14%  11% 
0 
VERB  Continued  logically  -  instr.  not  named  86%  86% 
Not  continued  logically  1%,  3% 
0 
9.4.6  Discussion: 
From  the  above  results  it  can  be  seen  that  for  the  control  group,  the  vast  majority  of 
responses  are  directed  towards  continuing  the  storyline  in  a  logical  manner.  This 
CP  V 
offers  cohesion  to  the  text.  For  those  very  small  number  of  instances  where  this  did 
not  take  place,  it  did  seem  that  the  subjects  themselves  made  some  kind  of  connection 
but  it  was  not  obvious  to  the  scorer. 
It  can  be  seen  that  for  temporal  items,  the  control  subjects  tend  to  generate  a  storyline 
which  is  ambiguous  as  far  as  the  scenario  which  is  operating  at  that  point  is  concerned  0 
(about  50%  of  the  time).  What  is  perhaps  most  surprising  is  that  where  a  particular 
scenario  can  be  identified  in  the  continuation,  the  subjects  chose  to  sustain  the  old 
scenario  almost  as  often  as  they  move  to  a  new  one  (both  about  25%  of  the  time)  in 
spite  of  the  flagging  of  a  time  shift  in  the  critical  sentence.  When  they  are  asked  to  WC,  0 
-218- estimate  the  times  that  the  various  activities  involved  in  the  temporal  texts  would  take 
(see  above),  in  every  instance  they  estimated  an  average  time  well  within  the  time  shift 
used  in  the  actual  text. 
For  causal  items,  the  controls  continue  most  often  with  an  alternative  inference  to  that 
in  the  original  text  (about  50%  of  the  time)  but  they  do  mention  the  intcndcd  inference 
in  almost  as  many  instances  (44%  of  the  timc). 
For  the  verb  items,  the  controls  tend  not  to  mention  the  associated  instrument  or  object 
(only  about  14%  of  the  time).  This  would  seem  to  be  the  natural  thing  to  do.  It  would 
seem  to  be  more  essential  to  continue  with  a  logical  story  line  than.  to  be  sidetracked 
into  talking  about  a  narrow  and  specific  aspect  related  to  the  action  just  described. 
These  results  would  seem  to  be  consistent  with  the  findings  of  O'Brien  et  al  (1988). 
They  found  that  subjects  will  generate  simple  elaborative  inferences  if  they  are  given 
sufficient  context.  Hence  in  the  temporal  and  causal  texts  used  above,  subjects  are 
given  a  title  and  three  lines  of  text  and  asked  to  continue  with  a  fourth  line.  This 
amounts  to  a  fair  a  degree  of  context  which  can  constrain  how  subjects  will  respond. 
However  in  the  verb  texts,  subjects  are  not  given  a  title  to  orientate  them  and  are  only 
given  two  lines  of  text;  they  are  asked  to  continue  with  the  third  line.  This  is 
insufficient  context  to  constrain  subjects  and  they  have  more  freedom  to  continue  as 
they  wish.  Most  opt  for  a  continuation  of  the  narrative  which  progresses  the  story  line 
and  does  not  remain  static,  describing  the  instrument  used  in  the  last  given  sentence. 
This  would  suggest  one  possible  reason  why  subjects  in  both  the  dcaf  and  control 
groups  in  the  verb  study  described  earlier  replicated  Singer's  pattern  of  results  rather 
than  those  4  Sanford  &  Garrod. 
-219- 9.5  Comparison  of  quality  of  scenario  generation  with 
performance  in  the  on-line  study 
9.5.1  Preamble 
During  the  on-line  study  it  was  mooted  that  perhaps  the  deaf  had  particular  difficulty 
with  certain  texts.  They  appeared  to  use  similar  mechanisms  during  the  inferencing 
process  as  the  hearing  subjects  but  this  might  have  failed  when  the  scenario  depicted  in 
the  text  was  beyond  their  experience. 
The  estimates  of  duration  for  temporal  texts  and  the  generation  of  facets  of  causal 
scenarios  noted  above  was  an  attempt  to  measure  how  enriched  each  situation  was  for 
both  groups.  Some  scenarios  were  better  than  others  and  so  a  comparison  was  made 
of  subjects'attempts  at  eliciting  the  various  scenarios  with  their  performance  in  the  on- 
line  study. 
For  the  temporal  texts,  all  mean  time  estimates  by  the  control  group  were  well  within 
the  time  shift  used  in  the  texts.  On  two  scenarios  the  range  of  estimates  exceeded  the 
time  used  in  the  text,  but  even  then,  the  majority  of  subjects  were  still  within  the  time 
shift. 
The  deaf  showed  a  wider  range  of  time  estimates  than  the  hearing  subjects  generally, 
with  the  range  often  going  beyond  the  time  shift  used  in  the  texts.  However,  if  mean 
times  are  considered,  the  deaf  overestimated  on  one  scenario  (the  funfair  ride)  and 
were  borderline,  although  just  with  the  time  shift,  for  two  other  situations  (a  train 
moving  off  and  writing  a  letter).  As  a  comparison,  the  difference  between  the  reading 
rates  for  the  deaf  of  explicit  and  implicit  conditions  of  Sentence  3  (where  the  critical 
manipulation  takes  place)  were  calculated.  One  might  expect  the  thrce  situations  where 
the  deaf  have  some  difficulty  in  estimating  the  time  shifts  accurately  to  be  those  texts 
were  the  implicit  reading  rate  is  slower  than  the  explicit.  If  the  deaf  draw  on  a  version 
-220- of  a  scenario  which  is  impoverished,  then  on-line  processing  should  break  down  and 
either  a  successful  inference  does  not  take  place  or  the  subjects  have  to  use  an 
alternative  mechanism  to  comprehend  which  will  involve  more  time.  The  differences 
in  rates  is  shown  in  Table  9.4  below: 
TABLE  9.4: 
Temporal  Scenario  Difference  in  Reading  Rates  (in  syll/sec): 
(implicit  minus  explicit) 
Going  to  church  9.909 
Funfair  ride  2.157 
Ferry  (going  on  hols)  0.276 
Bath  3.003 
Visit  friend's  house  -2.768 
TV  repair  -12.702 
Football  match  -6.120 
Swim  at  seaside  3.663 
Train  horle  from  school  3.378 
Going  to  a  dance  -3.217 
Looking  in  shop  window  4.570 
Train  moving  off  -0.270 
Writing  a  letter  -7.428 
Watching  a  film  3.812 
Taking  tea  in  cafe  1.020 
-221- No  consistent  pattern  was  found  between  reading  rates  and  those  scenarios  which 
were  less  enriched  for  the  deaf  group  on  average. 
If  a  similar  comparison  is  made  between  the  time  estimates  made  by  the  deaf  and  how 
accurately  questions  were  answered,  again  no  consistent  pattern  is  found.  Only  one 
scenario  (time  between  boarding  a  train  and  the  train  moving  off)  was  found  to  have 
both  a  low  apCuracy  score  and  a  poor  time  estimate. 
Using  the  average  number  of  entities  mentioned  for  each  scenario  that  were  obtained  in 
section  9.2  above,  a  similar  comparison  was  made  for  the  causal  scenarios  for  both  the 
deaf  group  and  the  hearing  group.  Firstly  the  relative  richness  of  the  scenarios  was 
compared  (this  is  shown  in  Figure  9.2  below).  The  deaf  generate  more  items  for  each 
scenario  than  the  controls  but  the  pattern  of  relative  richness/impoverishmcnt  is 
remarkably  similar.  Although  the  deaf  generate  more  items  than  the  comparison  group, 
contrary  to  expectations  given  the  well  documented  evidence  of  their  difficulty  with 
written  output,  this  is  a  quantitative  measure  and  may  not  reflect  the  true  depth  of  the 
cognitive  model  held  for  each  scenario.  From  section  9.2  it  was  noted  that  the  hearing 
group  tended  to  mention  a  wider  range  of  items  (eg  more  activities  and  more  people) 
associated  with  the  various  scenarios  than  the  deaf.  This  might  be  a  small  indication 
that  although  they  put  less  down  when  listing  such  items,  they  reflect  a  better 
qualitative  approach  than  the  deaf.  A  Pearson  product-moment  correlation  was 
calculated  giving  r--  0.8760,  df=10,  p<  0.01.  Thus  the  pattern  of  relative  difficulty  for 
each  causal  text/scenario  is  the  same  for  both  deaf  subjects  and  controls. 
-222- Figure  9.2:  Comparison  of  extent  of  enrichment  for  scenario  generation 
for  deaf  and  hearing  subjects 
Scenario  generation:  causal  texts 











Kev  to  scenarios: 
1  Eating  dinner,  2  In  the  swimming  baths,  3  Skating  on  thin  ice  on  a  pond,  4  Travelling 
by  car,  5  An  ambulance  at  the  scene  of  an  accident,  6  Waiting  for  a  bus,  7  Horse 
riding,  8A  hungry  dog  in  the  kitchen,  9  Making  sandwiches,  10  A  long  drive  in  the 
country,  11  Walking  across  a  field  on  a  rainy  day,  12  Shopping  with  purse  at  top  of 
shopping  bag. 
If  those  texts  where  the  implicit  condition  produced  a  slower  reading  rate  for  the 
critical  sentqnce  than  explicit,  and  hence  where  the  inference  seemed  to  be  made  more 
slowly,  are  plotted  on  the  graph  in  Figure  9.1,  it  can  be  seen  that  they  correspond  with 
7  out  of  eight  of  the  most  poorly  elicited  scenarios.  Indeed  all  seven  arc  below  the 
mean  number  of  i  tems  generated  for  al  I  ca  usal  scenarios.  However,  if  the  rcadi  ng  rates 
for  the  critical  sentence  under  the  implicit  condition  are  compared  with  the  number  of 
items  generated  for  each  causal  scenario,  the  Pearson  product-moment  correlation  is 
positive  but  fails  to  reach  significance  (r--  0.385,  df=  10,  p>  0.05).  Therefore, 
although  the  reading  times  for  the  implicit  condition  of  the  critical  sentences  are  slower 
for  those  scenarios  which  are  most  impoverished,  the  difference  is  not  great  enough  to 
reach  statistical  significance. 
-223- Similar  comparisons  for  the  number  of  questions  answered  correctly,  and  the 
reductions  in  reading  rate  for  the  questions  in  the  on-line  experiment  with  the  richness 
of  each  scenario  fail  to  reach  significance. 
9.5  Discussion 
It  would  seem  that  the  deaf  show  a  broadly  similar  pattern  in  their  scenario  generation 
to  their  hearing  peers.  For  temporal  texts,  all  but  one  scenario  is  within  the  time  shifts 
used  in  the  on-line  study,  with  another  two  borderline  but  still  within  the  time  shifts. 
For  causal  texts,  the  deaf  generate  more  items,  actions,  etc  associated  with  the  various 
scenarios  than  the  hearing  subjects  and  this  may  seem  unexpected  given  all  the 
evidence  of  how  poor  the  deaf  s  writtcn  output  tends  to  be.  It  may  be  that  although  the 
controls  produce  less,  nonetheless  what  they  produce  is  of  better  quality.  The  hearing 
group  tend  to  mention  a  broader  range  of  items,  cg  they  mention  more  "activitics"  and 
66people"  than  the  deaf  who  tend  to  mention  more  inanimate  objects.  However  there  is 
a  large  degree  of  overlap  between  the  groups.  There  is  a  remarkable  similarity  in  the 
relative  difficulty  of  the  causal  scenarios,  being  almost  identical  for  both  groups. 
With  the  deaf  group  it  is  for  those  causal  scenarios  where  they  produce  fewest  items  in 
their  listings  that  they  seem  to  have  longer  times  in  the  on-line  study  under  implicit 
conditions.  Given  the  greater  variability  within  the  deaf  group,  it  is  possible  that  some 
scenarios  cause  particular  difficulties  for  some  subjects.  Graesser.  &  Krcuz  (1993, 
p150)  argue  that  it  is  critical  for  readers  to  possess  a  sufficient  knowledge  base  if  they 
are  to  be  able  to  generate  inferences  on-line.  This  might  suggest,  therefore,  that  the 
deaf  subjects'  unfamiliarity  with  these  scenarios  leads  to  a  situation  where  an  inference 
cannot  be  drawn  on-line  and  the  subjects  have  to  use  secondary  processing. 
-224- Chapter  Ten: 
The  Eyetracker  Study 
10.1  Introduction: 
Although  the  results  from  the  previous  studies  appear  to  follow  a  consistent  pattern,  it 
could  be  argued  from  the  evidence  presented  in  the  forth  chapter  that  the 
methodologies  used,  like  all  approaches  in  this  area,  have  certain  limitations.  Keenan, 
Potts,  Golding  &  Jennings  (1990)  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  only  way  to  overcome 
such  restrictions  is  to  use  more  than  one  methodological  approach.  The  strengths  of 
one  approach  will  compensate  for  the  deficiencies  of  another  and  vice  versa,  so  that  if 
a  range  of  approaches  offers  converging  results,  there  can  be  greater  conf  idcncc  in  the 
findings. 
The  main  experimental  paradigms  used  thus  far  have  been  those  of  cued  recall  and  on- 
line  reading  or  response  times.  These  have  the  disadvantage  that  *they  only  enable 
testing  of  inference  generation  somewhat  downstream  from  where  this  actually  occurs. 
The  sentence  reading  time  is  a  measure  for  the  whole  sentence,  not  what  is  happening 
from  moment  to  moment  as  a  text  is  read.  The  memory  probe  occurs  even  longer  after 
the  infcrcnc&  may  have  been  made. 
In  the  present  study  we  use  the  approach  of  tracking  the  movements  of  the  eyes  as 
they  scan  over  text,  noting  which  words  are  actually  fixated,  in  which  order  and  the 
length  of  time  that  the  eyes  dwell  on  each  word.  The  process  is  sufficiently  accurate  to 
consider  which  letter  (or  letters)  within  a  word  is  fixated.  This  methodology  is  non- 
intrusive  and  is  considered  by  some  (eg  Rayner  &  Pollatsek,  1989,  pl.  11)  to  be  the 
most  reliable,  offering  the  richest  insight  into  the  processes  occurring  during  the  act  of 
reading  textual  material. 
-225- A  fuller  discussion  of  what  is  generally  known  about  eye  movements  during  the 
reading  process  and  what  measurements  arc  particularly  useful  is.  givcn  in  Section 
4.10.  However,  it  is  generally  accepted  that  measures  of  gaze  duration  (that  is  how 
long  words  are  fixated  on  the  first  sweep)  arc  good  estimates  of  speed  of  lexical 
access,  while  regressive  movements  reflect  higher  order.  processes  (Rayner  & 
Pollatsek,  1989). 
Pollatsek  &  Rayner  (1990),  however,  urge  a  certain  amount  of  caution  when 
interpreting  eye  movement  data.  Fixation  times,  for  example,  may  not  reflect  a  totally 
accurate  estimate  of  speed  of  lexical  access.  Some  studies,  eg  Rayner,  Well,  Pollatsek, 
&  Bertera  (1982)  have  shown  that  parafoveal  processing  can  take  place.  That  is,  as  the 
eye  fixates  one  word,  partial  information  about  the  following  word  can  be  extracted  on 
that  same  f  ixation. 
This  technique  has  been  used  successfully  to  study  automatic  inferencing  in  adults. 
Clark  &  Sengul  (1979)  found  that  if  the  surface  distance  in  a  text  between  an  anaphor 
and  its  antecedent  increased,  then  the  time  to  read  the  sentence  containing  the  anaphor 
increased.  Ehrlich  &  Rayner  (1983)  used  eye  movement  data  to  show  that  the  search 
for  the  antecedent  happens  immediately  the  anaphor  is  encountered.  They  discovered 
longer  fixation  times  on  the  anaphor  as  the  surface  distance  increased.  They  found  that 
if  there  were  three  or  more  intervening  lines  of  text,  then  the  search  continues  beyond 
the  anaphor,  with  increased  length  on  the  two  following  fixations,  indicating  an 
increasing  effort  at  resolution. 
More  recently,  Garrod,  Freudenthal,  &  Boyle  (1994)  used  eye-tracking  studies  to 
explore  the  rather  complex  interaction  of  pragmatic  aspects  of  a  text,  current  focus  of 
the  reader's  attention  (eg  who  the  main  character  is),  and  the  lexical  specificity  of  the 
pronoun  (ie  its  gender)  in  the  resolution  of  anaphors. 
Eye  movement  studies  of  children's  reading  are  rarcr.  A  study  by  Taylor  (1965) 
showed  that  as  children  get  older  their  fixation  times  on  words  decrease,  their  saccades 
become  longer,  and  the  number  of  regressions  they  make  is  reduced. 
-226- There  appear  to  be  few  studies  of  the  eye  movements  of  deaf  children  as  they  read. 
The  only  study  traceable  in  the  literature  is  by  Wood,  Wood,  Griffiths  and  Howarth 
(1986,  p109).  These  authors  found  that  deaf  subjects  fixate  each  word  in  turn  as  they 
read  through  a  text.  This  is  in  contrast  to  the  findings  of  Beggs,  Breslz!  W,  and 
Wilkinson  (1982),  quoted  in  Wood  et  al  (1986),  that  hearing  children  tend  to  skip  over 
certain  words  or  groups  of  words.  This  is  rather  surprising  given  the  evidence  from 
recent  work  (eg  Rayner,  1995)  that  fluent  readers  tend  to  fixate  the  majority  of  words 
on  a  page.  However,  the  discrepant  results  of  Beggs  et  al  (1982)  might  be  explained 
by  their  use  of  less  sophisticated  eye  tracking  technology  than  is  currently  available. 
Therefore,  the  use  of  an  eyetracking  paradigm  in  the  present  study  is  a  departure  from 
the  traditional  approach.  The  investigation  is,  to  a  large  extent,  breaking  new  ground 
and  is,  ipsofacto,  of  the  nature  of  a  pilot  study. 
The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  re-examine  deaf  and  hearing  children  as  they  draw 
temporal  and  causal  inferences,  using  the  same  textual  materials  as  in  the  on-line  and 
signing  studies.  In  those  studies  the  deaf  were  found  to  consistently  read  more  slowly 
than  the  hearing  controls.  A  study  of  eye  movements  could  determine  whether  the  deaf 
fixate  words  for  a  longer  than  the  hearing  subjects.  Do  the  deaf  have  slower  lexical 
access? 
Another  problem  with  the  on-line  study  was  that  it  relies  on  establishing  the  null 
hypothesis  to  prove  that  elaborative  inferences  have  occurred.  Since  the  deaf  had  a 
much  wider  range  of  times  when  estimating  various  temporal  scenarios,  it  may  be  that 
they  are  making  bridging  inferences,  but  that  the  additional  time  needed  is  occurring 
when  they  read  the  phrase  containing  the  time  shift  and  they  read  the  remainder  of  the 
sentence  more  quickly.  Since  the  on-line  study  measures  overall  times  for  reading 
whole  sentences,  it  would  be  insensitive  to  such  mechanisms. 
Similarly,  since  eye  movements  give  a  moment  to  moment  picture  of  reading 
behaviour,  it  should  be  possible  to  note  which  parts  of  the  text  are  difficult  for  the 
reader  and  cause  him/her  to  make  regressive  sweeps. 
-227- 10.2  METHOD: 
10.2.1  Subjects: 
The  experimental  group  initially  comprised  6  severely  or  profoundly  deaf  children 
each  with  an  average  hearing  loss  in  the  better  car  of  70dB  or greater,  all  functioning 
within  the  normal  range  of  intelligence,  with  no  additional  handicap  and  with  hearing 
parents.  All  were  prelingially  deafened.  No  subject  wore  glasses  and  none  had  any 
medical  condition  of  the  eye.  However,  not  all  the  subjects  could  be  tracked 
satisfactorily  and  two  of  the  six  had  to  be  dropped.  Subjects  who  had  long  eyelashes, 
for  instance,  proved  to  be  poor  trackers  as  the  beam  would  often  lock  onto  the  eyelash 
instead  of  the  eye.  For  the  four  remaining,  the  average  hearing  loss  was  104dB, 
ranging  froiý  101dB  to  106dB,  SD  =  2dB.  Ages  ranged  from  14  years  1  month  to  15 
years  8  months  (mean  =  14  years  7  months,  SD  =9  months).  These  four  subjects 
were  well  motivated  pupils  who  were  considered  by  their  teachers  to  be  better  readers 
than  the  average  deaf  child  of  that  age. 
The  comparison  group  initially  comprised  16  children  chosen  at  random  from  the 
second  year  of  a  local  mainstream  secondary  school.  All  were  considered  to  be  within 
the  average  range  of  ability.  None  wore  glasses  and,  as  far  as  medical  records 
showed,  none  had  any  medical  condition  of  the  eye.  However,  as  with  the 
experimental  group,  not  all  subjects  could  be  tracked  satisfactorily  and  so  6  had  to  be 
dropped.  The  remaining  10  subjects  had  and  average  age  of  13  years  6  months  (SD 
3  months). 
10.2.2  Materials: 
The  materials  used  were  those  of  the  online  experiment  described  in  Chapter  2.  The 
texts  were  presented  in  the  same  order  and  had  the  same  number  of  practice  items. 
-228- Each  text  was  presented  in  its  entirety  with  fitle,  four  lines  of  text  and  question,  spaced 
as  shown  below.  An  example  of  a  temporal  and  a  causal  text  are  given. 
TITLE 
First  line 
Second  line 
Third  line 




James  went  to  the  football  match. 
It  wds  a  good  game. 
After  the  game  he  saw  his  sister.  Explicitform 
Four  hours  later  he  saw  his  sister.  Implicitform 
He  kissed  her. 
/Did  James  kiss  his  sister  after  the  game? 
-229- Causal 
A  DAY  IN  THE  COUNTRY 
Tom  was  driving  in  the  country. 
The  car  stopped  suddenly  at  the  side  of  the  road. 
He  noticed  that  the  petrol  tank  was  empty.  Explicitform. 
He  took  an  empty  can  to  the  garage.  Implicitform 
He  was  cross  about  all  this. 
Q/Did  the  car  run  out  of  petrol? 
When  subjects  had  read  the  material,  they  pressed  a  button  on  the  computer  keyboard 
which  then  cleared  the  narrative  from  the  screen  and  presented  the  question,  to  which  a 
yes/no  push-button  response  was  required. 
This  presentation  is  different  from  that  in  the  on-line  experiment  where  each  line  is 
presented  singly.  The  present  situation  is  more  "natural"  in  that  subjects  can  retrace 
their  steps  if  difficulties  arise  as  they  read  the  text. 
All  textual  material  was  presented  in  lower  case  with  capitals  being  used  when 
appropriate,  ie  proper  n=es,  beginnings  of  sentences). 
10.2.3  Design  of  Study: 
This  was  similar  to  the  online  experiment  and  is  a  2X2X2  factorial  repeated  measures 
design.  The  between  subjects  factor  was  subject  group  and  had  two  levels,  deaf  and 
control.  The  first  within  subjects  factor  was  inference  type  and  had  two  levels, 
temporal  and  causal.  The  second  within  subjects  factor  had  two  levels,  inferred  and 
cxpliciL 
-230- Subjects  in  both  the  deaf  and  the  control  groups  were  split  into  two  sections,  each 
section  receiving  one  trial  containing  half  explicit  and  half  implicit  items  randomly 
distributed.  The  second  trial  contained  the  reverse  conditions  of  materials,  ie  explicit 
texts  in  the  first  trial  became  implicit  in  the  second. 
10.2.4  Procedure: 
A  Stanford  Research  Institute  Purkinjc  Dual  Image  Generation  5.5  Eyctmckcr  was 
used  in  this  study.  It  had  an  angular  resolution  of  10'arc.  This  is  linked  to  a  Vanilla 
386  personal  computer  which  controls  the  experiment  and  records  data.  Figure  10.1 
(below)  shows  the  layout  of  the  various  pieces  of  equipment. 
Subjects  were  seated  before  a  video  monitor  which  was  located  at  a  distance  of  70 
centimetres.  Their  heads  were  kept  in  a  constant  position  by  use  of  a  chin  rest  and  a 
support  for  the  forehead.  A  strap  with  velcro  tics  around  the  back  of  the  head 
minimised  head  movements.  Consideration  was  given  to  using  a  bitebar  but  as  some 
subjects  felt.  that  this  was  distasteful,  it  was  not  used. 
Viewing 
Computer  Monitor 







Key  Pad  Control 
Figure  10.1:  Layout  of  Eyetracker  Equipment 
-231- To  the  right  hand  side  of  the  subject's  head  was  the  eyetmcking  equipment  itself.  This 
comprised  S  device  which  shone  a  narrow  beam  of  infrared  light  through  a  series  of 
mirrors  onto  the  pupil  of  the  subject's  eye,  and  another  device  for  detecting  the 
reflected  image.  Since  the  light  is  within  the  infrared  range,  it  is  not  visible  to  the 
human  eye  and  so  subjects  are  unaware  of  it.  The  whole  of  this  equipment  is  mounted 
on  a  movable  platfonn  such  that  as  the  subject's  eye  moves  (to  look  at  text  on  the 
monitor),  the  infrared  device  can  move  also  to  keep  the  beam  locked  onto  the  subject's 
pupil. 
The  eyetracker  is  fine  tuned  and  calibrated  as  outlined  in  Appendix  A6. 
The  instructions  given  to  subjects  are  noted  in  Appendix  A7.  These  were  given  to  the 
hearing  subjects  by  the  experimenter  but  were  signed  and  explained  to  the  deaf 
subjects  by  their  teacher. 
The  principle  on  which  the  equipment  works  is  that  when  light  is  shone  onto  a  human 
eye,  the  light  is  reflected  in  a  series  of  images  at  zones  of  optical  discontinuity  within 
the  eye  (the  Purkinje-Sanson  images).  The  first  and  brightest  image,  reflecting  about 
2.5%  of  the  incident  light,  is  from  the  anterior  of  the  cornea  (Trevor-Roper,  1955);  the 
second  from  the  posterior  surface  of  the  cornea  (0.024%  of  incident  light);  the  third 
and  fourth  from  the  anterior  and  posterior  respectively  of  the  lens  surfaces  (both 
0.036%  of  the  incident  light).  Only  the  first  and  fourth  images  are  used  by  the 
eyetracker.  Since  the  forth  image  shows  no  parallactic  movement  in  relation  to  the  iris 
as  the  eye  rotates,  the  relative  positions  of  the  first  and  forth  images  can  be  used  as  an 
indicator  of  where  the  eye  is  pointing.  During  the  calibration  phase,  a  series  of  dots 
whose  coordinates  are  known  by  the  computer  are  displayed  on  the  monitor.  The 
subject  is  asked  to  focus  on  each  dot  in  turn  and  then  make  a  keypress.  This  allows  the 
computer  to  feed  the  detected  positions  of  both  Purkinje  images  for  each  known 
coordinate  position  into  a  complex  algorithm  so  that  during  the  experiment  the 
computer  can  calculate  the  exact  coordinates  being  fixated  by  the  eye  as  the  text  is 
being  read. 
-232- In  the  experiment  proper,  before  each  text  is  presented,  a  small  white  dot  appears  at 
the  top  left  hand  comer  of  the  screen.  This  focuses  the  subject's  attention  to  this  point 
and  when  the  computer  detects  that  the  coordinates  being  fixated  correspond  to  the 
white  dot,  then  and  only  then  is  the  text  presented  (the  first  word  of  the  text  appears 
just  to  the  right  of  the  white  dot).  This  ensures  that  subjects  are  looking  at  the  top  left 
of  the  screen  and  are  ready  to  start  reading  from  the  beginning  of  the  text.  This  avoids 
the  unfortunate  situation  where  a  subject  might  look  first  at  the  middle  of  a  text  and 
then  jump  back  to  the  beginning.  In  this  case  it  would  be  impossible  td  say  whether 
the  subject  had  absorbed  aspects  of  the  text  up  to  this  point.  In  this  case  it  would  be 
difficult  to  know  which  fixations  were  first  fixations  and  which  would  be  classed  as 
second  pass  fixations. 
10.3  Results: 
As  mentioned  above,  it  is  possible  from  the  recorded  data  to  tell  which  words  are 
fixated  and  in  which  order,  which  letter(s)  within  words  are  fixated,  and  how  long 
each  fixation  lasts.  From  these  data  can  be  calculated  the  mean  fixation  duration,  how 
many  regressions  are  made,  and  the  mean  number  of  fixations  per  word  (this  last 
giving  an  estimate  of  perceptual  span). 
However,  the  data  as  gathered  above  has  to  be  "cleaned  up".  This  process  is  referred 
to  as  eyewashing.  As  the  eyetracker  scans  the  reader's  eye,  there  is  sometimes  drift  in 
the  vertical  plane.  This  is  because  after  making  a  saccade,  the  landing  position  of  the 
eye  is  frequ6ntly  just  above  orjust  below  the  line.  This  is  due  to  the  imperfect  control 
of  the  ocular  motor  system.  While  the  horizontal  position  of  each  eye  fixation  remains 
true,  the  vertical  position  often  moves  up  or  down  by  one  or  two  lines  and  this  has  to 
be  corrected  before  the  data  can  be  used  for  analysis. 
Correction  of  drifting  in  the  vertical  co-ordinatcs  is  done  manually.  Multiline  text,  such 
as  that  used  in  the  present  study,  requires  subtle  evaluation.  One  way  of  doing  this  is 
-233- to  monitor  the  horizontal  positions  of  the  eye's  movement.  An  example  to  illustrate 
this  is  given  below: 
12345678 
......  etc  ............................... 
32  HORIZONTAL  CO-ORDINATE 
1  xxxx  xx  xxxx  xxx  xx 
xx  xxx  xx  xxxx  xxx  xxx  xxxx  xxxx 
xx  xx  xxxx  xxx 
A  series  of  fixations  which  may  start  on  line  2  may  then  suddenly  change  to  vertical 
co-ordinates  for  line  3.  However,  if  the  horizontal  co-ordinatcs  continue  in  an 
increasing  sweep  up  to  position  32  or  thereabouts,  then  this  is  most  likely  a  drift,  and 
the  true  vertical  fixation  remains  on  line  2,  and  we  do  not  have  any  Teal  movement  to 
line  3. 
Occasionally  a  fixation  may  be  totally  inconsistent  and  may  be  regarded  as  "rogue". 
These  are  usually  infrequent  and  are  ignored  in  the  final  analysis. 
Another  function  of  the  eyewashing  process  is  to  combine  very  small  fixation 
durations,  usually  of  less  than  80  milliseconds.  This  is  done  automatically  by  the 
computer  programme. 
The  time  required  to  complete  this  eyewashing  process  varies  from  subject  to  subject 
but  on  average  takes  between  about  two  and  a  half  and  rive  hours,  depending  on  the 
complexity  of  the  data.  Raw  data  files  could  contain  as  much  as  43,000  bytes  of 
information.  Therefore  the  process  is  rather  time  consuming. 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  computer  programme  used  to  analysc  the  raw  could  not 
distinguish  bctwccn  thosc  qucstions  which  wcrc  answcrcd  corrcctly  and  thosc  which 
-234- were  not.  This  is  because  the  programme  was  designed  for  use  with  undergraduate 
subjects  who  would  be  expected  to  comprehend  most  of  what  they  read.  As  was 
evident  from  the  on-line  study,  children  are  less  successful.  The  results  are  for  all  texts 
whether  they  were  answered  correctly  or  not,  ie  whether  the  inferences  were 
understood  or  not.  Consequently,  any  significant  findings  are  likely  to  be  diluted 
since  the  anýlysis  will  include  data  from  certain  passages  where  the  inference  was  not 
made. 
10.3.1  Analysis  of  complete  texts: 
The  measures  noted  below  are  calculated  for  complete  texts  including  titles,  exactly  as 
the  subject  sees  them. 
10.3.1.1  -Mean  fixation  durations: 
All  fixations  are  included  in  these  calculations,  first  fixations,  second  fixations,  and 
second  pass  fixations  (ie  first  fixation  duration,  gaze  duration  and  total  viewing  time). 
The  results  are  shown  below  in  Table  10.1: 
TABLE  10.1.  Mean  fixation  durations  (msecs): 
TEMPORAL  CAUSAL 
Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
Deaf  277  262  263  283 
Hearing  229  226  231  228 
-235- These  results  were  analysed  by  analysis  of  variance,  the  between  group  factor  being 
subject  group  (deaf  vs  hearingl),  the  first  within  factor  being  inference  type  (temporal 
vs  causal),  and  the  second  nithin  factor  being  inference  (inferred  or  explicit). 
Collapsing  across  texts  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables  we  find  that  the  deaf 
fixate  for  significantly  longer  than  hearing  subjects  (271  mscc  compared  with  228 
msec),  171,127-  10.017,  p<0.01.  There  was  also  a  significant  interaction  between 
inference  type  and  explicit/implicit,  FI,  12'  9.898,  p<0.0  1.  Post-hoc  Scheffd  tests 
showed  that  causal-implicit  items  had  significantly  longer  fixations  (255  mscc)  than 
tcmporal-implicit  (244  mscc)  at  p<0.01.  There  was  also  a  significant  3  way 
interaction,  171.12'  10.846,  p<0.01.  Post-hoc  Scheff6  tests  showed  that  for  deaf 
subjects,  under  the  implicit  condition,  causal  items  were  significantly  longer  than 
temporal  (p<0.05).  From  inspection  of  the  mean  fixation  durations  in  Table  10.1 
above,  it  can  be  seen  that  there  is  virtually  no  difference  between  temporal  implicit  and 
causal  implicit  for  the  hearing  group  (226  msecs  compared  with  228  msecs). 
Therefore  the  main  interaction  between  inference  type  and  explicit/implicit  is being 
caused  by  the  deaf  subjects.  This  would  be  expected,  given  the  results  of  the  earlier 
studies  which  showed  the  degree  of  difficulty  experienced  by  deaf  subjects  when 
reading  implicit  temporal  texts. 
Collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  texts  as  random  variables,  all  significant 
factors  and  interactions  above  arc  replicated.  The  deaf  arc  again  significantly  longer 
than  controls,  Fl.  28-,:  169.277,  p<0.001.  There  is  also  a  significant  interaction 
between  inference  type  and  explicit/implicit,  FI,  28=  4.990,  p<0.05.  The  three  way 
interaction  is  also  supported,  171,28'  10.313,  p<0.005.  Post-hoc  Schcffd  tests  for  both 
interactions  showed  similar  paurns  to  the  by-subjects  analysis. 
10.3.1.2  Percentage  regressions: 
In  calculating  the  mean  percentage  regressions,  all  regressions  were  included  in  the 
-236- analysis.  Rayner  &  Pollatsek  (1989)  discount  the  small  corrective  iegrcssions  which 
often  follow  return  sweeps.  However  this  procedure  was  not  followed  in  the  present 
study  since,  while  subjects  did  show  such  corrective  regressions,  they  did  not  do  so 
consistently.  They  would  often  fixate  on  the  middle  of  the  new  line  or  even  almost  to 
the  extremd  right  after  the  return  sweep,  and  follow  this  with  several  regressive 
sweeps  towards  the  start  of  the  new  line. 
The  mean  number  of  regressions  for  each  group  under  each  condition  is  show  in  Table 
10.2  below: 
TABLE  10.2:  Percentage  regressions 
TENVORAL  CAUSAL 
Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
Deaf  26.4  27.7  27.4  27.0 
Hearing  25.3  25.9  25.0  26.1 
There  were  no  significant  differences  on  any  of  the  main  factors  and  no  significant 
interactions.  However  both  the  deaf  readers  and  the  hearing  group  make  many  more 
regressions  (about  26%  and  25%  respectively)  than  the  fluent  adult  readers  quoted  by 
Rayner  &  Pollatsek  (1989),  who  made  about  10%  regressions.  This  most  likely 
reflects  the  relative  complexity  for  the  children  of  the  textual  materials  used  in  the 
present  study. 
10.3.1.3  Number  of  fixations  per  word: 
The  mean  number  of  fixations  per  word  gives  an  estimate  of  length  of  saccadc  during 
the  reading  process.  The  more  fixations  per  word,  the  shorter  the  average  length  of 
saccade. 
-237- The  mean  number  of  fixations  is  shown  below  in  Table  10.3: 
TABLE  10.3:  Number  of  fixations  per  word 
TEMPORAL  CAUSAL 
Explicit  implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
Deaf  1.282  1.505  1.257  1.287 
Heafing  1.060  1.175  1.108  1.179 
Collapsing  across  texts  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  an  analysis  of 
variance  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  with  implicit  passages  having  more  fixations 
per  word  than  explicit  (1.236  compared  with  1.137):  Fl.  12=  8.88  1,  p<0.01.  This  was 
true  for  both  subject  groups.  There  was  also  a  significant  interaction  between  group 
and  inference  type:  FI,  12=  6.860,  p<0.02.  Simple  effects  analysis  shows  that  for  the 
deaf  group,  there  were  significantly  more  fixations  on  temporal  items  than  for  causal 
(1.3934  compared  with  1.2719). 
Collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  materials  as  random  variables,  the  ANOVA 
revealed  a  significant  main  effect  with  implicit  texts  having  more  fixations,  FI,  28= 
6.018,  p<0.02,  which  supports  the  by-subjects  finding.  The  interaction  found  above 
is  also  supported  in  the  by-materials  analysis,  FI,  28=  4.827,  p<0.03. 
An  additional  significant  main  effect  was  found  in  the  by-materials  analysis  with  deaf 
subjects  having  more  fixations  per  word  than  than  hearing  subjects,  FI,  28--  28.623, 
p<0.0001.  This  effect,  however,  was  not  replicated  in  the  by-subjects  analysis. 
Therefore,  this  effect  is  likely  to  be  the  result  of  having  few  subjects  (particularly  in 
the  deaf  group),  but  many  textual  passages. 
-238- 10.3.2  Content  words  versus  function  words: 
A  distinction  is  often  made  in  psycholinguistics  between  two  classes  of  words,  known 
as  "function  words"  and  "content  words".  Function  words  include  prepositions, 
conjunctions,  articles,  and  pronouns.  They  usually  mean  little  if  read  in  isolation,  eg 
"of",  "the".  Content  words,  which  include  nouns,  verbs  and  adjectives,  are,  on  the 
other  hand,  more  meaningful  in  isolation,  eg  "tree",  "dog",  etc. 
Adverbs  present  some  difficulty  as  they  could  be  accommodated  in  either  class, 
depending  on  the  context  of  their  use.  In  the  analysis  outlined  below,  they  were 
counted  for  the  most  part  as  content  words.  Only  a  handful  were  classified  as  function 
words,  again  because  of  the  context  of  the  textual  material. 
In  additionjunction  words  are  usually  regarded  as  a  closed  class,  that  is,  there  is  a 
relatively  small  number  of  them  in  the  language;  content  words,  however,  are  an  open 
class,  with  a  limitless  number  of  words  available  and  new  ones  being  added  regularly 
to  the  language. 
One  view  is  that  content  words  are  the  bricks  or  building  blocks  of  language  and 
function  word  are  the  cement  that  holds  them  together.  As  a  result,  function  words 
tend  to  be  among  the  most  frequently  used  words  in  the  language.  Because  of  this 
high  frequency,  function  words  tend  to  be  highly  predictable  and  rapidly  encoded. 
They  are  frequently  skipped  (Rayner  &  Pollatsek,  1989).  Indeed,  while  about  90%  of 
content  words  are  fixated,  only  about  30%  of  function  words  arc  fixated  by  the  eyes 
(Rayner,  1995).  However,  Wood  (1984b)  has  argued  that  the  deaf  children  are  poorer 
than  hearing  children  in  their  use  of  diectic  wcrds.  Quigley  ct  al  (1976)  have  shown 
that  the  deaf  have  problems  with  various  syntactic  structures.  The  question  is  raised 
then  as  to  whether  the  deaf  fixate  a  larger  percentage  of  function  words  than  do  the 
hearing  controls. 
-239- The  percentage  of  the  total  number  of  fixations  which  arc  on  function  words  was 
calculated  for  all  subjects  on  every  text.  These  results  were  analysed  using  a  one-way 
analysis  of  variance,  collapsing  across  texts  and  using  subjects  as  random  variables, 
with  subject  group  as  the  between  group  factor.  This  failed  to  show  any  significant 
difference  between  groups  (FI,  12-,.,  --  0.428,  p>  0.05),  with  the  deaf  subjects  having 
18.3%  and  the  controls  19.6%  of  their  fixations  on  function  words. 
The  analysis  was  repeated,  collapsing  across  subjects  and  using  texts  as  random 
variables.  This  also  failed  to  reveal  any  significant  differences  between  groups  (FI,  30:  -- 
2.295,  p  0.05). 
Summary  of  Results: 
Rrations: 
When  reading,  the  deaf  have  longer  mean  fixation  times. 
Causal  items  had  longer  fixation  times  than  temporal  under  implicit  conditions  by  the 
deaf. 
Regressions: 
There  were  no  differences  in  number  of  regressions  between  groups. 
Both  groups  had  considerably  more  regrcssions  than  adults. 
Number  of  Fftations: 
There  were  more  fixations  per  word  under  implicit  conditions  than  explicit. 
For  the  deaf  subjects  only,  there  were  more  fixations  for  temporal  than  causal  items. 
-240- Function  vs  content  words 
There  were  no  differences  between  the  deaf  and  hearing  subjects  in  the  types  of  word 
fixated,  ie  &  deaf  behave  like  the  controls  and  tend  to  sk-ip  function  words,  fixating 
them  only  about  19%  of  the  time. 
10.3.3  Critical  Regions  of  the  text: 
The  above  results  are  based  on  eye  fixations  over  the  complete  text.  The  next  sections 
looks  at  what  may  be  happening  in  specific  parts  of  the  text.  Some  parts  of  the 
narrative  may  be  considered  more  critical  than  others  to  the  comprehension  of  the 
inference. 
In  the  temporal  texts  in  the  third  sentence,  a  change  of  scenario  is  signalled  clearly  in 
the  explicit  version  (eg  "After  he  went  home,...  ").  In  the  implicit  version,  the  change 
is  signalled  by  mention  of  a  lapse  of  time  which  is  outside  the  normally  accepted  limits 
for  the  activity  described  in  the  first  scenario  (eg  "Three  hours  later,...  ").  It  is  this 
change  which  is  being  probed  in  the  question,  whether  the  subject  has  realised  that  the 
scenario  has  in  fact  changed.  As  Anderson  (1982)  has  shown,  when  a  time-shift  is 
encountered  in  a  narrative,  the  sentence  which  contains  the  time-shift  takes  longer  to 
read  when  the  time-shift  is  beyond  the  normal  time  boundary  expected  for  that 
scenario.  The  additional  processing  time  is  necessary  as  alternative  scenario  structures 
or  other  bridge-building  operations  arc  set  up.  Therefore,  this  phrase  in  both  the 
explicit  and  implicit  versions  would  seem  to  be  the  most  critical  in  letting  subjects 
know  that  a  change  has  taken  place. 
In  causal  texts  the  situation  is  not  so  clearly  delineated.  The  third  sentence  is  still 
critical  in  conveying  the  information  to  be  inferred  but  because  of  the  nature  of  the 
inference,  no  one  part  of  that  sentence  does  this  alone.  The  whole  of  the  third  sentence 
is  necessary  if  the  inference  is  to  be  understood. 
-241- Therefore,  it  was  decided  to  examine  these  critical  regions  of  the  texts  to  see  whether 
subjects  did  anything  different  from  others  parts  of  the  material. 
10.3.3.1  First  pass  fixations 
The  first  pass  fixation  durations  for  the  critical  regions  of  the  text  as  outlined  above  (ie 
the  time  shift  phrase  in  the  temporal  items  and  the  whole  of  the  critical  sentence  in  the 
causal  items)  were  analysed  using  a  2X2X2  analysis  of  variance.  The  Mean  fixation 
times  are  given  below  in  Table  10.4. 
TABLE  10.4.  First  pass  fixations  (msecs) 
TEMPORAL  CAUSAL 
Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
Deaf  274  266  331  274 
Hearing  216  210  219  229 
Collapsing  across  materials  and  using  subjects  as  random  variables,  the  dcaf  were 
found  to  have  significantly  longer  fixations  than  the  hearing  subjects  (286  msecs 
compared  with  218  msecs),  171,12'  11.093,  p<  0.01.  Causal  texts  also  had  longer 
fixation  durations  than  tcmporal  (263  msccs  vcrsus  241  msccs),  FI,  12=  4.720,  p< 
0.05. 
Collapsing  across  subjects  and  trec-ting  texts  as  random  variabIcs,  the  analysis  rcvealcd 
the  deaf  to  have  significantly  longer  fixations  than  hearing  subjects  (F1,28'  12.739, 
p<0.002)  bult  failed  to  failed  to  find  any  difference  between  causal  and  temporal  items 
(FI.  28--  1.108,  p  0.05). 
-242- 10.3.3.2  Second  pass  fixations 
The  mean  times  for  second  pass  fixations  is  given  in  Table  10.5  below: 
TABLE  10.5:  Mean  second  pass  fixation  times  (msecs) 
TEMPORAL  CAUSAL 
Explicit  implicit  Explicit  Implicit. 
Deaf  160  203  170  163 
Hearing  121  98  118  144 
Collapsing  across  texts  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  The  deaf  are  again 
found  to  have  longer  fixation  times  than  the  hearing  group,  but  of  borderline 
significance  (174  msecs  versus  120  msecs),  FI,  12=  4.490,  p<  0.06. 
Collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  texts  as  random  variables,  the  deaf  have 
significantly  longer  fixation  times  than  the  hearing  group  (FI,  28ý  19,414,  p<  0.0001), 
thus  supporting  the  by-subjects  finding.  However,  in  the  by-materials  analysis  an 
interaction  effect  was  found  between  temporal/causal  items  and  group  membership. 
Simple  effects  analysis  indicated  that  temporal  items  had  longer  fixation  times  than 
causal.  This-effect  was  not  replicated  in  the  by-subjects  analysis. 
10.3.3.3  Total  gaze  duration 
The  mean  times  for  total  gaze  duration  are  given  in  Table  10.6  below: 
-243- TABLE  10.6:  Mean  times  for  total  gaze  duration  (msecs) 
TEMPORAL  CAUSAL 
Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
Deaf  267  267  329  281 
Hearing  222  211  223  231 
Collapsing  across  texts  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  the  analysis  revealed 
the  deaf  to  have  longer  fixation  times  than  hearing  subjects  (286  msecs  versus  221 
msecs),  FI,  12=  8.426,  p<  0.02.  Causal  texts  had  longer  fixation  times  than  temporal 
(266  msecs  versus  242  msecs),  Fl.  127-  5.304,  p<  0.04. 
Collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  texts  as  random  variables,  deaf  were  found  to 
be  longer  than  the  hearing  group  (F1,28'  10.756,  p<  0.003).  No  significant  difference 
was  found  between  causal  and  temporal  items  (F1.28-.:  1.739,  p>  0.05). 
10.3.3.4  Percent  regression 
The  mean  percentages  regressions  are  shown  in  table  10.7  below: 
TABLE  10.7:  Percentage  regressions 
TEMPORAL  CAUSAL 
Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
Deaf  28.9  25.6  20.7  19.0 
Hearing  25.1  24.7  22.6  21.4 
-244- Collapsing  across  texts  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  temporal  items  had 
significantly  more  regressions  than  causal  (26  %  compared  with  21  %),  F  1,127-  7.713, 
p<  0.02. 
Collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  texts  as  random  variables,  temporal  items  were 
again  found  to  have  a  greater  percentage  of  fixations  than  causal  items  (FI,  28=  7.2.52, 
P< 
10.3.3.5  Fixations  per  word 
The  mean  number  of  fixations  per  word  is  shown  below  in  Table  10.8: 
TABLE  10.8:  Mean  number  of  fixations  per  word 
TEMPORAL  CAUSAL 
Explicit  Implicit  Explicit  Implicit 
Deaf  1.374  1.665  1.167  1.085 
Hearing  1.109  1.277  1.003  1.076 
Collapsing  across  texts  and  treating  subjects  as  random  variables,  temporal  items  were 
found  to  have  more  fixations  than  causal  (1.356  versus  1.083),  FI,  12=  26.253,  p< 
0.0003.  An  interaction  effect  was  also  found  between  group  membership  and 
temporal/causal  type  (FI,  12..:  5.074,  p<  0.04).  Post-hoc  simple  effects  analysis 
revealed  temporal  items  have  more  fixations  than  causal  especially  for  the  deaf. 
Collapsing  across  subjects  and  treating  texts  as  random  variables,  temporal  items  were 
again  found  to  have  more  fixations  than  causal  (FI,  2g--  28.316,  p<0.0001)  and  the 
interaction  between  group  membership  and  temporal/causal  items  was  also  significant 
-245- (FI,  28=  7.974,  p<  0.01).  However,  several  other  significant  effects  were  found  in  the 
by-material  analysis  which  were  not  supported  in  the  by-subjects  analysis:  Implicit 
items  had  more  fixations  than  explicit  (FI.  28=  7.240,  p<  0.01),  deaf  had  more 
fixations  than  the  hearing  group  (F1,28=  17.446,  p<  0.001),  temporal  -implicit  had 
more  fixations  than  temporal-causal  (FI,  28=  6.694,  p<  0.02),  and  there  was  a 
significant  ii1teraction  between  group,  temporal/causal,  explicit/implicit  (FI,  28=  5.082, 
p<  0.03). 
Most  of  the  significant  effects  and  interactions  are  supported  in  both  the  by-subjects 
and  by-materials  analyses.  However,  a  few  arc  significant  only  in  one  or  other. 
According  to  Clark's  (1973)  reasoning  we  require  significance  in  both  analyses  to  be 
able  to  confidently  accept  the  effects  as  real.  In  the  present  study,  th6  sample  size  is,  of 
necessity,  small.  As  a  result  variability  within  each  subject  group  becomes  more  of  a 
problem.  With  a  bigger  sample  one  would  expect  such  individual  variability  to  be 
evened  out.  Therefore,  in  the  summary  below  only  those  effects  which  are  significant 
in  both  the  Uy-subjects  and  by-materials  analyses  are  quoted. 
Summary  of  results: 
Firstpassfixations: 
The  deaf  have  longer  fixation  times  in  the  critical  regions  than  hearing  subjects. 
Second  passfixations: 
The  deaf  again  have  significantly  longer  fixations  than  the  controls. 
Totalgaze  duration: 
The  deaf  once  more  have  longer  fixation  durations  than  the  controls. 
-246- Percent  regressions: 
Temporal  items  have  more  regressions  within  the  critical  regions  of  the  texts  than 
causal  items. 
FLrations  per  word: 
Tcrnporal  itcrns  havc  morc  fixations  pcr  word,  ic  havc  shortcr  saccadc  Icngths,  than 
than  causal  items,  this  effect  operating  more  strongly  for  the  deaf. 
10.4  Discussion: 
The  studies  reported  in  earlier  chapters  used  either  cued  memory  probes  or on-line 
methods.  Each  has  its  disadvantages,  which  have  already  been  discussed.  The  present 
study  is  an  attempt  to  monitor  the  eye  movements  of  subjects  as  they  read  text  which  is 
presented  in  a  "natural"  form,  ic  the  text  is  presented  in  total,  as  it  wQuld  appear  on  the 
page.  The  reader  is  free  to  move  forwards  or  backwards,  to  scan  over  the  text  at  will. 
The  technique  is  unobtrusive  yet  can  monitor  what  is  happening  from  moment  to 
moment  during  the  reading  process. 
The  most  obvious  finding  of  this  study  is  that  the  deaf  subjects  have  significantly 
longer  fixation  times  than  hearing  subjects.  This  is  true  for  all  fixations,  for  the  mean 
overall  fixation  times  for  entire  texts  as  well  as  for  first  pass,  second  pass,  and  total 
gaze  duration  for  the  critical  regions  of  texts.  One  possible  reason  for  this  could  be  that 
the  deaf  have  slower  lexical  access.  I 
There  is  no  difference  between  deaf  and  hearing  subjects  in  the  percentage  of 
regressions  found  in  the  overall  text.  However,  both  groups  make  significantly  more 
regressions  than  fluent  adult  readers  (  about  25%  compared  with  10%).  This  is  more 
in  line  with  the  findings  of  Taylor  (1965)  who  found  the  average  number  of 
regressions  for  hearing  14  year  olds  to  be  about  20%. 
-247- When  the  critical  regions  are  examined,  more  regressions  were  found  for  temporal 
items  than  for  causal.  This  may  reflect  the  fact  that  the  time  shift  phrase  for  temporal 
items  is  relatively  self  contained  and  is  pivotal  to  the  inference.  With  causal  texts, 
although  the  whole  of  the  critical  sentence  contains  the  information  necessary  for  the 
inference,  it  is  part  of  a  longer  causal  chain  of  events,  a  series  of  causal  antecedents 
and  consequences,  which  may  possess  more  forward  momentum  than  is  is  possible 
with  a  temporal  text.  Therefore  regressions  are  less  likely. 
The  number  of  fixations  per  word  is  a  rough  indication  of  mean  saccade  length;  the 
more  fixations  per  word,  the  shorter  the  saccade.  For  complete  texts,  implicit  items 
had  shorter  saccade  lengths  than  explicit  items.  This  would  seem  logical  in  that,  if 
implicit  text  is  more  difficult  to  comprehend,  then  the  reader  should  make  a  more 
concentrated  effort,  in  this  case  by  jumping  a  shorter  distance  each  time the  eyes  are 
moved.  In  the  present  study  no  difference  is found  between  mean  fixation  times  for 
explicit  or  implicit  texts.  Rayner  and  Pollatsck  (1989)  have  shown  that  as  the  difficulty 
of  text  increases,  readers  make  longer  fixations,  smaller  saccadcs,  and  more 
regressions,  resulting  in  slower  overall  reading  rates.  In  the  present  study,  subjects  do 
seem  to  be  making  shorter  saccadicjumps  but  are  not  making  longer  fixations,  and  do 
not  make  more  regressions.  Since  there  is  no  difference  between  explicit  and  implicit 
in  mean  fixation  durations,  the  fact  that  there  arc  more  fixations  per  word  for  implicit 
texts  means  that  the  implicit  texts  must  have  slower  overall  reading  rdtes. 
It  should  be  remembered  that  in  the  on-line  experiment  no  difference  was  found  in 
reading  times  between  explicit  and  implicit  texts.  However  these  results  were  for  those 
measures  taken,  ie  for  the  critical  sentence,  the  filler  sentence,  and  the  question- 
response,  and  not  for  the  entire  text.  Also  the  experimental  procedure  was  different  in 
that  only  one  sentence  was  presented  at  a  time.  Each  sentence  disappeared  as  the  next 
one  came  on  screen.  The  presentation  rate  was  under  the  control  of  the  subject.  This  is 
less  natural  than  the  present  study  where  the  entire  text  is  presented  on  screen  together 
and  subjects  can  jump  backwards  or  forwards  as  necessary. 
-248- It  is  possible,  therefore,  that  in  the  on-line  study,  where  the  text  is  presented  one 
sentence  at  a  time  and  erased  as  each  new  sentence  replaces  it,  subjects  have  to  be 
more  cautious.  Without  the  possibility  of  looking  back  to  check  any  uncertainties, 
subjects  have  to  be  sure  that  they  completely  understand  what  has  been  read  before 
committing  themselves  to  the  next  sentence.  Given  that  each  presentation  contained 
both  explicit  and  implicit  items,  subjects  may  treat  both  conditions  Mth  equal  caution, 
taking  extra  time  to  read  all  texts,  and  this  resulting  in  no  difference  between  the  two 
conditions  in  overall  reading  times. 
With  the  m6re  normal  situation  of  the  eye  tracking  study,  the  text  is  presented  in  its 
entirety,  subjects  have  more  freedom  and  flexibility.  They  can  af  ford  to  read  what  they 
believe  to  be  an  explicit  text  more  quickly  since  they  can  always  backtrack  if  there  are 
any  difficulties,  for  example,  if  the  text  turns  out  to  contain  implicit  information. 
Support  for  the  above  argument  can  be  found  when  the  overall  reading  times  for  the 
two  experimental  paradigms  are  compared.  If  the  mean  reading  times  for  the  critical 
sentence  in  the  on-line  study  and  for  the  complete  text  in  the  eye  movement  study  are 
prorated  for  a  ten  word  sentence,  direct  comparison  of  overall  reading  times  is 
possible.  It  is  found  that  the  hearing  subjects  do  indeed  take  longer  to  read  the  text,  for 
both  inference  types  under  explicit  and  implicit  conditions,  in  the  on-line  study  than  in 
the  eye  movement  study.  Therefore,  under  the  conditions  of  presentation  used  in  the 
on-line  study  (ie,  one  sentence  at  a  time  with  no  possibility  of  backward  checks),  the 
hearing  subjects  are  more  cautious,  with  longer  overall  reading  times.  It  should  be 
noted  that,  for  the  deaf  children,  mean  overall  reading  times  for  the  on-line  study  are 
not  longer  than  overall  reading  times  for  the  eyetracking  study.  The  possible  reasons 
for  this  are  discussed  later. 
Under  "normal"  conditions,  ie  when  reading  simple,  explicit  material,  it  is  known  that 
adult  subjects  can  and  do  make  use  of  information  from  parafoveal  input.  Whole 
words  to  the  right  of  the  fixated  word  can  be  identified,  or  more  likely,  partial 
information  about  the  next  word  can  be  garnered  (Rayner  &  Pollatsek,  1989).  It  has 
been  shown  by  a  number  of  studies,  eg  Rayner,  Well,  Pollatsck,  &  Bertera  (1982), 
-249- Rayner  &  Bertera  (1979),  Rayner  (1975a),  Underwood  &  McConkic  (1985),  Balota, 
Pollatsek  &  Rayner  (1985),  McConkie  &  Hogaboam  (1985),  and  Pollatsck,  Rayner  & 
Balota  (1986),  that  subjects  can  extract  useful  information  up  to  about  15  character 
spaces  to  the  right  of  the  fixated  word  (in  English).  The  next  word  or  two  to  the  right 
of  the  fixated  word  can  often  be  identified.  It  is  more  likely  that  some  information  can 
be  gained  about  the  next  word  to  the  right  but  there  is  also  likely  to  be  an  element  of 
guessing  from  the  context.  Readers  can  use  this  information  to  help  them  determine 
where  to  fixate  next. 
Rayner  (1986)  used  a  moving  window  technique  to  investigate  the  perceptual  span  of 
young  readers.  This  method  uses  an  eyetracking  technique  in  which  a  small  region  of 
the  text  around  the  fixation  point  is  presented  as  normal  but  the  surrounding  text  is 
made  unreadable  (by,  for  example,  replacing  every  letter  by  the  letter  "x").  When  the 
reader's  eye  moves  on  to  a  new  fixation,  the  text  around  this  area  appears  as  normal 
text  and  the  new  surrounding  text  is  obliterated.  This  happens  so  rapidly  that  it  is  not 
noticed  by  the  reader.  As  the  window  size  is  reduced  to  less  than  the  subject's 
perceptual  span,  reading  should  be  disrupted. 
Using  this  technique,  Rayner  found  that  beginning  readers  (aged  about  7  years)  have  a 
slightly  smaller  perceptual  span  than  skilled  readers,  about  11  character  spaces 
compared  with  15.  However,  after  about  a  year  these  very  young  readers  are  directing 
much  of  their  attention  to  the  right  of  the  fixation,  as  do  skilled  readers.  As  the 
window  is  reduced  to  about  5  character  spaces,  the  reading  rate  of  younger  readers  is 
disrupted  less  than  that  of  older  children  who  in  turn  are  disrupted  less  than  adults. 
This  would  suggest  that  the  smaller  perceptual  span  of  the  youngest  readers  is  due  to 
their  devoting  more  attention  during  a  fixation  to  fovcal  word  processing  than  do  more 
skilled  readers.  Rayner  also  found  that  if  the  difficulty  of  the  text  is  increased,  th-. 
older  children  (aged  about  9  years)  reduce  their  perceptual  span  to  that  of  the  younger 
children.  These  findings  were  for  normally  hearing  children.  There  would  appear  to  be 
no  such  studies  involving  deaf  children. 
-250- Possibly  what  is  happening  in  the  present  study  is  that  subjects  are  being  more 
cautious  with  implicit  texts  and  are  not  relying  as  much  on  this  parafoveal  input.  They 
are  fixating  for  a  similar  amount  of  time  overall  but  arc  concentrating  much  more  on 
foveal  input.  They  are,  in  effect,  behaving  as  younger  readers  and  reducing  their 
saccadicjumps  as  the  text  becomes  more  difficult,  or  at  least  less  certhin. 
The  cautious  approach,  which  the  hearing  subjects  seem  to  be  adopting  when  using 
the  on-line  protocol,  does  not  appear  to  be  used  by  the  deaf.  They  have  a  longer 
overall  reacting  time  (on  average)  for  the  eye  movement  study  than  for  the  on-line 
study.  The  deaf,  it  seems,  are  using  a  different  process. 
For  causal  texts,  the  deaf  were  found  to  have  longer  fixation  times  than  for  temporal 
items.  This  makes  sense  in  light  of  the  findings  from  the  on-line  study  where  causal 
items  were  found  to  be  processed  more  carefully  (ie  at  a  slower  rate  but  more 
accurately)  than  temporal  items. 
However,  for  the  deaf,  temporal  texts  have  shorter  saccade  lengths  than  causal  texts, 
both  over  the  entire  narrative  and  within  the  critical  regions.  Again,  if  temporal  items 
are  more  difficult  (especially  for  the  deaf),  then  one  might  expect  that  readers  would 
make  shorter  saccades  (Rayner  &  Pollatsek,  1989). 
It  should  be  noted  that  temporal  items  have  shorter  saccadc  Icngths  for  the  control 
group  also.  This  confirms  the  findings  of  the  on-line  study  that  temporal  items  proved 
to  be  more  difficult  than  causal  for  both  groups  of  subjects,  but  particularly  so  for  the 
deaf. 
When  Cýe  types  of  word  which  are  fixated  arc  examined,  no  d.  fferencc  is  found 
between  deaf  and  hearing  subjects.  For  both  groups,  81%  of  fixations  made  are  on 
contcnt  words  and  only  19%  on  function  words.  Again  this  is  what  would  bc  cxpectcd 
from  prcvious  rcsearch  (Rayncr,  1995). 
-251- The  findings  of  the  present  study  expand  on  those  of  the  previous  experiments.  From 
the  on-line  study  it  was  concluded  that,  with  sufficient  context,  the  deaf  make 
elaborative  inferences  as  the  implicit  material  is  read,  in  a  similar  manner  to  hearing 
children.  Only  when  they  seemed  to  lack  the  relevant  knowledge  or  experience  (direct 
or  indirect)  of  the  situation  described  in  the  text  did  they  fail  to  process  on-line  and 
revert  to  bridging  strategies.  With  a  less  enriched  context  (as  in  the  verb  study) 
instrumental  elaborations  were  not  made,  ýonfirming  the  general  consensus  view  that 
such  inferences  are  not  generally  made  on-line  (eg  Graesser  &  Kreuz,  1993).  From 
the  signing  study,  it  seemed  to  be  the  case  that  these  mechanisms  were  independent  of 
modality  of  communication,  reflecting  a  more  generalised  language  difficulty  which 
extended  beyond  the  process  of  reading. 
The  on-line  study  relies  on  proving  the  null-hypothesis,  with  the  attendant  difficulties 
of  this  methýdology,  which  have  already  been  discussed.  By  studying  eye  movements 
during  the  reading  process,  it  has  been  possible  to  examine  more  precisely  what  is 
happening  from  moment  to  moment.  It  has  been  discovered  that  both  deaf  and  hearing 
readers  process  implicit  material  more  slowly,  by  making  shorter  saccadic  sweeps. 
This,  however,  is  still  reconcilable  with  the  view  that  inferences  are  being  made  on- 
line.  It  has  been  stated  earlier  that  it  is  generally  agreed  that  first  pass  fixations  are 
good  estimates  of  speed  of  lexical  access  while  regressive  movements  reflect 
difficulties  with  higher  order  processing  (Rayner  &  Pollatsek,  1989).  The  slower 
approach  used  by  both  groups  for  implicit  material,  ie  shorter  saccadic  sweeps,  is  not 
regressive.  The  movement  continues  to  be  forward  through  the  text.  However,  the 
slower  processing  speed  might  reflect  the  fact  that  it  takes  time  to  make  an  elaborative 
inference. 
Mkgliano  et  al  (1993)  showed  that  causal  antecedent  inferences  were  generated  on-line 
but  only  when  readers  were  given  sufficient  time to  do  so.  They  estimated  that  such 
inferences  may  be  generated  after  a  delay  of  about  700  milliseconds  but  could  not  say 
for  certain  when  exactly  the  inference  is  made.  These  authors  did  not  find  any 
evidence  to  support  the  generation  of  causal  consequence  inferences  on-line  but  they 
themselves  admit  that  their  textual  materials  may  not  have  been  constraining  enough. 
-252- The  technique  used  by  Magliano  and  his  co-workers  involved  a  predetermined  rate  of 
presentation  of  text  and  a  lexical  decision  task  (unlike  the  studies  in  this  thesis). 
Other  estimates  of  the  time  taken  to  generate  particular  classes  of  inference 
automatically  on-line  are  around  this  magnitude,  eg  650  milliseconds  (Kintsch,  1988; 
McKoon  &  Ratcliff,  1992). 
Fincher-Kiefer  (1993)  proposes  that  at  the  situation  model  level,  inferences  are  made, 
although  these  might  be  incomplete  or  tentative,  but  they  lag  slightly  behind  the 
reader's  textbase  construction. 
The  overall  picture  is  that  deaf  children  are  not  so  very  different  from  their  hearing 
counterparts  when  they  read.  They  tend  to  have  a  slower  overall  reading  rate  but  this 
may  reflect  problems  with  lexical  access.  However,  when  attempting  to  comprehend 
impficit  material,  the  deaf  use  their  general  world  knowledge  in  a  similar  manner  to 
hearing  children,  but  because  of  lack  of  appropriate  experience,  direct  or  indirect,  this 
background  knowledge  may  not  be  as  enriched  as  it  is  for  hearing  children. 
The  particular  difficulties  experienced  by  both  groups  (for  example,  the  greater 
difficulty  in  making  temporal  inferences)  seem  to  be  greater  for  deaf  children.  It  was 
stated  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  that  this  eyetracking  study  was  of  the  nature  of  a 
pilot  study.  Because  of  the  difficulties  in  conducting  this  particular  experiment,  and  the 
relatively  small  numbers  of  deaf  subjects  used,  the  results  should  be  viewed  as 
promising  but  not  definitive. 
-253- Chapter  Eleven: 
Overview 
Deaf  children's  reading  has  been  extensively  studied.  However,  like  research  into  the 
reading  of  hearing  children  (eg  Harrison,  1996),  much  of  this  work  has  centred  on  the 
early  stages  of  learning.  Less  attention  has  been  directed  towards  comprehension 
skills,  those  aspects  of  the  reading  process  which  go  beyond  the  initial  stages  of 
decoding  and  word  identification.  These  higher  order  reading  sk-ills.  are  none-the-less 
very  important.  They  are  crucial  to  the  skilled  reader. 
While  the  purpose  of  the  present  thesis  was  to  examine  those  aspects  of  reading 
concerned  with  comprehension,  particularly  inferencing  skills,  account  was  taken  of 
those  factors  of  lower  order  processing  as  they  apply  to  deaf  children.  The  fact  that  the 
deaf  have  more  limited  vocabularies  than  hearing  children  (eg  Hatcher  &  Robbins, 
1978;  Paul,  1984),  have  problems  with  English  syntax  (eg  Quigley  et  al,  1977),  and 
have  difficulties  with  some  aspects  of  figurative  language  (eg  Conely,  1976;  Orlando 
&  Shulman,  1989),  all  influenced  the  design  of  the  textual  materials  used  in  the 
present  series  of  studies. 
It  has  been  shown  that  deaf  children  do  bring  their  own  world  knowledge  (or  schema) 
to  the  reading  process  (eg  Gaines  et  al,  1981),  but  that  some  perhaps  use  these  broad, 
top-down  skills  to  compensate  for  the  poorer  bottom-up  skills  described  earlier.  While 
the  deaf  tend  to  develop  similar  discourse  structures  and  story  grammars  as  hearing 
children,  it  has  been  shown  that  they  are  less  skilled  at  dis-cmbedding  the  most 
important  information  from  a  story  structurc  (Coggiola,  1983). 
Very  little  work  has  been  directed  towards  inferencing  skills  in  the  deaf,  yet  it  is  at  the 
very  level  of  complexity  where  text  relics  more  on  implicit  content  ýie  about  the  eight 
year  old  level)  that  deaf  children  reach  a  plateau,  and  make  very  little  progress. 
-254- The  main  study  in  this  area  was  by  Wilson  (1979).  He  found  that  dcaf  children  were 
as  competent  in  literal  interpretation  as  hearing  children  but  much  poorer  when  an 
inference  had  to  be  drawn.  He  also  found  this  to  be  true  when  the  thq  inference  had  to 
be  made  from  a  signed  presentation.  Wilson  concluded  that  the  dcaf  were  non- 
constructive  readers,  ie  that  they  were  not  using  a  schema  driven  approach  to  text 
interpretation. 
In  contrast  to  the  paucity  of  work  directed  towards  inferencing  skills  in  the  deaf,  there 
is  a  very  large  volume  of  studies  examining  this  process  in  hearing  adults.  Much  of 
this  work  has  has  occurred  over  the  last  twenty  or  so  years  and  concerns  itself  with 
what  type  of  inferences  are  made  (forward  or  backward)  and  when  such  inferences 
take  place  (at  the  time  of  reading  or  a  some  later  point).  These  many  studies  have  used 
a  wide  variety  of  experimental  techniques,  each  with  its  own  advantages  and 
disadvantages.  The  type  of  inference,  the  length  of  text  (eg  single  sentences, 
paragraphs,  longer  segments),  how  the  text  is  presented,  and  the  measures  used  to 
determine  whether  an  inference  has  been  made  have  varied  across  studies.  This  has  led 
to  differing  results,  with  obvious  difficulties  in  obtaining  a  unified  interpretation  of 
what  is  occurring.  The  current  consensus  seems  to  be  that  only  those  inferences  which 
are  necessary  for  local  cohesion  of  the  text  are  made  automatically  as  the  text  is  read. 
Only  when  the  context  is  so  constraining  as  to  eliminate  alternative  interpretations  will 
an  elaborative  inference  be  made  on-line.  However,  exactly  what  inferences  arc  drawn 
depends  also  on  the  genre  of  the  text,  the  reader's  motivations,  and  the  intentions  of 
the  author. 
The  present  series  of  studies  examined  the  inferencing  skills  of  severely/profoundly 
deaf  adolescents  of  average  intellectual  ability,  using  a  variety  of  experimental 
techniques,  ranging  from  memory  probes,  through  on-!  ine  measures  of  reading  time, 
to  measureffient  of  eye  movements  as  subjects  read.  Three  types  of  inference  were 
examined:  spatial  temporal,  and  causal. 
The  first  study  showed  that  the  deaf  have  more  difficulty  interpreting  implicit  material 
than  the  hearing  subjects,  even  those  younger  subjects  matched  on  reading  ability.  It 
-255- was  found  that  the  deaf  adolescents  were  as  good  at  making  spatial  inferences  as 
hearing  children  approximately  matched  on  reading  ability.  However,  temporal 
inferences  proved  to  be  the  most  difficult  for  both  hearing  and  deaf  subjects,  but 
particularly  so  for  the  deaf. 
The  on-line  study  confirmed  that  the  deaf  are  poorcr  at  drawing  temporal  and  causal 
inferences  but  when  they  did  so,  they  appeared  to  be  making  elaborative  inferences 
automatically  on-line  just  like  the  hearing  subjects.  Temporal  narrýtives  seem  to  be 
particularly  problematic  for  the  deaf.  It  seemed  that  these  inferencing  skills  were 
independent  of  modality  of  communication  and  operated  in  a  similar  way  when  the 
information  was  presented  in  signed  form,  indicating  that  the  difficulties  were  not 
purely  reading  based.  It  was  postulated  that  perhaps  the  deaf  lacked  the  necessary 
experience  and  background  knowledge  of  some  situations  and  so  were  unable  to  make 
inferences  on-line  in  these  cases.  When  the  deaf  readers  do  have  the  relevant 
background  knowledge,  they  perform  much  like  hearing  children. 
A  further  reading  time  study,  which  examined  instrumental  inferences  (a  particular 
type  of  elaboration  in  which  a  verb  can  imply  a  particular,  associated  instrument,  eg 
stir-spoon),  showed  that  deaf  children  are  like  hearing  children  in  that  neither  group 
draws  these  inferences  automatically  on-line.  This  finding  supports  the  consensus 
view  that  fluent  adult  readers  do  not  draw  such  inferences  at  the  time  of  reading  unless 
the  context  is  sufficiently  constraining  (cg  Rayner  &  Pollatsek,  1989) 
There  was  a  remarkable  similarity  between  the  deaf  and  hearing  children's 
constructions  of  the  various  scenarios  described  in  the  textual  materials  used  in  the 
experiments.  (Only  some  of  the  deaf  children  took  part  in  the  on-line  studies).  There 
seemed  to  be  similarities  in  the  relative  richness  of  tLe  various  scenarios  for  both 
groups.  However,  the  deaf  did  show  a  more  variable  range  of  time.  estimates  for  the 
temporal  scenarios,  while  the  hearing  subjects  tended  to  give  richer  descriptions  for 
the  causal  scenarios.  However,  no  correlation  was  found  between  those  scenarios 
with  less  enriched  background,  and  those  which  the  deaf  found  more  difficult  to 
interpret. 
-256- The  eye  movement  study  allowed  a  more  precise  examination  of  what  was  happening 
during  the  reading  process.  It  seemed  that  the  deaf  and  hearing  subjects  were  actually 
taking  slightly  longer  to  read  implicit  material  but  that  this  was  caused  by  closer 
scrutiny  of  the  text  by  subjects.  It  had  not  been  possible  to  detect  this  with  the  on-line 
study.  However,  it  is  still  likely  that  both  the  hearing  and  deaf  readers  are  drawing 
inferences  on-line  and  the  extra  time  is  that  needed  to  make  the  necessary  elaborations. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  type  of  inference  demanded  by  the  texts  used  in  these 
studies  should  be  fairly  automatic  but  will  still  rely  on  subjects  using  their  general 
world  knowledge.  It  was  also  found  that  deaf  subjects  probably  take  longer  to  access 
meaning  from  words. 
Pedagogical  implications 
These  findings  are  very encouraging.  They  show  the  normality  of  deaf  readers,  that 
they  use  sim.  ilar  mechanisms  to  hearing  children  when  comprehending  text.  Yet  Wood 
(1980)  contends  that  the  teaching  experiences  of  deaf  and  hearing  children  are  very 
different.  Conversations  with  deaf  children  tend  to  concentrate  on  the  literal  and 
pragmatic  functions  of  language  and  ignore  the  more  metaphorical  and  imaginative 
aspects.  There  is  a  strong  emphasis  towards  "bread-and-butter"  language. 
Wood  argues  that  deaf  children  are  also  much  more  dependent  on  the  teacher.  If  they 
encounter  a  difficult  word  they  look  to  the  teacher,  who  invariably  gives  the  deaf  child 
the  full  answer  straight  away,  as  it  is  often  assumed  that  the  child  does  not  know  the 
meaning  of  the  word  as  well  as  being  unable  to  read  it.  Explanations  tend  to  be 
concrete  in  nature  and  are  very  disruptive  to  the  flow  of  the  reading  process.  This  is  in 
contrast  to  teachers  of  hearing  children,  who  are  assumed  to  know  the  meaning  of  the 
word  and  are,  therefore,  given  prompts  to  help  them  decode  more  accurately. 
An  empirical  study  by  Howarth  et  al  (1981)  confirms  that  deaf  children  arc  indeed 
stopped  more  frequently  by  their  teachers  than  are  hearing  children,  and  that  these 
extra  stoppages  occurred  because  the  deaf  child  appeared  not  to  know  the  meaning  of  a 
-257- word.  Bccause  of  this,  the  rcading  rates  of  the  deaf  childrcn  wcrc  much  slowcr  than 
those  of  the  hearing  children.  Indeed,  they  were  so  slow  as  to  be  below  the  normally 
accepted  rate  at  which  spoken  language  can  be  understood. 
A  study  by  Allington  (1980)  of  hearing  children  found  that  poor  readers  arc 
interrupted  more  often  by  their  teachers  than  are  good  readers. 
Durkin  (1978-79)  found  that  teachers  of  hearing  children  expend  much  more  effort  in 
assessing  comprehension,  with  less  than  1%  of  reading  lessons  being  devoted  to 
comprehension  instruction.  What  children  experience  is  a  massive  dose  of  unguided 
practice  andlittle  help  in  how  to  actively  acquire  comprehension  skills. 
One  feature  of  reading  lessons  for  the  deaf  is  the  fact  that  the  child  is  most  often 
expected  to  read  aloud.  In  this  way  the  teacher  can  monitor  the  accuracy  of  the  child's 
performance.  Since  the  child's  speech  is  likely  to  be  unclear,  the  teacher  cannot  be 
sure  how  accurately  the  child  is  performing.  This  in  turn  leads  to  more  breaks  to  check 
certain  words  and  again  causes  disruption. 
Perhaps  another  way  of  monitoring  performance  would  encourage  greater  fluency. 
The  child  could  read  silently  (the  way  most  skilled  readers  do)  and  questions  could 
answered  afterwards  to  check  the  level  of  comprehension. 
A  few  studies  have  examined  the  efficacy  of  directly  teaching  children  comprehension 
skills.  Hansen  (1981)  showed  that  seven  year  old  hearing  children,  with  age 
appropriate  reading  skills,  who  are  trained  to  integrate  material  from  the  text  with  their 
prior  knowledge,  and  who  are  encouraged  to  predict  what  might  happen  next  in  the 
story,  show  better  comprehension  than  children  who  Eire  not  givrn  such  training. 
However,  their  improved  performance  related  only  to  the  texts  used  in  the  training  and 
did  not  transfer  to  new  material. 
In  a  refinem.  ent  of  the  above  study,  Hansen  &  Pearson  (1983)  compared  such  training 
techniques  on  hearing  nine  year  olds  who  were  good  or  poor  comprehenders.  They 
-258- found  that  the  training  helped  the  poorer  readers,  not  only  to  understand  the  original 
passages,  but  to  transfer  this  skill  to  new  texts.  There  was  no  effect  for  the  more 
competent  readers.  The  findings  of  both  these  studies  suggest  that  encouraging 
subjects  to  make  inference  can  be  effective  for  young  children  or  for  older  children 
who  have  poor  levels  of  comprehension.  Older  and  more  competent  readers  seem  to 
make  inferences  spontaneously.  More  recent  studies  by  Yuill  &  Joscelync  (1988  ')  and 
by  Yuill  &  Oakhill  (1988")  would  seem  to  confirm  these  findings.  However,  Oakhill 
&  Garharn  (1988)  emphasise  that  all  such  training  can  only  be  effective  if  the  children 
have  the  requisite  background  knowledge  to  start  with,  or  if  it  is  provided  for  them 
prior  to  reading. 
A  similar  study  by  Maeder  (19179)  with  deaf  children  reading  at  the  eight  year  level  or 
above,  found  that  written  or  signed  questions  inserted  during  reading  to  enhance 
comprehension  had  little  or  no  effect. 
It  seems,  therefore,  that  deaf  children  are  treated  very  much  like  hearing  children  who 
are  poor  comprehenders.  It  has  been  shown  that  direct  instruction  in  comprehension 
techniques  can  be  effective  in  such  circumstances,  yet  the  present  series  of  studies 
show  that,  with  the  appropriate  background  knowledge,  older  deaf  children  can  draw 
inferences  as  effectively  as  their  hearing  counterparts.  What  they  seem  to  lack  is  a 
breadth  of  background  knowledge  and  experience.  Thus,  while  the  process  of  making 
inferences  is  similar  for  both  groups,  the  deaf  read  more  slowly  with  lower  level  of 
comprehension.  This  obviously  has  a  wide  ranging  impact  on  all  areas  of  the 
curriculum,  where  the  pupil  is  reading  to  learn. 
Deaf  children  perhaps  need  to  be  encouraged  to  expand  their  experiences  of  life. 
Instead  of  concentrating  too  much  on  developing  the  deal'child's  proficiency  in,  say, 
English  syntactic  construction,  it  may  be  more  profitable  to  encourage  broader 
discussion  around  whatever  is  being  read,  to  empower  the  deaf  child  to  explore 
beyond  that  solely  presented  on  the  page.  This  is  in  line  with  Wood  (1980)  who 
advocates  encouraging  "abstract,  imaginative,  poetic  uses  of  language"  during  deaf 
children's  reading  lessons.  This  sentiment  is  echoed  by  Webster  (1986,  p249)  when 
-259- he  suggests  that  "...  accepting  the  linguistic  limitations  of  deaf  children  inspires  an 
approach  whereby  more  efficient,  more  active  questioning  of  text  is  encouraged.  " 
Since  the  present  set  of  studies  shows  that  the  deaf  use  similar  mechanisms  to  hearing 
children  when  drawing  inferences,  more  exploration  of  various  text  genre  could  be 
incorporated  into  the  curriculum  of  hearing  impaired  children.  At  Zwaan  and  van 
Oostendorp  (1993)  have  shown  that  the  text  genre  can  affect  the  types  of  inference 
made  (more  spatial  inferences  in  detective  stories,  for  example),  investigation  of 
different  story  types  should  be  encouraged,  perhaps  with  explicit  instruction  on  how 
to  extract  information  that  goes  beyond  the  literal. 
If  we  now  know  that  deaf  readers  are  capable  of  a  greater  level  of  comprehension  than 
was  previously  suspected,  there  should  possibly  be  a  shift  away  from  the  stifling 
insistence  on  correct  grammatical  interpretation  and  precise  decoding.  By  encouraging 
greater  fluency,  deaf  children  will  be  encourage  the  read  more  for  pleasure.  The 
situation  described  by  Strassman  (1992)  where  deaf  children  see  reading  merely  as 
one  of  the  things  which  one  does  at  school,  or  Cornett's  (1975)  statement  that  as  few 
as  5%  of  young,  intelligent  deaf  adults  read  for  pleasure,  could  be  turned  around  and 
deaf  children  be  given  the  opportunity  to  fully  enjoy  books  and  literature  which  until 
now  has  been  denied  to  so  many  of  them. 
Suggestions  for  further  work 
The  attempt  to  compare  different  types  of  inference,  such  as  temporal  and  causal,  by 
using  reading  rates  rather  than  direct  comparison  of  reading  times,  led  to  difficulties  in 
the  analysis  of  the  results,  since  the  relationship  between  reading  rate  and  sentence 
length  is  not  linear  (see  Section  6.3.2.2).  This  could  be  accomodatcd  by  reanalysis  of 
the  data  in  the  on-line  reading  study,  but  no  such  adjustments  could  be  made  with  the 
data  from  the  signing  study.  In  any  further  work  in  this  area,  it  would  seem  sensible  to 
-260- design  the  textual  materials  much  more  tightly  so  that  direct  comparison  can  be  made 
across  different  inference  types,  using  reading  times  as  the  metric. 
The  series  of  studies  described  in  this  thesis  should  be  viewed  merely  as  a  starting 
point.  Further  work  is  needed  to  explore  more  thoroughly  the  various  types  of 
inference  encountered  in  everyday  textual  materials,  for  example,  causal  antecedents 
and  causal  consequences.  The  work  already  begun  with  hearing  adults  could 
profitably  be  extended  to  deaf  adolescents.  Further  studies  using  a  range  of  techniques 
described  earlier,  but  particularly  those  involving  the  monitoring  of  eye  movements, 
are  called  for.  Given  the  variability  within  the  deaf  community,  further  studies  using 
eyetracking  techniques  with  a  much  larger  sample  size  would  seem  to  be  necessary. 
Any  findings  from  such  further  work  should  lead  to  a  more  appropriate  approach  to 
enhancing  deaf  children's  comprehension  skills. 
-261- References: 
Aarons,  L.  (1971).  Subvocalisation:  aural  and  EMG  feedback  in  reading.  Perceptual 
and  Motor  Skills,  33,271-3  06. 
Aaronson,  D.  &  Scarborough,  H.  S.  (1976).  Perfonnance  theories  for  sentence 
coding:  Some  quantitative  evidence.  Journal  of  Experimental  Psychology: 
Human  Perception  and  Performance,  2,56-70. 
Abbott,  V.  &  Black,  J.  B.  (1986).  Goal-related  inferences  in  comprehension.  In  J.  A. 
Galambos,  R.  P.  Abelson,  &  J.  B.  Black  (Eds.  ),  Knowledge  struclures. 
Hillsdale,  NJ:  Erlbaum. 
Alba,  J.  W.  &  Flasher,  L.  (1983).  Is  memory  schematic?  Psychological  Bulletin,  93, 
203-231. 
Allington,  R.  (1980).  Teacher  interruption  behaviours  during  primary-grade  oral 
reading.  Journal  ofEducational  Psychology,  72,371-374. 
Anderson,  A.  (1982).  Text  comprehension  -  the  influence  of  temporal  information  on 
processing  and  reading  rate.  Unpublished  Ph.  D.  thesis,  University  of  Glasgow. 
Anderson,  A.,  Garrod,  S.,  &  Sanford,  A.  (1983).  The  accessibility  of  pronominal 
antecedents  as  a  function  of  episode  shift  in  narrative  text.  QuarterlyJourtw1of 
Experimental  Psychology,  35,427-440. 
Anderson,  R.  (1981).  A  proposal  to  continue  a  ccntrc  for  the  study  of  reading 
(Technical  Proposal,  4  Vols.  ).  Urbana,  IL  University  of  Illinois,  Centre  for  the 
Study  of  Reading. 
-262- Anderson,  R.  C&  Ortony,  A.  (1975).  On  putting  apples  into  bottles  -A  problem  of 
polysemy.  Cognitive  Psychology,  7,167-180. 
Anderson,  R.  C.,  Pichert,  J.  W.,  Goetz,  E.  T.,  Schollcrt,  D.  L.,  Stevens,  K.  V.,  & 
Trollip,  S.  R.  (1976).  Instantiation  of  general  terms.  Journalof  VerbalLearning 
and  Verbal  Behaviour,  15,667-679. 
Arlin,  P.  (1977).  The  function  of  Piagetian  operational  levels  in  the  preference  and 
production  of  metaphors.  Paper  presented  to  the  Society  for  Research  in  Child 
Development,  New  Orleans. 
Ayers,  T.  L.  (1984).  Silent  reading  time  for  tongue-twister  paragraphs.  American 
Journal  of  Psychology,  97,605-609. 
Baddeley,  A.  (1976).  77te  psychology  of  memory.  London:  Harper  &  Row. 
Baddclcy,  A.  (1979).  Working  memory  and  reading.  In  P.  Kolers  &  M.  Wrolstad 
(Eds),  Processing  of  visible  language,  Vol  1.  New  York:  Plcnum  Press. 
Baddcley,  A&  Hitch,  G.  (1974).  Working  memory.  In  G.  A.  Bower  (Ed.  ),  The 
psychology  of  learning  and  motivation,  Vol.  8.  New  York:  Academic  Press. 
BaddclcY,  A.  &  Lcwis,  V.  (1981).  Inncr  activc  proccsscs  in  rcading:  The  inncr  voicc, 
the  inner  ear,  and  the  inner  eye.  In  A,  M.  Lesgold  &  C.  A.  Perfetti  (Eds), 
Interactive  processes  in  reading.  Hillsdale,  NJ:  Erlbaum. 
Baggett,  P.  (1975).  Memory  for  explicit  and  implicit  information  in  picture  stories. 
Journal  of  Verbal  Learning  and  Verbal  Behaviour,  14,538-548. 
Balota,  D.  A.  (1990).  The  role  of  meaning  in  word  recognition.  In  D.  A.  Balota,  G. 
B.  Flores  d'  Arcais  &  K.  Rayner  (Eds.  )  Comprehension  processes  in  reading. 
Hillsdale,  N.  J.:  Lawrence  Erlbaum  Associates. 
-263- Balota,  D.,  Boland,  J.,  &  Shields,  L.  W.  (1989).  Priming  in  pronunciation:  Beyond 
pattcm  rccognition  and  onsct  latcncy.  Journal  of  Memory  and  Language,  28, 
14-36. 
Balota,  D.  &  Chumbley,  J.  1.  (1984).  Are  lexical  decisions  a  good  measure  of  lexical 
access?  The  role  of  word  frequency  in  the  neglected  decision  stage.  Journal  of 
Erperimental  Psychology:  Human  Perception  and  Performance,  10,340-357. 
Balota,  D.,  Pollatsek,  A.,  &  Rayner,  K.  (1985).  The  interaction  of  contextual 
constmints  and  parafoveal  visual  information  in  reading.  Cognitive  Psychology, 
17,364-390. 
Banks,  J.,  Fraser,  R.,  Fyfe,  J.,  Grant,  C.,  Gray,  M.,  MacAuley,  M.,  &  Williams,  S. 
(1989).  Teaching  deaf  children  to  read:  A  pilot  study  of  a  method.  Journal  of1he 
British  Association  of  Teachers  of  the  Deaf,  13,129-141. 
Banks,  W.  P.,  Oka,  E.,  &  Shugarman,  S.  (1981).  Rccoding  of  printcd  words  to 
internaliscd  speech:  Does  recoding  come  before  lexical  access?  In  0.  J.  L. 
Tzeng  &  H.  Singer  (Eds),  Perception  ofprint.  Hillsdale,  NJ:  Erlbaum. 
Barnitz,  J.  (1980).  Syntactic  effects  on  the  reading  comprehension  of  pronoun- 
referent  structures  by  children  in  grades  two,  four,  and  six.  Reading  Research 
Quart,  erly,  15,268-289. 
Baron,  J.  (1973).  Phonetic  stage  not  necessary  for  reading.  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Experimen.  "al  Psychology,  25,241-246. 
Bartlett,  F.  (1932).  Renwmbering.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press. 
-264- Beggs,  W.  &  Breslaw,  P.  (1982).  Reading  retardation  or  linguistic  deficit?  III:  a 
further  examination  of  response  strategies  in  a  reading  test  completed  by 
hearing-impaired  children.  Journal  ofResearch  in  Reading,  6,19-28. 
Beggs,  W.,  Breslaw,  P.,  &  Wilkinson,  H.  (1982).  Eye  movements,  reading 
achievement  and  reading  test  validity.  In  R.  Groner  &  P.  Fraisse  (Eds.  ), 
Cognition  and  eye  movements.  Amstcrdam:  North  Holland  Publishing  Co. 
Bell,  B.  J.  &  Torrance,  N.  (1986).  Learning  to  make  and  recognisc  inferences  in  the 
early  grades.  Paper  presented  to  the  67th  Annual  Meeting  of  the  American 
Educational  Research  Association  (San  Francisco,  California:  April,  1986). 
Bellugi,  U.,  Mima,  E.,  &  Siple,  P.  (1974).  Remembering  in  signs.  Cognilion,  3,93- 
125. 
Bench,  J.  &  Bamford,  1  (1979).  Speech-hearing  tests  and  the  spoken  language  of 
hearing-impairedchildren.  LA)ndon/Ncw  York/San  Francisco:  Academic  Press. 
Billow,  R.  (1975).  A  cognitive  developmental  study  of  mctaphor  comprehension. 
Developmental  Psychology,  11,415-423. 
Black,  I  B.  &  Bower,  G.  H.  (1980).  Story  understanding  as  problem  solving. 
Poetics,  9,223-250. 
Bloom,  C.  P.,  Fletcher,  C.  R.,  van  den  Broek,  P.,  Reitz,  L.,  &  Shapiro,  B.  P. 
(1990).  An  on-line  assessment  of  causal  reasoning  during  comprehension. 
Memory  and  Cognition,  18,65-7  1. 
Bormuth,  J.  (1970).  On  the  theory  of  achievement  test  itents.  Chicago:  Univusity  of 
Chicago  Press. 
-265- Bransford,  J&  Johnson,  M.  (1972).  Contextual  prerequisites  for  understanding: 
Some  investigations  of  comprehension  and  recall.  Journal  of  Verbal  Learning 
and  Verbal  Behaviour,  11,717-926. 
Brennan,  M.,  Colville,  M.  D.,  &  Lawson,  L.  K.  (1980).  Words  in  hand.  A  structural 
analy.  yis  of  the  signs  of  British  Sign  Language.  Edinburgh:  Moray  House 
College. 
Brewer,  W.  (1975).  Memory  for  ideas:  Synonym  substitution.  Memory  and 
Cognition,  3,458-464. 
Brewer,  W.  (1980).  Literary  theory,  rhetoric,  stylistics:  Implications  for  psychology. 
In  R.  Spiro,  B.  Bruce,  &  W.  Brewer  (Eds.  ),  Theoretical  issues  in  reading 
comprehension.  Hillsdale,  N.  J.:  Lawrence  Erlbaum  Associates. 
Brimcr,  A.  (1972).  Wide-span  reading  test.  London:  Nelson. 
Brooks,  P  H.  (1978).  Some  speculations  concerning  deafness  and  learning  to  read,  in 
Li  bcn,  LS  (Ed),  Deaf  Children:  Developmental  Perspectives,  (pp  87-  10  1). 
Ncw  York,  Acadcmic  Prcss. 
Brown,  A.  (1975).  Recognition,  reconstruction  and  recall  of  narrative  sequences  by 
prc-opcrational  children.  Child  Development,  46,156-166. 
Brown,  A.  (1980).  Metacognitive  development  and  reading.  In  R.  J.  Spiro,  B.  C. 
Bruce,  &  W.  F.  Brewer  (Eds.  ),  Theoretical  issues  in  reading  comprehension. 
Hillsdale,  N.  J.:  Erlbaum. 
Brown,  A,  Campione,  I&  Day,  1  (1981).  Learning  to  learn:  On  training  students  to 
leam  from  tcxts.  EducalionalResearch,  10,14-2  1. 
-266- Brown,  A.  &  Day,  1  (1980).  Strategies  and  knowledge  for  summarizing  texts:  The 
development  of  expertise.  Unpublished  manuscript,  University  of  Illinois, 
Centre  for  the  Study  of  Reading,  Urbana,  Illinois. 
Brown,  A&  Murphy,  M.  (1975).  Reconstruction  of  arbitary  versus  logical  sequences 
by  pre-school  children.  Journal  of  Experimental  Child  Psychology,  20,307- 
326. 
Bryant,  P&  Trabasso,  T.  (1971).  Transitive  inferences  and  memory  in  young 
children.  Nature,  232,456-458. 
Campbell,  F. W.  &  Wurtz,  R.  H.  (1978).  Saccadic  omission:  Why  we  do  not  see  a 
grey-out  during  a  saccadic  eye  movement.  Vision  Research,  18,1297-1303. 
Carpcntcr,  P.  A.  &  Just,  A  A.  (1977).  Reading  comprehension  as  eyes  see  it.  In  M. 
A.  Just  &  P.  A.  Carpenter  (Eds.  ),  Cognitive  processes  in  comprehension. 
Hillsdale,  NJ:  Erlbaum. 
Chafe,  W.  (1970).  Meaning  and  the  structure  of  language.  Chicago:  University  of 
Chicago  Press. 
Chafe,  W.  (1972).  Discourse  structure  and  human  knowledge.  In  J.  B.  Carroll  &  R. 
0.  Freedle  (Eds.  ),  Language  comprehension  and  the  acquisition  of  knowledge. 
Washington:  Winston. 
Chai,  D.  (1967).  Communication  of  pronoun  rcfcrcncc  in  ambiguous  English 
sentences  for  children  and  adults.  Univetsity  of  Michigan,  Centre  for  Human 
Growth.  (ERIC  Document  Service,  ED  012  889). 
Chen,  K.  (1976).  Acoustic  images  in  visual  detection  for  deaf  and  hearing  college 
students.  Journal  of  General  Psychology,  94,243-246. 
-267- Chomsky,  N.  (1957).  syntactic  Structures.  The  Hague,  Netherlands:  Mouton. 
Chomsky,  N.  (1965).  Aspects  of  the  theory  of  syntax.  Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press. 
Chornsky,  N  (1976).  Reflections  on  language.  London:  Temple-Smith. 
Chumbley,  J.  1.  &  Balota,  D.  A.  (1984).  A  word's  meaning  affects  the  decision  in 
lexical  decision.  Memory  and  Cognition,  2,130-138. 
Clark,  E.  V.  (1978).  From  gesture  to  word:  On  the  natural  history  of  deixis  in 
language.  In  J.  S.  Bruner  &  A.  Garton  (Eds.  ),  Human  growth  and 
development.  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press. 
Clark,  H.  H.  (1973).  The  language-as-fixed-effect  fallacy:  A  critique  of  language 
statistics  in  psychological  research.  Journal  of  Verbal  Learning  and  Verbal 
Behaviour,  12,335-359. 
Clark,  H.  H.  (1975).  Bridging.  In  R.  Schank  &  B.  Nash-Webbcr  (Eds.  ),  Theoretical 
issues  in  natural  language  processing.  Proceedings  of  a  conference  at  the 
Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology. 
Clay,  M.  (1977).  Reading:  the  patterning  ofcomplex  behaviour.  London:  Heinemann. 
Coggiola,  D.  C.  (1983).  The  identification  and  use  of  levels  of  importance  in  text 
learning  by  hearing  impaired  college  students.  Unpublished  doctoral 
dissertation,  University  of  Rochester,  New  York. 
Collett,  D.  &  Lewis,  T.  (1976).  The  subjective  nature  of  outlier  rejection  procedures. 
Applied  Statistics,  25,228-237. 
Cometa,  M.  &  Eson,  M.  (1978).  Logical  operations  and  metaphor  interpretations:  A 
Piagetian  model.  Child  Development,  49,649-659. 
-268- Conely,  I  ý1976).  Role  of  idiomatic  expressions  in  the  reading  of  deaf  children. 
AnwricanAnnaLsofthe  Deaf,  121,381-385. 
Conrad,  C.  (1974).  Context  effects  in  sentence  comprehension:  A  study  of  the 
subjective  lexicon.  Memory  and  Cognition,  2,130-138. 
Conrad,  R.  (1977).  The  reading  ability  of  deaf  school-leavers.  British  Journal  of 
Educalional  Psychology,  47,138-148. 
Conrad,  P,  (1979).  The  deafschoolchild.  London:  Harper  &  Row. 
Corbett,  A.  &  Dosher,  B.  (1978).  Instrument  inferences  in  sentence  encoding.  Journal 
of  Verbal  Learning  and  Verbal  Behaviour,  17,479-49  1. 
Corcoran,  D.  W.  1  (1966).  An  acoustic  factor  in  Icttcr  cancellation.  Nature,  210,658. 
Cornett,  0.  (1975).  Cued  speech:  What  and  why?  In  P.  Henderson  (Ed.  ),  Methods  of 
conununication  currently  used  in  the  education  of  deaf  children,  pp  41-44. 
London:  Royal  Nafional  Insfitute  for  the  Deaf. 
Cotter,  C.  A.  (1984).  Inferring  indirect  objects  in  sentences:  Some  implications  for  the 
scmantics  of  vcrbs.  Language  andSpeech,  27,25-45. 
Davey,  B,  LaSasso,  C,  &  Macready,  G.  (1983).  Comparison  of  reading 
comprehension  task  performance  for  deaf  and  hearing  readers.  Journal  of 
Speech  and  Hearing  Research,  26,622-628. 
Day,  1  (1980).  Training  summarization  skills:  A  comparison  of  teaching  methods. 
Unpublished  doctoral  dissertation,  University  of  Illinois  at  Urbana-Champaign. 
DiFrancesca,  S.  (1972).  Academic  achcivemcnt  test  results  of  a  national  testing 
program  for  hearing-impairedstudents-United  States,  Spring  (Series  D,  No  9). 
Washington,  DC:  Gallaudet  College,  Office  of  Demographic  Studies. 
-269- Dixon,  K,  Pearson,  P,  &  Ortony,  A.  (1980).  Some  reflections  on  the  use  of  figurative 
language  in  children's  textbooks.  Paper  presented  at  the  annual  meeting  of  the 
National  Reading  Conference,  San  Diago. 
Doctor,  F-  A.  &  Coltheart,  M.  (1980).  Children's  use  of  phonological  encoding  when 
reading  for  meaning.  Memory  and  Cognition,  8,195-209. 
Dodd,  B.  (1980).  The  spelling  abilities  of  profoundly  pre-lingually  deaf  children,  in 
U.  Rith  (Ed),  Cognitive  processes  in  spelling,  pp  423-440.  London:  Academic 
Press. 
Dodd,  B.  (1987).  Lip-reading,  phonological  coding  and  deafness.  In  B.  Dodd  &  R. 
Campbell  (Eds).  Hearing  by  eye:  The  psychology  of  lip  reading.  London: 
Erlbaum. 
Dodd,  B&  Hermclin,  B.  (1977).  Phonological  coding  by  the  pre-lingually  deaf. 
Perception  and  Psychophysics,  21,413  -417. 
Dopkins,  S.  &  Myers,  J.  L.  (1989).  Goal  relationships  during  the  processing  of  text. 
Unpublished  manuscript,  University  of  Massachusetts,  Amherst. 
Dosher,  B.  A.  &  Corbett,  A.  T.  (1982).  Instrument  inferences  and  verb  schemata. 
Memory  and  Cognition,  10,531-539. 
Duffy,  S.  A.  (1986).  Role  of  expectations  in  sentence  integration.  Journal  of 
Erperimental  Psychology:  Learning,  Menwry  and  Cognition,  12,208-219. 
Durkin,  D.  (1978-79).  What  classroom  obscrvations  rcvcal  about  rcading 
comprehension  instruction.  Reading  Research  Quarterly,  14,481-533. 
Dycr,  M.  G.  (1983).  In-depth  understanding:  A  computer  model  of  integrated 
processingfor  narrative  comprehension.  Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press. 
-270- Edfeldt,  A.  W.  (1960).  Silent  speech  and  silent  reading.  Chicago:  University  of 
Chicago  Press 
Ehrlich,  K.,  &  Johnson-Laird,  P.  N.  (1982).  Spatial  descriptions  and  referential 
continuity.  Journalof  VerbalLearning  and  Verbal  Behaviour,  21,296-306. 
Engle,  P.  W.,  Cantor,  J.,  &  Turner,  M.  (1989).  Modality  effects:  Do  they  fall  on  deaf 
ears?  Quarterly  Journal  ofFxperbnental  Psychology,  41,273-292. 
Erickson,  M.  E.  (1987).  Deaf  readers  reading  beyond  the  literal.  American  Annals  of 
lheDeaf,  132,291-294. 
Ewoldt,  C.  (1981).  A  psycholinguistic  description  of  selected  deaf  children  reading  in 
sign  language.  Reading  Research  Quarterly,  17,58-89. 
Fillmorc,  C.  (1968).  The  case  for  case.  In  E  Bach  &R  Harms  (Eds),  Universals  in 
linguistic  theory  (pp  1-88).  New  York:  Holt,  Rinehart  and  Winston. 
Fincher-Kicfcr,  R.  (1993).  The  role  of  predictive  inferences  in  situation  model 
construction.  Discourse  Processes,  16,99-  124. 
Fischer,  S.  &  Gough,  B.  (1978).  Verbs  in  American  Sign  Language.  Sign  Language 
Studies,  18,17-48. 
Flesch,  R.  (1948).  A  new  readability  yardstick.  Journal  of  Applied  Psychology,  32, 
221-233. 
Fletcher,  C.  R  (1986).  Strategies  for  the  allocation  of  short-term  memory  during 
comprchension.  Journal  ofMemory  and  Language,  25,43-58. 
Fletcher,  C.  R.  &  Bloom,  C.  P.  (1988).  Causal  reasoning  in  the  comprehension  of 
simpIc  narrativc  tcxts.  Journal  ofMemory  and  Language,  27,235-244. 
-271- Forster,  K  1.  (1981).  Priming  and  the  effects  of  sentence  and  lexical  context  on 
naming  time:  Evidence  for  autonomous  lexical  processing.  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Experbnental  Psychology,  33,465-495. 
Fraise,  P.  (1963).  The  psychology  of  lime.  New  York:  Harper  &  Row. 
Frith,  U.  (1979).  Reading  by  eye  and  writing  by  ear.  In  P.  A.  Kolers,  M.  E  Wrolstad 
&  H.  Bouma  (Eds).  Processing  of  visibLe  language,  Vol.  1.  New  York: 
Plcnum. 
Fry,  E.  (1977).  Fry's  readability  graph:  clarification,  validity  and  extension  to  level 
17.  Journal  ofReading,  21,242-252. 
Fur-th,  H.  (1966).  A  comparison  of  reading  test  norms  of  deaf  and  hearing  children. 
Anwrican  Annals  ofthe  Deaf,  111,461-  462. 
Fusaro,  J&  Slike,  S.  (1979).  The  effect  of  imagery  on  the  ability  of  hcating-impaired 
children  to  identify  words.  American  Annals  ofthe  Deaf,  124,829-832. 
Gaines,  R,  Mandler,  J,  &  Bryant,  P.  (1981).  Immediate  and  delayed  story  recall  by 
hearing  and  deaf  children.  Journal  of  Speech  and  Hearing  Research,  24,463- 
469. 
Gamham,  A.  (1979).  Instantiation  of  vcrbs.  Quarterly  Journal  of  Experimental 
Psychology,  31,207-214. 
Garrod,  S.,  O'Brien,  E.,  Morris,  R.,  &  Rayner,  K.  (1990).  Elaborative  inferencing 
as  an  active  or  passive  process.  Journal  ofErperimental  Psychology:  Learning, 
Memory,  and  Cognition,  16,250-257. 
-272- Garrod,  S.  &  Sanford,  A.  (1977).  Interpreting  anaphoric  relations:  The  integration  of 
semantic  information  while  reading.  Journal  of  Verbal  Learning  and  Verbal 
Behaviour,  16,77-90. 
Garrod,  S.  &  Sanford,  A.  (1978).  Anaphora:  A  problem  in  text  comprehension.  In  R. 
N.  Campbell  &  P.  T.  Smith  (Eds.  ),  Recent  advances  in  the  psychology  of 
language.  New  York.  Plenum  Press. 
Garrod,  S.  &  Sanford,  A.  (1980).  Bridging  inferences  and  the  extended  domain  of 
reference.  Paper  presented  at  9th  International  Attention  and  Performance 
Conference,  Cambridge,  England. 
Garrod,  S.  &  Sanford,  A.  (1981).  Bridging  inferences  in  the  extended  domain  of 
reference.  In  J.  Long  &  A.  Baddeley  (Eds.  ),  Attention  andperformance  IX  (pp 
331-346).  Hillsdale,  NJ:  Lawrence  Erlbaum  Associates. 
Gentner,  D.  (1981).  Verb  semantic  structures  in  memory  for  sentences:  Evidence  for 
componential  representation.  Cognitive  Psychology,  13,56-83. 
Giorcclli,  L  (1982).  The  comprehension  of  some  asspccts  of  figurative  language  by 
deaf  and  hearing  subjects.  Unpublished  doctoral  dissertation,  University  of 
illinois  at  Urbana-Champaign. 
Goetz,  I-  T.  (1977).  Inferences  in  the  comprehension  of  memory  for  text.  Urbana, 
ILL:  University  of  Illinois,  Centre  for  the  Study  of  Reading  (ERIC  Document 
and  Reproduction  Service  No.  ED  150  548). 
Goggiola,  D.  (1983).  The  identification  and  use  of  levels  of  importance  in  text 
leamipg  by  hearing  imPaired  college  students.  Unpublished  doctoral  disertation, 
University  of  Rochester,  New  York. 
-273- Golding,  J.  M.,  Graesser,  A.  C.,  &  Millis,  K.  K.  (1990).  What  makes  a  good  answer 
to  a  question?  Testing  a  psychological  model  of  question  answering  in  the 
context  of  narrative  text.  Discourse  Processes,  13,305-326. 
Goodman,  IC  (1969).  Analysis  of  oral  reading  miscues:  applied  psycholinguistics. 
Reading  Research  Quarterly,  5,9-3  0. 
Gormley,  K&  Franzen,  A.  (1978).  Why  can't  the  deaf  read?  Comments  on  asking 
the  wrong  question.  American  Annals  of  the  Deaf,  123,524-547. 
Gough,  P.  (1972).  One  second  of  reading.  In  J.  Kavanagh  &  1.  Mattingly  (Eds.  ), 
Language  by  ear  and  by  eye:  The  relationship  between  speech  and  reading  (pp 
331-3ý8).  Cambridge,  MA:  NUT  Press. 
Gracsscr,  A.  C.  (1981).  Prose  comprehension  beyond  the  word.  Ncw  York: 
Springer-Verlag. 
Graesser,  A.  C.  &  Clark,  L,  F.  (1985).  Structures  and  procedures  of  implicit 
knowledge.  Norwood,  N.  J.:  Ablex. 
Graesser,  A.  C.,  Haberlandt,  K.,  &  Koizumi,  D.  (1987).  How  is  reading  time 
influenced  by  knowledge  based  inferences  and  world  knowledge?  In  B.  K. 
Britton  &  S.  M.  Glynn  (Eds.  ),  Executive  control  processes  in  reading. 
Hillsdale,  NJ:  Erlbaum. 
Gracsscr,  A.  C.  &  Kreuz,  P.  J.  (1993).  A  theory  of  inference  generation  during  text 
comprehension.  Discourse  Processes,  16,145-160. 
Graesser,  A.  C.,  Lang,  K  L.,  &  Roberts,  R.  M.  (1991).  Question  -answering  in  the 
context  of  stories.  Journal  ofErperimental  Psychology:  General,  120,254-277. 
-274- Graesser,  A.  C.  &  Murachver,  T.  (1985).  Symbolic  procedures  of  question 
answering.  In  A.  C.  Graesser  &  J.  B.  Black  (Eds.  ),  The  psychology  of 
questions.  BlIsdale,  NJ:  Erlbaum. 
Graesser,  A.  C.,  Robertson,  S.  P.,  &  Anderson,  P.  A.  (1981).  Incorporating 
inferences  in  narrative  representations:  A  study  of  how  and  why.  Cognitive 
Psychology,  13,1-26. 
Graesscr,  A.  C.,  Robertson,  S.  P.,  Lovelace,  E.,  &  Swinchart,  D.  (1980).  Answers 
to  why-questions  expose  the  organisation  of  story  plot  and  predict  recall of 
actions.  Journalof  VerbalLearning  and  Verbal  Behaviour,  19,110-119. 
Graesser,  A.  C.,  Singer,  M.,  &  Trabasso,  T.  (1994).  Constructing  inferences  during 
narrative  text  comprehension.  Psychological  Review,  101,371-395. 
Green,  D&  Shallice,  T.  (19176).  Direct  visual  access  in  reading  for  meaning.  Memory 
and  Cqgnition,  41,753  -758. 
Grice,  H.  P.  (1975).  Logic  and  conversation.  In  P.  Cole  &  J.  L.  Morgan  (Eds.  ), 
Syntar  and  semantics,  VoL  3:  Speech  Acts.  New  York:  Seminar  Press. 
Griswold,  E&  Cummings,  J.  (1974).  The  expressive  vocabulary  of  preschool  deaf 
children.  American  Annals  of  the  Deaf,  119,16-28. 
Haber,  R,  N.  &  Haber,  L.  R.  (1982).  Does  silent  reading  involve  articulation? 
Evidence  from  tongue-twisters.  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  95,409419. 
Haberlandt,  K-  &  Bingham,  G.  (1978).  Verbs  contribute  to  the  coherence  of  brief 
narratives:  Reading  related  and  unrelated  sentence  triples.  Journal  of  Verbal 
Learning  and  Verbal  Behaviour,  17,419-425. 
-275- Hammermcister,  F.  (1971).  Reading  acheivement  in  deaf  adults.  American  Annals  of 
the  Deaf,  116,25-28. 
Hamp,  H.  (1975).  Thepicture  aidedreading  test.  Northampton:  Hamp. 
Hansche,  L.  &  Gordon,  G.  (1983).  An  investigation  of  the  relationship  of  story 
schema  to  reading  ability  and  grade  level.  In  J.  Niles  &  ý.  Harris  (Eds.  ), 
Searches  for  meaning  in  rcading/languagc  processing  and  instruction.  Thirty- 
second  yearbook  of  the  National  Reading  Conference  (pp  255-259).  Rochester, 
N.  Y.:  National  Reading  Conference. 
Hansen,  J.  (1981).  The  effects  of  inference  training  and  practice  on  young  children's 
reading  comprehension.  Reading  Research  Quarterly,  16,391-417. 
Hansen,  J.  &  Pearson,  P.  D.  (1983).  An  instructional  study:  Improving  the  inferential 
comprehension  of  good  and  poor  fourth-grade  readcrs.  Journal  ofEducational 
Psychology,  75,821-829. 
Hanson,  V.  L  (1982).  Short-term  recall  by  deaf  signers  of  American  Sign  Language: 
Implications  of  encoding  strategy  for  order  recall.  Journal  of  Experimental 
Psychology:  Learning,  Memory,  and  Cognition,  8,572-583. 
Hanson,  V.  L.  (1986).  Access  to  spoken  language  and  the  acquisition  of  orthographic 
structure:  Evidence  from  deaf  readers.  Quarterly  Journal  of  Experimental 
Psychology,  38,193-212. 
Hanson,  V.  L,  Goodell,  F_  W.,  &  Perfetti,  C.  A.  (1991)  Tongue-twister  effects  in 
the  silent  reading  of  hearing  and  deaf  college  students.  JourMl  ofMemory  and 
Language,  30,319-330. 
-276- Hanson,  V.  L.,  Liberman,  I.  Y.,  &  ShankNveiler,  D.  (1984).  Linguistic  coding  by 
deaf  children  in  relation  to  beginning  reading  success.  Journal  of  Experimental 
Child  Psychology,  37,378-393. 
Hanson,  V.  L&  Lichtenstein,  E.  L.  (1990).  Short-term  memory  coding  by  deaf 
signeis:  The  notion  of  primary  lenguage  coding  reconsidered.  Cognitive 
Psychology,  22,211-224. 
Hardyck,  C&  Petrinovich,  L.  (1970).  Subvocal  speech  and  comprehension  level  as  a 
function  of  the  difficulty  level  of  reading  material.  Journal  of  Verbal  Learning 
and  Verbal  Behaviour,  9,647-652. 
Hardyck,  C,  Petrinovich,  L&  Ellsworth,  D.  H.  (1966).  Feedback  of  speech  muscle 
activity  during  silent  reading:  Rapid  extinction.  Science,  154,1467-1468. 
Harrison,  C..  (1996).  Methods  of  teaching  reading:  Key  issues  in  research  and 
implications  for  practice.  Edinburgh:  Scottish  Off-ice  Education  and  Industry 
Department,  Interchange  Document  No.  39. 
Hatcher,  C&  Robbins,  N.  (1978).  The  development  of  reading  skills  in  hearing- 
impaired  children.  Cedar  Falls:  University  of  North  Iowa.  (ERIC  Document 
Reproduction  service  No  ED  167  960). 
Haviland,  S.  &  Clark,  H.  H.  (1974).  Whaes  new?  Acquiring  new  infonnation  as  a 
process  in  comprehension.  Journal  of  Verbal  Learning  and  Verbal  Behaviour, 
13,512-521. 
Houck,  J.  (1982).  The  effects  of  idioms  on  reading  comprehension  of  hearing 
impaired  students.  Unpublished  doctoral  dissertation,  University  of  Northern 
Colorado. 
-277- Howarth,  S.,  Wood,  D.,  Griffiths,  A.,  &  Howarth,  C.  (1981).  A  comparative  study 
of  the  reading  lessons  of  deaf  and  hearing  pry  school  children.  British  Journal 
of  Educational  Psychology,  51,156-  162. 
Huey,  E.  B.  (190811968).  The  psychology  and  pedagogy  of  reading.  Cambridge,  M. 
A.:  NHT  Press. 
Ikeda,  M.  &  Saida,  S.  (1978).  Span  of  recognition  in  reading.  Vision  Research,  18, 
83-88. 
Iran-Nejad:  A,  Ortony,  A,  &  Rittenhouse,  R.  (1981).  The  comprehension  of 
metaphoric  uses  of  English  by  deaf  children.  Journal  of  Speech  and  Hearing 
Research,  24,551-556. 
Israelite,  N.  (1981).  Direct  antecedent  context  and  comprehension  of  reversible 
passive  voice  sentences  by  deaf  readers.  Unpublished  doctoral  thesis, 
University  of  Pittsburgh. 
Jarvclla,  FL  (1971).  Syntactic  processing  of  connected  speech.  Journal  of  Verbal 
LearnitigandBehaviour,  10,409-416. 
Johnson-Laird,  P.  N.  (1983).  Mental  models.  Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Harvard 
University  Press. 
Johnson-Laird,  P.  N.  &  Stevenson,  R.  (1970).  Memory  for  syntax.  Nature,  227, 
412. 
Just,  M.  A.  &  Carpenter,  P.  A.  (1980).  A  theory  of  reading:  From  eye  fixations  to 
comprehension.  Psychological  Review,  87,329-354. 
Just,  A  A..  &  Carpenter,  P.  A.  (1987).  The  psychology  of  reading  and  language 
comprehension.  Rockleigh,  NJ:  Allyn  &  Bacon. 
-278- Just,  M.  A.  &  Clark-,  H.  H.  (1973).  Drawing  inferences  from  the  presuppositions  and 
implications  of  affirmative  and  negative  sentences.  Journal  of  Verbal  Learning 
and  Verbal  Behaviour,  12,21-31. 
Kail,  P,  V.,  Chi,  M.  T.  H.,  Ingram,  A.  L.,  &  Danner,  F.  W.  (1977).  Constructive 
aspects  of  children's  reading  comprehension.  OdIdDevelopment,  48,684-688. 
Keenan,  J.,  Baillet,  S.  D.,  &  Brown,  P.  (1984).  The  effects  of  causal  cohesion  on 
comprehension  and  memory.  Journal  of  Verbal  Learning  and  Verbal  Behaviour, 
25,115-126. 
Keenan,  J.,  Golding,  J.,  Potts,  G.,  Jennings,  T.,  &  Aman,  C.  (1990). 
Methodological  issues  in  evaluating  the  occurrence  of  inferences.  In  A.  C. 
Graesser  &  G.  H.  Bower  (Eds.  ),  The  psychology  of  learning  and  motivation 
(Vol.  25).  Orlando,  Florida:  Academic  Press. 
Keenan,  J.  &  Kitsch,  W.  (1974).  The  identification  of  explicitly  and  implicitly 
presented  infonnation.  In  W.  Kitsch  (Ed.  ),  71e  representation  of  meaning  in 
memory  (pp  153-166).  Hillsdale,  N.  J.:  Lawrence  Erlbaum  Associates. 
Keenan,  J.,  Potts,  G.,  Golding,  J.,  &  Jennings,  T.  (1990).  Which  elaborative 
inferences  are  drawn  during  reading?  A  question  of  methodologies.  In  D.  A. 
Balota,  G.  B.  Flores  d'  Arcais,  &  K.  Rayner.  (Eds.  ),  Comprelwinion 
processes  in  reading.  Hillsdale,  N.  J.:  Lawrence  Erlbaum  Associates. 
Keenan,  J.;  Potts,  G.,  Jennings,  T.,  &  Golding,  J.  (1988).  Can  naming  detect 
inferences?  Paper  presented  at  the  annual  meeting  of  the  Psychonomic  Society, 
Chicago,  Illinois. 
Kennedy,  R.  A.  (1979).  Eye  movements  and  reading.  In  M.  M.  Gruncbcrg,  P.  E. 
Morris,  &  R.  N.  Sykes  (Eds.  ),  Practical  aspects  of  memory.  London: 
Proceedings  of  the  International  Conference. 
-279- King,  C&  Quigley,  S.  (1985).  Reading  and  deafness.  London:  Taylor  &  Francis. 
Kintsch,  W.  (1974).  The  representation  of  meaning  in  memory.  Hillsdalc,  NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Kintsch,  W.  (1988).  The  role  of  knowledge  in  discourse  comprehension:  A 
construction-integmtion  model.  Psychological  Review,  95,163-182. 
Kintsch,  W.  -&  Mross,  E.  F.  (1985).  Context  effects  in  word  identification.  Jounialof 
Memory  andLanguage,  24,336-349. 
Kintsch,  W.  &  van  Dijk,  T.  A.  (1978).  Towards  a  model  of  text  comprehension  and 
producfion.  Psychological  Review,  85,363-394. 
Meirnan,  G.  (1975).  Speech  rccoding  in  reading.  Journal  of  Verbal  Learning  and 
Verbal  Behaviour,  14,323-339. 
Klima,  E.  &  Bellugi,  U.  (1979).  The  signs  of  language.  Cambridge,  Massachusetts: 
Harvard  University  Press. 
Kluwin,  T,  Getson,  P,  &  Kluwin,  B.  (1980).  The  effects  of  experience  on  the 
discourse  comprehension  of  deaf  and  hearing  adolescents.  Directions,  1,49. 
Kosslyn,  S.  M.  &  Matt,  A.  M.  (1977).  If  you  speak  slowly,  do  people  read  your 
prose  slowly?  Person-particular  speech  recoding  during  reading.  Bulletin  of  ihe 
PsychometricSociety,  9,250-252. 
Kretschmer,  R.  (1976).  Judgments  of  grammaticality  by  11,14,  and  17  year  old 
hearing  and  hearing-impaired  youngsters.  Unpublished  doctoral  dissertation. 
University  of  Kansas. 
-280- Kretschmer,  R.  (1982).  Reading  and  the  hearing-impaircd.  individuai:  Summation  and 
applicafion.  Volta  Review,  84,107-122. 
Kyle,  1  (1980).  Reading  development  of  deaf  children.  Journal  of  Research  in 
Readiýg,  3,  "86-97. 
Lake,  D.  (1978).  Syntax  and  sequential  memory  in  hearing-impaircd  children.  In  H. 
Reynolds  &  C.  Williams  (Eds),  Proceedings  of  the  Gallaudct  conference  on 
reading  in  relation  to  deafness.  Washington,  DC:  Gallaudet  College. 
LaSasso,  C.  (1980).  The  validity  and  reliability  of  the  cloze  procedures  as  a  measure 
of  readability  for  prelingually,  profoundly  deaf  students.  American  Annals  of 
theDea  125,559-563.  ff, 
Lesgold,  A*.  M.  (1974).  Variability  in  childrcn's  comprchcnsion  of  syntactic 
structures.  Journal  ofEducational  Psychology,  66,333-338. 
Levelt,  W.  J.  M.  (1989).  Speaking:  From  intention  to  articulation.  Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  MIT  Press. 
Levy,  B.  A.  (1975).  Vocalisation  and  suppression  effects  in  sentence  memory. 
JournalofVerbalLearning  and  Verbal  Behaviour,  14,304-316. 
Levy,  B.  A.  (1977).  Reading:  Speech  and  meaning  processes.  Journal  of  Verbal 
Learning  and  Verbal  Behaviour,  16,623-638. 
Leybxýrt,  J.  &  Alcgria,  J.  (1993).  Is  word  proccssing  involuntaiy  in  deaf  childrcn? 
British  Journal  ofDevelopinental  Psychology,  11,1-29. 
Lichtenstein,  E.  (1980).  A  proposal  for  the  experimental  investigation  of  rccoding 
strategies  used  by  deaf  readers  during  reading  comprehension.  Centre  for  the 
Study  of  Reading,  University  of  Illinois,  Urbana. 
-281- Liddell,  S.  (1975).  Restrictive  relative  clauses  in  American  Sign  Language.  San 
Diego,  CA:  Salk  Institute  and  University  of  California. 
Linde,  C.  &  Labov,  W.  (1975).  Spatial  networks  as  a  site  for  the  study  of  language 
and  thought.  Language,  51,924-939. 
Locke,  J.  (1978).  Phonemic  effects  in  the  silent  reading  of  hearing  and  deaf  children. 
Cognition,  6,175-187. 
Locke,  J&  Locke,  V.  (1971).  Deaf  children's  phonetic,  visual  and  dactylic  coding  in 
a  graphemic  recall  task.  Journal  of  Experimental  Psychology,  89,142-146. 
Long,  D.  L.  &  Golding,  J.  M.  (1993).  Superordinate  goal  inferences:  Arc  they 
automatically  generated  during  comprehension?  Discourse  Processes,  16,55- 
74. 
Long,  D.  L.,  Golding,  I  M.,  &  Graesser,  A.  C.  (1992).  A  test  of  the  on-line  status 
of  goal-related  inferences.  JournalqfMemoryandLanguage,  31,634-647. 
Long,  D.  L.,  Golding,  I  M.,  Graesser,  A.  C.,  &  Clark,  L.  F.  (1990).  Goal,  event, 
and  state  inferences:  An  investigation  of  inference  generation  during  story 
comprehension.  In  A.  C.  Graesser  &  G.  H.  Bower  (Eds.  ),  The  psychology  of 
learning  and  motivation:  Inferences  and  text  comprehension  (Vol.  25).  New 
York:  Academic. 
Lovie,  P.  (1986).  Identifying  outliers.  In  A.  D.  Lovie  (Ed.  ),  New  developments  in 
statistics  for  psychology  and  the  social  sciences.  London  &  Ncw  York:  B  PS- 
Methuen. 
-282- Lucas,  M.  M.,  Tanenhaus,  M.  K.,  &  Carlson,  G.  N.  (1989).  Infcrenccs  in  scntence 
comprehension:  The  role  of  constructed  representations.  Proceedings  of  the 
Ninth  Annual  Cognitive  Science  Society  Meeting  (pp  566-574).  Hillsdale,  N. 
J.:  Lawrence  Erlbaum  Associates. 
Lucas,  M.  M.,  Tanenhaus,  M.  K.,  &  Carlson,  G.  N.  (1990).  Lcvels  of  rcprcsentation 
in  the  interpretation  of  anaphoric  reference  and  instrument  inference.  Memory 
and  Cognition,  18,611-637. 
McCawley,  J.  (1968).  The  role  of  semantics  in  a  grammar.  In  I-  Bach  &  R.  Harms 
(Eds),  Universals  in  linguistic  theory  (125-169).  New  York:  Holt,  Rinehart  and 
Winston. 
McConlcie,  G.  W.  &  Hoaboam,  T.  W.  (1985).  Eye  position  and  word  identification  in 
reading.  In  R.  Groner,  G.  W.  McConkie,  &  C.  Menz  (Eds.  ),  Eye  movements 
and  human  information  processing.  Amsterdam:  North-Holland  Press. 
McConkie,  G.  W.  &  Rayner,  K.  (1975).  The  span  of  the  effective  stimulus  during  a 
fixation  in  reading.  Perception  and  Psychophysics,  17,578-586. 
McCutchen,  D.,  Bell,  L.  C.,  France,  1.  M.,  &  Pcrfetti,  C.  A.  (i991).  Phoneme- 
specific  interference  in  reading:  The  visual  tongue-twistcr  effect  revisited. 
Reading  Research  Quarterly,  26,87-103. 
McCutchen  .,  D.  &  Pcrfctti,  C.  A.  (1982).  The  visual  tonguc-twistcr  effcct: 
Phonological  activation  in  silent  reading.  Journalof  VerbalLearningand  Verbal 
Behaviour,  21,672-687. 
McGill-Franzen,  A&  Gormley,  K.  (1980).  The  influence  of  context  on  dcaf  readers' 
understanding  of  passive  sentences.  American  Annals  of  Me  Deaf,  125,937- 
942. 
-283- McGuigan,  F.  J.  (1967).  Feedback  of  speech  muscle  activity  during  silent  reading: 
Two  comments.  Science,  157,579-580. 
McGuigan,  F.  I&  Bailey,  S.  C.  (1969).  Longitudinal  study  of  covert  oral  behaviour 
during  silent  reading.  Perceptual  andMotor  Skills,  28,170. 
McKoon,  G.  (1988).  Word  identification  and  elaborative  inference:  The  relation 
between  theory  and  empirical  measurement.  Unpublished  manuscript. 
McKoon,  G.  &  Keenan,  J.  (1974).  Response  latencies  to  explicit  and  implicit 
statements  as  a  function  of  the  delay  between  reading  and  text.  In  W.  Kintsch 
(Ed.  ),  The  representation  ofineaning  in  memory  (pp  166-176).  Hillsdalc,  N.  J.: 
Lawrence  Erlbaum  Associates. 
McKoon,  G.  &  Ratcliff,  R.  (1981).  The  comprehension  processes  and  memory 
structures  involved  in  instrumental  inferences.  Journal  of  Verbal  Learning  and 
Verbal  Behaviour,  20,671-682. 
McKoon,  G.  &  Ratcliff,  R.  (1986).  Inferences  about  predictable  events.  Journal  of 
E-  -p  rimental  Psychology:  Learning,  Memory  and  Cognition,  12,82-9  1.  Ex 
,e 
McKoon,  G.  &  Ratcliff,  R.  (1989a).  Assessing  the  occurence  of  elaborative  inference 
with  recognition:  Compatibility  checking  versus  cue  theory.  Journal  ofMetnory 
andLanguage,  28,547-563. 
McKoon,  G.  &  Ratcliff,  R.  (1989b).  Semantic  associations  and  elaborative  inference. 
Journal  of  Experimental  Psychology:  Learning,  Memory  and  Cognition,  15, 
326-338. 
McKoon,  G.  &  Ratcliff,  R.  (1989c).  Inferences  about  contextually  dermcd  categorics. 
Journal  of  Experimental  Psychology:  Learning,  Memory  and  Cognition,  15, 
1134-1146. 
-284- McKoon,  G.  Ratcliff,  R.  (1990).  Dimcnsions  of  infcrcnce.  In  A.  C.  Graesser  &  G. 
H.  Bower  (Eds.  ),  Yhe  psychology  of  learning  and  motivation:  ItIferences  and 
text  comprehension  (Vol.  25).  New  York:  Academic. 
McKoon,  G&  Ratcliff,  R.  (1992).  Inference  during  reading.  Psychological  Review, 
99,440-466. 
Macder,  J.  (1979).  Comparative  effectiveness  of  inserted  poslquesthqns  in  prose 
learning  on  the  reading  comprehension  of  hearing-impaired  children. 
Washington,  DC:  Model  Secondary  School  for  the  Deaf. 
Magliano,  J.  P.,  Baggett,  W.  B.,  Johnson,  B.  K.,  &  Gracsser,  A.  C.  (1993).  The 
time  course  of  generating  causal  antecedent  and  causal  consequence  inferences. 
Discourse  Processes,  16,35-54. 
Magliano,  J.  P.  &  Graesser,  A.  C.  (1991).  A  thrcc-prongcd  mcthod  for  studying 
inference  generation  in  literary  text.  Poetics,  29,193  -232. 
Mandler,  J.  (1978).  A  code  in  the  node:  The  use  of  a  story  schema  in  retrieval. 
Discourse  Processes,  1,14-35. 
Mandler,  J.  &  Johnson,  N.  (1977).  Remembrance  of  things  parsed:  Story  structure 
and  recall.  Cognitive  Psychology,  9,111-  151. 
Mani,  K.  &  Johnson-Laird,  P.  N.  (1982).  The  mcntal  rcprcscntation  of  spatial 
descriptions.  Memory  and  CoS  nition,  10,181-187. 
Marschark,  M.,  Mouradian,  V.,  &  Halas,  A  (1994).  Discourse  rules  in  the  language 
productions  of  deaf  and  hearing  children.  Journal  of  Experimental  Child 
Psychology,  57,89-107. 
-285- Masson,  M.  E.  I&  Freeman,  L.  (1990).  Fluent  identification  o(  repeated  words. 
Journal  ofErperimental  Psychology:  Learning,  Memory  an  Cognition,  16,355- 
373. 
Matin,  E.  (1974)*.  Saccadic  suppression:  A  review  and  an  analysis.  Psychological 
Bulletin,  81,899-917. 
Meadow,  K.  P.  (1967).  The  effect  of  early  manual  communication  and  family  climate 
on  the  deaf  child's  development.  Unpublished  doctoral  dissertation,  University 
of  California,  Berkeley. 
Meadow,  K.  P.  (1968).  Early  manual  communication  in  relation  to  the  dcaf  child's 
intellectual,  social,  and  communicative  functioning.  American  Annals  of  Me 
Deaf,  113,29-41. 
Meyer,  D.  E.  &  Schvaneveldt,  R  (1971).  Facilitation  in  recognizing  pairs  of  words: 
Evidence  of  a  dependence  between  retrieval  operations.  Journal  of  Erperhwntal 
Psychology,  90,227-  234. 
Millis,  K.  K.  (1989).  The  time  course  of  constructing  bridging  and  expectation 
knowledge-based  inferences  during  the  comprehension  of  expository  text. 
Unpublished  doctoral  dissertation,  Memphis  State  Universitý. 
Mitchell,  D.  C.  &  Green,  D.  W.  (1978).  The  effects  of  context  and  content  on 
immediate  processing  in  reading.  Quarterly  Journal  of  Experimental 
Psychi2logy,  30,609-636. 
Moores,  D.  (1967).  Applications  of  "cloze"  procedures  to  the  assessment  of 
psycholinguistic  abilities  of  the  deaf.  Unpublished  doctoral  thesis,  University  of 
Illinois  at  Urbana-Champaign. 
-286- Morrison,  R.  E.  &  Inhoff,  A.  W.  (1981).  Visual  factors  and  eye  movements  in 
reading.  Visible  Language,  15,129-146. 
Morrow,  D.,  Bower,  G.,  &  Greenspan,  S.  (1989).  Updating  situation  models  during 
narrative  comprehension.  Journal  ofMemory  and  Language,  28,292-312. 
Morrow,  D.,  Greenspan,  S.,  &  Bower,  G.  (1987).  Accessibility  and  situation  models 
in  narrative  comprehension.  Journal  ofMemory  and  Language,  26,165-187. 
Moulton,  R&  Beaslcy,  D.  (1975).  Vcrbal  coding  stmtegies  used  by  hearing-impaircd 
individuals.  Journal  ofSpeech  andHearing  Research,  18,559-570. 
Murray,  J.  D.,  Klin,  C.  M.,  &  Myers,  J.  L.  (1991).  Forward  inferences  about 
specific  events  during  reading.  Paper  presented  at  the  Psychonomic  Society 
Conference,  San  Francisco. 
Myers,  J.  L.  (1990).  Causal  relatedness  and  text  comprehension.  In  D.  A.  Balota,  G. 
B.  Flores  d'  Areais,  &  K.  Rayner  (Eds.  ),  Comprehension  processes  in  reading. 
Hillsdale,  NJ:  Lawrence  Erlbaum  Associates. 
Myers,  J.  L.  &  Duffy,  S.  A.  (1991).  Causal  inferences  and  text  memory.  In  A.  C. 
Graesser  &  G.  H.  Bower  (Eds.  ),  The  psychology  of  learning  and  motivation 
(Vol.  25).  Orlando,  FL:  Academic  Press. 
Myers,  J.  L.,  Shinjo,  M.,  &  Duffy,  S.  A.  (1987).  Degree  of  causal  relatedness  and 
memory.  Journal  ofMemory  and  Language,  26,453-465. 
Neely,  J.  H.  &  Keefe,  D.  E.  (1989).  Semantic  context  effects  on  visual  word 
processing:  A  hybrid  prospective/retrospective  processing  theory.  In  0.  H. 
Bower  (Ed.  ),  77ze  psychology  of  learning  and  molivation  (Vol.  23,  pp  207- 
248).  Orlando,  FL:  Academic  Press. 
-287- Neely,  I  H.,  Keefe,  D.  E.,  &  Ross,  K.  L.  (1989).  Semantic  priming  in  the  lexical 
decision  task:  Roles  of  prospective  prime-gencratcd  cxpectancics  and 
retrospective  semantic  matching.  Journal  of  Experimental  Psychology: 
Learning,  Memory  and  Cognition,  15,1003-1019. 
Nicholas,  D.  W.  &  Trabasso,  T.  (1981).  Towards  a  taxanomy  of  infcrenccs.  In  F. 
Wilkening,  J.  Becker,  &  T.  Trabasso  (Eds.  ),  Information  integration  by 
children.  Hillsdale,  NJ:  Lawrence  Erlbaum  Associates. 
Nisbett,  R.  E.  &  Wilson,  T. D.  (1977).  Telling  more  than  we  know:  Yerbal  reports  on 
mental  processes.  Psychological  Review,  8,231-259. 
Nolen,  S.  B.  &  Wilbur,  R.  B.  (1985).  The  effects  of  context  on  deaf  students' 
compýehension  of  difficult  scntcnces.  American  Annals  of  the  Deaf,  130,23  1- 
235. 
Norman,  D.,  Rumelhart,  D.,  &  LNR.  (1975).  Explorations  in  cognition.  San 
Francisco:  Freeman. 
O'Brien,  E.  I  Myers,  &IL.  (1985).  When  comprehension  difficulty  improves 
memory  for  text.  Journal  of  Erperintental  Psychology:  Learning,  Memory  and 
Cognition,  11,12-2  1. 
U  Brien,  E.  I&  Myers,  I  L.  (1987).  The  role  of  causal  connections  in  the  retrieval 
of  text.  Memory  and  Cognition,  15,419-  427. 
O'Brien,  E.  J.,  Shank,  D.  M.,  Myers,  J.  L.,  &  Rayner,  K.  (11988).  Elaborative 
inferences  during  reading:  Do  they  occur  on-line?  Journal  of  Experimental 
Psychology:  Learning,  Memory  and  Cognition,  14,410-420. 
Oakhill,  I&  Gamham,  A.  (1988).  Becoming  a  skilled  reader.  Oxfoid:  Blackwcll. 
-288- Odom,  P.,  Blanton,  R.,  &  McIntyre,  C.  (1970).  Coding  medium  and  word  recall  by 
deaf  and  hearing  subjects.  Journal  of  Speech  and  Hearing  Research,  13,54-58. 
Olson,  G.,  Duffy,  S.,  &  Mack,  R.  (1984).  Thinking-  out-loud  as  a  mcthod  for 
studying  real-time  comprehensive  processes.  In  D.  E.  Kieras  &  M.  A.  Just 
(Eds.  ),  New  methods  in  reading  comprehension  research  (pp  253-286). 
Hillsdale,  NJ:  Lawrence  Erlbaum  Associates. 
Omanson,  R.,  Warrcn,  W.,  &  Trabasso,  T.  (1978).  Goals,  infcrcntial 
comprehension,  and  recall  of  stories  by  children.  Discourse  Processes,  1,337- 
354. 
O'Neill,  M.  (1973).  The  receptive  language  competence  of  deaf  children  in  the  use  of 
the  base  structure  rules  of  transformational  generative  grammar.  Unpublished 
doctoral  disertation,  University  of  Pittsburgh,  PA. 
Page,  S.  (1981).  The  effect  of  idiomatic  language  in  passages  on  the  reading 
compýehcnsion  of  deaf  and  hearing  students.  Unpublished  doctoral  dissertation, 
Ball  Statc  Univcrsity 
Paris,  S.  G.  &  Carter,  A.  Y.  (1973).  Semantic  and  constructive  aspects  of  sentence 
memory  in  children.  Developmental  Psychology,  9,109-113. 
Paris,  S.  G.  &  Lindaucr,  B.  K.  (1976).  The  role  of  inference  in  children's 
comprehension  and  memory  for  sentcnccs.  Cog?  iitive  Psychology,  8,217-227. 
Paris,  S.  G.  &  Mahoney,  G.  (1974).  Cognitive  integration  in  children's  memory  for 
sentences  and  pictures.  Child  Development,  45,633-642. 
Paris,  S.  G.  &  Upton,  L.  L.  (1976).  Children's  memory  for  inferential  relationships 
in  prose.  CIdId  Development,  47,660-668. 
-289- Paul,  P.  (19ý4).  The  comprehension  of  multimeaning  words  from  selected  frequency 
levels  by  deaf  and  hearing  subjects.  Unpublished  doctoral  discrtation, 
University  of  Illinois  at  Urbana-Champaign. 
Payne,  1  (1982).  A  study  of  the  comprehension  of  verb-particle  combinations  amomg 
deaf  and  hearing  subjects.  Unpublished  doctoral  dissertation,  University  of 
Illinois  at  Urbana-Charnpaign. 
Perfetti,  C.  A.  (1985).  Reading  ability.  New  York:  Oxford. 
Perfetti,  C.  A.  (1989).  There  are  generalised  abilities  and  one  of  them  is  reading.  In  L. 
Resnick  (Ed.  ),  Knowing  and  learning:  Issues  for  a  cognitive  science  of 
instruction.  Hillsdale,  NJ:  Erlbaum. 
Perfetti,  C.  A.  (1993).  Why  inferences  might  be  restricted.  Discourse  Processes,  16, 
181-192. 
Perfetti,  C.  A.,  Beverly,  S.,  Bell,  L.,  Rodgers,  K.,  &  Fiux,  R.  (1987). 
Comprehending  newspaper  headlines.  Journal  of  Memory  and  Language,  26, 
692-713. 
Perfetti,  C.  A.  &  Lesgold,  A.  M.  (1977).  Discourse  comprehension  and  sources  of 
individual  differences.  In  M.  A.  Just  &  P.  A.  Carpenter  (Eds.  ),  Cognitive 
processes  in  comprehension.  Hillsdale,  NJ:  Erlabaum. 
Perfetti,  C.  A.  &  Roth,  S.  F.  (1981).  Some  of  the  intemctive  processes  in  reading  and 
their  role  in  reading  skills.  In  A.  M.  Lesgold  &  C.  A.  Perfetti  (Eds.  ),  Interactive 
processes  in  reading.  Hillsdale,  NJ:  Erlbaum. 
Perrig,  W.  &  Kintsch,  W.  (1985).  Propositional  and  situational  rcprcscntations  of 
text.  Journal  ofMemory  and  Language,  24,503  -518. 
-290- Piaget,  1  (1969).  The  child's  concept  of  time.  London:  Routlcdgc,  Kcegan,  Paul. 
Pinhas,  J.  (1984).  Inferential  processing  abilities  of  deaf  and  hearing  readcrs. 
Unpublished  doctoral  dissertation,  Cornell  University. 
Polio,  M.  &  Polio,  H.  (1979).  A  test  of  metaphoric  comprehension  and  some 
preliminary  developmental  data.  Journal  of  ChildLanguage,  6,111-120. 
Pollatsek,  A,  Bolozky,  S.,  Well,  A.  D.,  &  Rayner,  K.  (1981).  Assyffietries  in  the 
perceptual  span  for  Israeli  readers.  Brain  andLanguage,  14,174-180. 
Pollatsek,  A.,  Rayner,  K.,  &  Balota,  D.  A.  (1986).  Inferences  about  eye  movement 
control  from  the  perceptual  span  in  reading.  Perception  and  Psychophysics,  40, 
123-130. 
Posner,  M.  -  1.  &  Boies,  S.  W.  (1971).  Components  of  attention.  Psychological 
Review,  78,391-408. 
Potts,  G.  R.,  Keenan,  I  M.,  &  Golding,  J.  M.  (1988).  Assessing  the  occurcnce  of 
elaborative  inferences:  Lexical  decision  versus  naming.  Journal  of  Memory  and 
Langauge,  27,399-415. 
Prinz,  P.  M.  &  Prinz,  E.  A.  (1985).  If  only  you  could  hear  what  I  sce:  Discoursc 
development  in  sign  language.  Discourse  Processes,  8,1-19. 
Quigley,  S.  &  Frisina,  R.  (1961).  Institutionalization  and  psychoeducational 
development  of  deaf  children,  CEC  Research  Monogwph.  Washington,  DC: 
Council  on  Exceptional  Children. 
Quigley,  S,  Power,  D,  &  Steinkamp,  M.  (1977).  The  language  structure  of  dcaf 
children.  Volta  Review,  79,73-84. 
-291- Quigley,  S,  Smith,  N,  &  Wilbur,  R.  (1974).  Comprehension  of  rclativiscd  sentences 
by  deaf  students.  JournalofSpeechandHearing  Research,  17,325-341. 
Quigley,  S,  Wilbur,  R,  &  Montanelli,  D.  (1974).  Question  formation  in  the  language 
of  deaf  students.  Journal  ofSpeech  and  Hearing  Research,  17,699-713. 
Quigley,  S.,  Wilbur,  R.,  &  Montanelli,  D.  (1976).  Complement  structures  in  the 
language  of  deaf  students.  Journal  of  Speech  and  Hearing  Research,  19,448. 
457. 
Quigley,  S.,  Wilbur,  R.,  Power,  D.,  Montanclli,  D.,  &  Steinkamp,  M.  (1976). 
Syntactic  structure  in  the  language  of  deaf  children.  Urbana,  I  L:  Unimsity  of 
Illinois,  Institute  for  Child  Behaviour  and  Development. 
Quinn,  L.  (1981).  Reading  skills  of  hearing  and  congenitally  deaf  children.  Journalof 
Experimental  Child  Psychology,  32,139-16  1. 
Rayner,  K.  (1975).  The  perceptual  span  and  peripheral  cues  in  reading.  Cognifive 
Psychology,  7,65-81. 
Rayner,  K.  (1978).  Eye  movements  in  reading  and  information  processing. 
-P-sychologicalBulletin, 
85,618-660. 
Rayner,  K.  (1986).  Eye  movements  and  the  perceptual  span  of  in  beginning  and 
skilled  readers.  Journal  ofErperimental  Child  Psychology,  41,211-236. 
Rayner,  K.  (1995).  What  the  eye  tells  the  brain  during  reading.  Paper  presented  at 
Reading  2000:  Recent  advances  in  the  science  of  reading.  Seminar,  University 
of  Glasgow. 
Rayner,  K.  &  Bertera,  J.  H.  (1979).  Reading  without  a  fovca.  Science,  206,468- 
469. 
-292- Rayner,  K.,  Carlson,  M.,  &  Frazier,  L.  (1983).  The  interaction  of  syntax  and 
semantics  during  sentence  processing:  Eye  movements  in  the  analysis  of 
semantically  biased  sentences.  Journal  of  Verbal  Learning  and  Verbal 
Behaviour,  22,358-374. 
Rayner,  K&  Pollatsek,  A.  (1989).  77te  Psychology  of  Reading.  London,  Prcnticc- 
Hall  Intcmational. 
Rayner,  K.,  Well,  A.  D.,  Pollatsek,  A.,  &  Bertera,  J.  H.  (1982).  The  availability  of 
useful  information  to  the  right  of  fixation  in  reading.  Perception  and 
Psychophysics,  31,537-550. 
Reich,  P  A,.  &  Reich,  C  M.  (1974).  A  follow-up  study  of  the  deaf,  Toronto,  Ontario, 
Toronto  Board  of  Educational  Research  Report. 
Richek,  M.  (1976-77).  Reading  comprehension  of  anaphoric  forms  in  varying 
linguistic  contexts.  Reading  Research  Quarterly,  12,145-165. 
Robbins,  N&  Hatcher,  C.  (1981).  The  effects  of  syntax  on  the  reading 
comprehension  of  hearing-impaired  children.  Volta  Review,  83,105-115. 
Sachs,  1  (1974).  Memory  in  reading  and  listening  to  discourse.  Memory  and 
Cognition,  2,95-100. 
Sanford,  A.  (1990).  On  the  nature  of  text-driven  inference.  In  D.  A.  Balota,  G.  B. 
Flores  d'Arcais,  &  K.  Rayner  (Eds.  ),  Comprehension  processes  in  reading.  pp 
515-535.  Hillsdale,  N.  J.:  Lawrence  Erlbaurn  Associates. 
Sanford,  A.  &  Garrod,  S.  (1977).  Implicit  information  in  comprehending  discourse. 
Paper  presented  at  the  4th  International  Salzburg  Linguistics  Meeting. 
-293- Sanford,  A.  &  Garrod,  S.  (198  1).  Understanding  written  language:  Explorations  in 
comprehension  beyond  the  sentence.  Chichester,  Wiley. 
Sanford,  A.,  Garrod,  S.,  Lucas,  A.,  &  Henderson,  R.  (1983).  Pronouns  without 
explicit  antecedents?  Journal  ofSemantics,  2,303-318. 
Sarachan-Deily,  A.  B.  (1984).  Written  discourse  of  deaf  and  hearing  students: 
Semahtic  analysis.  Paper  presented  at  the  9th  Annual  Boston  University 
Conference  on  Language  Development.  Boston,  Massachusetts. 
Schank,  R.  C.  (1973).  Identification  of  conceptual  i  sations  underlying  natural 
language.  In  R.  C.  Schank  &  K.  M.  Colby  (Eds.  ),  Computer  models  of 
thought  and  language.  San  Francisco:  Frccman. 
Schank,  R.  C.  (1976).  The  role  of  memory  in  language  processing.  In  C.  Coffer 
(Ed.  ),  The  nature  of  human  memory.  San  Francisco:  W.  H.  Freeman  Press. 
Schank,  R.  4C.  &  Abelson,  P-  (1977).  Scripts,  plans,  goals,  and  understanding:  An 
inquiry  into  human  knowledge  structures.  Hillsdale,  NJ:  Erlbaum. 
Schustack,  M.,  Erlich,  S.,  &  Rayner,  K.  (1987).  Local  and  global  sources  of 
contextual  facilitation  in  reading.  Journal  of  Memory  and  Language,  26,322- 
340. 
Seidenberg,  M.  S.,  Waters,  G.  S.,  Sanders,  M.,  &  Langer,  P.  (1984).  Pre-  and  post- 
lexical  loci  of  contextual  effects  on  word  recognition.  Memory  and  Cognition, 
12,315-328. 
Shankweiler,  D.  &  Crain,  S.  (1986).  Language  mechanisms  and  reading  disorder.  A 
modular  approach.  Cognition,  24,139-168. 
-294- Sharkey,  N.  E.  (1986).  A  model  of  knowlcdge-based  expectations  in  text 
comprehension.  In  J.  A.  Galambos,  R.  P.  Abelson,  &  J.  B.  Black  (Eds.  ), 
Knowledge  structures.  Hillsdale,  NJ:  ErIbaum. 
Sharkey,  A.  J.  &  Sharkey,  N.  E.  (1992).  Weak  contextual  constraints  in  text  and 
word  piming.  Journal  ofMemory  and  Language,  31,507-524. 
Shatz,  C.  (1975).  The  development  of  social  cognition.  In  E.  M.  H&thcrington  (Ed.  ), 
Review  of  child  development  research.  Chicago,  IL:  University  of  Chicago 
Press. 
Singer,  M.  '(1978).  The  role  of  explicit  and  implicit  recall  cucs.  In  Symposium: 
Implication  and  inference  in  language  comprehension.  Paper  presented  at  the 
annual  meeting  of  the  American  Psychological  Association,  Toronto. 
Singer,  M.  (1979).  Processes  of  inference  during  sentence  encoding.  Memory  and 
Cognition,  7,192-200. 
Singer,  M.  (1980).  The  role  of  case  filling  inferences  in  the  coherence  of  brief 
passages.  Discourse  Processes,  3,185-20  1. 
Singer,  M&  Ferreira,  F.  (1983).  Inferring  consequences  in  story  comprehension. 
Journal  of  Verbal  Learning  and  Verbal  Behaviour,  22,437-448. 
Singer,  M.,  Hallclorson,  M.,  Lear,  I  C.,  &  Andrusiak,  P.  (1992).  Validation  of 
causal  bridging  inferences  in  discourse  understanding.  Journal  of  Memory  and 
Language,  31,54-1-572. 
Slowiaczek,  M.  L.  &  Clifton,  C.  (1980).  Subvocalisation  and  rcading  for  mcaning. 
Journal  of  Verbal  Learning  and  Verbal  Behaviour,  19,573  -582. 
-295- Smith,  P.  T.  &  Groat,  A.  (1979).  Spelling  patterns,  letter  cancellation  and  the 
processing  of  text.  In  P.  A.  Kolers,  M.  E.  Wrolstad,  &  H.  Bouma  (Eds). 
Processing  of  visible  language,  Vol  1,  New  York,  Plenum. 
Southgate,  V.  (1962).  Group  reading  test  (test  2,  form  A-  sentence  completion). 
Sevenoaks:  Hodder  &  Stoughton. 
Spache,  G.  D.  (1953).  A  new  readability  formula  for  primary  grade  reading  materials. 
ElenwntarySchooIJournal,  53,410-413. 
Spiro  ,  R.  (1975).  Inferential  reconstruction  in  memory  for  connected  discourse. 
(Technical  Report  No.  2).  Urbana,  Illinois:  University  of  Illinois,  Laboratory 
for  Cognitive  Studies  in  Education. 
Spiro,  R.  (1977).  Remembering  information  from  text:  Teoretical  and  empirical  issues 
concerning  the  "State  of  Schema"  reconstruction  hypothesis.  In  R.  Anderson, 
R.  Spiro,  &  W.  Montague  (Eds.  ),  Schooling  and  the  acquisition  of  knowledge 
(pp  137-165).  Ffillsdale,  NJ:  Lawrence  Erlbaum  Associates. 
Stein,  N.  (1978).  How  children  understand  stories:  A  developmental  analysis. 
(Technical  Report  No.  69),.  Urbana  Illinois:  University  of  Illinois,  Centre  for 
the  Study  of  Reading.  (ERIC  Document  Reproduction  SerVicc  No.  ED  153 
205). 
Stein,  N.  &  Glenn,  C.  (1979).  An  analysis  of  story  comprehension  in  elementary 
school  children.  In  R.  Freedle  (Ed.  ),  New  directions  in  discourse  processing: 
Advances  in  discomrse  processes  (Vol.  2),  (pp  53  -120).  Nonvood,  NJ:  A  bi  cx. 
Stem,  J.  A.  (1978).  Eye  movements,  reading,  and  cognition.  In  J.  W.  Senders,  D.  F. 
Fisher,  &  R.  A.  Monty  (Eds.  ),  Eye  movements  and  higher  psychological 
functions.  Hillsdala  Erlbaum. 
-296- Stoefen,  J.  (1981).  Hearing  impaired  children's  reading  comprchension  of  anaphoric 
relationships.  Unpublished  doctoral  thesis,  University  of  Nebmsk-a. 
Strassman,  B.  (1992).  Dcaf  adolescents'  mctacognitivc  knowledge  about  school 
related  reading.  Anwrican  Annals  ofthe  Deaf,  13  7,326-330. 
Stroop,  I  P,  (1935).  Studies  of  interference  in  serial  verbal  reactions.  Journal  of 
Experimental  Psychology,  18,643-662. 
Stuckless,  F-  &  Birch,  1  (1966).  The  influence  of  early  mannual  communication  on 
the  linguistic  development  of  deaf  children.  American  Annals  of  Me  Deaf,  111, 
452-460,499-504. 
Stuckless,  E.  &  Pollard,  G.  (1977).  Processing  of  fingerspelling  and  print  by  deaf 
students.  American  Annals  of  the  Deaf,  122,475-479. 
Taylor,  1.  &  Taylor,  AA  (1983).  The  psychology  of  reading.  New  York,  Academic 
Press. 
Taylor,  S.  8.  (1965).  Eye  movements  while  reading:  Facts  and  fallacies.  American 
EducationalResearch  Journal,  2,187-202. 
Till,  R.  E.,  Mross,  E.  F.,  &  Kintsch,  W.  (1988).  Time  course  of  priming  for 
associate  and  inference  words  in  a  discourse  context.  Memory  and  Cognition, 
16,283-298. 
Tinker,  M.  A.  (1963).  Legibility  oftrint.  Ames,  Iowa:  Iowa  State  University  Press. 
Tinker,  M.  A.  (1965).  Bases  for  effective  reading.  Minneapolis:  University  of 
Minnesota  Press. 
-297- Trabasso,  T,  Nicholas,  D.  W.,  Ornanson,  R.  C.,  &  Johnson,  L.  (1977).  Infcrcnccs  in 
story  comprehension.  Paper  presented  at  the  Symposium  on  the  Devclopmcnt  of 
Discourse  Processing  Skills:  Society  for  Research  in  Child  Development,  New 
Orleans. 
Trabasso,  T.  &  Sperry,  L.  L.  (1985).  Causal  relatedness  and  the  importance  of  story 
events.  Journal  ofMemory  and  Language,  24,595-611. 
Trabasso,  T.  &  Suh,  S.  (1993).  Understanding  text:  Achieving  cxplanat6ry  coherence 
through  on-line  inferences  and  mental  operations  in  working  memory. 
Discourse  Processes,  16,3-34. 
Trabasso,  T.  &  van  den  Broek,  P.  (1985).  Causal  thinking  and  the  representation  of 
narTative  events.  Journal  ofMemory  and  Language,  24,612-630. 
Trevor-Roper,  P.  D.  (1955).  Ophthalmology:  A  textbook  for  diploma  students. 
Chicago:  Year  Book  Publishers. 
Triernan,  R.  A.,  Baron,  J.,  &  Luk,  K.  (1981).  Speech  recoding  in  silent  reading:  A 
comparison  of  Chinese  and  English.  Journal  of  Chinese  Liquisfics,  9,116- 
124. 
Trieman,  R.  A.,  Freyd,  I  J.,  &  Baron,  1  (1983).  Phonological  recoding  and  use  of 
spelling  sound  rules  in  reading  of  sentences.  Journal  of  Verbal  Learning  and 
Verbal  Behaviour,  22,682-700. 
Trieman,  P-  A.  &  Hirsh-Pasek,  K.  (1983).  Silent  reading:  Insights  from  second- 
generation  deaf  readers.  Cognitive  Psychology,  15,39-65. 
Trueswcll,  J.  C.,  Tanenhaus,  A  K.,  &  Gamey,  S.  M.  (1994).  Semantic  influences 
on  parsing:  Use  of  thematic  role  information  in  syntactic  ambiguity  resolution. 
Journal  ofMemory  and  Language,  33,285-318. 
-298- Underwood,  N.  R.  &  McConkie,  G.  W.  (1985).  Perceptual  span  for  letter 
distinctions  during  reading.  Reading  Research  Quarterly,  20,153  -162. 
van  den  Brock,  P.  (1990a).  The  causal  inference  maker.  Towards  a  process  model  of 
inference  generation  in  text  comprehension.  In  D.  A.  Balota,  G.  B.  Flores  d' 
Arcais,  &K  Rayner  (Eds.  ),  Comprehension  processes  in  reading.  Hillsdale, 
NJ:  EFIbaum. 
van  den  Broek,  P.  (1990b).  Causal  inferences  and  the  comprehension  of  narrative 
text.  In  A.  C.  Graesser  &  G.  H.  Bower  (Eds.  ),  The  psychology  of 
learning  and  motivation:  Inferences  and  text  comprehension.  New  York: 
Academic. 
van  den  Broek,  P.  &  Lorch,  R.  F.  (1993).  Network  representations  of  causal  relations 
in  memory  for  narrative  texts:  Evidence  from  primed  recognition.  Discourse 
Processes,  16,75-98. 
van  den  Brock,  P.  &  Trabasso,  T.  (1986).  Causal  networks  versus  goal  hierarchies  in 
summarizing  text.  Discourse  Processes,  9,1-15. 
van  Dijk,  T.  A.  &  Kintsch,  W.  (1983).  Strategies  of  discourse  comprehension.  Ncw 
York-  Academic  Press. 
van  Meter,  P.  &  Pressley,  M.  (1994).  Encoding  of  instruments  when  10-  to  14-year- 
olds  process  isolated  instrument-implicit  sentences:  More  evidence  of  improved 
encoding  during  childhood  resulting  from  elaborative  instructions.  Journal  of 
Educational  Psychology,  86,402-412. 
Vcmon,  M.  &  Koh,  S.  (1970).  Early  manual  communication  and  dcaf  childrcn's 
achimment.  American  Annals  ofthe  Deaf,  115,527-536. 
-299- Wallace,  G.  &  Corballis,  M.  (1973).  Short-term  memory  and  coding  stratcgics  of  the 
deaf.  Journal  of  Experimental  Psychology,  99,334-348. 
Webster,  A,  Wood,  D,  &  Griffiths,  A.  (1981).  Reading  retardation  or  linguistic 
deficit?  1:  Interpreting  reading  test  performance  of  hearing  impaircd  adolcsccnts. 
Journal  ofResearch  in  Reading,  4,136-147. 
Webster,  A.  (1986).  Deafness,  development  and  literacy.  London:  Methuen. 
Wender,  K.  (1989).  Mental  models  for  spatial  knowledge.  In  A.  F.  Bcnnct  &  K.  M. 
McConkey  (Eds.  ),  Cognition  in  individual  and  social  contexts.  Amsterdam: 
North-Holland. 
West,  R.  F.  &  Stanovich,  K  E.  (1982).  Automatic  contextual  facilitation  in  rcadcrs  of 
three  ages.  Child  development,  49,717-727. 
White,  A&  Stevenson,  V.  (1975).  The  effects  of  total  communication,  manual 
communication,  oral  communication  and  reading  on  the  lcýtrning  of  factual 
information  in  residential  school  deaf  children.  American  Annals  of  the  Deaf, 
120,48-57. 
Whitney,  ý.  (1986).  Processing  category  terms  in  context:  Instantiations  as 
inferences.  Memory  and  Cognition,  14,3  9-48. 
Whitney,  P.  &  Kellas,  G.  (1984).  Processing  category  terms  in  context:  Instantiation 
and  structure  of  semantic  categories.  Journal  of  Experimental  Psychology: 
Lea?  ning,  Memory  and  Cognition,  10,95-103. 
Wilbur,  R,  Fraser,  J,  &  Fruchtcr,  A.  (1981).  Comprehension  of  idioms  by  hearing. 
impaired  students.  Paper  presented  at  the  American  Spccch-Languagc-Hcafing 
Association  Convention,  Los  Angeles. 
-300- Wilson,  K,  Karchmer,  M,  &  Jenserna,  C.  (1978).  Litcml  vcrsus  infcrcntial  itcm 
analYsis  of  reading  acheivcment  in  hearing-impaircd  students.  '  In  H  Reynolds  C 
Williams  (Eds),  Proceedings  of  the  Gallaudet  conference  on  reading  in  rclation 
to  deaf. 
Wilson,  K.  (1979).  Inference  and  language  processing  in  hearing  and  deaf  childrcn. 
Unpublished  doctoral  dissertation,  Boston  University. 
Winer,  B.  J.  (1971)'.  Statistical  principles  in  experimental  design.  'Ncw  York: 
McGraw  HII. 
Wolk,  S&  Schildroth,  A.  (1984).  Consistency  of  an  associational  .  stmtcgy  used  on 
reading  comprehension  tests  by  hearing-impaired  students.  Jounial  ofResearch 
in  Reading,  7,135-142. 
Wolverton,.  G.  S.  &  Zola,  D.  (1983).  The  temporal  characteristics  of  visual 
information  extraction  during  reading.  In  K.  Rayncr  (Ed.  ),  Eye  movements  in 
reading:  Perceptual  and  languageprocesses.  New  York:  Academic  Press. 
Wood,  D.  (1980).  A  developmental  psychologist  looks  -  with  teachers  -  at  the 
education  of  deaf  children.  EducationalAnalysis,  2,61-83. 
Wood,  D.  (1984).  The  assessment  of  linguistic  and  intellectual  abilities  of  hearing 
impaired  school  children.  Journal  of  the  Association  of  Educational 
Psychologists,  6,31-39. 
Wood,  D,  Griffiths,  A,  &  Wcbstcr,  A.  (1981).  Rcading  rctardation  or  linguistic 
deficit?  II:  test-answering  strategies  in  hearing  and  hearing-impaircd  school 
children.  Journal  ofResearch  in  Reading,  4,148-157. 
Wood,  D.,  Wood,  H.,  Griffiths,  A.,  &  Howarth,  1.  (1986).  Teaching  and  talking 
with  deafthildren.  Chichestcr  Wilcy. 
-301- Wrightstone,  J,  Aronow,  M,  &  Moskowitz,  S.  (1963).  Dcvcloping  rcading  tcst  norms 
for  deaf  children.  Anwrican  Annals  of  the  Deaf,  108,311-316. 
Yuill,  N.  M.  &  Joscelyne,  T.  (1988).  Effects  of  organisational  cucs  and  strategies  on 
good  and  poor  comprehenders'  story  understanding.  Journal  of  Educational 
Psychology, 
Yuill,  N.  M.  &  Oakhill,  I  V.  (1988).  Effects  of  infcrcncc  awarcncss  training  on  poor 
reading  comprehension.  Applied  Cognitive  Psychology, 
Zwaan,  R.  A.  (1993).  Aspects  of  literary  comprehension:  A  cognitive  approach. 
Philadelphia,  PA:  John  Benjamins. 
Zwaan,  R.  A.  &  van  Oostendorp,  H.  (1993).  Do  rcadcrs  construct  spatial 
representations  in  naturalistic  story  comprehension?  Discourse  Processes,  16, 
125-144. 
-302- AppendiX  Al 
Textual  material  used  In  first  study 
Booklet  1: 
The  man  was  running  down  the  road. 
The  man  tripped  on  the  pavement. 
The  man  broke  his  leg. 
Could  the  man  walk? 
No.  The  man  could  not  walk. 
The  lady  was  hungry. 
The  lady  was  eating  a  sandwich. 
Then  the  lady  had  some  tea. 
Did  the  lady  have  the  tea  before  eating  the  sandwiches? 
No.  She  ate  the  sandwiches  first. 
(iii)  The  ball  was  under  the  chair. 
Frank  put  the  bat  beside  the  ball. 
Then  Frank  went  out  to  play. 
Was  the  bat  under  the  chair? 
(iv)  Joe  was  drinking  a  cup  of  milk. 
Joe  put  the  cup  on  the  table. 
The  cup  was  beside  the  plate. 
Was  the  plate  on  the  table? 
-303- Mother  cooked  the  dinner.  M 
Mother  laid  the  table. 
Then  mother  read  a  book. 
Did  mother  read  the  book  before  laying  the  table? 
(2)  The  cake  was  on  the  table.  (S) 
The  cake  was  on  a  plate. 
Mary  cut  the  cake  with  a  knife. 
Was  the  plate  on  the  table? 
(3)  The  children  were  playing  with  a  ball.  (C) 
John  threw  the  ball  to  Susan. 
The  ball  broke  a  window. 
Did  John  break  the  window? 
The  girl  took  the  cake.  (C) 
Her  inother  was  angry. 
The  cake  was  for  tea. 
Did  mother  eat  the  cake? 
(5)  The  milk-man  dropped  the  bottle.  M 
The  milkman  got  a  brush  and  buckct. 
Then  the  milkman  cleaned  up  the  mess. 
Did  the  milk-man  clean  up  the  mess  before  he  droppcd  the  bottle? 
-304- (6)  The  shirt  was  under  the  bed.  (S) 
The  shoes  were  on  the  shirt. 
The  phirt  was  very  dirty. 
Were  the  shoes  under  the  bed? 
(7)  The  doll  was  in  the  bag.  (S) 
Jenny  was  playing  with  the  toy  cat. 
Jenny  put  the  toy  cat  in  beside  the  doll. 
Was  the  toy  cat  in  the  bag? 
................................................. 
(8)  The  car  crashed  into  the  wall.  M 
The  car  was  badly  smashed. 
Later  the  policeman  came. 
Did  the  car  crash  before  the  policeman  came? 
................................................. 
(9)  The  boy  opened  the  door.  (C) 
The  cat  ran  out. 
His  father  was  cross. 
Did  father  let  the  cat  out? 
Booklet  3: 
The  bread  was  in  the  cupboard.  (S) 
The  butter  was  beside  the  bread. 
The  chccsc  was  on  the  table. 
Was  the  butter  on  the  table? 
-305- Kate  is  very  thirsty.  (C) 
Kate  pours  out  a  glass  of  lemonade. 
Kate  washes  her  glass  when  she  finishes. 
Did  Kate  drink  the  lemonade? 
(12)  James  was  eating  the  apple.  (T) 
James  finished  the  apple. 
Then  James  put  his  book  down. 
Did  James  put  his  book  down  before  eating  the  applc? 
(13)  The  tree  fell  on  the  road. 
The  car  had  to  stop. 
This  made  James  late. 
Was  James  driving  the  car? 
(14)  Mary  and  Tom  were  playing  in  the  garden.  (S) 
Mary  was  looking  for  Tom. 
Tom  ran  behind  a  wall. 
Could  Mary  see  Tom? 
(15)  The  boy  was  playing  football.  M 
The  boy  got  a  goal. 
Then  the  boy  went  home. 
Did  the  boy  get  the  goal  before  going  home? 
(C) 
-306- Mother  had  some  money.  (C) 
All  the  money  fell  out  of  mother's  purse. 
Mother  wanted  to  get  some  fruit. 
Could  mother  pay  for  the  fruit? 
(17)  Ann  was  walking  along  the  street. 
Ann  slipped  on  some  ice. 
Ann  fell  down. 
Did  Ann  fall  down  before  she  slipped? 
Frank  was  cold.  (S) 
Frank  put  on  his  jacket. 
Then  Frank  put  on  his  coat. 
Was  Frank's  coat  over  his  jacket? 
.................................................. 
Booklet  2: 
This  contained  the  first  line  of  each  of  the  texts  in  Booklet  1,  followed  by 
blank  lines  for  subjects  to  complete  the  rest  of  the  story,  cg 
(1)  Mother  cooked  the  dinner. 
etc 
-307- Booklet  4: 
This  was  similar  to  booklet  2,  only  containing  the  first  lines  of  those  texts  in 
Booklet  3,  eg 
(10)  The  bread  was  in  the  cupboard. 
etc 
-308- Appendix  A2 
Instructions  to  teachers  for  the  first  study 
INSTRUCTIONS  TO  THE  TEACHER 
The  directions  below  are  to  be  read  to  the  group  of  children  (or  signed  if  the 
children  are  deaf  and  normally  use  TC). 
The  examples  on  pages  1-4  of  the  first  booklet  should  be  worked  through 
with  the  pupils  to  ensure  that  they  understand  what  is  required.  Any 
difficulties  or  misunderstandings  should  be  explained  at  this  point.  No  help, 
feedback  or  encouragement  should  be  given  except  on  the  sample  items. 
The  pupils  should  be  encouraged  to  write  a  fuller  answer  rather  than  simply 
giving  a  "yes"  or  a  "no".  The  answer  does  not  have  to  be  grammatical  so 
long  as  the  meaning  is  clear, 
eg.  on  item  (3) 
..... 
"The  ball  is  under  the  chair" 
etc. 
ANSWER:  Yes  the  bat  was  under  the  chair. 
OR:  Yes.  Bat  under  chair. 
Allow  one  minute  for  each  page  before  telling  the  children  to  turn  to  each 
new  item. 
DIRECTIONS  TO  PUPILS: 
Have  the  children  complete  the  identification  information  on  the  front  of 
each  booklet.  (There  are  4  booklets  in  all). 
"OPEN  YOUR  BOOK  AT  THE  FIRST  PAGE. 
YOU  WILL  SEE  SOME  SENTENCES  AND  A  BLANK  PAGE  FOR 
YOU  TO  ANSWER  THE  QUESTION.  " 
Read  the  first  paragraph  aloud  (or  sign),  then  say: 
"THE  MAN  TRIPPED  AND  BROKE  HIS  LEG.  SO  THE  MAN  COULD 
NOT  WALK  BECAUSE  HE  BROKE  HIS  LEG.  YOU  SHOULD  WRITE 
YOUR  ANSWER  LIKE  THIS.  " 
Point  to  the  answer  given  in  the  booklet. 
Coach  children  if  there  are  any  misunderstandings  as  to  what  is  required. 
When  everyone  understands  say: 
-309- "NOW  TURN  TO  THE  NEXT  PAGE.  " 
Read  the  paragraph  aloud  then  say: 
"NOW  TURN  TO  THE  NEXT  PAGE.  " 
Read  the  paragraph  aloud  then  say: 
"THE  LADY  WAS  EATING  THE  SANDWICH,  THEN  THE  LADY  HAD 
SOME  TEA.  SO  THE  LADY  DID  NOT  HAVE  THE  TEA  BEFORE 
EATING  THE  SANDWICH.  YOU  SHOULD  WRITE  YOUR  ANSWER 
LIKE  THIS.  " 
Point  to  the  answer  in  the  booklet. 
When  everyone  has  understood  say: 
"TURN  TO  THE  NEXT  PAGE.  TRY  THIS  ONE  BY  YOURSELF.  " 
Use  the  examples  on  pages  3  and  4  in  a  similar  manner  to  that  above. 
After  the  example  on  page  4,  say: 
"THERE  ARE  SOME  MORE  SENTENCES  LIKE  THESE  FOR  YOU 
TO  TRY  ON  YOUR  OWN.  AFTER  A  FEW  PAGES  YOU  WILL  BE 
ASKED  TO  REMEMBER  WHAT  YOU  HAVE  READ.  TURN  TO  THE 
NEXT  PAGE.  ONCE  YOU  HAVE  FINISHED,  WAIT  UNTIL  I  TELL 
YOU  TO  GO  ON.  " 
Allow  the  pupils  to  tackle  each  page,  allowing  one  minute  for  completion. 
After  completion  of  page  13,  collect  in  all  the  booklets,  then  distribute  the 
second  booklet  containing  pages  a-k.  Then  say: 
"HERE  IS  THE  FIRST  SENTENCE  OF  SOME  OF  THE  PAGES  YOU 
HAVE  JUST  READ.  TRY  TO  WRITE  THE  REST  OF  THE  STORY.  " 
Illustrate  by  using  the  two  examples  given  on  pages  a  and  b. 
Again  allow  one  minute  for  completion  of  each  page. 
Once  the  second  booklet  has  been  completed  and  removed,  give  the  third 
booklet  containing  pages  14  to  22.  Then  take  this  booklet  away  and  give 
the  fourth  booklet,  containing  pages  I  to  k,  in  a  manner  to  that  above. 
Make  sure  that  each  child  has  written  his  or  her  name  on  each  of  the  four 
booklets. 
-310- Appendix  A3 
Textual  materials  used  In  the  on-line  and  signing  studies 
IN  THE  SýOP  (Practice  item) 
Tony  was  hungry. 
He  went  into  the  shop. 
He  bought  some  sweets. 
Then  he  went  home. 
Did  Tony  Buy  milk? 
THE  ACCIDENT  (Practice  item) 
There  was  ice  on  the  road. 
Mary  fell  down. 
She  cut  her  knee. 
She  was  crying. 
Was  Mary  hurt? 
IN  THE  PARK  (Practice  item) 
It  was  a  sunny  day. 
Fred  went  for  a  walk. 
He  went  to  the  park. 
He  saw  lots  of  flowers. 
Did  Fred  go  to  the  park? 
-311 
- BEDTIME  (Practice  item) 
William  was  tired. 
It  was  getting  late. 
He  went  to  bed. 
Soon  he  was  asleep. 
Did  William  stay  up? 
THE  CAR  (Practice  item) 
The  car  came  round  the  corner. 
it  was  going  very  fast. 
it  could  not  stop  and  crashed  into  the  wall. 
People  stood  and  watched. 
Did  the  car  hit  the  wall? 
GOING  TO-SCHOOL 
John  was  on  his  way  to  school. 
He  went  by  bus. 
He  was  very  late  getting  to  class.  Explicit 
He  had  to  wait  a  long  time.  Implicit 
His  teacher  was  cross. 
Did  John  arrive  early  at  school? 
-312- IN  CHURCH 
It  was  Sunday. 
Ian  went  to  church. 
After  coming  out,  he  saw  his  sister.  Explicit 
Three  hours  later,  he  saw  his  sister.  Implicit 
She  was  wearing  a  large  hat. 
Did  Ian  see  his  sister  after  leaving  church? 
THE  FUN  FAIR 
Carol  was,  at  the  fun  fair. 
She  went  on  the  big  wheel. 
After  coming  off,  she  smoked  a  cigarette.  Explicit 
An  hour  later,  she  smoked  a  cigarette.  Implicit 
She  was  having  fun. 
Did  Carol  smoke  her  cigarette  on  the  big  wheel? 
SAILING  TO  AMERICA 
Mr  Jones*was  sailing  to  America. 
He  went  onto  the  boat. 
As  the  boat  sailed  away,  he  had  a  drink.  Explicit 
About  three  hours  later,  he  had  a  drink.  Implicit 
He  was  sad  to  be  leaving  home. 
Did  Mr  Jones  have  a  drink  before  the  boat  sailed  away? 
-313- IN  THE  KITCHEN 
The  dog  was  in  the  kitchen. 
It  was  very  hungry. 
It  ate  the  meat  on  the  table. 
It  saw  some  meat  on  the  table. 
Mother  was  angry. 
Was  there  any  meat  left? 
BATHTIME 
it  was  Sunday  night. 
William  was  having  a  bath. 
After  his  bath  he  started  to  sing  loudly. 
Two  houri  later  he  started  to  sing  loudly. 
it  was  his  favourite  song. 
Did  William  sing  after  he  had  his  bath? 
WAITING  AT  THE  BUS  STOP 
Jill  was  waiting  for  a  bus. 
She  saw  it  coming. 
it  was  full. 
The  bus  ran  past. 
She  was  very  annoyed. 







-314- PLAYING  GAMES 
Frank  was  at  his  friend's  house. 
They  played  games. 
After  he  went  home,  he  drank  some  lemonade.  Explicit 
About  five  hours  later,  he  drank  some  lemonade.  Implicit 
He  was  very  thirsty. 
Did  Frank  drink  the  lemonade  at  his  friend's  house? 
HORSE  RIDING 
A  noise  frightened  the  horse. 
Andrew  fell  from  the  horse. 
He  was  very  dirty.  Explicit 
He  landed  in  mud.  Implicit 
The  horse  ran  awaY. 
Was  Andrew  clean? 
THE  TELEVISION 
The  television  broke  down. 
The  repair  man  came  to  the  house. 
After  he  left,  mother  made  a  cup  of  tea.  Expliqit 
Three  hours  later,  mother  made  a  cup  of  tea.  Implicit 
There  were  biscuits  and  cakes. 
Did  the  repair  man  have  a  cup  of  tea? 
-315- IN  THE  KITCHEN 
Mary  was  cutting  bread. 
She  was  making  sandwiches. 
She  cut  herself  badly.  Explicit 
The  knife  slipped  suddenly.  Implicit 
She  managed  to  finish  the  job. 
Did  Mary  get  hurt? 
FOOTBALL 
James  went  to  the  football  match. 
It  was  a  dood  game. 
After  the  game  he  saw  his  sister. 
Three  hours  later  he  saw  his  sister. 
He  kissed  her. 
Did  James  kiss  his  sister  after  the  game? 
INLONDON 
Joe  went  to  London. 
He  traveliqd  all  daY. 
The  car  stopped  outside  the  hotel.  Explicit 
He  parked  just  outside  the  hotel.  Implicit 
It  was  getting  dark. 
Was  the  car  far  away? 
-316- AT  THE  SEASIDE 
Michael  was  on  holiday. 
He  went  for  a  swim  in  the  sea. 
After  his  swim,  he  shouted  to  his  friends.  Explicit 
Two  hours  later,  he  shouted  to  his  friends.  Implicit 
They  waved  to  him. 
Did  Michael  shout  to  his  friends  before  going  into  the  sea? 
THE  TRAIN 
John  was  coming  back  from  school. 
He  took  the  train  home. 
Getting  off  the  train,  it  got  very  warm.  Explicit 
About  two  hours  later,  it  got  very  warm.  Implicit 
He  boughý  some  ice-cream. 
Did  John  buy  ice-cream  after  getting  off  the  train? 
THE  DANCE 
Alice  went  to  a  dance. 
it  was  great  fun. 
After  the  dance,  she  met  her  friend.  Explicit 
Five  hours  later,  she  met  her  friend.  Implicit 
They  talked  about  school. 
Did  Alice  meet  her  friend  after  the  dance? 
-317- A  WINTER'S  DAY 
David  was  skating  on  the  frozen  pond. 
The  ice  was  very  thin. 
The  ice  cracked  and  he  fell  into  the  water.  Explicit 
He  was  far  too  heavy  for  the  thin  ice.  Implicit 
He  shouted  for  help. 
Did  the  ice  break? 
THE  DRESS 
The  purse  was  hanging  out  of  mother's  bag. 
She  was  looking  at  some  clothes. 
A  thief  took  her  purse.  Explicit 
A  thief  stood  behind  her.  Implicit 
She  wanted  to  get  a  dress. 
Was  mother's  purse  stolen? 
THE  SHOP  WINDOW 
Alan  walked  along  the  street. 
He  looked  in  a  shop  window. 
After  he  went  home,  a  car  crashed  into  the  shop. 
About  thirty  minutes  later,  a  car  crashed  into  the  shop. 
The  car  was  badly  damaged. 
Did  Alan  see  the  crash? 
-318- IN  A  FIELD 
Alan  crossed  the  field. 
It  had  been  raining. 
When  he  came  home,  his  shoes  were  wet  and  dirty.  Explicit 
When  he  came  home,  he  left  dirty  marks  on  the  carpet.  Implicit 
He  went  straight  to  his  room. 
Were  Alan's  shoes  covered  in  mud? 
THE  RAILWAY  STATION 
Margaret  was  in  the  railway  station. 
She  got  on  the  train. 
As  it  moved  away,  she  read  a  book. 
Half  an  hour  later,  she  read  a  book. 
She  was  going  to  London. 
Was  the  train  moving  when  Margaret  read  her  book? 
THE  LETTER 
Catherine  sat  down  at  the  table. 
She  was  writing  to  her  uncle. 
She  finished  the  letter  and  had  a  cup  of  tea.  Explicit 
About  an  hour  later  she  had  a  cup  of  tea.  Implicit 
The  tea  was  hot. 
Did  Catherine  have  tea  before  finishing  the  letter? 
-319- THE  SWIMMING  BATHS 
Jim  was  on  holiday. 
He  went  to  the  swimming  baths. 
He  dived  from  the  edge  into  the  water.  Explicit 
He  dived  from  the  edge  of  the  pool.  Implicit 
He  was  enjoying  himself. 
Did  Jim  get  wet? 
THE  CINEMA 
Jane  went  to  the  cinema. 
She  saw  a  good  film. 
After  going  home,  she  ate  some  crisps.  Explicit 
Five  hours  later,  she  ate  some  crisps.  Implicit 
They  were  very  salty. 
Did  Jane  eat  the  crisps  in  the  cinema? 
DINNER 
Ann  was  6ngry. 
She  had  her  dinner. 
She  had  some  chicken.  Explicit 
The  chicken  was  tasty.  Implicit 
She  washed  the  dishes. 
Did  Ann  eat  the  chicken? 
-320- A  DAY  IN  THE  COUNTRY 
Tom  was  driving  in  the  country. 
The  car  stopped  suddenly. 
He  noticed  that  the  petrol  tank  was  empty. 
He  took  an  empty  can  to  the  garage. 
He  was  vross  about  all  this. 
bid  the  car  run  out  of  petrol? 
CLEANING  THE  WINDOWS 
Denis  fell  off  the  ladder. 
His  mother  phoned  for  help. 
The  ambulance  rushed  off  to  hospital. 
The  ambulance  rushed  along  the  road. 
Mother  followed  in  her  car. 
Did  Denis  go  to  hospital? 
GOING  HOME 
Martin  left  to  catch  his  bus. 
He  ran  down  the  street. 
He  just  missed  the  bus. 
He  was  jdst  too  late. 
It  started  to  rain. 







-321- THE  CAFE 
Mary  went  into  the  cafe. 
She  had  a  cup  of  tea. 
She  left  the  cafe  and  smoked  a  cigarette.  Explicit 
About  an  hour  later  she  smoked  a  cigarette.  Implicit 
She  was  wearimg  a  red  coat. 
Did  Mary  smoke  the  cigarette  in  the  cafe? 
SHOPPING 
Frank  came  out  of  the  shop. 
It  started  to  rain. 
He  did  not  have  an  umbrella  and  got  all  wet.  Explicit 
He  did  not  have  an  umbrella  and  had  to  run.  Implicit 
He  hurried  all  the  way  home. 
Did  Frank  stay  dry? 
-322- A1212endix  A4 
VCR  Program  for  Signing  Study 
10REM  FILE  "VCRPROG" 
20REM  0  F.  Shoveller. 
30REM  FLOWCHART 
40REM  SETUP  &  LOAD  PREVIOUS  DATA 
50REM  WA  IT  FOR  TONE  FROM  V.  C.  R. 
60REM  DETECT  TONE  GIVE  AUDIO 
70REM  SET  TIME=0  START  CLOCK 
80REM  WAIT  FOR  KEY  PRESS 
90REM  IF  KEY  NOT  PRESSED  (I  5s)  LOOP 
I  OOREM  TIMEOUT  GIVE  AUDIO.  LOOP  50 
11  OREM  STORE  TIME  TO  KEY  PRESS 
120REM  GIVE  AUDIO.  DISPLA,  YON  MONITOR 
130REM  CHECK  ANSWER 
140REM  FLAG  ANSWER  IF  WRONG  "-TIME" 
15OREM  STORE  TIME  (&  ANSWER) 
16OREM  QUESTION  NO.  IN  DATA  STATEMENT 
170REM  DO  A  VERAGES  ON  CORRECT&  STORE 
180REM  LOOP50 
190REM  REMEMBER  TO  BACKUP  REGULARLY. 
200: 
21OREM  START 
220MODE7 
230VDU23,1,0;  0;  0;  0; 
240PR0Clnit:  PROCinit2 
25OPROCignore 
260PROCget 




31  OREPEAT:  T=TIME/1  O0:  PRINTTAI3(31,13);  T-.  O3;  " 




-323- 350  PRINT'H$ 
360PRINT"'Waiting  on  cue  tone  from  V.  C.  R.  " 
370REM  ADVAL(1)>2000  ?  NOISE  INHIBIT 
380REM  TEST 
390REM  IFGET:  TIME=O:  GOT0410 
400  REPEAT:  UNTI  LADVAL(l  )>  20  00:  TIM  E=O 
41OVDU7:  PRINT"'B82Cue  Detected" 
420PRINT"'Clock  zeroed  and  running.  " 
430PRINT"'Waiting  on  answer  key  press.  " 
440PRINT'  "Elapsed  time  to  answer  (Secs) 
45OREM  TEST 
46OREM  PROCtest:  GOTO480 
470REPEAT:  T=TIME/1  00:  X=(ADVAL(O)  AND 
3):  PRINTTAB(31,13);  T-.  O3;  #1  ":  UNTIL  X>O  ORT-.  02>15 
480IFT-.  02>15  PRINT"'B86TIMEOUT":  GOT0510 
490VDU7:  PRINT"'B81  Key  Detected" 
50OREM  X=  1  =YES  2=NO,  T>  1  5s=timeout 
510ENDPROC 
520: 
530DEFPROC!  nit 
540NO/o=O:  X"ý/ý=O:  Y`ý/`0:  X=O.  T=O 




590REM  GROUPS  OF  15,40  QUESTIONS 
60OREM  WRONG  ANSWERS..  -VALUES 
61  OREM  OPEN  CHANNEL  0  ONLY 
620CLOSE#0 
630*FX1  6j1 
6  40  PRINT"  "WHICH  TAPE?  1  or  2":  W%=GET 
650REM  R%=Data  set  EDIT  IF  REN. 
660REM  W%=WHICH? 
6701FW%=49  THEN  D$="TAPE1  "  ELSE  D$="TAPE2" 
680PRINT';  D$;  "  SELECTED" 
690PRINT"'Loading  data  for  ";  D$;  .....  WAIT.  " 
700X=OPENIN  D$ 
71  OFOR  Y%=O  TO  30:  FOR  X0/6=0  TO  40 
720INPUT#X,  A(X%,  Y%) 
730NEXT:  NEXT 
740CLOSE#X 




790PRINT"'WHICH  PUPIL?  (D)eaf  or  (C)ontrol  ? 
";:  F10/6=GET:  PRINT""  FINDING  NEXT  RECORD" 
80OREM  SELECT  CORRECT  HALF  OF  ARRAY 
81OREM  i.  e.  Deaf  or  Control 
8201FP%=68  FORN%=  1  TO  1  5:  IF  A(1,  N%)=99 
Yo/o=NO/o:  H$="DeafB83"+STR$(YO/o)+"using"+D$:  N%=1  5 
8301FP%=68  NEXT 
8401FPI,  Yo=67  FORNV6=1  6  TO  301F  A(1,  N%)=99 
Y,  Yo=N%:  H$="ControIB83"+STR$(YO/o-1  5)+"using 
"+D$.  NP/cr--30 
8501FP%=67  NEXT 
860PRINT'H$ 




91  OREM  IGNORE  1  st.  5 
920FOR  N%=1  TO  5:  CLS 







1  OOOIF  D$="TAPE1  "  THEN  RESTORE1  290  ELSE  RESTORE1  310 
10  1  OFOR  N%=  6  TO  45:  CLS 
1020READA% 
10301FAO/o--999:  N%=45:  NEXT:  PROCsave:  ENDPROC 
104OX0/6=N%-5:  PRINT"'Logging  data  on  question";  N% 
1  OSOPROCtone 
10601F  T>  15  A(X%,  Y%)=O:  GOT01  100 
10  70T=T-.  0  3:  REM"  883  CORRECTION  FACTOR 
10801FA%=X  THEN  PRINT`Correct";:  A(X%,  Y%)=T 
ELSEPRINT"'Wrong";:  A(X%,  Y%)=-T 
1090PRINT"answer  given  in";  T;  "Secs.  " 
11  OOPROCdelay:  NEXT:  ENDPROC 
-325- 1110: 
11  20DEFPROCdelay 
11  30T=TIME:  REPEAT:  UNTILTIME-T>300:  ENDPROC 
1140: 
11  50DEFPROCsave:  CLS 
11  60PRINT"'Saving  data  to  disc.  " 
11  70PRINT"'Do  NOT  touch  keyboard!!  " 
11  80X=OPENOUT  D$ 
11  90FOR  Y/o--O  TO  30:  FOR  X%=O  TO  40 
1200PRINT#X,  A(X9/o,  Y%) 
121  ONEXT:  NEXT:  CLOSE#X:  PRINT"'  Data 
saved  .....  BACKUP?  ":  PROCde  lay:  ENDPROC 
1220: 
1230DEFPROCreset 
1240CLS:  PRINT"'IF  YOU  ONLY  REQUIRE  ANOTHER  RUN, 
REWIND  TAPE  AND  PRESS  ANY  KEY  WHEN  READY.  ":  IFGET 
1250ENDPROC 
1260: 
1270REM  1  =YES  2=NO 
1280REM  TAPE  1 
1290DATA 
-326- Api2endix  A5 
Textual  materials  for  the  verb  study 
The  first  four  passages  are  practice  items. 
The  experimental  passages  are  presented  in  the  following  form: 
First  sentence. 
Second  sentence:  Instrument  stated  /  unstated  form 
Third  sentence:  Noun  form  /pronoun  form 
Question:  Affirmative  response/  negative  response 
Susan  went  to  her  desk. 
She  looked  at  the  book.  Practice  item 
The  book  was  interesting. 
Was  there  a  book  on  the  desk? 
Simon  was  fixing  the  roof. 
He  went  up  a  ladder.  Practice  item 
The  ladder  was  against  the  wall. 
Did  Simon  stand  on  a  box? 
Peter  was  a  good  artist. 
He  was  painting  a  new  picture.  Practice  item 
The  brush  was  not  very  good. 
Was  Peter  using  a  pencil? 
-327- Marie  was  now  a  big  girl. 
She  was  the  same  height  as  her  brother.  Practice  item 
She  was  six  feet  tall. 
Was  Marie  tall? 
David  was  in  the  pool. 
He  moved  through  the  water.  /  He  swam  to  the  edge. 
The  water  was  deep.  /  It  was  very  deep. 
Was  David  in  the  water  /  on  the  ground? 
Jill  was  very  hungry. 
She  took  all  the  food.  /  She  ate  every  last  crumb. 
The  food  was  tasty.  /  It  was  very  tasty. 
Did  Jill  eat  food  /  nothing? 
William  sat  down. 
He  did  up  his  face.  /  He  tied  his  shoe. 
The  face  had  come  undone.  /  It  had  come  undone  again. 
Had  the  face  been  loose  /  tight? 
Peter  was  in  the  garden. 
He  was  using  a  spade.  /  He  was  digging  up  some  flowers. 
The  spade  was  heavy.  It  was  very  heavy. 
Was  Peter  using  a  spade  /  hammer? 
Susan  was  in  the  country. 
She  pointed  the  gun  at  some  rabbits.  /  She  tried  to  shoot  some  rabbits. 
The  gun  was  old.  /  It  was  very  old. 
Did  Susan  use  a  gun  /  knife? 
-328- Simon  got  out  of  bed. 
He  used  his  toothbrush.  /  He  cleaned  his  teeth. 
The  toothbrush  was  green.  /  It  was  bright  green. 
Did  Simon  use  a  toothbrush  /  cloth? 
Tom  was  going  to  London. 
He  was  taking  his  car.  /  He  was  driving  there. 
The  car  had  been  fixed.  /  It  had  just  been  fixed. 
Did  Tom  go  to  London  by  car  /  train? 
Jim  went  to  the  hairdressers. 
The  lady  used  her  scissors.  /  The  lady  cut  his  hair. 
The  scissors  were  sharp.  They  were  very  sharp. 
Did  the  lady  use  her  scissors  /a  razor? 
Frank  was  out  for  a  walk. 
The  pond  was  covered  with  ice.  /  The  pond  had  frozen  over. 
The  ice  was  thin.  /  It  was  very  thin. 
Was  the  pond  covered  by  ice? 
Andrew  was  on  holiday. 
He  used  his  new  camera.  /  He  photographed  his  friends. 
The  camera  was  a  present.  It  was  a  new  present. 
Did  Andrew  have  a  camera  telescope? 
Martin  was  on  his  way  to  school. 
He  put  some  letters  in  the  postbox.  /  He  posted  some  letters  to  his  friends. 
The  postbox  was  painted  red.  /  It  was  painted  bright  red. 
Were  the  letters  in  the  postbox  /  litterbin? 
-329- Sally  went  to  the  stables. 
She  got  on  a  horse.  /  She  was  going  to  ride  home. 
The  horse  was  young.  It  was  very  young. 
Was  Sally  on  a  horse  bike? 
Mother  was  in  the  kitchen. 
She  put  some  cakes  in  the  oven.  /  She  was  baking  some  cakes. 
The  oven  was  hot.  /  It  was  very  hot. 
Were  the  cakes  in  the  oven  /  cupboard? 
Jack  was  enjoying  himself. 
He  liked  it  on  the  boat.  /  He  liked  to  go  sailing. 
The  boat  was  big.  /  It  was  very  big. 
Was  Jack  on  a  boat  /  bus? 
Mary  was  going  shopping. 
She  put  the  clothes  on  the  baby.  /  She  dressed  the  baby. 
The  clothes  were  made  of  blue  wool.  /  They  were  made  of  soft  blue  wool. 
Did  the  baby  have  blue  clothes? 
Anne  was  in  the  cafe. 
She  had  a  cigarette.  /  She  was  smoking. 
The  cigarette  was  in  the  ashtray.  /  It  was  lying  in  the  ashtray. 
Did  Anne  have  a  cigarette  /  pipe? 
Elizabeth  went  to  the  cinema. 
She  paid  her  money.  /  She  bought  a  ticket. 
The  ticket  was  for  the  balcony.  It  was  for  a  balcony  seat. 
Did  the  ticket  cost  money? 
-330- Ian  went  home  after  school. 
He  put  his  keys  in  the  door.  /  He  unlocked  the  door. 
His  keys  got  stuck.  /  But  they  got  stuck. 
Did  Ian  use  his  keys?  /  Did  Ian  ring  the  bell? 
Jane  went  to  America. 
She  went  by  areoplane  last  week.  /  She  flew  there  last  week. 
The  plane  was  fast.  /  It  was  very  fast. 
Did  Jane  go  to  America  by  plane  /  boat? 
Margaret  sat  down  at  the  table. 
She  used  her  spoon.  /  She  stirred  the  tea. 
The  spoon  was  shiny.  /  It  was  very  shiny. 
Did  Margaret  use  a  spoon? 
-331- ARpendix  A6 
Calibration  of  the  Purklnle  ual  Image 
Generation  5.5  Eyetracker 
Tracker  Position  and  Beam  Alignment: 
Turn  Power  and  Servo  on.  it  is  worth  leaving  the  Servo  on  for  5-10  minutes  to 
warm  up.  Before  turning  the  main  Power  on,  make  sure  that  the  servo  switch  is  off. 
Similarly,  after  tracking  always  ensure  that  Servo  is  off  before  switching  power 
off. 
When  the  subject  is  in  position,  still,  and  fixating  on  the  fixation  point,  the  task  is 
to  Centre  the  Infra  red  beam  in  the  pupil  plane  of  the  subject's  eye.  When  it  is  in 
that  plane,  turning  Set  Up/Track  on  should  result  in  a  lock.  The  beam  locks  onto 
two  of  the  four  purkinle  Images  that  are  formed  as  the  light  source  passes  through 
the  eye.  The  first  purkinje  image  is  a  virtual  image  formed  by  the  cornea.  It  is  up  to 
two  hundred  times  more  intense  than  the  fourth  image  which  is  formed  by  the 
posterior  surface  of  the  lens  (the  second  and  third  purkinje  images  are  not  needed 
for  tracking).  It  is  by  monitoring  the  relative  positions  of  the  first  and  fourth 
images  that  eyernovements  can  be  tracked  accurately. 
Aligning  the  beam  is  achieved  by  moving  the  tracker  housing.  It  is  set  up  on  motors 
and  these  are  controlled  via  three  switches  on  the  front  panel:  in/out,  up/down, 
and  leftfright.  This  task  is  made  easier  by  viewing  the  video  picture  of  the  subject's 
eye  (via  a  small  infra  red  camera  situated  on  the  housing).  The  video  picture  is 
split  in  two.  The  left  half  gives  a  side  view  of  the  right  eye,  and  the  right  half  a  front 
view  (only  movements  of  the  right  eye  are  tracked). 
First,  align  the  in/out  dimension.  Monitoring  the  left  hand  side  of  the  screen,  flick 
the  in/out  switch  until  the  surface  of  the  eye  is  level  with  the  alignment  mark  on 
the  screen.  Altering  the  in/out  dimension  will  move  the  position  of  the  diachrole 
mirror  to  about  3/4  of  an  inch  from  the  subject's  eye.  This  mirror  reflects  the  beam 
onto  the  eye  at  an  angle  of  30  degrees:  it  is  transparent,  so  subjects  are  not  aware  of 
its  presence  while  focusing  on  the  fixation  point  and  subsequent  text. 
When  the  surface  is  level  with  the  alignment  mark,  use  the  up/down  and  left/right 
switches  to  Centre  the  beam  on  those  dimensions.  The  right  half  of  the  video  screen 
is  most  helpful  at  this  stage.  The  beam  will  appear  as  a  green  spot  over  the  subject's 
eye.  When  the  three  dimensions  are  centred,  both  the  first  and  fourth  purkinje 
images  should  be  visible  as  small  specks  of  light  over  the  pupil.  Now  put  the  Set 
Up/Track  on.  If  the  beam  has  been  accurately  centred,  a  lock  should  be  obtained 
immediately.  System  lock  is  signalled  by  a  bank  of  lights  on  the  front  panel 
changing  from  red  to  green.  If  there  is  no  Immediate  lock,  adjust  on  the  three 
dimensions  in  the  usual  manner  (usually  a  small  change  to  the  up/down  or 
left/right  is  all  that  is  needed). 
When  a  lock  is  obtained,  each  of  the  three  dimensions  has  to  be  fine-tuned.  Fine- 
tune  the  in/out  first.  Turn  the  dial  in  the  Centre  of  the  control  panel  to  A  1.  Now  the 
LED  read-out  refers  to  this  dimension,  and  it  has  to  be  set  to  zero  (it  will  usually 
vary  between  about  -5  and  +5  in  the  first  instance).  Flicking  the  in/out  switch 
-332- will  decrease  or  increase  the  level.  Any  value  between  -1  and  +1  Is  acceptable. 
When  this  dimension  is  zeroed,  turn  the  Focus  Centre  switch  on. 
Zero  the  up/down  and  left/right  dimensions  in  the  same  manner.  The  corresponding 
dial  positions  are  VI  (vertical)  and  HI  (horizontal).  When  this  Is  complete,  an 
automatic  alignment  algorithm  is  used  th  centre  the  position  of  the  fourth  detector. 
Turn  the  dial  to  cIH  and  pull  the  4th  detector  auto  position  switch.  Release  the 
switch  when  the  whirring  noise  discontinues.  Perform  the  same  procedure  with  the 
dial  at  cN.  Both  these  parameters  should  now  be  zeroed  (anything  less  than  0.5  is 
acceptable).  Their  values  are  also  displayed  on  the  LED  read  out.  Finally,  check  that 
the  light  level  on  the  fourth  image  is  set.  Select  the  4LL  dial  position  and  use  the 
rotary  pot  to  settle  the  LED  read-out  at  (approximately)  5.0. 
Although  beam  alignment  involves  a  number  of  sub-procedures,  in  practice  all  of 
these  stages  can  be  performed  quite  quickly  (providing  the  subject  is  still  and 
trackable).  It  is  worth  learning  to  align  the  beam  quite  fast  since  during  this  stage 
subjects  are  left  looking  at  a  single  fixation  point  and  are  more  prone  to  extended 
blinks. 
Callbratlon: 
The  purpose  of  the  calibration  is  to  test  the  accuracy  of  the  lock  obtained.  When  all 
the  beam  alignment  is  complete,  hit  any  key  on  the  keyboard  and  the  subject  will  be 
cued  to  start  the  calibration.  A  single  flashing  cross  will  appear  on  the  main  screen. 
When  they  are  looking  directly  at  this  cross,  they  press  the  left-hand  pace 
(response)  key,  and  within  a  short  space  of  time  the  cross  moves  to  a  different 
screen  position.  When  they  have  re-fixated  it,  pressing  the  key  again  has  the  same 
effect. 
There  are  about  a  dozen  successive  crosses  to  be  fixated.  After  the  final  cross,  the 
slave  screen  (le  the  screen  linked  to  the  computer  which  is  running  the 
experiment)  displays  two  banks  of  x  and  y  coordinates:  the  left-hand  bank  gives  the 
tracker  readout  of  eye-position  as  the  pace  key  was  hit  on  each  occasion;  the 
right-hand  bank  gives  the  actual  on-screen  position  of  the  crosses.  Providing  the 
tracker  is  aligned  accurately  and  the  subject  is  hitting  the  key  while  fixating 
directly  on  the  crosses,  these  banks  of  coordinates  should  be  almost  identical.  If 
there  are  marked  discrepancies,  check  to  see  if  they  occur  in  a  particular  part  of 
the  visual  field  (eg  all  low  x  coordinate  inaccuracies)  or  ask  the  subject  to  perform 
the  calibration  again  stressing  the  importance  of  looking  directly  at  the  cross  as 
they  hit  the  key. 
There  is  no  time  constraint  in  calibration.  However,  some  subjects  seem  to  move 
from  cross  to  cross  as  fast  as  they  can.  If  subjects  calibrate  poorly,  ask  them  to 
repeat  the  procedure  with  less  haste.  If  a  second  calibration  is  inaccurate,  It 
suggests  a  deeper  problem  in  beam  alignment.  Perhaps  the  subject  has  moved 
unintentionally,  or  there  is  some  interference  from  eyelashes. 
When  the  subject  is  calibrated,  press  'c'  to  commence  the  reading  phase.  If  anything 
goes  wrong  during  the  reading  and  the  procedure  has  to  be  stopped,  always  re- 
calibrate  after  setting  the  subject  up  again.  Similarly,  after  each  break  in  the 
reading,  re-align  and  re-calibrate  in  the  usual  fashion. 
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